Svetlana Bunina v Orkhan Nasibov

1. This is an application by notice dated 2 March 2026, whereby the claimant, Svetlana Bunina, seeks as against the defendant in the claim, Orkhan Nasibov, the continuation of a domestic freezing injunction against the defendant granted by HHJ Malcolm Davis-White KC, on 2 March 2026 until the conclusion of these proceedings.

2. That application is supported by the first affidavit of Mr Robert Laurie, who is the claimant's solicitor, and the first affidavit of Mr Vladislav Bunin, who is the claimant's husband. There have since also been second affidavits of both of these gentlemen, which are also in support of the application. There has been no response from the defendant and hence no evidence has been filed on his behalf.

3. The application arises in the context of a claim which was begun by Part 7 claim form issued on 10 February 2026. That claim form sets out in very short order the broad description of the claim. On 7 February 2025, the claimant entered into a fund storage agreement with Guavapay UAB, a Lithuanian company. That agreement is dated 7 February 2025. On the same date, the claimant had entered into a personal guarantee agreement with the defendant, also with that date. And, on that basis, the claimant transferred 15 Bitcoin to a wallet controlled by Guavapay UAB, again on the same date, 7 February 2025.

4. The claim form goes on to say that, on 19 September 2025, the claimant sent Guavapay UAB a formal notice of withdrawal in accordance with the terms of the fund storage agreement, requesting full withdrawal of the 15 Bitcoin by 3 October 2025, and payment of all accrued interest. No response has been received by the claimant from Guavapay UAB, and no funds have been returned to her to date. On 12 January 2026, the claimant made a demand to the defendant for payment of the sums due and owing to her in the amount of $1,833,997.05 or €561,845.45, plus interest. The defendant has failed to pay the sum demanded, or any sum, in breach of the personal guarantee agreement. And then there is a claim for the sum.

5. The particulars of claim were attached, and go into the matter in more detail. In relation to the personal guarantee agreement, I refer, first of all, to the address given for the defendant, Apartment 36, Valencia Tower, 3 Bollinder Place, London EC1V 2AP. The agreement also gives details of the defendant's passport, issued by the Republic of Vanuatu, and valid from 8 November 2023 until 7 November 2033.

6. In the guarantee, the defendant is defined as the guarantor. Clause 1 provides that: “The guarantor hereby irrevocably and unconditionally guarantees to the user the full and punctual performance of all obligations of the provider under the storage agreement, including, but not limited to 1.1 ensuring the secure storage of the funds in the wallet as specified in the storage agreement, 1.2 timely payment of monthly interest in accordance with the terms of the Storage agreement, 1.3 the return of the funds upon the user's request, subject to the withdrawal notification terms outlined in the storage agreement.” There are then other provisions, including clause 2 (scope of liability) and clause 3 (repayment terms). Under clause 4, (default and remedies): “In the event of default by the provider, the user shall have the right to demand immediate fulfilment of the provider's obligations from the guarantor and further provision.” Clause 5 is headed, “Governing Law and Jurisdiction” and reads: “This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United Kingdom. Any disputes arising under or in connexion with this agreement shall be resolved exclusively by the courts of England, and the guarantor consents to the jurisdiction of such courts.”

7. There is no such law as the law of the United Kingdom, since it comprises at least three different legal systems. The reference, therefore, to the laws of the United Kingdom should, I think, be understood as a reference to English law, both because of the exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts of England, and also the fact that the defendant gave us his address in this agreement and his residential address in London.

8. An application was originally made under or in relation to that claim for a domestic freezing injunction, which was granted by HHJ Davis-White KC, sitting as a judge of the High Court. That order was dated 2 March 2026, but it was a without notice application, and therefore given over until a return day. The hearing before me is the return date on that injunction. And, as I have already said, the claimant by a second application notice, dated 2 March 2026, has now sought the continuation of the injunction.

9. At about the same time, on 4 March 2026, the claimant made a further application for permission to serve the freezing injunction by an alternative method. The reason that this was done was that, although the claim form and the particulars of claim were served on the defendant on 3 March 2026 by reason of leaving the documents at the address specified for the purposes of Section 1140 of the Companies Act 2005, the service of the freezing order was more problematic. Those documents comprising the freezing order, the alternative service order, the hearing bundle for each of the two hearings (one in relation to the without notice injunction, the other in relation to the alternative service application) and the application notice for a continuation of the freezing injunction were also to be served that way. But what the court did in relation to the application for service by an alternative method was to order that service would be good if effected by means of the use of a certain Telegram account. That is, Telegram in the sense of the messaging and telephony service. And the judge, Joanna Smith J, made that order on 6 March 2026.

