Pocket Renting Limited (in Administration) v Investalet Limited & Ors

1. This is a claim for possession and money judgment in respect of five residential properties owned by the claimant, who is a company in administration. All five properties are situated in West London.

2. The properties are 52 Chippenham Road, 58A Chippenham Road, 64A Chippenham Road, Flat 83 Carlton Mansion, Randolph Avenue, and Flat 85 Elgin Mansion, Elgin Avenue. They will be referred to in the rest of this judgment as “the properties.”

3. All parties were represented by counsel. The claimant by Mr Moraes, the first defendant by Mr Brittain and the second defendants by Mr Vasilescu.

4. Mr Vasilescu provided an email showing that he had been contacted by Bleu Plan LLC who had arranged for Mr Vasilescu to represent the second defendants. Bleu Plan claims to have been granted sub-tenancies of all the properties by the first defendant and to have in turn let them on assured tenancies to the second defendants. There was some amount of confusion as to the precise lines of communication between the second defendants and Mr Vasilescu. A witness statement was filed by Mr David Edwards of Bleu Plan dated 4 February, i.e. the day before the last hearing, in which he set out the position of the current occupiers. Background ICC Proceedings

5. This matter has had a troubled history, the first attempt to obtain possession was made in the Insolvency and Companies Court in Maher & Anor v Investalet Ltd & Anor [2025] EWHC 3133 (Ch) (‘the ICC Proceedings’). That was an attempt to seek possession within administration proceedings.

6. The background to this matter has already been largely rehearsed and considered in detail and dealt with in those proceedings. In that case, the claimant sought possession of the same five properties. ICC Judge Greenwood would have made a possession order, but for the fact he considered he did not have jurisdiction to do so, that is what led to these proceedings being issued.

7. Judge Greenwood set out the factual background as follows. a. The claimant had let the properties to the first defendant by way of five written tenancy agreements between 2018 and 2021; b. Administrators had then been appointed in respect of the claimant company on 29 September 2023. c. The first defendant's case on giving up possession was that it had sublet the properties to Bleu Plan LLC, by tenancy agreements in March and April of 2024; after the date that the claimant had been put into administration, d. That sub-letting was without the consent or knowledge of the administrators; e. Bleu Plan said it had sub-sub-let the properties to individuals on assured shorthold tenancies; f. Initially when the identity of the occupants was requested by the claimant, the first defendant relied on Data Protection regulations to avoid giving any information; g. The administrators terminated the first defendant's tenancies by way of notice to quit and those of any occupiers and requested vacant possession by 31st of August 2024; h. Letters were sent out to the occupiers of the properties but were unanswered. Attendance at the properties by representatives of the claimant suggested though that they were occupied.

8. In respect of the tenancies to Bleu Plan, he found the following: “56.1. The notices to quit were validly served on 28 June 2024, and the Investalet Tenancies came to an end on 31 August 2024. Since then, Investalet has had no right to occupy the Properties. 56.2. Investalet had no contractual right to sub-let the Properties. I do not accept that it was entitled to do so by virtue of the alleged permission given orally by Mr Wilkinson: 56.2.1. first, the sub-tenancies were not made until after the commencement of the administration, after the termination of Dendrow’s GMA, and thus after the termination of the authority or power of either Dendrow or Mr Wilkinson to act for the Company; 56.2.2. second, Investalet’s evidence of the alleged prior oral permission was unconvincing: there was no statement from Mr Wilkinson himself and no reference to the alleged permission in any document (other than the letter from Mr Wilkinson); 56.2.3. third, in any event, the permission, as stated by Mr Wilkinson, was contingent on Investalet’s continuing adherence to the terms of the Investalet Tenancies; however, it is in breach of those Tenancies because it has failed to pay any rent since November 2023; 56.2.4. on any view therefore, the sub-tenancies were contractually prohibited; 56.2.5. finally, the evidence of the sub-tenancies themselves was again, most unsatisfactory: there was no explanation of their production in a form unsigned on behalf of Bleu Plan, or their later production in a form signed by Mr Siha, but using different a signature. 56.3 In any event, despite having been served and given notice at every stage, there was no opposition to the claim advanced by any actual alleged occupier or sub-tenant of Bleu Plan.”

