Marcia Janice Steele v Ofsted

The published version of the decision has been redacted to ensure compliance with the Tribunal Order made on 21/01/2026 pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Health Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008(as amended). The Appeal

1. The Appellant brought this appeal (“the Appeal”) against the decision (“the Decision”) by the Respondent to cancel her registration as a childminder on the Early Years Register, Compulsory and Voluntary parts of the Childcare Register, set out in a written notice dated 04 December 2024.

2. The Respondent opposes the appeal. Restricted Reporting Order

3. With the agreement of the parties, the Tribunal made a restricted reporting order under Rule 14(1)(a) and (b) of the 2008 Rules, prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any documents or matter likely to lead members of the public to identify any minor child or the parents of any minor children in order to protect the privacy and best interests of the children involved.

4. Accordingly, in this decision, we anonymise the names of the minor children and their parents.

5. To preserve the anonymity of those not directly involved in the proceedings themselves, we have also anonymised the Appellant’s family members and childcare assistants where it has been necessary to refer to them. Background

6. The Appellant has been a registered childminder with Ofsted since 08 March 2011. Since registration the Appellant has changed her registered address on at least 9 occasions, and from 13 June 2024, her registered address was in Biddenham, Bedfordshire. The Appellant was last inspected by the Respondent on 05 September 2022, and her provision was judged as ‘Good’.

7. On 12 March 2024, the Appellant was evicted from the premises in Biddenham. Minded children were present when High Court Enforcement Officers (‘HCEOs’) and Police were in attendance.

8. Since 13 March 2024, the Appellant was subject to seven periods of suspension as follows: (i) 13 March to 23 April 2024; (ii) 24 April to 04 June 2024, lifted on 31 May 2024 (for which, see below); (iii) 19 July to 29 August 2024; (iv) 30 August to 10 October 2024; (v) 11 October to 21 November 2024; (vi) 22 November 2024 to 02 January 2025; and lastly (vii) On an ongoing basis until the cancellation process has completed and/or until any risk of harm has been sufficiently reduced.

9. The second period of suspension was lifted on 31 May 2024 because the Appellant had informed the Respondent that she was taking an 8-week break from childminding and had no suitable premises during that time to childmind from. The Respondent took the view at that time and in those circumstances, that there was no sufficient risk of harm, because no children would be in her care.

10. The suspension commencing on 19 July 2024 was made following further information or evidence which had by then become available to the Respondent and a “Joint Evaluation Meeting” (JEM) with the LADO on 19 July 2025 which had the effect of changing the Respondent’s view in relation to risk.

11. The Appellant brought appeals against the 3 rd to 7 th periods of suspension, all of which were dismissed.

12. The Respondent’s Notice of Intention (NOI) to cancel the Appellant’s registration was issued on 10 September 2024 and following consideration of the Appellant’s objections, the Respondent issued its Notice of Decision (NOD) on 04 December 2024, to cancel the Appellant’s registration on the basis that she no longer meets the prescribed requirements of registration and is no longer considered suitable to provide childcare.

13. This has been the hearing of the Appellant’s appeal against that decision. Hearing and attendance

14. The Appellant attended and represented herself as a litigant-in-person. She made opening submissions, cross examined the Respondent’s witnesses, gave oral evidence herself, and then made closing submissions after having heard those from the Respondent.

15. The Appellant did not call any other witnesses.

16. The Respondent was represented by Mr Praveen Saigal, a solicitor-advocate. Mr William Chapman, a lawyer at the Respondent, attended throughout to observe. Various members of Ofsted staff, usually witnesses, were present in the hearing room on different days, as were some members of the public.

17. The Respondent’s witnesses, in the order that they appeared, were as follows: • Mrs Vicky Davis-Short, Office Supervisor for High Court Enforcement Limited (HCE) (by video link). • Mr Darris Thomas, High Court Enforcement Officer (HCEO) for High Court Enforcement Group. • Mr W, parent of child N. • Miss Sandeep Mohan, Local Authority Designated Officer (LADO) for Bedford Borough Council. • Miss Karen Dover, HCEO (by video link) for High Court Enforcement Group • Ms Naomi Brown, now a Principal Officer, but previously an Early Years Regulatory Inspector (EYRI) for Ofsted. • Mrs Emma McCabe, Early Years Senior Officer (EYSO) for Ofsted. • Ms Jenny Hardy, EYRI for Ofsted. • Miss Sarah Stephens, EYSO for Ofsted. • Mrs Sarah Gilpin, Senior His Majesty’s Inspector (SHMI) for Ofsted.

18. The hearing took place as a hybrid hearing. Mrs Davis-Short gave her evidence by video link. The Tribunal later heard and allowed an application for Miss Dover to do the same (see below). Everybody else attended the hearing in person.

