Revolut Ltd · DRN-6189228

Complaint Mr B is unhappy that Revolut Ltd didn’t reimburse him after he reported falling victim to a scam. Background The background to this complaint is familiar to both parties, so I do not propose to set it out in full. What follows is a brief summary of the key events. In late 2023, Mr B fell victim to an investment scam. He had been communicating via WhatsApp with an individual who claimed to be a cryptocurrency trader. This individual told Mr B that he was connected to financial regulatory authorities in Germany and that Mr B could earn substantial profits through arbitrage trading. In reality, Mr B was not dealing with a legitimate financial professional but with a fraudster. Relying on what he had been told, Mr B agreed to take part in the supposed investment opportunity. Over the following months, he made numerous payments from his Revolut account to a wide range of recipients. Some were established third‑party cryptocurrency exchanges, some were lesser‑known operators in the crypto sector, and others were private individuals or companies. His first attempt to make a payment to a well‑known crypto intermediary on 4 August 2023 was blocked by Revolut. However, he continued making further payments linked to the scam until late November 2023. Mr B realised he had been scammed when he was unable to withdraw the profits he believed he had earned. He complained to Revolut, but it declined to pay a refund. Mr B was unhappy with that response and so he referred his complaint to this service. It was looked at by an Investigator who didn’t uphold it. Mr B disagreed with that outcome, and the complaint has now been passed to me for a final decision. Findings I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. As a starting point, the legal position is that a firm is generally required to process payments and withdrawals authorised by its customer, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations 2017 and the firm’s own account terms and conditions. It is accepted that the payments in dispute here were authorised by Mr B. On that basis, Revolut is, in principle, entitled to assume it acted correctly in processing them. However, that is not the end of the matter. Good industry practice requires firms to monitor for account activity that is unusual or out of character and which may suggest an increased risk of fraud. Where such concerns arise, I would expect a firm to take reasonable steps to protect its customer. This may include issuing clear and timely warnings during the payment journey or contacting the customer to understand the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The Investigator’s view set out in considerable detail each of the transactions forming part of this complaint, whether they reached a point at which Revolut ought reasonably to have intervened, and what the likely consequences of an intervention would have been. I do not intend to repeat that analysis here. In broad terms, I agree there were multiple points during

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the scam at which Revolut should have intervened. I can see that the firm did intervene very early on, but I consider that further interventions were warranted as the pattern of payments developed. However, it is not enough for me simply to conclude that Revolut should have done more. I must also be satisfied that any failing on Revolut’s part caused Mr B’s loss, and that an appropriate intervention would have prevented further payments. On the evidence, I find it difficult to support that conclusion. Revolut did intervene at the outset, yet this had little effect on Mr B’s actions. Instead, he repeatedly declined to engage with the firm’s questions, even though those questions were aimed at protecting him from the risk of fraud. In messages to Revolut staff, Mr B described the questioning as intrusive. He said, for example: “Would you like me to tell you where I am buying my milk and daily groceries? I am in charge of my finances … I believe you are questioning my personal information and that is not the bank’s position to do so.” When the agent attempted to gather further information about the cryptocurrency account Mr B was paying, he replied: “Can you stop this humiliating interrogation please?” The agent asked whether Mr B was investing independently or acting on someone’s advice, how he had learned about the opportunity, and whether he had been asked to pay fees. Mr B responded: “I am not making any particular investment. Not sure why you arrived at that conclusion but that is not correct! Nobody is giving me any investment advice. No opportunity found. No fees at all.” He reiterated on 19 August and again on 29 September that he had not been approached about an investment opportunity. Given this level of resistance, and the fact that Revolut was already asking relevant questions at an early stage, I am not persuaded that further or more detailed interventions would have altered the outcome here. I don’t say any of this to downplay the significance of what has happened here. Mr B was clearly the victim of a cynical scam and I have a great deal of sympathy for him and the position he’s found himself in. However, my role is to look at the actions and inactions of Revolut and, for the reasons I’ve explained, while I accept that it could’ve done more here, I’m not persuaded its failure to do so was the effective cause of Mr B’s losses. Final decision For the reasons I’ve explained above, I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr B to accept or reject my decision before 28 April 2026. James Kimmitt Ombudsman

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