Paul Calvert v The Information Commissioner & Anor

Preliminary matters

1. In this decision, we use the following terms to denote the meanings shown: Appellant: Paul Calvert. Appropriate Limit: The “appropriate limit” as set out in the Fees Regulations (in this case, 18 hours’ work, as referred to in paragraph 45). Authority: The Chief Constable of Northumbria Police (the Second Respondent). Commissioner: The Information Commissioner (the First Respondent). Decision Notice: The Decision Notice of the Commissioner dated 19 July 2022, reference IC-154405-M8R7, relating to the Request. Fees Regulations: The Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulation 2004. FOIA: The Freedom of Information Act 2000 . Request: The second part of the request for information (regarding Police investigations involving the North East Ambulance Service) made by the Appellant dated 20 November 2021, as referred to in paragraph 5, covering the period between January 2016 and November 2021 (as referred to in paragraph 7) . Requested Information: The information which was requested by way of the Request. Tribunal Rules: The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009.

2. Unless the context otherwise requires (or as otherwise expressly stated), references in this decision: a. to numbered paragraphs are references to paragraphs of this decision so numbered; b. to a regulation are references to the applicable regulation of the Fees Regulations; c. to a section are references to the applicable section of FOIA. Introduction

3. This is an appeal against the Decision Notice, which (in summary) held that the Authority was entitled to refuse the Request pursuant to section 12(1) (exemption where cost of compliance exceeds appropriate limit). Background to the Appeal

4. The background to the appeal is as follows. The Appellant’s request for information

5. On 20 November 2021, the Appellant contacted the Authority and requested information in the following terms: “ Please send me the information held, this regarding Northumbria Police involvement regarding the following matters: i) FWIN 282 01/06/2020 - With regards to this Northumbria Police incident number, please supply any associated crime numbers recorded against this reference and supply the classification of the crime or crimes that were recorded and the recorded outcomes. Could you please confirm Northumbria Police's recorded outcome for the incident and/or recorded crimes. ii) Police Investigations Involving- the North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust- (a) Provide the total number of incidents/crimes, whereby Northumbria Police, have investigated the North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust or any of its employee's. (b) If any such incidents or crimes are recorded, could you provide a breakdown of the type of incident and/or crime type recorded and the final outcome of these matters. ”

6. The Authority provided an initial response on 26 November 2021. It stated that it was dealing with the first part of the Appellant’s request for information (regarding incident number FWIN 282 01/06/2020) under the Data Protection Act and that a separate response would accordingly be provided in respect of that. It confirmed that it was dealing with the second part of the Appellant’s request for information (regarding Police investigations involving the North East Ambulance Service) under FOIA and asked the Appellant to clarify the date range in respect of which he was seeking the information.

7. The Appellant replied on the same date (26 November 2021). He disputed that the first part of his request for information should be dealt with under the Data Protection Act, but he confirmed that he was seeking information for the previous six years. As we note below, the Authority therefore treated the Request as seeking the Requested Information for the period between January 2016 and November 2021.

8. The Authority responded on 17 December 2021. It stated that it held the Requested Information “in part” but refused to disclose it, citing section 12(1).

9. On the same date (17 December 2021), the Appellant wrote to the Authority to request an internal review.

10. The Authority responded on 3 February 2022, upholding its position.

11. On 5 February 2022, the Appellant contacted the Commissioner to complain about the Authority’s response to the Request.

12. The Commissioner subsequently issued the Decision Notice. The Decision Notice

13. The Decision Notice recorded that the Appellant had complained about the Authority’s application of section 12(1). The Commissioner accordingly concluded that the scope of his investigation under section 50 was to determine whether the Authority was entitled to rely on section 12(1) to refuse to comply with the Request and whether it had complied with its obligations under section 16 in respect of the Request.

14. Consequently, whilst the Decision Notice quoted all of the Appellant’s request for information, it is evident that the Commissioner’s analysis and findings related only to the second part of that request for information (namely, the Request).

15. The Decision Notice recorded that the Authority had stated that: a. the number of crimes recorded between January 2016 and November 2021 was in excess of 838,700; b. manual searches would be required and to review each record would take approximately three minutes; c. at three minutes per record, it would exceed 41,935 hours to locate the Requested Information and review each record; d. it could not provide any reasonable advice and assistance in order to refine the scope of the Request to bring it within the Appropriate Limit.

