ClearBank Limited · DRN-5631437

The complaint Mr K complains that ClearBank Limited has declined to refund payments on C’s account which he says he didn’t authorise. Mr K who is the director of C have brought the complaint on C’s behalf. C holds a business bank account with Tide and Tide’s bank accounts are provided by ClearBank, and ClearBank is the respondent business here, but in the decision, I’ll refer to Tide for simplicity. What happened The background to this complaint is well known to both parties, so I’ll provide only a brief summary here. Mr K received a call in November 2024 from a scammer impersonating somebody from Tide’s fraud team. The scammer said C’s account had been compromised and that he would need to move his funds to a new account with a different financial institution. Mr K said the caller ID showed the call was from Tide. He also said the scammer provided accurate details about the account and sent verification emails and text messages. As a result, he was persuaded to use his Tide app to approve £19,650 of payments across six separate card transactions within around 15 minutes to an account he thought was safe. Tide said Mr K authorised the payments. It also confirmed that 3DS verification was used to approve the payments and provided Mr K with a warning explaining that Tide would never call to ask him to approve this payment in the app. While it accepts it could have intervened on payment three in what it agrees was an unusual payment, it considered Mr K equally responsible for the loss. So it offered to refund 50% of the payments from and including payment three, totalling £6,450. As an agreement wasn’t reached this complaint has passed to me. I issued my provisional decision on 5 February 2026 upholding this complaint. As Tide disagreed, I am issuing a final decision. Responses to my Provisional decision Tide did not accept my provisional decision and I’ve carefully reviewed the points it made. Among other things it mentioned that the warning Mr K received made it clear that Tide would not ask him to approve the payment. And if Mr K was persuaded that he was speaking to Tide this warning should have been a red flag to him. Tide also pointed out that Mr K would have been familiar with the warning as he had completed payments using the same method previously. It said that as Mr K had read the warning previously when he was not under the influence of the scammer – he would already have been familiar with it. I’ve considered the points Tide has made. The warning Mr K received explains that Tide would not ask Mr K to approve the payment. I’ve carefully weighed this against the circumstances of the scam, which I set out in my provisional decision and below. For the

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reasons explained, I’m not persuaded that Mr K’s failure to pay close attention to the warning, or to recall having seen it in previous transactions, means that the loss (from and including payment two) should not be refunded to him or that only a partial refund would be appropriate. Tide has also mentioned that Mr K should be liable for at least 50% of the loss as he approved the payments. It believes liability should be split because there was a point where it considered both it and Mr K could have prevented the fraud. I’ve considered Tide’s point, however I’m not persuaded I should deviate from the findings I set out in my provisional decision. For ease I have set out my findings below. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having done so, I’m intending to reach the same conclusions as set out in my provisional decision and for materially the same reasons. I’ll explain why. Before I set out my thoughts, I want to acknowledge that I have summarised this complaint briefly and, in less detail, than has been provided. I’ve focused on what I think is the heart of the matter. While I may not comment on every point raised, I have considered it. I’m satisfied that I don’t need to comment on every individual point or argument to be able to reach what I think is the right outcome. Our rules allow me to do this and reflect the fact that we are an informal service and a free alternative for consumers to the courts. I’m satisfied Mr K on behalf of C authorised the payments for the purposes of the of the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (‘the Regulations’), in force at the time. So, although he didn’t intend the money to go to the alleged scammers, under the Regulations, and under the terms and conditions of his bank account, Mr K on behalf of C is presumed liable for the loss in the first instance. Although C did authorise the disputed payments, Tide is expected to process payments and withdrawals that a customer authorises it to make, but where the customer has been the victim of a scam, it may sometimes be fair and reasonable for the bank to reimburse them even though they authorised the payment. Did Tide miss an opportunity to prevent C’s loss. Although I think it would be fair to treat the payments as authorised, I have gone on to consider whether Tide should have done more to prevent this loss. Tide accepts it should have intervened by payment three and had it done so it would have prevented C’s loss from that point. I’ve considered this in more detail below. Having taken into account longstanding regulatory expectations and requirements, and what I consider to be good industry practice, Tide ought to have been on the look-out for the possibility of fraud and made additional checks before processing payments in some circumstances. I have reviewed C’s account statements and note it is a business account. Having considered the overall account activity, when the disputed payment was made, its value, and who it was made to, I’m persuaded there were a number of indicators which should have stood out as unusual enough for Tide to intervene from the second payment Mr K made

