Praful Chhaya v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

Preliminary matters

1. References in this decision to a ‘section’ are references to the applicable section of T he Road Traffic Act 1988 .

2. In this decision, we use the following terms to denote the meanings shown: ADIs: Approved Driving Instructors (those whose name appear on the Register) . Appellant: Praful Chhaya. Offences: The offences referred to in paragraph 4 of this decision (with “Offence” to be construed accordingly). Register: The Register of Approved Driving Instructors maintained by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency. Registrar: The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors (the Respondent). Registrar’s Decision: The decision of the Registrar, by way of letter to the Appellant dated 28 January 2025, to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register . Introduction - b ackground to the appeal

3. This was an appeal against the Registrar’s Decision.

4. The reasons for the Registrar’s Decision were, in summary, that the Appellant had accrued penalty points for three motoring offences – namely, a fixed penalty of three penalty points on 22 April 2023 for speeding, a fixed penalty of three penalty points on 19 October 2024 for speeding and a fixed penalty of three penalty points on 26 October 2024 for speeding – and accordingly the Registrar considered that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. The appeal The grounds of appeal

5. The Appellant challenged the Registrar’s Decision, arguing that they were a fit and proper person. The material aspects of the Appellant’s appeal relied, in summary, on the grounds that: a. removing him from the Register would have a devastating impact on his livelihood and, because it would deprive him of this right to earn a living, would contravene the Human Rights Act; b. the second Offence and the third Offence took place at the same location a week apart; c. there were mitigating personal circumstances regarding the third Offence; d. he was unaware of the second Offence at the time of the third Offence; and e. the Offences involved speeds of less than 10 mph above the relevant speed limits.

6. In support of his appeal, the Appellant provided some references and information regarding his work with a charity. The Registrar’s case

7. The Registrar resisted the appeal. The Registrar’s Statement of Case maintained that the Appellant’s driving licence being endorsed with nine penalty points cannot be ignored. The Registrar accordingly upheld their view that the Appellant was not a ‘fit and proper person’ to have their name on the Register. The Registrar also stated that the Appellant had not given notification of the Offences, despite an obligation to do so pursuant to their registration as an ADI. Mode of hearing

8. The proceedings were held by the cloud video platform. The Tribunal Panel, the Appellant and Mr Russell (on behalf of the Registrar) joined remotely. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.

9. There was a slight delay in starting the hearing as the Appellant was unable to connect for technical reasons. After he joined, there were some minor difficulties with his connection (which had no material adverse effect on proceedings), but these resolved themselves and subsequently he had no further problems with participating remotely.

10. However, on two occasions during the hearing, Judge Roper lost his connection to the video link. On the first occasion, the lost connection was only brief and the proceedings were paused during the interruption. On the second occasion, Judge Roper had to log-out and rejoin and a few minutes passed before he re-connected. At the point of that lost connection, the Appellant had been giving an oral statement which was based on the Appellant’s written submissions in the bundle. Judge Roper explained that he had missed parts of the Appellant’s oral statement. The Appellant confirmed that his oral statement had been based on his written submissions which were included in the bundle and accordingly the Appellant and Mr Russell were content that the hearing could continue without the Appellant needing to repeat the parts which had been missed. However, Judge Roper subsequently obtained and listened to a recording of the hearing and therefore was aware of everything which the Appellant said during the hearing. It has all been taken into account in reaching this decision.

11. There were no other interruptions of note during the hearing. The evidence and submission

12. The Tribunal read and took account of a bundle of evidence and pleadings.

13. We heard from the Appellant directly, as well as hearing oral submissions from Mr Russell on behalf of the Registrar .

14. All of the contents of the bundle and the parties’ submissions were taken into account, even if not directly referred to in this decision. The relevant legal principles

15. Section 123(1) prohibits the giving of instruction in the driving of a motor car for payment unless the instructor’s name is entered in the Register, or they are the holder of a current licence issued under section 129 .

16. Conditions for entry and retention on the Register require a person to be, and continue to be, a “fit and proper person” pursuant to section 125(3)(e) and section 127(3)(e).