19. The Tribunal heard evidence and submissions over 9 days with an hour for lunch on each day and shorter breaks of around 10 to 15 minutes mid-morning and mid-afternoon. At times extra breaks were accommodated when either the Appellant or a witness required them.

20. We started late on two days: (i) On day 2 the Appellant made an application to attend remotely (for which, see below). She arrived at the hearing centre mid-morning. We were unable to continue with the substantive hearing itself until 1pm, after taking an early lunch break from 12.00 until 1pm. (ii) On day 9 the Appellant arrived late due to having overslept. We were able to continue with the hearing at 11.10am. Late Evidence

21. There were a number of applications for the admission of late evidence over the course of the 9 days, which are recorded in the order in which they occurred, below:

22. On day 1 , the Appellant sought to have admitted a small bundle containing: (i) Correspondence evidencing the escalation of her complaint against The Sheriff’s Office (TSO); (ii) A copy of TSO’s article on their use of body-worn cameras dated 06/08/2019; (iii) A copy of TSO’s complaints handling procedure for incidents prior to 31/12/2024; and (iv) A copy of the HCEOA Code of Conduct.

23. The Appellant’s reasons for this application were that she considered these should be available to the Tribunal panel to be referred to if need be. The Respondent raised no objections.

24. The Tribunal’s decision was that the documents should be admitted in the interests of justice because they were relevant to some of the Appellant’s allegations about the conduct of TSO HCEOs and the impact this may have had on the situation on 12/03/2024.

25. Also on day 1 , the Respondent sought to have admitted a second witness statement of Mrs Gilpin exhibiting a map and photographs and relating specifically to the planned meeting on 27/08/2025 at Central Bedfordshire Council’s offices.

26. The Appellant did not object to its admission. The Tribunal’s decision was that it should be admitted in evidence because it was relevant to some of the matters of factual dispute in the appeal.

27. Late on day 5, the appellant sought permission to admit two further documents in late evidence. These were a copy of a WhatsApp message from Mr W in respect of the nut allergy management plan for Child N and a copy of the allergy management plan itself. This application was considered as a preliminary matter on day 6. The Appellant explained that she sought its admittance because she had been unable to find it during her cross examination of Mr W but she considered that it was relevant to his credibility as a witness.

28. There were no objections from the Respondent. The Tribunal’s decision was to admit the documents in evidence because the appellant considered them important in our assessment of Mr W as a witness.

29. On day 6 the Appellant made a further application for late evidence, this time seeking to have admitted two exchanges of correspondence with Nursery World Show. The first details the Appellant’s engagement as a speaker at the ‘Big Day Out’ event on 16/05/2025, and the second details the show’s withdrawal of her invitation to speak as a result of her being “currently in a dispute with Ofsted”.

30. The Appellant explained that in preparing to give evidence she had noted that the bulk of the exhibits to the witness statement of Miss Stevens pertain to a Nursery World article and the Appellant’s activities with the National Union of Childminders. She considered this to be an attempt to show that everything she was doing was “anti-Ofsted”, and thought this additional evidence would demonstrate that not to be the case.

31. There were no objections from the Respondent, with Mr Saigal submitting that the documents were clearly relevant to the Appellant’s case in relation to Ofsted. The Tribunal panel agreed and decided that the documents should be admitted .

32. On day 7 the Appellant made a further application for the admission of late evidence. The document she asked to have admitted was a letter to her from Recording Officer Mrs D Cox in the Professional Standards Department of Bedfordshire Police dated 27 October 2025.

33. This, the Appellant stated, was explicitly about the conduct of Police Officers on 12/03/2024 which was much of what the Respondent’s case was about and is also connected to her allegations of false imprisonment by the TSO HCEOs. She had been unable to produce it earlier as it had only been sent to her yesterday.

34. The Respondent did not object to its admission, and Mr Saigal noted that in terms of its relevance, the document is in keeping with the Appellant’s case. However, he also observed that the Appellant’s covering email makes a very serious allegation of what would amount to criminal activity on the part of both the Respondent and the Police.

35. The Tribunal noted Mr Saigal’s observations in respect of the covering email. We determined that the document should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice.

36. On day 8 the Appellant made another application for the admission of late evidence. This consisted of two documents taken from webpages: (i) The Merriam Webster dictionary definition of the word ‘sleepover’ together with a link to the full webpage; and (ii) An article from clevelandclinic.org about ‘gaslighting.’

37. The Appellant submitted that the documents were relevant because they related to matters Mr Saigal had put to her in cross-examination, which she intended to return to in re-examination.

38. Mr Saigal had no observations to make. The Panel determined that the documents should be admitted because the Appellant had submitted that they were relevant to her evidence and having them available to read was likely to be more time-efficient than the Appellant having to give detailed explanations during her re-examination. Other applications

39. On day 2 (21/10/2025) the Tribunal received an email from the Appellant, sent at 1.15am, making an informal request to attend on that day by video link. Her reasons were that she had been trying to purchase a train ticket and had encountered a “problem” which she thought may have been a result of her bank carrying out fraud checks. The panel refused that request and asked that the Appellant try again to make her way into the hearing.

40. This was followed at 9.06am by another email from the Appellant, this time containing a formal application to be permitted to attend the hearing by video link, save for the days when she would give evidence herself. The reasons given were, in summary: (i) Difficulty in purchasing a train ticket; (ii) Poor sleep due to the stress of the situation; (iii) Signs of stress including sore throat; (iv) Perimenopause

41. The Appellant attached a document entitled “Sick Certificate 30 March 2025” to her application. This was a private medical certificate issued by Bupa which confirms a diagnosis of perimenopausal symptoms and states that the patient is “fit to work provided employer can provide workplace adaptations or altered duties….” It goes on to state that the Dr has “advised… to refrain from work starting 30/03/2025 to 30/09/2025”.

42. Once again, the Tribunal panel responded asking the Appellant to make her way into the hearing where her application would be considered in person.

43. The Appellant arrived mid-morning and her application for remote attendance was dealt with as a preliminary matter. The application was opposed by the Respondent, with Mr Saigal submitting that the matter had been listed for an in-person hearing with good reason and noting that during a previous hearing relating to the Appellant’s appeal against suspension, there had been difficulties with the Appellant’s internet connectivity.

44. The Tribunal’s decision was to refuse the Appellant’s application for remote attendance. This was for the following reasons: (i) The Appellant was a litigant in person and the task of cross-examining the Respondent’s witnesses and presenting her case was a substantial one. It would be very difficult for the panel to have an eye on the Appellant’s wellbeing and offer adjustments, breaks or assistance with questioning using remote conferencing. (ii) Equally, it would be difficult for the Appellant in cross examining witnesses, to know when a witness had finished speaking, when to start another question, and so on. This risked creating an unnatural exchange which risked both the witnesses’ abilities to give their best evidence and the Appellant’s prospects of ensuring that she thoroughly cross examined them. (iii) The panel took the view that, particularly in light of her identified health difficulties arising from stress and Perimenopause, the Appellant would be better supported and would find the process of the hearing easier to follow and engage in if she were present in the room. The Appellant’s health needs could be accommodated in the face-to-face hearing by means of additional breaks, and it would be easier for the Panel to determine when such breaks were necessary with the Appellant physically present. (iv) Furthermore, the medical certificate provided was out of date and did not suggest that the Appellant was currently too ill to participate. (v) It was not, therefore, in the interests of justice to permit the Appellant to attend remotely.

45. Late on day 2 , the Respondent made an oral application for Miss Dover to give her evidence remotely by video link. It had originally been envisaged that Miss Dover’s evidence would be heard on day 1, but it was now clear she would not give evidence until day 3. Due to the distance she had to travel, Miss Dover had been staying in London but needed to return home on the evening of day 2. She would, however, be able to rearrange her work and personal commitments to attend remotely on day 3.

46. Mr Saigal further submitted that the Respondent’s view was that Miss Dover was a duplicate witness and so if she were not permitted to attend remotely, the Respondent would no longer call her to give oral evidence.

47. The Appellant did not object to the application, although she did express surprise and shock at “counsel’s approach” (something which she did not explain further). She accepted that it was as a consequence of her attending late that Miss Dover’s evidence had had to be moved to day 3. The Appellant’s view was that Miss Dover was not a duplicate witness. There were key things that it was important she be cross examined about. She was not concerned about Miss Dover giving evidence remotely, but would be concerned if she were not called at all.

48. The Tribunal’s decision was to permit Miss Dover to give evidence remotely on the morning of day 3. The reasons for this were that: (i) We agreed with the Appellant that Miss Dover was an important witness; (ii) We accepted the practical difficulties the witness encountered because of the witness timetable running behind schedule; and (iii) There were no objections from the Appellant, and the panel could foresee no detriment to either party’s case if Miss Dover be permitted to give her evidence remotely.