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towards the scam. The second payment was for £3,350 and C had earlier on in the day transferred £3,400. The amount of the transactions is out of step with how the account normally operates and payments one and two were made in a relatively short period. Given that, I think a suspicious pattern had emerged that ought to have given Tide concern that C was at risk of financial harm from fraud from payment two. At this point, I consider it would have been good practice for Tide to have provided a tailored written warning where it asked a series of questions in order to establish the actual scam risk and the circumstances surrounding the payment. Tide has questioned whether an intervention would have made a difference and have prevented Mr K from making the transaction. It has also said that Mr K ignored a warning before completing the payment, which I’ve detailed below. I’ve considered Tide’s point. However, in the circumstances of this case I think Tide should have asked further questions in addition to the general warning it provided. If it had asked further questions about the circumstances of the transactions, I think it is likely that the scam would have been uncovered – particularly given the prevalence of these types of scams by the time the transaction occurred. And if the scam had been uncovered it’s unlikely Mr K would have continued with the payments. As such, I’m satisfied that intervention from payment two would have prevented Mr K from proceeding with the payment and avoided the loss from this point. Contributory negligence In order to consider whether C should bear any responsibility for the losses I’ve carefully considered all the information given, specifically the surrounding circumstances of the scam and the steps that persuaded Mr K that the payment was genuine. To summarise briefly, • Mr K was told by the scammers that C’s account was compromised, and somebody had attempted to withdraw funds. The scammers used pressure tactics to keep him on the phone and said that if he hung up, he would be negligent, and they wouldn’t be able to recover the funds. • He received a verification code – this message appeared to be from Tide’s official number (Tide believes the number was spoofed – so this message falsely appeared to be from Tide). The scammer confirmed the code which further persuaded Mr K that he was speaking to Tide. • The scammer knew personal details about him, specifically his name, date of birth and his address (although the postcode was incorrect which the scammer explained was because the person who was trying to access his account had changed his postcode), • He received an email from the scammers impersonating Tide. This said his card had been successfully cancelled and confirmed the name he was given for the scammer he was speaking to (the email said “you are currently speaking to [the name of the scammer Mr K thought he was speaking to] from our support team – please follow the instructions provided by the advisor during this call to ensure that your account remains secure”). • He was told that if he ended the phone call then he wouldn’t be covered by the customer protection scheme which covers funds lost due to fraud. • Mr K was asked to approve the payment and its amount in his app – where it detailed the payment amount – the recipient bank, an account with a third-party financial institution, and contained a warning that Tide wouldn’t ask him to approve payments

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in app. Tide has highlighted that when Mr K approved the transaction the name of the business was not Tide, which should have set off alarm bells as it didn’t make sense for him to transfer funds to another business in order to keep the funds safe. Tide has provided a screenshot showing what Mr K would have seen when he approved the payment in the app. It informed Mr K of who the payments were to (which wasn’t Tide) and contains the warning “Tide will never call you to ask you to approve this payment in the app – if someone calls asking for this, hang up immediately and contact our 24/7 Fraud … team”. Mr K needed to click “approve payment” to allow the transactions – which he did. However, I’ve noted that this warning did not set out the implications of approving the payment. And I can see that Mr K was reassured by the information the scammer knew about the account and the correspondence he thought he was getting from Tide which led him to think he was legitimately transferring funds to a safe account. Tide said Mr K would have been familiar with the warning as he had approved payments by this method before when he wasn’t the victim of a scam. It questioned the reasonableness of Mr K’s actions in continuing with the payment despite the warning. I’ve weighed up the points Tide has raised and the specific circumstances of this complaint carefully. It’s well known that scammers commonly use a range of tactics to appear genuine and to create a sense of urgency or panic, and I’m satisfied that’s what most likely happened here. By telling Mr K that C’s funds were unsafe, I can understand why he followed the scammer’s instructions and why the warning Tide provided didn’t register with him. Even if Mr K had seen the warning before, I’m not satisfied that given the circumstances of the scam, Mr K’s continuing with the payment means that a deduction for contributory negligence would be fair. Once a person believes they are dealing with a genuine party, acting in their best interests and their funds are in immediate risk, there’s not always the presence of mind to critically assess the requests being made. Given the circumstances of the transactions, I accept that the combination of being told his funds were unsafe and the likely pressure being applied by the scammer led Mr K to take the steps needed to allow the payments. Considering the circumstances and sophisticated nature of the scam – and the multiple ways the scammer reassured Mr K that he was speaking to Tide, taking a step back, and considering the details and warning in the “approve payment” screen, despite Tide saying Mr K would have also have seen the screen before on other transactions – I don’t think it is fair or reasonable for a deduction for contributory negligence to be made. Should Tide have done more to recover the loss? I’ve also considered if Tide could have done more to recover the loss. I appreciate the payment may still have been pending when Mr K reported it. But as it had already been processed by Tide, it couldn’t have declined or frozen the payment at that point. I have also considered whether Tide did what we would expect to try to recover C’s money once it was told about the scam. As the payment was a card payment, and didn’t involve credit, the opportunity to recover the funds would be through the chargeback scheme. But I don’t consider that a chargeback claim would have had any prospect of success. Mr K made a payment to a money remittance service. Its contract with him (on behalf of C) to arrange

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the onward transmission of his funds. There would have been no valid chargeback rights given there was no dispute that the provider fulfilled the service it ‘sold’ to C. So I can’t say there was any failing in this regard on Tide’s part. For these reasons, I don’t think Tide needed to do more to attempt to recover C’s funds once it was aware of the issue. Tide’s handling of C’s request for reimbursement. Mr K has also raised concerns about Tide’s handling of his request for a reimbursement. Crucially, Mr K is bringing the complaint on behalf of C, a limited company. So I can only consider the impact of Tide’s actions on C, not Mr K. I have reviewed the call Mr K had with Tide where he reported the scam, and have noted the frustration and difficulty he says he experienced when trying to speak to Tide on the phone. I can see he reported the scam on 5 November 2024, and a final response was issued on 16 December 2024 providing him with referral rights to our service. I can understand Mr K’s frustration at what was a difficult and worrying time. However, I think his distress was primarily caused by falling victim to a cruel scam, rather than Tide’s handling of his request for reimbursement. As I mentioned above, as C is the complainant (not Mr K), I am unable to make any award for Mr K’s distress. Taking into account what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances, I’m satisfied that awarding 8% interest on the reimbursement is sufficient to compensate C for being without money that Tide should have reimbursed sooner. Tide has also referred to the fact that Mr K informed them that the third-party financial institution he transferred funds to would be issuing a refund so doesn’t want to issue a refund until it confirms that it hasn’t issued a refund. Mr K confirmed he hasn’t received a refund. I appreciate Tide’s concerns, but the third party confirmed no refunds were issued. So I don’t agree that a refund from Tide would likely result in C being doubly compensated. My final decision My final decision is that I uphold this complaint and direct ClearBank Limited to reimburse C disputed payments 2-6, totalling £16,250, and pay C simple interest at the rate of 8% on this amount from the date of the payments to the date of settlement. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask C to accept or reject my decision before 3 April 2026. Sureeni Weerasinghe Ombudsman

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