16. The Commissioner found that that the Authority’s estimate of 41,935 hours (at three minutes per record to locate, retrieve and extract the Requested Information) was reasonable.

17. The Commissioner considered that, even if only one minute per record was allowed to locate and review the Requested Information, the cost of complying with the Request would still far exceed the Appropriate Limit.

18. The Commissioner also considered that the Request could not be meaningfully refined such that the Requested Information could be provided within the Appropriate Limit, due to the way in which the Requested Information is stored by Northumbria Police and due to the length of time it would take to search each record manually.

19. The Commissioner therefore concluded in the Decision Notice that: a. providing the Requested Information would exceed the Appropriate Limit and accordingly that the Authority was entitled to rely on section 12(1); and b. the Authority had complied with its obligations under section 16 to offer advice and assistance in respect of the Request.

20. The Decision Notice did not require the Authority to take any steps. The appeal The grounds of appeal

21. The Appellant’s position was, in essence, that the Decision Notice was wrong to allow the Authority to rely on section 12 to refuse to provide the Requested Information. The material aspects of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal were based on his views that (in summary): a. the Requested Information would be held on computer systems and accordingly the Authority should be able to use computer software to search for it (with no manual searches being necessary); b. the stated number of 838,700 crimes could be reduced by the parameters given in the Request (essentially, that inputting those parameters into the database would result in significantly less crimes within the scope of the Request); c. the assessment of time given by the Authority (and accepted by the Commissioner) required to locate and retrieve the Requested Information was therefore not reasonable.

22. The Appellant also argued, in effect, that the Commissioner was wrong to conclude that the Authority had not breached section 16. We refer to the material aspects of his argument later below. The Tribunal’s powers and role

23. The powers of the Tribunal in determining the appeal are set out in section 58 , as follows: “(1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may Review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based. ”.

24. In summary, therefore, the Tribunal’s remit for the purposes of this appeal was to consider whether the Decision Notice was in accordance with the law. In reaching its decision, the Tribunal may review any findings of fact on which the Decision Notice was based and the Tribunal may come to a different decision regarding those facts. Essentially, the Tribunal is empowered to undertake a ‘full merits review’ of the appeal before it (so far as the Decision Notice is concerned). Mode of hearing

25. The proceedings were held by the cloud video platform. The Tribunal Panel, Mr Waters (on behalf of the Authority) and the witness (see paragraph 29) joined remotely. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.

26. The Commissioner did not attend the hearing and was not represented (having previously indicated that he would be content to rely on his written submissions if there was an oral hearing).

27. The Appellant also did not attend the hearing and was not represented. He had originally stated that he wished for a paper hearing of the appeal but later requested an oral hearing. However, the Appellant subsequently contacted the Tribunal to explain that, due to ill health, he was no longer able to participate fully in the proceedings in person. We considered whether to adjourn the hearing but the Appellant stressed that, sadly, his health was unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future and he requested that the appeal be determined on the basis of his written submissions. In the circumstances, we considered (having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2 of the Tribunal Rules) that it was appropriate to proceed with the hearing in the Appellant’s absence, relying on his written submissions. The evidence and submission

28. The Tribunal read and took account of a bundle of evidence and pleadings. We also received documents relating to proceedings before the Upper Tribunal and its subsequent decision (see paragraphs 76 to 78).

29. The bundle contained two witness statements provided on behalf of the Authority . Both statements were from the same witness. This witness’s statement was given in their capacity as a Data Protection Officer for Northumbria Police and Head of Information Management Department. The witness also gave evidence in person at the hearing. It is not necessary for us to identify this witness personally in this decision - therefore we merely refer to them below as “the witness” and we mean no disrespect to them in doing so.

