Shawbrook Bank Limited · DRN-6259816

The complaint Mrs D’s complaint is, in essence, that Shawbrook Bank Limited (the ‘Lender’) acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with her under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the ‘CCA’) and (2) deciding against paying claims under Section 75 of the CCA. What happened Mrs D was an existing member of a timeshare arrangement from a timeshare provider (the ‘Supplier’) having bought a number of different products from it over time. The products bought by Mrs D from the Supplier and mentioned in this decision are the following: • Vacation Club – this was a points-based membership, not asset backed. • FPOC1 – the Supplier’s first version of a ‘fractional’ points-based membership which was asset-backed. • FPOC2 – the Supplier’s second ‘fractional’ membership, also asset-backed. • Signature Suites/Signature Collection – similar to FPOC1 and 2, but sold as being more luxurious and better appointed, and offered guaranteed availability in the suite on a set week. This was also asset backed. • Holiday Owners Club – a points-based membership NOT asset backed. The product at the centre of this complaint is Mrs D’s purchase of an FPOC2 (which I shall refer to as the ‘Fractional Club’) membership on 9 September 2015 (the ‘Time of Sale’). She entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,990 fractional points at a cost of £30,476 (the ‘Purchase Agreement’) but after trading in some of her existing fractional points she ended up paying £6,868 for the Fractional Club membership. As I’ve said, Fractional Club membership (like the FPOC1 and Signature memberships) was asset backed – which meant it gave Mrs D more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the ‘Allocated Property’) after their membership term ends. Mrs D paid for her Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £6,868 from the Lender (the ‘Credit Agreement’). Following her purchase of the Fractional Club, Mrs D went on to make a further purchase of 1,070 fractional points in a Signature Collection membership in 2018, and 3,330 points in the Holiday Owners Club in 2019. Mrs D – using a professional representative (the ‘PR’) – wrote to the Lender on 16 August 2021 (the ‘Letter of Complaint’) to raise a number of different concerns about her Fractional Club membership and the associated Credit Agreement. As those concerns haven’t changed

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since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn’t necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above. The Lender did not provide Mrs D with a substantive response to her complaint within the eight weeks required by the regulator, so she referred her complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, rejected the complaint on its merits. The Investigator didn’t think Mrs D’s credit relationship with the Lender had been rendered unfair, and didn’t think her claim under Section 75 of the CCA was valid as the purchase price of the product at the centre of the complaint was in excess of the £30,000 upper limit required for claims. Mrs D disagreed with the Investigator’s assessment and asked for an Ombudsman’s decision – which is why it was passed to me. The provisional decision I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the ‘PD’) setting out my initial thoughts on the merits of Mrs D’s complaint. In the PD I said: “I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld. However, before I explain why, I want to make it clear that my role as an Ombudsman is not to address every single point that has been made to date. Instead, it is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. So, if I have not commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, that does not mean I have not considered it. As I’ve said, Mrs D originally made a complaint to the Lender that, for various reasons, it had participated in and perpetuated an unfair credit relationship with her under Section 140A of the CCA. She also made a claim to the Lender under Section 75 of the CCA, which the Lender did not accept and pay. Mrs D’s complaint to this Service was of an unfair credit relationship (under s.140A CCA) and that the Lender was unfair in not accepting her Section 75 claim. The PR disagreed with the Investigator’s view, but only in relation to the allegation of an unfair credit relationship under Section 140A of the CCA which had been caused by an alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare, Holiday Products, Resale and Exchange Contracts Regulations 2010 (the ‘Timeshare Regulations’). It did not disagree with the Investigator’s view on the other aspects of the sale and the contract that were originally cited as causing an unfairness, nor what he had said about the validity of Mrs D’s claim under Section 75 of the CCA. As those aspects of her complaint no longer seem to be in dispute, I shall concentrate my provisional findings on the alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, and whether this caused Mrs D’s credit relationship with the Lender to be unfair to her. I will also address the PR’s original concerns about the commission arrangements in place between the Lender and the Supplier.

