Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc · DRN-6227032

The complaint Mrs I’s complaint is, in essence, that Mitsubishi HC Capital UK Plc trading as Novuna Personal Finance (the ‘Lender’) acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with them under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the ‘CCA’) and (2) deciding against paying a claim under Section 75 of the CCA. What happened Mrs I was the member of a timeshare provider (the ‘Supplier’) – having purchased a number of products from it over time. But the product at the centre of this complaint is their membership of a timeshare that I’ll call the ‘Fractional Club’ – which they bought on 15 February 2018 (the ‘Time of Sale’). They entered into an agreement with the Supplier to buy 1,300 fractional points at a cost of £17,433 (the ‘Purchase Agreement’). Fractional Club membership was asset backed – which meant it gave Mrs I more than just holiday rights. It also included a share in the net sale proceeds of a property named on the Purchase Agreement (the ‘Allocated Property’) after their membership term ends. Mrs I paid for their Fractional Club membership by taking finance of £17,433 from the Lender (the ‘Credit Agreement’). Mrs I – using a professional representative (the ‘PR’) – wrote to the Lender on 3 November 2022 (the ‘Letter of Complaint’) to raise a number of different concerns. As those concerns haven’t changed since they were first raised, and as both sides are familiar with them, it isn’t necessary to repeat them in detail here beyond the summary above. The Lender dealt with Mrs I’s concerns as a complaint and issued its final response letter on 31 December 2022, rejecting it on every ground. The complaint was then referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file, upheld the complaint on its merits. The Lender disagreed with the Investigator’s assessment and asked for an Ombudsman’s decision – which is why it was passed to me. I considered the matter and issued a provisional decision (the ‘PD’) dated 26 February 2026. In that decision, I said: Section 75 of the CCA: the Supplier’s misrepresentations at the Time of Sale The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier.

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Certain conditions must be met if the protection afforded to consumers is engaged, including, for instance, the cash price of the purchase and the nature of the arrangements between the parties involved in the transaction. The Lender doesn’t dispute that the relevant conditions are met. But for reasons I’ll come on to below, it isn’t necessary to make any formal findings on them here. It was said in the Letter of Complaint that Fractional Club membership had been misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale because Mrs I were: 1. Told that they had purchased an investment that would “considerably appreciate in value”. 2. Promised a considerable return on their investment because they were told that they would own a share in a property that would considerably increase in value. 3. Told that they could sell their Fractional Club membership to the Supplier or easily to third parties at a profit. 4. Made to believe that they would have access to “the holiday apartment” at any time all year round. However, neither points 1 nor 2 strike me as misrepresentations even if such representations had been made by the Supplier (which I make no formal finding on). Telling prospective members that they were investing their money because they were buying a fraction or share of one of the Supplier’s properties was not untrue. And even if the Supplier’s sales representatives went further and suggested that the share in question would increase in value, perhaps considerably so, that sounds like nothing more than a honestly held opinion as there isn’t any accompanying evidence to persuade me that the relevant sales representative(s) said something that, while an opinion, amounted to a statement of fact that they did not hold or could not have reasonably held. As for points 3 and 4, while it’s possible that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented at the Time of Sale for one or both of those reasons, I don’t think it’s probable. They’re given little to none of the colour or context necessary to demonstrating that the Supplier made false statements of existing fact and/or opinion. And as there isn’t any other evidence on file to support the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was misrepresented for these reasons, I don’t think it was. So, while I recognise that Mrs I - and the PR - have concerns about the way in which Fractional Club membership was sold by the Supplier, when looking at the claim under Section 75 of the CCA, I can only consider whether there was a factual and material misrepresentation by the Supplier. For the reasons I’ve set out above, I’m not persuaded that there was. And that means that I don’t think that the Lender acted unreasonably or unfairly when it dealt with this particular Section 75 claim. Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? I’ve already explained why I’m not persuaded that Fractional Club membership was actionably misrepresented by the Supplier at the Time of Sale. But there are other aspects of the sales process that, being the subject of dissatisfaction, I must explore with Section 140A in mind if I’m to consider this complaint in full – which is what I’ve done next. Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs I and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at:

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1. The standard of the Supplier’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material; 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale in relation to Fractional Club membership, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier; 3. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; 4. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant 5. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement. I have then considered the impact of these on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs I and the Lender given her circumstances at the Time of Sale. The Supplier’s sales & marketing practices at the Time of Sale Mrs I’s complaint about the Lender being party to an unfair credit relationship was made for several reasons. The PR says, for instance, that the right checks weren’t carried out before the Lender lent to Mrs I. I haven’t seen anything to persuade me that was the case in this complaint given its circumstances. But even if I were to find that the Lender failed to do everything it should have when it agreed to lend (and I make no such finding), I would have to be satisfied that the money lent to Mrs I was actually unaffordable before also concluding that they lost out as a result and then consider whether the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. But from the information provided, I am not satisfied that the lending was unaffordable for the Mrs I. Connected to this is the suggestion by the PR that the Credit Agreement was arranged by an unauthorised credit broker, the upshot of which is to suggest that the Lender wasn’t permitted to enforce the Credit Agreement. However, it looks to me like Mrs I knew, amongst other things, how much they were borrowing and repaying each month, who they were borrowing from and that they were borrowing money to pay for Fractional Club membership. And as the lending doesn’t look like it was unaffordable for them, even if the Credit Agreement was arranged by a broker that didn’t have the necessary permission to do so (which I make no formal finding on), I can’t see why that led to Mrs I financial loss – such that I can say that the credit relationship in question was unfair on them as a result. And with that being the case, I’m not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to tell the Lender to compensate them, even if the loan wasn’t arranged properly. The PR also says that there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement. But as I can’t see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mrs I in practice, nor that any such terms led them to behave in a certain way to their detriment, I’m not persuaded that any of the terms governing Fractional Club membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy. I acknowledge that Mrs I may have felt weary after a sales process that went on for a long time. But they say little about what was said and/or done by the Supplier during their sales presentation that made them feel as if they had no choice but to purchase Fractional Club membership when they simply did not want to. They were also given a 14-day cooling off period and they have not provided a credible explanation for why they did not cancel their membership during that time. And with all of that being the case, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mrs I made the decision to purchase Fractional Club membership because their ability to exercise that choice was significantly impaired by pressure from the Supplier.

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Overall, therefore, I don’t think that Mrs I credit relationship with the Lender was rendered unfair to them under Section 140A for any of the reasons above. But there is another reason, perhaps the main reason, why the PR says the credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to them. And that’s the suggestion that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to them as an investment in breach of prohibition against selling timeshares in that way. The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations The Lender does not dispute, and I am satisfied, that Mrs I’s Fractional Club membership met the definition of a “timeshare contract” and was a “regulated contract” for the purposes of the Timeshare Regulations. Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations prohibited the Supplier from marketing or selling Fractional Club membership as an investment. This is what the provision said at the Time of Sale: “A trader must not market or sell a proposed timeshare contract or long-term holiday product contract as an investment if the proposed contract would be a regulated contract.” But the PR says that the Supplier did exactly that at the Time of Sale – saying, in summary, that Mrs I were told by the Supplier that Fractional Club membership was the type of investment that would only increase in value. The term “investment” is not defined in the Timeshare Regulations. But for the purposes of this provisional decision, and by reference to the decided authorities, an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit. A share in the Allocated Property clearly constituted an investment as it offered Mrs I the prospect of a financial return – whether or not, like all investments, that was more than what they first put into it. But it is important to note at this stage that the fact that Fractional Club membership included an investment element did not, itself, transgress the prohibition in Regulation 14(3). That provision prohibits the marketing and selling of a timeshare contract as an investment. It doesn’t prohibit the mere existence of an investment element in a timeshare contract or prohibit the marketing and selling of such a timeshare contract per se. In other words, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. To conclude, therefore, that Fractional Club membership was marketed or sold to Mrs I as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3), I have to be persuaded that it was more likely than not that the Supplier marketed and/or sold membership to them as an investment, i.e. told them or led them to believe that Fractional Club membership offered them the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit) given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. There is competing evidence in this complaint as to whether Fractional Club membership was marketed and/or sold by the Supplier at the Time of Sale as an investment in breach of regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations. On the one hand, it is clear that the Supplier made efforts to avoid specifically describing membership of the Fractional Club as an ‘investment’ or quantifying to prospective purchasers, such as Mrs I, the financial value of their share in the net sales proceeds of the Allocated Property along with the investment considerations, risks and rewards attached to them.