49. The Tribunal noted the Appellant had hoped that the hearing would be completed in six days to allow her to attend work thereafter. The Tribunal advised that it would try to accommodate any work commitments made by the Appellant but that the hearing was scheduled for 10 days and if necessary, it would run for the full time. In the event, 9 of the 10 days listed were required. Other preliminary matters

50. During the course of her evidence the Appellant suggested to the Tribunal that it was under a legal duty to report her allegations of false imprisonment by the TSO HCEOs to the Attorney General. The panel noted that this is not, in fact, the case, and further, that the allegations have already been reported to the Police. The Tribunal therefore did not consider itself under any duty, legal or moral, to report the Appellant’s allegations to any other person or body.

51. We would record for completeness that the Appellant did not appear to accept the Tribunal’s view or decision on this point. Legal Framework and Principles

52. The statutory framework relating to the registration of childminders is set out in Part 3 of the Childcare Act 2006 .

53. Section 32 of the Act provides for the maintenance of two childcare registers. The first register (“the Early Years Register”) includes “other early years providers” registered to provide early years childcare for children (from birth to the age of five years) for which registration is compulsory.

54. The second register is “the General Childcare Register.” This is divided into two parts: A register which contains those providers registered to provide later years childcare for children aged between 5 and 8 years for which registration is compulsory (“the compulsory part”). A register which contains those providers registered to provide later years childminding/childcare for children aged over 8 years for which registration is voluntary (“the voluntary part”).

55. Section 68 of the Act provides for the cancellation of a person’s registration in certain circumstances. Section 68(2) provides that Ofsted may cancel registration of a person registered on either part of the General Childcare Register, if it appears: (a) that the prescribed requirements for registration which apply in relation to the person’s registration under that Chapter have ceased, or will cease, to be satisfied: (b) … (c) that he has failed to comply with a requirement imposed on him by regulations under that Chapter.

56. The prescribed requirements for Later Years registration are provided for by Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Childcare (General Childcare Register) Regulations 2008 and include that the applicant is suitable to provide later years provision (paragraph 1).

57. The prescribed requirements for “other childcare providers” are provided for by Part 1 of Schedule 5 of the Childcare (General Childcare Register) Regulations 2008 and include that the applicant is suitable to provide later years provision (paragraph 1).

58. The Tribunal’s decision of Ofikwu v Ofsted - 2022 4499 EY at paragraph 32 states: “A key requirement that underpins the statutory framework is that the provider is suitable. The concept of suitability embraces an evaluation of matters such as honesty, integrity, reliability, openness, transparency, insight, as well as attitude to the regulator and other agencies. It also embraces the issue of trust and confidence.”

59. “Harm” is defined in regulation 13 of the Childcare (Early Years and General Childcare Registers) (Common Provisions) Regulations 2008 as having the same definition as in section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989 . This refers to harm as: “ill treatment or impairment of health or development, including for example impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another.” “Development” means physical, intellectual, emotional, social, or behavioural development. “Health” means physical or mental health.

60. The right of appeal against the decision lies under section 74 of the Childcare Act 2006 . This provides that (as applicable): “74 Appeals (1) ….. a registered person may appeal to the Tribunal against the taking of any of the following steps by the Chief Inspector under this Part— ….. (e) the cancellation of registration. ….. (4) On an appeal the Tribunal must either— (a) confirm the taking of the step…..or (b) direct that it shall not have, or shall cease to have, effect. (5) Unless the Tribunal has confirmed the taking of a step mentioned in subsection (1) (a) or (e) or the making of an order under section 72(2) cancelling a person's registration, the Tribunal may also do either or both of the following— (a) impose conditions on the registration of the person concerned; (b) vary or remove any condition previously imposed on the registration.”

61. The Respondent bears the burden of proving any breaches alleged, including the core allegation that the Appellant is unsuitable. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.

62. However, when a party makes a specific allegation, the general rule is that he/she must prove that which is alleged.

63. The persuasive burden regarding necessity, justification, and proportionality rests on the Respondent. The Issues

64. In brief, the issue for the Tribunal to determine is whether or not the Appellant is suitable to be registered by Ofsted as a childminder. The actions and behaviour under consideration are particularised in detail in the Scott Schedule. Evidence

65. The Tribunal was provided with two paginated bundles: (i) Bundle for final hearing, paginated from A1 to J107 and comprising 2651 pages in pdf form (including index and cover sheets); and (ii) Supplementary Bundle for final hearing, paginated from A1 to D170 and comprising 204 pages in pdf form (including index and cover sheets).

66. Additional to the bundle, the Tribunal was provided with video footage as follows: (i) 11 video clips adduced by the Appellant; (ii) 3 video clips adduced by the Respondent; (iii) 2 further recordings comprising the TSO HCEOs’ bodyworn footage, adduced by the Respondent; and (iv) Seven further recordings comprising Police bodyworn footage, adduced by the Respondent, labelled as exhibits SS9.1 to SS9.7.