10. Accordingly, following that order, all the documents which were required to be served, and to which I have referred, were served by way of messages sent to that account. I have been shown evidence, especially from Mr Bunin, the husband of the claimant, which demonstrates convincingly that he and the defendant had direct contact, both by messaging and by telephony via the Telegram account, and that therefore, there was a strong expectation that messages sent to that account would be received by the defendant. There are records in the evidence which show actual conversations between Mr Bunin and the defendant using that account.

11. The other efforts to effect personal service of the order on the defendant included attending at 36 Ravensbourne Apartments, which on the evidence before me, is a residence at which the defendant's wife and children reside, and therefore, the court could reasonably expect that documents sent to the defendant at that address would eventually come to his attention.

12. Nevertheless, the primary basis upon which the claimant says that the injunction was served, and the other documents which were required to be served at the same time is by means of the Telegram account. And there is no doubt from the evidence before me that those documents were indeed sent to that Telegram account. I therefore have to consider what is the likelihood that the account represents a means of getting the documents to the defendant.

13. Someone responded to the messages from the claimant's solicitors, but said that whoever it was was not the defendant. I have to say I have very grave doubts about that on the evidence before me. But it does not matter. I am not required to decide anything about that, because that person then went on to say, “But I have sent the documents on to the defendant.” Either way, it seems to me I can be satisfied to a very high standard that the defendant has indeed had service of all these documents upon him.

14. I therefore turn to the substance of the case. First of all, there is the corporate structure which is involved in this case. The defendant appears to be a shareholder in and a director, sometimes sole director, of a number of companies. The two which are directly owned and controlled by him are the Lithuanian company, Guavapay UAB, and an English registered company, Tainotech Limited. Tainotech appears to be a shareholder in a series of other English companies, including Guavapay Limited, and other companies with the Guavapay name or as part of their name. I have been taken to other records from Companies House which demonstrate that.

15. As I have said, the agreement was made with the Lithuanian company, but it was guaranteed by the defendant himself. A withdrawal request was made by the claimant to the Lithuanian company on 19 September 2025. It was addressed to the claimant's usual point of contact at Guavapay, someone called Afar Jafarli. It appears that, two days before, the FCA in the UK had imposed a limit on Guavapay Limited's activities in the UK. There was also a change of directors on the board of the company on 19 September.

16. As is clear, the jurisdiction of the court is engaged in this case because of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the personal guarantee agreement made with the defendant. So, there is no question but that the English court has jurisdiction to deal with this dispute.

17. Secondly, there is the question of a good arguable case. Mr Kuhn, for the claimant, took me to the matters set out in paragraph 35 of his skeleton argument, subparagraphs a to h: “35. As pleaded at §9 in the POC [HB/3/30-31], the effect of the FSA and the PGA is that: a. The Applicant agreed to store 15 BTC with Guavapay UAB: Clause 1.1-1.2 of the FSA. b. Guavapay UAB agreed to pay interest on the 15 BTC at a rate of 15% per annum (calculated at 1.25% per month): Clause 1.3 of the FSA. c. The Applicant was entitled to withdraw her funds from the relevant cryptocurrency wallet held with Guavapay UAB upon written notice of at least two weeks (14 days) (the ‘Withdrawal Notification Terms’): Clause 2.1 and 4.1 of the FSA. d. Upon termination of the FSA, Guavapay was obliged to settle all outstanding interest payments up to the date of termination: Clause 5.2 of the FSA. e. The Respondent, as Guarantor, guaranteed the full and punctual performance of all obligations of Guavapay UAB owed to the Applicant under the FSA, including as to the return of funds upon her request, subject to the Withdrawal Notification Terms: Clauses 1 to 1.3 (inclusive) of the PGA. f. In the event of Guavapay UAB’s failure to fulfil its obligations under the FSA, the Respondent, as Guarantor, is obliged to return the funds upon the Applicant’s request within 14 days of receiving written notice from the Applicant: Clause 3.1 of the PGA. g. This obligation expressly includes the return of both the principal sum and accrued and unpaid interest due and owing to the Applicant under the FSA. The Applicant is entitled to withdraw the said funds, in full or in part, in fiat currency, specifically in US Dollars (USD) or Euros (EUR): Clause 2.2 of the FSA and Clause 3.2 of the PGA. h. The Applicant has the right to demand immediate fulfilment of Guavapay UAB’s obligations from the Respondent: Clause 4.1 of the PGA.”

18. The point that comes most strongly out of this recitation of the features of this case is that, since the demand was made, there has been absolutely no response from UAB, and UAB is therefore in breach of the fund storage agreement. There is then a letter by the claimant's solicitors to the defendant making a demand under the personal guarantee agreement and that was sent up to the address, not the address given in the personal guarantee agreement, but the address given by the defendant under Section 1140 of the Companies Act 2005. But it was also sent to the defendant by email.