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On the other hand, I acknowledge that the Supplier’s sales process left open the possibility that the sales representative may have positioned Fractional Club membership as an investment. So, I accept that it’s equally possible that Fractional Club membership was marketed and sold to Mrs I as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3). However, whether or not there was a breach of the relevant prohibition by the Supplier is not ultimately determinative of the outcome in this complaint for reasons I will come on to shortly. And with that being the case, it’s not necessary to make a formal finding on that particular issue for the purposes of this decision. Would the credit relationship between the Lender and Mrs I have been rendered unfair to her had there been a breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations? Having found that it was possible that the Supplier breached Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations at the Time of Sale, I now need to consider what impact that breach had on the fairness of the credit relationship between Mrs I and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement as the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. Indeed, it seems to me that, if I am to conclude that a breach of Regulation 14(3) led to a credit relationship between Mrs I and the Lender that was unfair to them and warranted relief as a result, whether the Supplier’s breach of Regulation 14(3) led them to enter into the Purchase Agreement and the Credit Agreement is an important consideration. The Letter of Complaint submitted by the PR mentioned that Fractional Club membership had been sold as an investment. It did so using identical statements to several other complaints submitted by the same PR. So, I have reason to doubt that it was representative of Mrs I’s thoughts at the Time of Sale, and I put little weight on this. In August 2023 the PR supplied this service with a witness statement from Mrs I. It’s unsigned and undated, but the PR says the statement was taken sometime in 2019. With reference to Fractional Club membership being sold as an investment it says: “During the presentation we were told that we are buying a fraction of a property and that the property will be sold in 19 years and we will be given 2.42% after sale. We were made to belief that the property will increase in value and this was a good investment since we will enjoy all the holidays and still get money back after the property is sold.” I accept from this statement that Mrs I has said membership was marketed and sold as an investment. She’s not said it explicitly, but I also accept that from what Mrs I has said it can be interpreted that she held out hope of making a profit from buying membership. That being said, I must question the timing under which the statement was provided - Shortly after the judgment in R (on the application of Shawbrook Bank Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd and R (on the application of Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd (t/a Barclays Partner Finance)) v Financial Ombudsman Service [2023] EWHC 1069 (Admin) (‘Shawbrook & BPF v FOS’) was handed down. The Lender has said that it was not supplier with a copy of Mrs I’s testimony when the PR submitted the Letter of Complaint. It seems that the first time this service or the Lender (and Supplier) were provided a copy, was late 2023. That’s some three years after the PR says it was taken. I find it difficult to understand why the Financial Ombudsman Service was only given such evidence when it was. I also find it difficult to understand why Mrs I’s account of