67. In total the video footage in evidence was over 16 hours in duration.

68. A substantial amount of late evidence was produced by the parties immediately before and during the hearing and this was admitted as set out under the heading ‘Preliminary Matters’ above.

69. The Tribunal was also provided with skeleton arguments by both parties.

70. The Tribunal heard oral evidence from the Appellant herself and from the witnesses listed at paragraph 9. above. It is not proportionate to summarise the lengthy witness evidence in this decision; instead, I set out briefly below the Tribunal’s assessment of each witness and then refer below to parts of the witness evidence insofar as is necessary in explaining the Tribunal’s findings of fact.

71. The reader should not assume that evidence not expressly referred to in this decision was not taken into account.

72. The witnesses: (i) Mrs Davies-Short The panel found Mrs Davies-Short to be a credible witness who ensured that she did not go beyond her remit and had no reluctance to respond to questioning. She was knowledgeable about the practical side of the HCEO role insofar as it applied to her. She was a thoughtful and careful witness. (ii) Mr Darris Thomas Mr Thomas could not always recall all of the details of the events of 12 March 2024, which is unsurprising given the length of time that has elapsed. He was open in stating what he could not recall. He had a good awareness of how he conducted himself in his role as an HCEO and was a balanced witness. (iii) Mr W Mr W also gave evidence to the best of his recollection and was not afraid to say when he did not know something. He was very fair to the Appellant in mentioning the positive aspects of her care of children. He was consistent, measured, and clear. (iv) Miss Mohan Miss Mohan clearly understood her role thoroughly and was able to explain it clearly. She was not distracted or put off by cross-examination and was polite, very patient, and fair. The panel considered her to be very professional, and a highly credible witness. (v) Miss Dover Miss Dover spoke frankly and gave evidence to the best of her recollection. She was well informed in respect of her role. Her responses were restrained and fair under cross-examination. (vi) Ms Brown Ms Brown was professional and balanced. She was not afraid to say when something was outside of her role and remit. She was very thoughtful and considered, especially when asked questions about bias. (vii) Mrs McCabe Mrs McCabe was a frank and open witness who did not appear to exaggerate or embellish her answers. She was professional, thoughtful, and considered. (viii) Ms Hardy Ms Hardy has had primary responsibility for this matter. She was knowledgeable about her role but was clearly exasperated. She struggled to contain herself emotionally. It was clear that the matter has had a significant impact on her personally, to the extent that she considered the working relationship with the Appellant to be “irretrievable.” The panel considered carefully why that was. Ms Hardy told us that she had tried very hard to work positively with the Appellant, but due to having exhausted all avenues to achieve this, without success, as Ms Hardy saw it, she had essentially come to the end of the road. Due to the complaints that the Appellant had made about her and four of her colleagues, and the Appellant’s highly combative approach to working with Ofsted, Ms Hardy did not feel that a positive working relationship was now achievable. (ix) Miss Stevens It was also clear that this matter has been difficult and stressful for Miss Stevens. She was knowledgeable and gave measured, balanced evidence but also considered the professional relationship with the Appellant to now be irretrievable. She told us that she had never before come across the level of hostility that Ofsted have encountered from the Appellant. (x) Mrs Gilpin Mrs Gilpin was a resilient witness who was straightforward and forthright. She gave evidence to the best of her recollection. She accepted that if the Tribunal were to reinstate the Appellant’s registration, Ofsted would need to find a way to make that work. (xi) The Appellant The Appellant gave extremely lengthy answers to the questions that were put to her. She had a tendency to try to divert attention to what she perceives as the failings of others and repeatedly evaded giving a direct answer when challenged. She was clearly passionate about the causes she believes in, but these were largely irrelevant to the matter before the Tribunal. At times it was clear that she was thinking on her feet to try to perpetuate the untruths that she had allowed to permeate these proceedings, something she did not always manage to do convincingly. Findings of Fact

73. The Schedule of Allegations in this case is particularly long. The Tribunal has made findings against the schedule below, but before turning to those findings, the panel consider it helpful to set out the findings of fact that the Tribunal made of its own volition as a result of the evidence heard during the course of the hearing. Approaching the findings in this manner is perhaps simpler than making findings against the individual examples given by the Respondent under some of the allegations in the Scott Schedule.

74. These are the matters of fact upon which the parties were not agreed, but which have a direct bearing upon the substantive findings of the Tribunal and therefore, which the Tribunal had to determine before it could proceed to decide the application itself. The decision is structured in the same way as the Respondent put the case, that is, considering first the run-up to 12 March 2024, secondly the day itself, and third, events since that date. Did the Appellant compose all the emails to the TSO?