19. The copies of the same letter were also sent to the defendant at 36 Valencia Tower, which is the address given in the personal guarantee agreement. It was also sent to the property, which (according to the Land Registry) belongs to the defendant at 36 Ravensbourne Apartments, where his wife and children live, and also was sent to the defendant via the same Telegram account, the subject of the order made by Joanna Smith J.

20. So far as a good arguable case is concerned, I am asked to bear in mind the features set out in subparagraphs a to h of paragraph 35 of the claimant's skeleton, and to infer that there is no obvious or apparent defence to the claim, and therefore there must be at least a good arguable case on the merits of the case. As it seems to me, that is right.

21. The third matter which I must be satisfied of is that there is, in this case, a real risk of dissipation of assets by the defendant. This is a case where there are a number of features of the case, which perhaps looked at in isolation, one from another, might not persuade the court that there was a real risk of dissipation. For example, there is the fact that the Lithuanian company appears to have insufficient assets to repay its indebtedness, and that this is proved by the mere refusal to return the 15 BTC Bitcoin, and coupled with the fact, of course, that the guarantor, the defendant, is the sole director and shareholder in the Lithuanian company. It also appears, on the evidence, that the claimant's Bitcoin may have been moved out of the wallet that they were stored into. So, that, if true, would be an additional signal as part of the insufficiency of assets of the Lithuanian company.

22. The second factor, which is relied on, is that the defendant appears to be jurisdictionally exceptionally mobile. He appears over the past few years to have had no fewer than five nationalities, and currently is a national of the Republic of Vanuatu in the Pacific Ocean. It is unclear on the evidence where the defendant lives, although he appears to operate with a multiplicity of addresses. Some people do prize their privacy very highly. But, where you have coupled with the reluctance to give details of where he is, or to respond, other factors suggesting that something may well not be right, the fact that someone does not want to tell you anything about where they are, or indeed who they are, is itself a matter of some concern. In passing, I note, although I do not place any particular reliance on it, that Vanuatu appears not to have any mutual enforcement agreements with the United Kingdom.

23. The third factor which is relevant here is the fact that there was a winding up petition presented by a creditor against the UK company, Guavapay Limited on 24 December 2025. And it appears that a winding up order has since been made, in January 2026. There were a number of directors of the English company, apart from the defendant. They all resigned on 19 September last year, just after the FCA had imposed the restrictions on the English company’s activities. The only one who continued was the defendant himself, and he too resigned from Guavapay Limited on 9 January 2026, when another person was appointed for a very short period. I do not know what the current position is since the winding up order was made.

24. The fourth factor, which I take into account, is that the defendant has the effective control and the ownership of Guavapay and the other English companies, as well as the Lithuanian company. That by itself does not mean a great deal, except that it means that whatever decisions the defendant comes to can be implemented immediately without having to consult anyone else. It speeds up the process.

25. The fifth factor is that the Lithuanian company and the defendant, as guarantor, have ignored the demands for payment. The defendant has failed to meet his own obligations or even accept that he has any, and has not responded. That is, I think, not the action of someone who has nothing to hide, so to speak.

26. And then the last factor is that it appears that the financial position of the companies is weak. I think that HHJ Davis-White KC described it as dominoes waiting to be pushed over. But it seems to me, from being taken to some of the documents in the case, that this is a case where one company appears to have assets, but the assets appear to be liabilities of the other companies. And so really it is, if I may change the game analogy, a house of cards.

27. So, looking at all of that, do I consider that there is a real risk of dissipation? Yes, I do. I am entirely satisfied as to that. I should say, of course, that I am entirely satisfied that the defendant has assets within this jurisdiction. He is the registered proprietor of the flat at 36 Ravensbourne Apartments, for example. There may well be others as well.

28. The next point is the question of whether it is just and convenient to grant the continuation of the freezing order. The claimant makes a number of points in favour of the justness and convenience of continuing the order. The first is that this is not an application for a worldwide freezing order. It simply applies within this jurisdiction. So it is limited in scope. It is also, and this is the second point, limited in the number of bells and whistles which are being sought to be attached to the form of the injunction. Indeed, the standard form is being used here, and there is nothing that the court needs to be particularly careful about, except in the general sense that the court always is careful about freezing injunctions. The third matter, which I mention, is that the judge on the previous occasion, HHJ Davis-White KC, asked for £25,000 by way of fortification of the claimant's cross undertaking. This has been provided, and I take that into account. It will continue. The fourth point is that this is not a case where there is any real pushback against the claim. The underlying claim on the documents, and I have only seen the documents, appears to me to be a strong one, and there has been no response whatever from the defendant to say there is anything wrong with it.

29. Accordingly, I am quite satisfied that it is just and convenient in the circumstances of this case to continue the freezing injunction until trial or further order, or perhaps I mean conclusion of the proceedings. Trial or further order is probably better because that provides a point at which an order can be made. And if it comes to an end earlier, then an application can be made for the discharge. ---------------