9. As reflected in that last paragraph, ICC Judge Greenwood was satisfied that the occupiers of the properties had been served with the proceedings. It is notable that in those proceedings none of the occupants appeared at the hearing nor sought to resist the possession order that was sought. These proceedings

10. These proceedings also have not been without their fair share of trouble. The Court did not leave sufficient time between the issue of the proceedings and the first hearing date. The claim was issued on 19 December 2025 and the first hearing was listed for 13 January 2026. That was contrary to the provisions of CPR Part 55.5 (3) which provides that 28 days needs to be given between issue and the first hearing. That is in the case of standard possession proceedings.

11. The date can be shorter in respect of what is termed ‘a possession claim against trespassers’, but there is a specific definition of trespasser in those types of proceedings at CPR Part 55.1(b), being: ‘a possession claim against trespassers’ means a claim for the recovery of land which the claimant alleges is occupied only by a person or persons who entered or remained on the land without the consent of a person entitled to possession of that land but does not include a claim against a tenant or sub-tenant whether his tenancy has been terminated or not’

12. That is not engaged in the present case as certainly the first defendant was initially in occupation pursuant to a lease and the second defendants also appear to initially have been tenants.

13. On 13 January 2026, the matter came before Chief Master Schuman, the claimant and the first defendant were both represented by counsel, but there was no attendance on behalf of the second defendants. Chief Master Schuman dismissed the first defendant's application to have the matter transferred to the County Court and adjourned the matter to 3 February 2026 in order to allow sufficient time to elapse between issue the first hearing.

14. That hearing did not take place on 3 February 2026 but eventually came before me on 5 February. I have been provided with a series of certificates of service, crucially for matters that will be relevant later on, in relation to the second defendants. Service of these proceedings

15. Service of proceedings against the second defendants was carried out following the requirements of CPR 55.6. ‘55.6 Where, in a possession claim against trespassers, the claim has been issued against ‘persons unknown’, the claim form, particulars of claim and any witness statements must be served on those persons by – (a) (i) attaching copies of the claim form, particulars of claim and any witness statements to the main door or some other part of the land so that they are clearly visible; and (ii) if practicable, inserting copies of those documents in a sealed transparent envelope addressed to ‘the occupiers’ through the letter box; or (b) placing stakes in the land in places where they are clearly visible and attaching to each stake copies of the claim form, particulars of claim and any witness statements in a sealed transparent envelope addressed to ‘the occupiers’.’

16. I have been provided with evidence, which I accept that it was effected by attaching sealed copies of the claim form and particulars of claim to the doors of the properties and inserting the papers through the letterbox addressed to ‘the occupiers’. They were first served on 30 December 2025, that provided not just the proceedings themselves, but also the date of the first hearing.

17. Service of the notice of the adjourned hearing was again carried out in the same manner on 14 January and then service of the further adjourned first hearing was given on 3 February again in the same manner. Who is in occupation?

18. As mentioned above, Bleu Plan had been involved in the ICC Proceedings and had at a late stage disclosed a number of tenancy agreements in relation to the properties which provided the identity of various tenants. Those tenancies were granted around March and April 2024 and indeed its own tenancy, that is Blue Plan's tenancy, was granted around that time which was after the claimant had gone into administration.

19. The tenancies disclosed in the ICC Proceedings were: a. 52 Chippenham Road, subject to a tenancy dated 18 March 2024 to a Mohammed Yamil Ibn Khalid Al-Walid; b. 58A Chippenham Road, subject to tenancy dated 9 April that was to a Mr James Mason,Andrew Clarke and a Louise Weston. c. 64A Chippenham Road, subject to a tenancy let to a Victoria Ivanov. d. 85 Elgin Mansions, subject to a tenancy dated 22 April 2024 to Khadija Bint Aziz; and e. 83 Carlton Mansions, subject to a tenancy dated 23August 2024 to Hamza Massoud and Yasmin Bint Youssef.

20. I was provided evidence showing that some of the properties were advertised on Airbnb-style websites through a company which was connected to the first defendant. The dates of the adverts were later than the dates of the tenancies referred to above. The advertisements for some of the properties also suggested that they were potentially houses in multiple occupation, with individual rooms being advertised for letting. That ran contrary to the impression given by the tenancies, which was that each property was wholly and individually let to a small number of individuals collectively.