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the Time of Sale wasn’t supplied to the Lender when a complaint was made. It causes me to question whether the statement might have been generated or amended more recently than 2019 – perhaps after the judgement I refer to above. Indeed, as there isn’t any other evidence on file to corroborate Mrs I very recent evidence about their motivations at the Time of Sale, there seems to me to be a very real risk that Mrs I recollections were coloured by the judgment in Shawbrook & BPF v FOS. And with that being the case, I’m not persuaded that I can give their written recollections the weight necessary to finding that the credit relationship in question was unfair for reasons relating to a breach of the relevant prohibition. Given what I’ve said above, I cannot find that the prospect of a financial gain from Fractional Club membership was an important and motivating factor when Mrs I decided to go ahead with their purchase. That doesn’t mean they weren’t interested in a share in the Allocated Property. After all, that wouldn’t be surprising given the nature of the product at the centre of this complaint. But as Mrs I themselves don’t persuade me that their purchase was motivated by their share in the Allocated Property and the possibility of a profit, I don’t think a breach of Regulation 14(3) by the Supplier was likely to have been material to the decision Mrs I ultimately made. On balance, therefore, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the Fractional Club membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare Regulations, I am not persuaded that Mrs I’s decision to purchase Fractional Club membership at the Time of Sale was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain (i.e., a profit). On the contrary, I think the evidence suggests she would have pressed ahead with their purchase whether or not there had been a breach of Regulation 14(3). And for that reason, I do not think the credit relationship between Mrs I and the Lender was unfair to them even if the Supplier had breached Regulation 14(3). Section 140A: Conclusion Given all of the factors I’ve looked at in this part of my decision, and having taken all of them into account, I’m not persuaded that the credit relationship between Mrs I and the Lender under the Credit Agreement and related Purchase Agreement was unfair to her. And as things currently stand, I don’t think it would be fair or reasonable that I uphold this complaint on that basis. The Supplier’s alleged breach of Spanish Law and its implications on the Credit Agreement The PR argues that, because the Purchase Agreement was unlawful under Spanish law in light of certain information failings by the Supplier, I should treat that Agreement and the Credit Agreement as rescinded by Mrs I and award them compensation accordingly – in keeping with the judgment of the UK’s Supreme Court in Durkin v DSG Retail [2014] UKSC 21 (‘Durkin’). However, as the Lender hasn’t been party to any court proceedings in Spain, it seems to me that there is an argument for saying that the Purchase Agreement is valid under English law for the purposes of Durkin. I also note that the Purchase Agreement is governed by English law. So, it isn’t at all clear that Spanish law would be held relevant if the validity of the Purchase Agreement were litigated between its parties and the Lender in an English court. For example, in Diamond Resorts Europe and Others (Case C-632/21), the European Court of Justice ruled that,

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because the claimant lived in England and the timeshare contract governed by English law, it was English law that applied, not Spanish, even though the latter was more favourable to the claimant in ways that resemble the matters seemingly relied upon by the PR. What’s more, as Mrs I has gone some way to taking advantage of the Purchase and Credit Agreements, an English court might hesitate to uphold a claim for rescission of either Agreement because there are equitable reasons to do so. Overall, therefore, in the absence of a successful English court ruling on a timeshare case paid for using a point-of-sale loan on similar facts to this complaint, and given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I’m not persuaded that it would be fair or reasonable to uphold it for this reason. In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I did not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs I’s Section 75 claim. And, I was not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with them under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to them for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I could see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate them as things stood. The Lender accepted the PD. The PR also responded – they did not accept the PD and provided some further comments and evidence they wish to be considered. I’m now finalising my decision. The legal and regulatory context In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii) regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is, in many ways. no different to that shared in several hundred published ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints – which can be found on the Financial Ombudsman Service’s website. And with that being the case, it is not necessary to set out that context in detail here. But I would add that the following regulatory rules/guidance are also relevant: The Consumer Credit Sourcebook (‘CONC’) – Found in the Financial Conduct Authority’s (the ‘FCA’) Handbook of Rules and Guidance Below are the most relevant provisions and/or guidance as they were at the relevant time: • CONC 3.7.3 [R] • CONC 4.5.3 [R] • CONC 4.5.2 [G] The FCA’s Principles The rules on consumer credit sit alongside the wider obligations of firms, such as the Principles for Businesses (‘PRIN’). Set out below are those that are most relevant to this complaint: • Principle 6