30. We heard oral submissions from Mr Waters on behalf of the Authority .

31. All of the contents of the bundle and the parties’ submissions were taken into account, even if not directly referred to in this decision. The statutory framework We acknowledge the Practice Direction dated 4 June 2024 ( https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/practice-direction-from-the-senior-president-of-tribunals-reasons-for-decisions/ ) and particularly paragraph 9, which refers to the First-tier Tribunal not needing to specifically refer to relevant authorities. We include references to the applicable legislative framework, to provide relevant context, but have accordingly not referred to the applicable case law. General principles

32. Section 1(1) provides individuals with a general right of access to information held by public authorities. It provides: “ Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled— (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. ”.

33. In essence, under section 1(1), a person who has requested information from a public authority is entitled to be informed in writing whether it holds that information. If the public authority does hold the requested information, that person is entitled to have that information communicated to them. However, those entitlements are subject to the other provisions of FOIA, including some exemptions and qualifications which may apply even if the requested information is held by the public authority. Section 1(2) provides: “ Subsection (1) has effect subject to the following provisions of this section and to the provisions of sections 2, 9, 12 and 14. ”.

34. Accordingly, section 1(1) does not provide an unconditional right to be told whether or not a public authority holds any information, nor an unconditional right of access to any information which a public authority does hold. The rights contained in that section are subject to certain other provisions of FOIA, including section 12. Section 12 - exemption where cost of compliance exceeds appropriate limit

35. Section 12 addresses a potential exemption to the duty to disclose information pursuant to s ection 1(1)(b). So far as is relevant for current purposes, section 12 provides: “(1) Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the authority estimates that the cost of complying with the request would exceed the appropriate limit. … (3) In subsections (1) and (2) “the appropriate limit” means such amount as may be prescribed, and different amounts may be prescribed in relation to different cases. … (5) The Minister for the Cabinet Office may by regulations make provision for the purposes of this section as to the cost to be estimated and as to the manner in which they are to be estimated. ”. The Fees Regulations

36. The Fees Regulations are applicable for the purposes of section 12. Regulation 3 prescribes the “appropriate limit” referred to in section 12(1). It states: “(2) In the case of a public authority which is listed in Part I of Schedule 1 to the 2000 Act , the appropriate limit is £600. (3) In the case of any other public authority, the appropriate limit is £450. ”

37. Regulation 4 has effect in any case in which a public authority proposes to estimate whether the cost of complying with a request for information would exceed the “appropriate limit”. So far as is relevant, regulation 4 provides: “(3) In a case in which this regulation has effect, a public authority may, for the purpose of its estimate, take account only of the costs it reasonably expects to incur in relation to the request in– (a) determining whether it holds the information, (b) locating the information, or a document which may contain the information, (c) retrieving the information, or a document which may contain the information, and (d) extracting the information from a document containing it. (4) To the extent to which any of the costs which a public authority takes into account are attributable to the time which persons undertaking any of the activities mentioned in paragraph (3) on behalf of the authority are expected to spend on those activities, those costs are to be estimated at a rate of £25 per person per hour. ”.

38. Accordingly, not all costs which may be incurred in complying with a request for information may be taken into account. Only the activities set out in regulation 4 can be taken into account when estimating the cost of compliance for the purposes of the “appropriate limit”. In estimating the cost for the time spent in undertaking those activities, a rate of £25 per person per hour applies.

39. In summary, therefore, the Authority would be entitled to refuse the Request if complying with it would entail the Authority undertaking more than 18 hours on the specified activities (18 hours being the “appropriate limit” of £450, divided by the £25 hourly rate).

40. Section 12 is not subject to a public interest test. Section 16 – duty to provide advice and assistance

41. Section 16(1) provides: “ It shall be the duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance, so far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so, to persons who propose to make, or have made, requests for information to it. ”.

42. Section 16(2) clarifies that if a public authority, in providing advice and assistance, conforms to the recommendations as to good practice contained within the code of practice (issued pursuant to section 45), it will have complied with section 16(1). Discussion and findings Outline of relevant issues

43. As we have noted, the findings in the Decision Notice related to the second part of the Appellant’s request for information (regarding Police investigations involving the North East Ambulance Service). In accordance with the remit of the Tribunal to which we have referred, the fundamental issues which we needed to determine in the appeal was whether the Commissioner was correct to conclude, in the Decision Notice, that: a. the Authority was entitled to rely on section 12(1) to refuse to comply with the Request; and b. the Authority had complied with its obligations under section 16 in respect of the Request. Whether the Authority was entitled to rely on section 12(1)

44. In considering whether the Authority was entitled to rely on section 12(1), this essentially requires determining whether the cost of complying with the Request would exceed the Appropriate Limit.