21. Mr Edwards provided in his witness statement details of the current occupation, and those that were instructing Mr Vasilescu. That showed different occupation to that disclosed in the ICC Proceedings by way of the said tenancy agreements.

22. Instead of the occupants at 58A Chippenham Road being James Mason, Andrew Clarke, and Louise Weston there was somebody called Ali Saeed who had said he was living there. Instead of Victoria Ivanov living at 64A Chippenham Road it was said that Louise Weston was living there. And in relation to 83 Carlton Mansions, no one had been identified and it appeared that if it was occupied, the occupier had not appointed Mr Vasilescu to represent them. Arrears, settlement sums and mesne profits

23. A winding up petition by the claimant against the first defendant in relation to unpaid rents was withdrawn on the basis of a settlement agreement to pay £122,000 by way of instalments. In breach of that agreement, as of today’s date, only £5,000 has been paid. In addition there are significant sums by way of mesne profits for the failure to give up possession on termination of their lease. Procedural Objections

24. Mr Vasilescu's main objections were on procedural grounds. Transfer to the County Court

25. The first was that the matter should not be kept in the High Court. With some admirable candour he asserted that there were huge prejudices to the second defendants in the matter being dealt with in the High Court because it would deal with the matter more swiftly. If it were transferred to the County Court, which is the usual home for possession claims, then the defendants could take advantage of the unfortunate delays that beset the County Courts in order to stay in occupation longer, where otherwise they may be evicted earlier.

26. That matter was already been determined by Chief Master Schuman at the previous hearing, when she dismissed the application to transfer to the County Court, even though the second defendants did not attend that hearing, I do not consider I am in a position to go behind that decision but even if I could do, I see no reason to disturb it. Mr Vasilescu’s reasoning did not warrant a transfer. Persons Unknown

27. The second objection was that the occupiers are referred to in the proceedings as ‘persons unknown’ and have been served in that capacity, rather than in the names of the occupiers as disclosed by the tenancy agreements in March and April 2024 that I have referred to above.

28. It is said that it is not acceptable to describe people as persons unknown when you know of their identities. I do not consider that that is a bar to making a possession order for the following reasons.

29. By way of background, the then occupiers had been served with the ICC Proceedings using the label Persons Unknown and service was on ‘the occupiers’ as recorded by Judge Greenwood and they had played no part in those proceedings. Notwithstanding their misguided nature, those proceedings were still a claim for possession. Judge Greenwood made a clear finding not just of service on them but that they had not raised any grounds of resistance nor any correspondence and considered that possession would have been granted but for the jurisdictional issue.

30. I find that they have been properly served with these proceedings.

31. Whilst Bleu Plan did disclose some tenancy agreements in the ICC proceedings, which identified some individuals occupying pursuant to assured tenancies, in around March or April 2024, I do not consider that it is a procedural misstep or fatality to this claim not to have named those people. Person’s unknown is sufficient to describe the second defendants. The crucial point is that they are sufficiently described in the claim form and processes served on them.

32. Lord Sumption JSC set out the position in Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [2019] UKSC 6 , [2019] 1 WLR 1471 “12. The Civil Procedure Rules neither expressly authorise nor expressly prohibit exceptions to the general rule that actions against unnamed parties are permissible only against trespassers. The prescribed forms include a space in which to designate the claimant and the defendant, a format which is equally consistent with their being designated by name or by description. The only requirement for a name is contained in a practice direction. But unlike the Civil Procedure Rules, which are made under statutory powers, a practice direction is no more than guidance on matters of practice issued under the authority of the heads of division. As to those matters, it is binding on judges sitting in the jurisdiction with which it is concerned: Bovale Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2009] 1 WLR 2274 . But it has no statutory force, and cannot alter the general law. Whether or not the requirement of paragraph 4.1 of Practice Direction 7A that the claim form “should state” the defendants full name admits of a discretion on the point, is not therefore the critical question. The critical question is what, as a matter of law, is the basis of the court’s jurisdiction over parties, and in what (if any) circumstances can jurisdiction be exercised on that basis against persons who cannot be named.