17. A person’s name may therefore be removed from the Register under section 128(2)(e) if the Registrar considers that they have ceased to be a “fit and proper person”.

18. The requirement to be a “fit and proper person” is not simply that the person is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor, but that they are a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. Accordingly, the requirement to be a “fit and proper person” extends beyond instructional ability alone and, in assessing whether someone is a “fit and proper person”, account has to be taken of their character, behaviour and standards of conduct. This involves consideration of all material matters, including convictions, cautions and other relevant behaviour, placing all matters in context, and balancing positive and negative features as appropriate.

19. The entry of a person’s name on the Register carries with it an ‘official seal of approval’ and consequently maintenance of public confidence in the Register is important. The Registrar therefore has the duty of ensuring that ADIs are ‘fit and proper’ persons to have their names entered in the Register. As part of that, the Registrar exercises functions of scrutiny and that is why there are stringent disclosure requirements expected of ADIs and those wishing to become an ADI.

20. In cases involving motoring offences, it is expected that anyone who is to be an ADI will have standards of driving and behaviour above that of an ordinary motorist. Teaching people of all ages (including those aged under 18) to drive safely, carefully and competently is a professional vocation requiring a significant degree of responsibility. Such a demanding task should only be entrusted to those with high personal and professional standards and who themselves have demonstrated a keen regard for road safety and compliance with the law.

21. In cases involving non-motoring offences, the standing of the Register could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidence undermined, if it were known that a person’s name had been permitted onto, or allowed to remain on, the Register when they had demonstrated behaviours, or been convicted or cautioned in relation to offences, substantially material to the question of fitness. Indeed, it would be unfair to others who have been scrupulous in their behaviour, and in observing the law, if such matters were ignored or overlooked.

22. Some of the factors in the preceding paragraph can also be relevant in cases involving motoring offences. The role and powers of the Tribunal

23. An appeal to the Tribunal against the Registrar’s Decision is undertaken by way of a ‘re-hearing’; the Tribunal ‘stands in the shoes’ of the Registrar and take a fresh decision on the evidence before it, giving appropriate weight to the Registrar’s Decision (as the Registrar is tasked by Parliament with making such decisions). The Tribunal does not conduct a procedural review of the Registrar’s decision-making process but, in reaching its decision, the Tribunal may review any findings of fact on which the Registrar’s Decision was based and the Tribunal may come to a different decision regarding those facts.

24. The powers of the Tribunal in determining the appeal are set out in section 131(3). In summary, for the purposes of the appeal, the Tribunal is empowered to make an order for the removal or the retention of the Appellant’s name in the Register, as it thinks fit.

25. However, under section 131(4A), if the Tribunal considers that any evidence adduced on the appeal had not been adduced to the Registrar before the Registrar’s Decision, it may (instead of making such an order) remit the matter to the Registrar for him to reconsider the Registrar’s Decision.

26. Where the Tribunal makes an order for the removal of the Appellant’s name in the Register, it may also, pursuant to section 131(4), direct that (in essence) the Appellant cannot apply to have their name entered in the Register for a period of up to four years. Discussion and findings

27. As we have noted, the Registrar has the duty of ensuring that those who have their names entered in the Register are ‘fit and proper’ persons. Part of this is ensuring that ADIs understand their responsibilities and can show that they not only know the rules but follow them.

28. In this case, the Appellant had accrued a total of nine points on his driving licence and had not notified the Registrar of the Offences.

29. The Appellant accepted the high standards required of him as an ADI. In essence, he sought leniency for the reasons set out in his grounds of appeal.

30. We consider the Appellant’s arguments regarding contravention of the Human Rights Act to be misconceived. In summary, this is because: a. there is no right ‘to earn a living’ under the Human Rights Act; and b. in any event, removing the Appellant from the Register would not deprive him of this right to earn a living (only his right to work as an ADI, but this is related to the conditions we have referred to, which are essentially for the benefit of the public).