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• Principle 7 • Principle 8 What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Following the responses from both parties, I’ve considered the case afresh and having done so, I’ve reached the same decision as that which I outlined in my provisional findings, for broadly the same reasons. Again, my role as an Ombudsman isn’t to address every single point which has been made to date, but to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. If I haven’t commented on, or referred to, something that either party has said, this doesn’t mean I haven’t considered it. Rather, I’ve focused here on addressing what I consider to be the key issues in deciding this complaint and explaining the reasons for reaching my final decision. The PR’s further comments in response to the PD in the main relate to the issue of whether the credit relationship between Mrs I and the Lender was unfair. In particular, the PR has provided further comments in relation to whether the membership was sold to Mrs I as an investment at the Time of Sale. They’ve also now argued for the first time that the payment of a commission by the Lender to the Supplier led to an unfair credit relationship. As outlined in my PD, the PR originally raised various other points of complaint, all of which I addressed at that time. But they didn’t make any further comments in relation to those in their response to my PD. Indeed, they haven’t said they disagree with any of my provisional conclusions in relation to those other points. And since I haven’t been provided with anything more in relation to those other points by either party, I see no reason to change my conclusions in relation to them as set out in my PD. So, I’ll focus here on the PR’s points raised in response. Section 140A of the CCA: did the Lender participate in an unfair credit relationship? The Supplier’s alleged breach of Regulation 14(3) of the Timeshare regulations My PD set out my assessment of Mrs I’s testimony. Part of that was to consider when it was written, and whether it may have been affected by external factors such as the widespread publication of the outcome of Shawbrook and BPF v FOS. The PR says that it was taken in 2019 and that at the point the complaint was made to the Lender and subsequently referred to this service, there was no requirement to provide a witness testimony. The PR said Mrs I’s recollections were only provided to this service when requested in 2023. Taking into account I haven’t seen any persuasive evidence to demonstrate when Mrs I’s testimony was taken, and knowing that the first time it was provided to this service was in 2023, a few months after the outcome in Shawbrook & BPF v FOS, I maintain that there is a risk that Mrs I’s testimony could have been coloured by it. In any case, and in addition to what was said in my PD, in her testimony Mrs I says: “When we approached [Supplier] that we wanted to cancel, they informed us that we cannot

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cancel but can only sell back to some organisation they work with or we can transfer it back to them and continue paying back the finance.” Mrs I says this after commenting that she’d felt rushed into the purchase and had experienced difficulty in finding holiday availability. From what Mrs I has said here it seems that she was dissatisfied with her membership and asked to cancel it. I have to question why she’d do that if she believed that she’d make a profit from membership. It causes me to reconsider whether Mrs I held out hope of making a profit when she said she would “get money back” earlier in her testimony. It doesn’t suggest to me that any investment element to membership had been important to Mrs I, and I’m therefore doubtful that it was an important and motivating factor in her decision to purchase. On balance, the way in which the evidence has been provided makes me conclude that I can place little weight on it. Additionally, I’m not persuaded by Mrs I’s testimony that investment was an important and motivating factor in her making the purchase. So, ultimately, for the above reasons, along with those I already explained in my PD, I remain unpersuaded that any breach of Regulation 14(3) was material to Mrs I’s purchasing decision. The PR also said that in the judgment handed down in Shawbrook & BPF v FOS, it was not challenged that the product in question was marketed and sold as an investment. But, as I explained in my provisional decision, the Timeshare Regulations did not ban products such as the Fractional Club. They just regulated how such products were marketed and sold. And the judgment referred to did not make a blanket finding that all such products were mis-sold in the way the PR appears to be suggesting. Any complaint needs to be considered in the light of its specific circumstances. So, as I said before, even if the Supplier had marketed or sold the membership as an investment in breach of Regulation 14(3) (which I still make no finding on here), I’m not persuaded Mrs I’s decision to make the purchase was motivated by the prospect of a financial gain. So, I still don’t think the credit relationship between Mrs I and the Lender was unfair to them for this reason. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale The PR says that a payment of commission from the Lender to the Supplier at the Time of Sale should lead me to uphold this complaint because, simply put, information in relation to that payment went undisclosed at the Time of Sale. As both sides already know, the Supreme Court handed down an important judgment on 1 August 2025 in a series of cases concerned with the issue of commission: Johnson v FirstRand Bank Ltd, Wrench v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33 (‘Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench’). The Supreme Court ruled that, in each of the three cases, the commission payments made to car dealers by lenders were legal, as claims for the tort of bribery, or the dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty, had to be predicated on the car dealer owing a fiduciary duty to the consumer, which the car dealers did not owe. A “disinterested duty”, as described in Wood v Commercial First Business Ltd & ors and Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Pengelly [2021] EWCA Civ 471, is not enough. However, the Supreme Court held that the credit relationship between the lender and Mr Johnson was unfair under Section 140A of the CCA because of the commission paid by the lender to the car dealer. The main reasons for coming to that conclusion included, amongst other things, the following factors:

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1. The size of the commission (as a percentage of the total charge for credit). In Mr Johnson’s case it was 55%. This was “so high” and “a powerful indication that the relationship…was unfair” (see paragraph 327); 2. The failure to disclose the commission; and 3. The concealment of the commercial tie between the car dealer and the lender. The Supreme Court also confirmed that the following factors, in what was a non-exhaustive list, will normally be relevant when assessing whether a credit relationship was/is unfair under Section 140A of the CCA: 1. The size of the commission as a proportion of the charge for credit; 2. The way in which commission is calculated (a discretionary commission arrangement, for example, may lead to higher interest rates); 3. The characteristics of the consumer; 4. The extent of any disclosure and the manner of that disclosure (which, insofar as Section 56 of the CCA is engaged, includes any disclosure by a supplier when acting as a broker); and 5. Compliance with the regulatory rules. From my reading of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench, it sets out principles which apply to credit brokers other than car dealer–credit brokers. So, when considering allegations of undisclosed payments of commission like the one in this complaint, Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench is relevant law that I’m required to consider under Rule 3.6.4 of the Financial Conduct Authority’s Dispute Resolution Rules (‘DISP’). But I don’t think Hopcraft, Johnson and Wrench assists Mrs I in arguing that her credit relationship with the Lender was unfair to her for reasons relating to commission given the facts and circumstances of this complaint. I haven’t seen anything to suggest that the Lender and Supplier were tied to one another contractually or commercially in a way that wasn’t properly disclosed to Mrs I, nor have I seen anything that persuades me that the commission arrangement between them gave the Supplier a choice over the interest rate that led Mrs I into a credit agreement that cost disproportionately more than it otherwise could have. I acknowledge that it’s possible that the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the regulatory guidance in place at the Time of Sale insofar as it was relevant to disclosing the commission arrangements between them. But as I’ve said before, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And with that being the case, it isn’t necessary to make a formal finding on that because, even if the Lender and the Supplier failed to follow the relevant regulatory guidance at the Time of Sale, it is for the reasons set out below that I don’t think any such failure is itself a reason to find the credit relationship in question unfair to Mrs I. In stark contrast to the facts of Mr Johnson’s case, the amount of commission paid by the Lender to the Supplier for arranging the Credit Agreement that Mrs I entered into wasn’t high. At £697.32, it was only 4% of the amount borrowed and even less than that as a proportion of the charge for credit. So, had she known at the Time of Sale that the Supplier was going to be paid a flat rate of commission at that level, I’m not currently persuaded that she either wouldn’t have understood that or would have otherwise questioned the size of the

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payment at that time. After all, Mrs I wanted Fractional Club membership and had no obvious means of her own to pay for it. And at such a low level, the impact of commission on the cost of the credit she needed for a timeshare she wanted doesn’t strike me as disproportionate. So, I think she would still have taken out the loan to fund her purchase at the Time of Sale had the amount of commission been disclosed. What’s more, based on what I’ve seen so far, the Supplier’s role as a credit broker wasn’t a separate service and distinct from its role as the seller of timeshares. It was simply a means to an end in the Supplier’s overall pursuit of a successful timeshare sale. I can’t see that the Supplier gave an undertaking – either expressly or impliedly – to put to one side its commercial interests in pursuit of that goal when arranging the Credit Agreement. And as it wasn’t acting as an agent of Mrs I but as the supplier of contractual rights she obtained under the Purchase Agreement, the transaction doesn’t strike me as one with features that suggest the Supplier had an obligation of ‘loyalty’ to her when arranging the Credit Agreement and thus a fiduciary duty. Overall, therefore, I’m not persuaded that the commission arrangements between the Supplier and the Lender were likely to have led to a sufficiently extreme inequality of knowledge that rendered the credit relationship unfair to Mrs I. Conclusion In conclusion, given the facts and circumstances of this complaint, I do not think that the Lender acted unfairly or unreasonably when it dealt with Mrs I’s Section 75 claim, and I am not persuaded that the Lender was party to a credit relationship with her under the Credit Agreement that was unfair to her for the purposes of Section 140A of the CCA. And having taken everything into account, I see no other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate her. My final decision For the reasons explained above, my final decision is that I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mrs I to accept or reject my decision before 13 April 2026. Stephen Trapp Ombudsman

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