13. In approaching this question, it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of case in which the defendant cannot be named, to which different considerations apply. The first category comprises anonymous defendants who are identifiable but whose names are unknown. Squatters occupying a property are, for example, identifiable by their location, although they cannot be named. The second category comprises defendants, such as most hit and run drivers, who are not only anonymous but cannot even be identified. The distinction is that in the first category the defendant is described in a way that makes it possible in principle to locate or communicate with him and to know without further inquiry whether he is the same as the person described in the claim form, whereas in the second category it is not.

14. … the legitimacy of issuing or amending a claim form so as to sue an unnamed defendant can properly be tested by asking whether it is conceptually (not just practically) possible to serve it. The court generally acts in personam. Although an action is completely constituted on the issue of the claim form, for example for the purpose of stopping the running of a limitation period, the general rule is that “service of originating process is the act by which the defendant is subjected to the court’s jurisdiction”: Barton v Wright Hassall llp [2018] 1 WLR 1119 , para 8. The court may grant interim relief before the proceedings have been served or even issued, but that is an emergency jurisdiction which is both provisional and strictly conditional. In Dresser UK Ltd v Falcongate Freight Management Ltd [1992] QB 502 the Court of Appeal held that, for the purposes of the Brussels Convention (the relevant provisions of the Brussels Regulation are different), an English court was “seised” of an action when the writ was served, not when it was issued. … 15 An identifiable but anonymous defendant can be served with the claim form or other originating process, if necessary by alternative service under CPR r 6.15. This is because it is possible to locate or communicate with the defendant and to identify him as the person described in the claim form. Thus, in proceedings against anonymous trespassers under CPR r 55.3(4), service must be effected in accordance with CPR r 55.6 by attaching copies of the documents to the main door or placing them in some other prominent place on the land where the trespassers are to be found, and posting them if practical through the letter box. In Brett Wilson llp v Persons Unknown [2016] 4 WLR 69 alternative service was effected by e-mail to a website which had published defamatory matter, Warby J observing (para 11) that the relevant procedural safeguards must of course be applied. In Smith v Unknown Defendant Pseudonym “Likeicare” [2016] EWHC 1775 (QB) Green J made the same observation (para 11) in another case of internet defamation where service was effected in the same way. Where an interim injunction is granted and can be specifically enforced against some property or by notice to third parties who would necessarily be involved in any contempt, the process of enforcing it will sometimes be enough to bring the proceedings to the defendants attention. In Bloomsbury Publishing Group [2003] 1 WLR 1633 , for example, the unnamed defendants would have had to identify themselves as the persons in physical possession of copies of the book if they had sought to do the prohibited act, namely disclose it to people (such as newspapers) who had been notified of the injunction. The Court of Appeal has held that where proceedings were brought against unnamed persons and interim relief was granted to restrain specified acts, a person became both a defendant and a person to whom the injunction was addressed by doing one of those acts: South Cambridgeshire District Council v Gammell [2006] 1 WLR 658 , para 32. In the case of anonymous but identifiable defendants, these procedures for service are now well established, and there is no reason to doubt their juridical basis.”

33. In this case, I am more than satisfied that giving notice to ‘occupiers’ and serving in compliance with 55.6 was sufficient to bring it to the attention of the current occupiers of the properties these proceedings. Further, it seems that they were eventually stirred into action by the enigmatic Bleu Plan, who arranged for their representation through counsel. Whilst, for the reasons set out above, this is not strictly a squatters case within the meaning of CPR Pt 55, the same principle applies namely that the defendant is sufficiently identifiable by reference to the property they occupy. The failure to specifically name them does not mean that the proceedings are not effective.

34. Even if names had been drawn from the tenancy agreements, I do not think the matter would have ended there. At the very least, there seems to have been an element of musical chairs with the occupation of the individual properties. As I have already pointed out, a number of the individuals who were said to be living at some of these addresses are now no longer said to be in those addresses and different people have popped up at the last minute in emails. I also have severe doubts as to the occupation or the extent of the occupation, given that some of these properties have appeared on online databases or online sales or letting platforms after the dates of the tenancy agreement. In that respect, it was more sensible to issue against persons unknown and serve on the occupiers, than run the risk of a change in occupier and a defence raised that the wrong party had been named.

35. Further, each tenancy agreement provided appears to be for the entire property with a relatively sizeable rental. It seems odd then that in those circumstances none of the occupiers appear to have independently sought legal advice for a period of in excess of a year where possession proceedings were threatened against them in the ICC Proceedings and that nothing happened until Bleu Plan stirred them into action.