31. The Appellant provided his view of the mitigating personal circumstances regarding the third Offence. In summary, he was distressed about some particular circumstances regarding his daughter (compounded by other difficult personal circumstances) and he considered that this had affected his concentration. We do not detail the circumstances in this decision, to respect the privacy of the Appellant and his daughter, but we accept and understand that the Appellant was very upset by the circumstances in question. However, we are not persuaded that this was a sufficiently mitigating factor in respect of the third Offence (especially having regard the other factors we refer to).

32. The Appellant stated during the hearing that he had been on a speed awareness course, linked to an earlier speeding transgression (in addition to the Offences). The Appellant submitted that, in effect, he had learned from the experience of the Offences and had made deliberate changes to improve his driving. We are not persuaded by those arguments. In this case, the Appellant had already been caught speeding, resulting in his attendance on a speed awareness course, but was subsequently guilty of the first Offence, even before committing the second Offence and the third Offence. Consequently, the Appellant has been guilty of three speeding offences despite previously attending a speed awareness course and despite being an ADI. We consider that this is a matter of concern, given the Appellant’s status as an ADI.

33. In our view, it does not help the Appellant’s case that the second Offence and the third Offence occurred in the same location a week apart. If anything, it means that the Appellant should have been more aware of the relevant speed limit, having been in the area only seven days previously. The Appellant also stated that he knew the area well, in any event, but that he must have forgotten to switch off his speed limiter.

34. We also had some concerns with the Appellant’s argument that he would have taken “greater care” at the time of the third Offence if he had been aware of the second Offence; he should have been taking proper and sufficient care as to the relevant speed limit in any event (especially given the higher standard of driving expected of ADIs) and we consider that it is immaterial that he was not aware of the second Offence at the time of the third Offence. We also consider the Appellant’s arguments that he would have taken greater care at the time of the second Offence to be inconsistent with his assertion that he was unable to concentrate at the time because of his daughter’s circumstances. Also, in our view, taking into account the other factors we refer to, we do not consider it is a sufficient mitigating factor that the Offences involved speeding of less than 10 mph above the relevant speed limits.

35. The Appellant referred us to other First-tier Tribunal decisions, but we have not taken any into account. Other First-Tier Tribunal decisions are not binding on us and, more importantly, each such decision turns on its facts.

36. The Registrar cited statistics of injuries and deaths relating to driving offences. The Registrar considered that he could not condone motoring offences such as those which the Appellant had been found guilty of. The Registrar’s view was that allowing the Appellant to remain on the Register could undermine the public’s confidence in it. They added that it would be unfair to other ADIs who had been scrupulous in observing the law to allow the Appellant to remain on the Register, given the Offences. We consider those arguments of the Registrar to have some force in the circumstances of this appeal.

37. We have taken into account all of the circumstances, including the Appellant’s good work with charity and his contributions to the community, and we accept that the Appellant showed remorse for the Offences. All things considered, however, we find that the accumulation of nine penalty points for speeding is indicative of the Appellant not sufficiently understanding the importance of not speeding. We are also mindful that the Appellant stated that his case “involved no danger” and we consider that that illustrates a lack of awareness of the dangers of speeding. We find that there are no extenuating circumstances which would justify allowing the Appellant to remain on the Register on the facts of this case.

38. The Appellant also stated that he was unaware of the need to notify the Registrar of the Offences. However, there was a clear declaration in his application form to be an ADI to the effect that he must notify the Registrar within 7 days of any fixed penalties or other offences. This declaration was in the section signed by the Appellant. The Second Offence and the Third Offence took place after this signed declaration. In our view, there was no excuse or justification for the Appellant to not notify the Registrar of the Second Offence and the Third Offence after that date. We consider that this failure was also a concern.

39. For all of the reasons we have given, we find that the Appellant does not currently meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person to have their name retained in the Register. On balance, taking into account all the circumstances, we conclude that the Registrar’s Decision was correct.

40. We therefore dismiss the appeal and we order that the Appellant’s name be removed from the Register. Signed: Stephen Roper Date: 17 December 2025 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal