HSBC UK Bank Plc · DRN-6189253

Complaint Mr B is unhappy that HSBC UK Bank Plc didn’t reimburse him after he reported falling victim to a scam. Background The background to this complaint is familiar to both parties, so I do not propose to set it out in full. What follows is a brief summary of the key events. In late 2023, Mr B fell victim to an investment scam. He had been communicating via WhatsApp with an individual who claimed to be a cryptocurrency trader. This individual told Mr B that he was connected to the financial regulatory authorities in Germany and that Mr B could earn substantial profits through arbitrage trading. In reality, Mr B was not dealing with a legitimate financial professional but with a fraudster. Relying on what he had been told, Mr B agreed to take part in the supposed investment opportunity. Over the following months, he made numerous payments from his HSBC account to other accounts that were in his name. He did so from August 2023 until December 2023. Most of these payments were made to a firm I’ll refer to as Company R. Mr B realised he had been scammed when he was unable to withdraw the profits he believed he had earned. He complained to HSBC, but it declined to pay a refund. Mr B was unhappy with that response and so he referred his complaint to this service. An Investigator reviewed the complaint but didn’t uphold it. Mr B disagreed with that outcome, and the complaint has now been passed to me for a final decision. Findings I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. As a starting point, the legal position is that a firm is generally required to process payments and withdrawals authorised by its customer, in accordance with the Payment Services Regulations 2017 and the firm’s own account terms and conditions. It is accepted that the payments in dispute here were authorised by Mr B. On that basis, Mr B is presumed liable at first instance. However, that is not the end of the matter. Good industry practice requires firms to monitor for account activity that is unusual or out of character and which may suggest an increased risk of fraud. Where such concerns arise, I would expect a firm to take reasonable steps to protect its customer. This may include issuing clear and timely warnings during the payment journey or contacting the customer to understand the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The Investigator’s view set out in considerable detail each of the transactions forming part of this complaint, whether they reached a point at which HSBC ought reasonably to have intervened, and what the likely consequences of an intervention would’ve been. I don’t intend to repeat that analysis here. In broad terms, I agree there were multiple points during the scam at which HSBC should have intervened. I can see that it did intervene very early on, but I consider that further interventions were warranted as the pattern of payments developed.

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However, it is not enough for me simply to conclude that HSBC should have done more. I must also be satisfied that any failing on HSBC’s part caused Mr B’s loss, and that an appropriate intervention would have prevented further payments. On the evidence, I find it difficult to support that conclusion. Mr B did speak to an employee of the bank on 9 August 2023. He wasn’t particularly open when answering that employee’s questions. He said that he was transferring money to his own account and he expressed frustration at receiving so many calls flagging up the possibility of fraud. The employee asked him why he was transferring the money to an account with Company R and he told them that he was doing so to take advantage of “better rates.” I agree that the call handler’s questions could’ve been a bit more open-ended, but I’m not sure it would’ve made a difference. Mr B has also brought a complaint about Company R to this service which is being considered under separate cover. Company R also intervened in connection with the activity on his account and he displayed a great deal of frustration with its employees too. He also gave inaccurate answers to its questions by insisting that he wasn’t making an investment, and nobody was advising him on an investment opportunity. It’s difficult to see how, even if HSBC had done more, Mr B wouldn’t have remained resistant to its efforts. I don’t say any of this to downplay the significance of what has happened here. Mr B was clearly the victim of a cynical scam, and I have a great deal of sympathy for him and the position he’s found himself in. However, my role is to look the actions and inactions of HSBC and, for the reasons I’ve explained, while I accept that it could’ve done more here, I’m not persuaded its failure to do so was the effective cause of Mr B’s losses. Final decision For the reasons I’ve explained above, I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr B to accept or reject my decision before 28 April 2026. James Kimmitt Ombudsman

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