45. Pursuant to the Fees Regulations, the “appropriate limit” for the Authority is £450 because it is not a public authority which is listed in Part I of Schedule 1 to FOIA (see regulation 3(2) and regulation 3(3), set out in paragraph 36). In accordance with regulation 4(4), the cost of the time expected to be spent complying with the Request is to be calculated at £25 per hour, meaning that the Request would exceed the “appropriate limit” if complying with it would take more than 18 hours’ work.

46. As we have noted: a. the Authority stated that the recorded number of crimes within the scope of the Request, between the dates of January 2016 and November 2021, exceed 838,700; b. the Authority’s position was that manual searches would be required and, at three minutes per record, it would exceed 41,935 hours to locate the Requested Information and review each record; c. the Commissioner accepted that that was a reasonable estimate - and he considered that, even if only one minute per record was allowed, the cost of complying with the Request would still far exceed the Appropriate Limit; and d. the Appellant’s position was that the estimate was not reasonable, for reasons we have referred to and which we address in further detail below.

47. The Appellant did not dispute the recorded number of 838,700 crimes, but (as we have noted) he considered that the number could be reduced significantly by, essentially, inputting appropriate search parameters into Northumbria Police’s database. He also considered that, in summary, there was no need for manual searches of the Requested Information as it could be readily located on Northumbria Police’s computer systems using those search parameters.

48. The Appellant stated that he was an ex-Police Officer (formerly employed by Northumbria Police) and was therefore knowledgeable of the computer systems used. He accordingly considered that it would be possible to readily identify the Requested Information using software and appropriate search terms.

49. The Appellant therefore argued that the crime numbers (and associated estimates) were, in essence, misleading. He argued that his experience as a Police Officer, involving use of the computer systems in question, meant that he had more knowledge and expertise than the Commissioner. He considered that the Commissioner’s lack of knowledge of police databases and the ability to retrieve or not retrieve data from those databases meant, essentially, that the Commissioner had not made an informed decision in the Decision Notice.

50. The Appellant contended that all police forces in the UK, including Northumbria Police, use computer software to log incidents and crimes and therefore a computer database could be searched electronically without the need for manual searches for the Requested Information. He stated that he had used the crime recording systems utilised by both Northumbria Police and Durham Constabulary and that he was therefore conversant with how such systems work and the level of detail that can be retrieved from them.

51. The Appellant argued that the Requested Information comprised only crime/incident information recorded against the North East Ambulance Service as a suspect and, as these were specific parameters, this would return a small data set. He considered that this principle had been misunderstood and therefore that incorrect assumptions had been used to provide the time estimate for the retrieval of the Requested Information.

52. The Appellant cited various examples of case law in support of his appeal. Other First-tier Tribunal decisions are not binding on us (and each case turns on its own facts in any event), but we accept the premise underpinning the cited case law that any estimate of time by a public authority for responding to a request for information has to be sensible, realistic and supported by cogent evidence.

53. However, an estimate of time given by a public authority must be considered with regard to the specific circumstances of the case. This includes taking into account how the public authority in question holds the information and how it would retrieve it. It is also necessary to consider whether the estimate included any costs that were either not reasonable or not related to the matters that may be taken into account pursuant to regulation 4(3).

54. An estimate also involves something more than a guess or an arbitrarily selected figure. It requires, in essence, a process to be undertaken which comprises two stages. The first stage is an investigation which will need to cover matters such as the amount of information in question and where it is located. The second stage is an exercise of assessment and calculation which involves making an informed and intelligent assessment of how many hours are likely to be needed to extract the information. The concept of ‘reasonableness’ is a central element.

55. The witness explained that they had been working with the system used by Northumbria Police for over 16 years and that during that time their role involved managing and having overall responsibility for all aspects of Information Governance for Northumbria Police, including Freedom of Information, Data Protection, Records Management and Information Security issues .