36. I am sceptical that the evidence produced as to the occupancy is an attempt to delay possession by Bleu Plan and possibly by the first defendant. That concern is reinforced by the unexplained lateness of the submission of evidence by Mr Edwards, the last minute corralling of the occupiers and their failure to engage in the ICC Proceedings at all.

37. Even if defendants had been named, drawn from the tenancy agreements, I have little doubt that objections would be raised on the basis that the wrong parties had been identified. As it is, the proceedings, by being served on occupiers of specific premises were sufficient to bring those occupiers within the jurisdiction of the court and these proceedings.

38. That deals with the procedural objections. Summary Disposal

39. This was a first hearing of a possession claim under CPR Pt 55. ‘55.8 (1) At the hearing fixed in accordance with rule 55.5(1) or at any adjournment of that hearing, the court may – (a) decide the claim; or (b) give case management directions. (2) Where the claim is genuinely disputed on grounds which appear to be substantial, case management directions given under paragraph (1)(b) will include the allocation of the claim to a track or directions to enable it to be allocated.’

40. The parties accepted that the approach I should take at this hearing was that set out by Lewison LJ in Global 100 Ltd v Maria Laleva [2021] EWCA Civ 1835 , [2022] 1 WLR 1046 . where he considered that this provision was the same as a test for summary judgment under CPR 24; i.e. whether the defendant had shown a real prospect of success in defending the claim. Therefore, notwithstanding the different terminology used in part 55.8, which requires a defence to be ‘genuine’, that did not add anything to the test. These proceedings can be dealt with summarily under Pt 55.8, which involves an evaluation of the merits of a potential defence.

41. If I do think there is a real prospect of success, I should go on and give directions, if not then I should order possession. First Defendant

42. In terms of the first defendant, no real defence was put forward. The notice to quit terminated their tenancy as has already been found by Judge Greenwood.

43. Mr Brittain said the first defendant was neutral as to the money judgment claimed and struggled to put any substantive defence forward to a possession claim certainly as against the first defendant. Instead, he readily segued into trying to bolster the second defendant's position. That was for the second defendant to do.

44. I am satisfied not least following the ICC Proceedings, that the lease with the first defendant was terminated and in addition that the sums claimed are outstanding both in relation to the settlement agreement and into the ongoing mean profits.

45. As at 13 January, the total claimed was the outstanding settlement sum for the rent arrears of £117,000 plus interest and mean profits of £222,970. Second Defendant

46. Turning then to the second defendant, there was no credible substantive defence being advanced by the second defendant.

47. Mr Vasilescu disavowed any reliance on section 18 of the Housing Act 1988 .

48. Section 18 provides that ‘(1) If at any time— (a) a dwelling-house is for the time being lawfully let on an assured tenancy, and (b) the landlord under the assured tenancy is himself a tenant under a superior tenancy; and (c) the superior tenancy comes to an end, then, subject to subsection (2) below, the assured tenancy shall continue in existence as a tenancy held of the person whose interest would, apart from the continuance of the assured tenancy, entitle him to actual possession of the dwelling-house at that time.’

49. It would follow that if the assured tenancies were lawfully granted, then notwithstanding the end of the first defendant’s tenancy, they would remain and would bind the claimant. That consequence would not arise if the letting was not lawful.

50. The leases between the claimant and first defendant prohibited any subletting save for ‘the immediate family or employees of the Tenant Company.’ That would seem to mean that the sub-letting to Bleu Plan would not have been a lawful let, with the result that any further sub-letting from them would also not be a lawful let. I presume that was why no reliance was placed on this section. It might also be because it would be difficult to contend that any of the assured tenancies had been ‘lawfully’ let given that they post dated the administration and there had been no consent from the administrator.

51. Mr Vasilescu not only disavowed any reliance on section 18 , but also accepted that the lease between the claimant and the first defendant had terminated. I could not therefore follow how he contended that the assured tenancies could survive, but nonetheless he asserted they did. There was no basis then that he could say that any of the occupants had any right to remain in occupation after that lease had terminated.

52. I will therefore make the possession order as sought as against persons unknown on the properties.