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Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs D and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at: 1. The standard of the Supplier’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material; 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier; 3. The commission arrangements in place at the Time of Sale; 4. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; and 5. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances. I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs D and the Lender. The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mrs D’s Fractional Club membership met the definition of a “timeshare contract” and was a “regulated contract” for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations. Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling membership of the Fractional Club as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale: “A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.” But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale. So, that is what I have considered next. The term “investment” is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. In Shawbrook & BPF v FOS1, the parties agreed that, by reference to the decided authorities, “an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit” at [56]. I will use the same definition. A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs D the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what she first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn’t prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se. 1 R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin)

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In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mrs D as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to her as an investment, i.e. told her or led her to believe that Fractional Club membership offered her the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. And there is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs D, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them. But on the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it’s equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mrs D as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3). However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it’s not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision. If the Fractional Club was sold to her as an investment, would the credit relationship between Mrs D and the Lender have been rendered unfair? Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach (if there was one) had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs D and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement, as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. Indeed, it seems to me that if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs D and the Lender that was unfair to her and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) led her to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration. But on my reading of the evidence before me, the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was not an important and motivating factor when Mrs D decided to go ahead with her purchase. I am simply not persuaded, by the evidence that has been submitted, that that was the case. I’ll explain. As I’ve said, Mrs D had made multiple purchases of various types of timeshare membership from the Supplier, from her first trial membership in 2010, up until her last purchase of a Holiday Owners Club membership in 2019. So, I think it is safe to assume that Mrs D was/is interested in holidays, and specifically the type of holiday that the Supplier provides.

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As part of its submissions to this Service, the PR sent in a statement from Mrs D. This set out her recollections of her purchases from the Supplier. Her first ‘fractional’ membership (FPOC1) was made on 7 November 2011. She bought 3,632 fractional points, and after trading in her Vacation Club points she ended up paying £21,000 – she paid this amount in cash over two instalments. As far as her recollections of this purchase are concerned, she said in her statement: “On 7th November 2011 we had a phone call from [the Supplier’s representative] who said he had some interesting and exciting news for us about our membership, and also he had the latest brochure to give us with all the updated listings etc. […] We went to the Sales Office expecting to be given our new brochure but instead were shown to a table with a computer. [redacted] uploaded our membership details and told us what holidays we had taken recently and what we had booked for the future (although I already knew this and could have told him without having to look at a computer screen). He asked us if we had encountered any problems and I said that availability was always a problem and he said he might just have the answer to that. He asked us if we had heard of Fractional Points and we said 'NO'. At this stage there was still no mention that they would be trying to sell me another product and I kept asking when could I see the new brochure I had been promised. [redacted] explained the idea of Fractional Points to us and said that basically the points we owned were becoming worthless and that the members wanted more of an investment for their money. Fractional points, he said, meant that instead of just owning points we would own a share in "bricks and mortar", and that not only would it give us the ability to use our points worldwide but as an investment we would get back a share of the property when it was sold. Towards the end of the "sales pitch" another man, presumably his manager, joined us and also added his input, which added to the pressure I was already starting to feel. The "manager" said, it was the new way forward and members were finding it a really exciting concept. [My husband] was quite excited about owning a share in a [Supplier] property but I must admit, I was a bit more dubious especially since [redacted] kept evading my question as to how much this was all going to cost as we were still paying off the loan for our Vacation Club Membership, which we were now being told was becoming worthless. Also during these discussions other reps kept interrupting and telling us we were so lucky to be there as the Fractions were selling like 'hot cakes' and we would be silly to miss such an exciting opportunity. I asked [redacted] how much this was all going to cost and he said not as much as we would think because we could 'trade in' what we already owned, which would be more than half the cost and then he called over his manager who explained that we would be getting four weeks of Fractional Rights in a property at Marina Dorada plus further points to use on holidays. We still were not given any paperwork outlining costs etc. and I explained that because of [my husband]'s operation we had not been able to use the points we already had. [redacted] said we were such valued members and he sympathised with [my husband]'s predicament regarding his operation etc. so he would see if he could arrange a special deal whereby we had 3,632 points plus a credit of all the points we had not used with our membership so far. This was to be a special deal for us alone apparently. By now we had been there for nearly four hours and we only then found out that even with the trade in deal etc. we still had to pay £21,000 which we had to pay in two

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instalments, £10,500 by the 31st of December 2011 and £10,500 by the 31st of January 2012. The maintenance charge for 2012 would be £1,596. We were also told that [the Supplier]’s Fractional was a great investment that we could sell at any time but that we would be stupid to sell it before the end of the term and if [the Supplier] sold it, we would make a much better profit. […] I still kept asking questions such as "what if the property did not sell", "how much would we get back", but we were assured that it was a brilliant opportunity to own a share in a property that could only increase in value. By now I was feeling so stressed and I could not think straight, let alone make a reasoned decision and so I left the decision to my husband and he eventually agreed. I remember it was so late by now that we were the only clients left in the building and whilst we were signing paperwork, most of the reps were leaving or had already left. We signed the contract with agreement number 652015/3013104 for 3,632 points which entitles 4 weeks in allocated property MD269 at resort Marina Dorada. The purchase price was £53,513 but as mentioned previously by trading in our previous ownership which had a value of £32,513, a balance of £21,000 was left to pay.” This, as regards the FPOC1 purchase, sets out that it was most likely sold and/or marketed to Mrs D as an investment, and it seems that they bought it as such. This FPOC1 membership was partly traded in towards the purchase of a ‘Signature Suites’ membership three years later, on 13 November 2014. This Signature Suites membership is still active. Then, on 1 June 2015, Mrs D bought a further ‘Signature Collection’ membership, trading in her remaining FPOC1 fractional points. This Signature Collection membership also remains active. As far as these two ‘Signature’ purchases are concerned, and the reasons she made them, Mrs D says: “However, the following year in November I decided to book a holiday with a friend and we visited [the Supplier] World in the Costa del Sol. As usual we were invited to the complimentary breakfast by one of the reps. We were taken to look at the new Santa Cruz Signature Suite. We were shown all the lovely bed linen, state of the art kitchen and a video talk by Jennie Bond who was extolling the virtues of the apartments. We were then taken back to the Sales Office and again shown to a table with a computer monitor to 'view my membership' and see if there was a way of reducing my annual management charge which had now risen to nearly £1,800 and to see what the forward was. I was still quite distressed over the death of my husband as it was my first visit to the resort without him and had only recently paid off the finance loan for the Fractional Points, which I had been told was now my sole responsibility, so at the outset of the meeting I told them I was in no position emotionally nor financially about purchasing anything else. This did not seem to deter the sales rep who kept insisting that the property was more affordable than I would think and that because they were still at the early stages of the launch I was there at just the right time to get a really good deal that he felt sure I would

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be happy with. The breakfast plus looking around the Signature Suite had already taken up quite a few hours but I agreed to spare just one more hour as long as that was all it would take. He then went to fetch his boss who asked if we had been impressed and proceeded with what I can only describe as the hard sell. The rep explained to him that I had already said I could not afford it but he came up with a deal whereby I would trade in some of my Fractional Points towards the purchase and that I would have week 15 guaranteed every year in the Santa Cruz Suites. At the end of the 19 years (2033) the property would be sold and I would not only have enjoyed 19 years of holidays but I would also receive a return on my investment as I would hold a fraction of the property which would therefore have a monetary selling value. I was told that their offer for the points was exceptional and I was lucky to have been offered that much for them and to keep it quiet.” So, with this sale, it seems that it differed because there doesn't seem to be any suggestion that Mrs D was told she would make a profit from it. She has only said she “would receive a return” and the property would have “a monetary selling value”. There is a stark difference here between what she remembers being told about the investment element of the FPOC1 membership, and these two Signature memberships. Then I turn to the purchase of the Fractional Club that is being considered in this complaint. The Fractional Club was an FPOC2 – so this meant it provided points which could be exchanged for accommodation every year from the Supplier’s portfolio of resorts, but it was still asset-backed by an Allocated Property. As I’ve said, this was bought on 9 September 2015, with a final price (following a trade-in) of £6,868 paid for by a loan from the Lender. This membership remains active. But Mrs D says very little about this purchase in her statement. She says: “Despite all the misgivings I later purchase another Signature Suite which was next to the original week giving me 2 weeks holiday. This was done through Shawbrook Finance, the reason being that I was told my points were becoming worthless and were incurring high management charges.” From this, the only reason she says she bought this membership was so that it provided her with a week consecutive to her existing Signature week. There is nothing here which leads me to think that it was either sold to her as an investment, nor that she bought it as such. It seems she bought it so that it could provide her a 2-week holiday as opposed to a single week. Following this purchase, as I’ve said, Mrs D went on to complete two further purchases (there was a third which was cancelled during the cooling-off period) – these purchases were of a Signature Collection, which was then partly traded in towards a Holiday Owners Club membership. As this Signature Collection was fractional, and so asset-backed, I find it hard to understand why it would have been partially traded in towards a non-fractional membership, with no investment element, if it had been bought as an investment. So, as I’ve said, it does appear that Mrs D’s first fractional membership was bought for the investment potential it had. And this membership is still active. But it seems, from what Mrs D has said, that her following purchases were all about the holidays they could provide.

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Given all of this, I am not persuaded, either by what Mrs D has said nor by the circumstances of the sale, that the Fractional Club membership was bought for its investment potential. That doesn’t mean Mrs D wasn’t interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn’t be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs D herself, nor the circumstances of the sale, don’t persuade me that her purchase was motivated by her share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don’t think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision she ultimately made. On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs D’s decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests she would have pressed ahead with her purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs D and the Lender was unfair to her even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3). Mrs D’s Commission Complaint I note that one of Mrs D’s other concerns relates to alleged payments of commission by the Lender to the Supplier for acting as a credit broker and arranging the Credit Agreement. This complaint point was not addressed by the Investigator in his view, so I will deal with this now. As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 (‘Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench’). The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough. However, the Supreme Cort held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors: 1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship…was unfair” (see paragraph 327); 2. The failure to disclose the commission; and 3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender. The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA: 1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit; 2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates);

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3. The characteristics of the consumer; 4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and 5. Compliance with the regulatory rules. From my reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is relevant law that I’m required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Dispute Resolution Rules (‘DISP’). But I don’t think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Mrs D in arguing that her credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. I haven’t seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn’t properly disclosed to Mrs D, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs D into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have. I acknowledge that it’s possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. But as I’ve said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn’t necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don’t currently think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs D. Based on what I’ve seen so far, the Supplier’s role as a credit broker wasn’t a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier’s overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can’t see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn’t acting as an agent of Mrs D but as the supplier of contractual rights she obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn’t strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of ‘loyalty’ to her when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty. What’s more, in stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson’s case, as I understand it, the Lender didn’t pay the Supplier any commission at the Time of Sale. And with that being the case, even if there were information failings at that time and regulatory failings as a result (which I make no formal finding on), I’m not currently persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs D.

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Conclusion In conclusion, as things currently stand, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it did not accept the relevant Section 75 claims, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with Mrs D under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA – nor do I see any other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mrs D.” The responses to the provisional decision The Lender responded to the PD and accepted it. The PR, on Mrs D’s behalf, did not accept it, but provided no further evidence that it wished me to consider. Having received the relevant responses from both sides, I am now finalising my decision. The legal and regulatory context In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways, no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service’s website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant: The Consumer Credit Sourcebook (‘CONC’) – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority’s (the ‘FCA’) Handbook of Rules and Guidance Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time: • CONC 3.7.3 [R] • CONC 4.5.3 [R] • CONC 4.5.2 [G] The FCA’s Principles The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses (‘PRIN’). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint: • Principle 6 • Principle 7 • Principle 8 What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Following the responses from both sides, I’ve considered the case afresh. And having done so, and because no new evidence has been submitted or arguments made in response to

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my initial findings, I see no reason to depart from the outcome as set out in the provisional decision above. Given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs D’s Section 75 claims, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mrs D. My final decision I do not uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Ms D to accept or reject my decision before 27 April 2026. Chris Riggs Ombudsman

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