56. The witness’s evidence countered the Appellant’s views regarding the ability to search and retrieve information from Northumbria Police’s database. In summary, their evidence was that the Authority’s estimate regarding the time needed to respond to the Request was reasonable and that it was based on how Northumbria Police recorded information, the system it used and considered calculations as to the time which would be needed.

57. The witness gave evidence to the effect that: a. contrary to the Appellant’s assertions, Police Forces in the UK do not have one unified system and there are differing, often bespoke, systems implemented across them all; b. the system used by Northumbria Police is unique to it; it is an Oracle based system which has been used (and developed) for approximately 30 years; c. due to the age and structure of Northumbria Police’s system, it has certain limitations – in particular, extraction of data and statistics from its database background is complex and often requires a multifaceted approach; d. in recent years, Northumbria Police introduced a separate system for managing incident information only, but neither of the systems in use have a dedicated field for recording “employer” details; e. there is a field for recording “occupation” details but this is a “non-mandatory” field and this field is often unpopulated (either because it is considered irrelevant or individuals do not provide this information to Northumbria Police).

58. The witness went on to explain the difficulties with searching for the Requested Information, given that there is no field for recording “employer” details. They stated that they had undertaken a keyword search, within the ‘free text’ contained within the crime details recorded, for “ambulance” “paramedic” “NHS” and “NEAS” and that this had generated a total of 1583 records for the six-year period in question. The witness explained that they had interrogated a selection of those records, which showed that such records did not relate to an ambulance driver or NHS employee being investigated, but instead revealed where an ambulance had been called following a reported incident.

59. Consequently, the witness stated that it was necessary to undertake a manual review of the records in order to determine if the Requested Information is held and they outlined the steps required for that review. They explained that it took 6 minutes on average to interrogate each record to ascertain if details of occupation were recorded and accordingly, with the total of 1583 records, this would require in excess of 158 hours.

60. We accept the witness’s evidence on the above points. We find that the intrinsic difficulties with the source data, for the reasons given by the witness, mean there is no direct search criterion which can be used to readily identify or easily search for the Requested Information and consequently that the stated manual searches would be necessary. We accept the witness’s evidence on the average time required to undertake manual searches of each record, but even if the actual time required were significantly less then we consider that it would still exceed the Appropriate Limit.

61. The witness accepted that the Appellant had been employed as a Police Officer with Northumbria Police, and we questioned them during the hearing about his stated experience and knowledge of Northumbria Police’s system. Some of these points were also covered in their second witness statement but, in summary, the witness gave evidence to the effect that the Appellant’s former role (as a Constable) involved a more restricted use of Northumbria Police’s system, in that he would be able to use the system in the course of his duties but this differed from specialist ability in the accurate and relevant extraction of large data sets using specialist analytical software. The witness explained that, at the time when the Appellant was employed by Northumbria Police, the ability to apply such software to its system was limited in its nature, with licensed application of the software at that time reserved for individuals in analytical roles or those with responsibility for providing analytical data for reporting purposes.

62. We also accept that evidence and, with no disrespect to the Appellant’s former role, we find that his experience in using Northumbria Police’s system and data sets is limited, compared with the experience of the witness and their role (for over 16 years) in using, analysing and interrogating data for different purposes than those required for a Police Constable. Accordingly, whilst we accept the Appellant’s statement that he had experience of Northumbria Police’s crime recording systems, we prefer the evidence of the witness, on the basis that their experience of Information Governance is more pertinent to the issues before us.

63. The witness was able to provide a first-hand account not only of the nature of the recorded information which could be responsive to the Request but also how the Authority’s estimates were calculated, as recorded in the Decision Notice. We found their evidence to be consistent and we considered the witness to be knowledgeable and credible.

64. In particular, we accept the witness’s evidence that manual searches of the Requested Information would be required, given the system constraints we have referred to and we find that the Authority’s estimates of the likely work involved were reasonable.

65. We accordingly consider that searching and retrieving the Requested Information would not be as straightforward as the Appellant suggested. Indeed, the witness’s evidence also set out that the Appellant’s suggestions for how the Requested Information could be more easily identified were tested in respect of the data held in Northumbria Police’s systems and that manual searches would nevertheless still be required such that the Appropriate Limit would be exceeded.

66. For the above reasons, we consider that the Commissioner correctly concluded in the Decision Notice that the Authority could rely on section 12 to refuse the Request. Whether the Authority was in breach of section 16

67. As we have noted, the Authority’s position was that it could not provide any reasonable advice and assistance in order to refine the scope of the Request to bring it within the Appropriate Limit. That was also the finding of the Commissioner in the Decision Notice, who accordingly concluded that the Authority had not breached section 16.

68. The Appellant disputed that section 16 had been adhered to. He argued, in essence, that: a. there were alternative methods that could have been employed for the Authority to provide the Requested Information; and b. he had not been afforded the opportunity to reframe the Request so that it could be narrowed in scope and dealt with within the Appropriate Limit.

69. We do not accept the Appellant’s argument that alternative methods could have been used to provide the Requested Information, for the reasons we have referred to above.

70. In respect of the Appellant’s argument that he had not been afforded the opportunity to reframe the Request so that it could be narrowed in scope, it is important to note that the duty to provide advice and assistance under section 16(1) is not an absolute one; the duty extends only so far as it would be reasonable for a public authority to provide advice and assistance. The relevant question is therefore to what extent it was reasonable for the Authority to provide advice and assistance in respect of the Request.

71. In considering that question, we find that the Request was unambiguous and did not require the Authority to seek clarification as to the information which was sought, beyond the date range for the Requested Information (which the Authority did seek, as we have noted). The Request was otherwise clearly worded and we consider that the information sought was explicit and therefore that no other clarification was necessary.

72. We have also assessed, in considering that question, whether it was reasonable for the Authority to provide the Appellant with advice and assistance to help him reframe the Request in a way that would bring it within the Appropriate Limit. Given what the Request was seeking, as well as the difficulties we have outlined regarding the Authority needing to conduct manual searches, we consider that there was no feasible alternative way of restating the Request in order to bring it within the Appropriate Limit.

73. The Appellant also argued that, because the Authority acknowledged that the Requested Information was held “in part”, it could have complied with ‘part’ of the Request within the Appropriate Limit. We consider that that argument is misconceived; if a public authority holds part of the information which is requested, it does not necessarily follow that the public authority could comply with that request within the “appropriate limit” just because it holds part of the requested information. It would still be open to the public authority, as with the Authority in this case, to cite section 12 in respect of the information which it does hold within the scope of the Request. As we have found, the Authority was unable to comply with the Request within the Appropriate Limit in respect of the information which it holds within the scope of the Request, for the reasons we have referred to above.

74. For the above reasons, we consider that the Commissioner correctly concluded in the Decision Notice that the Authority had not breached section 16. Other matters

75. For completeness, we now briefly address the following points.

76. The Appellant’s appeal against the Decision Notice was previously determined by another Panel of the First-tier Tribunal and its decision was subsequently successfully appealed to the Upper Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal directed that the appeal be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for reconsideration by a differently constituted Panel (being the Panel in the present decision). We considered the appeal afresh, in accordance with our remit referred in paragraphs 23 and 24, without taking into account the previous decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

77. We were, however, aware that, in connection with the Upper Tribunal proceedings, reference had been made to the Authority responding to the Request after the date of the previous decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and that the Authority had allegedly provided some or all of the Requested Information. It was contended on behalf of the Appellant during the course of those proceedings that this demonstrated a lack of integrity on the part of the Authority in refusing the Request pursuant to section 12.

78. Our role was to consider the lawfulness of the Decision Notice in respect of its (primary) conclusion that the Authority could rely on section 12 and the law requires this to be assessed as at the date of the Authority’s refusal of the Request. Consequently any alleged subsequent disclosure of the Requested Information was not relevant for the purposes of the appeal. Moreover, the Upper Tribunal had issued directions permitting a party to provide any further relevant evidence to the First-tier Tribunal and no such additional evidence was provided. Final conclusions

79. For all of the reasons we have given, we find that the Decision Notice was correct in determining that the Authority was entitled to rely on section 12(1) to refuse to comply with the Request and that the Authority had not breached section 16 in respect of the Request.

80. We therefore dismiss the appeal.