75. During his cross examination of the Appellant, Mr Saigal took her to a number of emails which are exhibited to the witness statement of Mrs Davies-Short, and which commence at H7 in the bundle. The emails are sent from 4 different email addresses, and purport, variously, to be from the Appellant herself, from a family member named ‘Ms KS’ (and I should note that I have anonymised these purported individuals as much as possible to ensure their privacy), from the Appellant’s father ‘Mr KS’, and from someone sharing the same first name as the Appellant but with a different middle name (‘Ms MMS’).

76. Of the 4 email addresses in question, the Appellant accepted that two of them belong to her. One is her personal email address, and the other is for a tuition centre that she runs. However, she told the Tribunal that she did not write or send the bulk of the emails, even those originating from her accounts and/or purporting to be signed by her.

77. This was the first time that the Appellant has said that the emails sent from her email addresses were not sent by her. She told us that she had given authority to her cousin, ‘Ms KS’, and to a friend of the family ‘SW’ (who the Appellant describes as a journalist) to use her email addresses in order to fight the planned eviction. The Appellant told us that she had no knowledge of what Ms KS and/or SW were doing, save that she had agreed with them that they would “deal with” the eviction for her. She had a lot else going on at the time, and they were taking off her shoulders something that she did not think was a “big deal.” The reason why the Appellant did not think it a big deal, she told us, was because she had a genuinely held belief that she would not be evicted from the premises.

78. The issue with the emails is that they contain a sequence of untruths, for example that the Appellant’s father was living at the property and had chicken pox, that there was an ongoing appeal against the eviction when there was not, and so on. Mr Saigal pointed out a number of stylistic consistencies between the emails which may suggest that they were all authored by the same person. The Appellant said in response that lots of people write in this manner or use Chat GPT to assist them.

79. The panel noted that there were some inconsistencies in the emails, for example at H11, an email sent from the account purportedly belonging to Ms KS states within it that “…it is very distressing for me to be given such short notice…” (my emphasis) of the eviction. This would suggest either that Ms KS was impersonating the Appellant (or perhaps impersonating the Appellant’s father, since part of the fabrication was that he was resident at the property) or that the author was in fact the Appellant.

80. There was also a propensity towards the largely incorrect use of the words “’without prejudice” across a number of the email addresses, suggesting that they were written by the same person. There is a similar use of the words in other communications sent by the Appellant after the events of 12 March 2024.

81. We also noted that whoever was writing the emails had extensive knowledge of, and access to, the Appellant’s personal information. At H9, an email purporting to be from the Appellant attaches a BUPA doctor’s note in respect of her having chicken pox (a subject which we return to below). Further, one of the email addresses in use was the address for the private tuition centre the Appellant owns and runs. Unfettered access to that account logically means that an individual would have had access to confidential information relating to that business.

82. Having heard in detail from the Appellant during her oral evidence and having examined the email correspondence closely, the Panel is satisfied that on balance of probabilities, all of the emails were written and sent by the Appellant herself. This means that prior to the events of 12 March 2024, the Appellant constructed a network of untruths in an attempt to prevent the eviction from going ahead.

83. We would note that even if we are wrong, and the messages were composed by others, this does little to redeem the Appellant herself in respect of the events prior to the eviction. It would suggest that she allowed others to impersonate her, to construct falsehoods on her behalf and to have unsupervised access to potentially confidential information via the email address related to her Tuition Centre. Whether she knew, or did not know, the precise content of the emails being sent, would not have mattered. Did the Appellant or her father have chicken pox in February/March 2024?

84. On 29 February 2024, the Appellant had a video consultation with a doctor from Bupa. The resulting letter is at H10. It states that the Appellant has told the doctor that there is an outbreak of chicken pox at work and is on day 2 to 3 of the rash. As she works with children, she is off work. The letter states that the Appellant can return to work when the whole rash has crusted over, but notes that the rash was not clear on the video.

85. It was as a result of this letter that the eviction originally planned for the same date, 29 February 2024, was postponed, and rescheduled to 12 March 2024. On 11 March 2024, the Appellant alleged that her father had now caught chicken pox and was contagious (it was also being alleged that he was residing at the property at this time). A further doctor’s letter was produced and that appears at H20 in the bundle.

86. A witness statement from Lauren Gazzard, Bupa Senior Benefits Investigator, dated 19 August 2025, confirms that the second letter purporting to relate to the Appellant’s father was not, in fact, produced by Bupa. This means that it has been falsified.

87. During her oral evidence the Appellant was candid in telling us that in any event, her father does not live at the property, and she has had no contact with him for the last two years. It is clear to the Tribunal that the Appellant’s father did not have chicken pox.

88. The question of whether the Appellant herself had chicken pox is slightly more nuanced. The Bupa letter in respect of her is genuine. However, the panel noted that it is written in such a way that it indicates that it was the Appellant who suggested to the doctor that she had chicken pox. The rash was not clear on the video. The letter also records an “outbreak at work” which would suggest that the children in the Appellant’s care had chicken pox, something which is not in fact suggested or corroborated anywhere in the evidence.

89. The Appellant told us during her oral evidence that she continued to accept children for minding on and after 29 February 2024. She had not been certain that the doctor’s diagnosis was correct, and having taken advice from a family member who is not medically trained, she decided that she did not have chicken pox. She now does not believe that she ever did have it. In any event, her rash was fully crusted over at that point (something which again appears not to be substantiated by the doctor’s letter). The Appellant also told us that the reference to an outbreak at work must be a mistake on the doctor’s part.

90. On balance of probabilities, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Appellant did not have chicken pox, but that she sought to convince staff at the TSO that she did. The Panel considered that it would be particularly easy to convince a doctor of the existence of symptoms via a video consultation because, as the doctor mentions, it is difficult to get an accurate picture of, for example, a rash, via a video link. Furthermore, it is a highly plausible complaint for an individual working with young children. We did not accept that the doctor would have mistakenly written down observations such as “outbreak at work.”

91. It is clear that the Appellant sought to use her diagnosis of chicken pox, successfully in fact, to delay the eviction and it appears to the Tribunal more likely than not that, given the ploy was successful on the first occasion, she sought to repeat it by claiming that her father was then also unwell.

92. Once again, if the Tribunal is wrong about this, the alternative is also unpalatable. If the Appellant really did have symptoms consistent with chicken pox, she should not have been accepting children for minding during the course of that illness. Chicken pox is a highly communicable disease which can have serious consequences in some individuals. Therefore, to take the advice of an unqualified family member over that of a doctor and to place children and their families at risk of contracting chicken pox is also a highly concerning thing for a professional engaged in the care of children to do. Mr W made clear in his evidence that the parents of the minded children had not been notified of any outbreak, confirmed or suspected, and indeed the Appellant herself told us that she did not notify the parents of any such concern.

93. In another alternative, if the Appellant had obtained such a diagnosis genuinely, but believed it to be incorrect such that she still considered it safe to accept children for minding, then, by the same logic, it would equally have been safe for the eviction to go ahead and therefore it would have been misleading of her to try to rely upon it to delay the eviction. Was it reasonable of the Appellant to assume that the eviction would not go ahead on 12 March 2024?

94. The Appellant told us that she had a genuine belief that the eviction was unlikely to take place. This is why she considered it appropriate to accept children for minding on 12 March 2024.

95. The Appellant’s first attempt to delay the eviction had been successful. Because she provided a doctor’s letter stating that she had chicken pox, the TSO called off the 29 February date in an effort to protect their own staff from contracting the disease.

96. The Appellant then tried a number of tactics to get the rescheduled date postponed again. These attempts were clearly unsuccessful. The TSO decided not to reschedule again, and it is clear from the Appellant’s correspondence to the TSO the day before the eviction that she was well aware that it was their intention to attend at the property.

97. She would also have been aware that, by that stage, no application for a stay of eviction had been made to the Court. She did not make that application until the morning of 12 March 2024, which means that it would have been reasonable to assume that it would not be heard before the HCEOs arrived at the property.

98. The Tribunal finds that, at the very least, there was evidently a very real risk that HCEOs would attend and would attempt to carry out the eviction on the planned date, thereby causing disruption at the premises, taking up the Appellant’s time and attention, and exposing any minded children to their presence. It was not reasonable to assume that this would not happen. On 12 March 2024, did the Appellant make appropriate efforts to arrange for the minded children to be collected when it became clear the eviction was going ahead?

99. The Appellant’s evidence was that she had contacted one parent, who had not yet dropped off their children, and asked them not to come. This is not disputed and is evidenced by the bodyworn footage of the HCEOs.

100. She stated that she then contacted the parents of the already-present children, as a group, using an app called the ‘Family App’. A photo of a laptop screen showing this message is at page I330 in the bundle. The message reads “Emergency Please collect your children asap.” On the photo provided, it is only possible to see two recipients of the message. Both of these recipients have the same name, one being a contact at Wootton Park Pre-Prep and the other being a Childcare assistant. It appears likely they are both the same person given they share the same name. It is not possible to see whether there are any other recipients in the group. Next to the recipients it states that the message has been seen by one person.

101. The Appellant told us that, at the time, it did not surprise her that a message stating “emergency” and asking parents to collect their children asap did not yield results. She told us that many parents would be at work or otherwise busy. She said that it is possible to read the message using notification preview on a mobile phone, so the fact that it had only been opened by one person did not mean it had not been read by others.

102. Mr W’s evidence was that, had he received such a message, he would have dropped everything to go and collect his child. He was familiar with the Family App, and is still active on it to this day, because his child’s new nursery setting also uses it. He maintained that he did not receive the message in question. The Appellant sought to discredit Mr W as a witness, and it is worth considering that here.

103. The Appellant sought to persuade the panel that Child N had a “serious” nut allergy which her parents (Mr W and his wife Mrs W) had “purposely” concealed from her for a period of time when enrolling his daughter at her setting. This, she asserted, was not the action of a parent who would drop everything to collect their child in an emergency, and discredited him as a reliable or honest witness.

104. The panel noted the following: (i) Mr W described the nut allergy diagnosis as “recent” in his third witness statement of 08 August 2024. In his oral evidence when asked by the Appellant Mr W said that it was a new diagnosis, and they had informed the Appellant as soon as they could. The late evidence adduced by the Appellant on day 5 contains the child’s allergy action plan. It confirms that this was issued on 29 November 2023, approximately 2.5 to 3 months before Mr and Mrs W began to make arrangements for Child N to attend the Appellant’s setting. The panel accepts that there is a discrepancy between what Mr W asserted in his oral evidence and the written evidence. (ii) At H54, the text message conversation between Child N’s parents and the Appellant, Mrs W had responded to the Appellant’s cancellation of N’s settling-in sessions by stating that medical intervention for the allergy was not needed and the parents have only been advised to avoid nuts. Traces of nuts were fine. The reaction N had experienced was not severe.

105. That there is a discrepancy between Mr W’s account of when the diagnosis was made, and the actual date on the allergy management plan, does not automatically discredit Mr W as a witness. The passage of time means that all of the witnesses, including the Appellant, had gaps in their memories. Furthermore, the diagnosis was not, in fact, of a severe allergy. It was not something life-threatening. It was also relatively new, so perhaps something that the parents were not yet used to including within essential information. The panel could quite accept that it may be something that was not at the forefront of Mr and Mrs W’s minds when making arrangements for their new childminder, and it is clear that they notified the Appellant as soon as it occurred to them to do so.

106. This is an entirely different kind of situation from ignoring, and then claiming not to have received, a message stating that there has been an emergency, which is in essence what the Appellant alleges Mr W has done. The panel believed Mr W when he said that he had not received the message in question.

107. On balance of probabilities, the panel was satisfied that any parent who has left their child in the care of a childminder and then receives a message which states “emergency” and asks for the child to be collected, would either make such arrangements without delay, or would at the very least try to contact the childminder to obtain more information. But none of the children were then collected and there were no such phone calls made.

108. On balance therefore, the panel finds that the message in question was not sent to the parents of the minded children.

109. Turning to consider other steps taken by the Appellant during the course of the day, the panel notes that the evidence demonstrates that the Appellant did not make any sustained attempts to contact the children’s parents. She refused to share their contact details with first the HCEOs and later the Police. It is only later in the day, whilst the HCEOs were still present, that she makes contact with Ms P but instead of asking her to collect her child, she seeks to orchestrate a later finish and then, a sleepover.

110. Viewed in the light of this communication with Ms P, the fact that the group message was not sent to the children’s parents is suspicious. The panel considered it more likely than not that the failure to send the message was no accident. It was part of an ongoing attempt by the Appellant to ensure that children remained on the premises in an active attempt to delay or thwart the eviction.

111. The panel is therefore satisfied that the Appellant did not make appropriate efforts to arrange for the minded children to be collected when it became clear the eviction was going ahead.

112. The panel reflected on why it was, however, that the Appellant did contact one parent who had not yet dropped off their children. We noted that if it was her intention, as the Respondent asserts, to use the children to delay or prevent the eviction, it would not have been in her interests for that parent to attend and witness the presence of HCEOs, because that parent would then know what was happening and would be in a position to contact parents of other minded children. The Meaning of ‘Sleepover’

113. There was considerable discussion in the hearing of the meaning of the word ‘sleepover’. Mr W’s oral evidence was that it was his inherent understanding that it meant overnight. He thought that Ms P also understood it to mean overnight.

114. This view is corroborated by Ms P’s first witness statement of 08 August 2024, where she sets out that the request by the Appellant that Child C stay for a ‘sleepover’ was very unusual, and she did not know how to respond, having already made her views on sleepovers clear to the Appellant during a conversation a few weeks’ prior. She writes at paragraph 7 on page H57 that she was “…very alarmed when [the Appellant] suggested that my daughter stayed at the setting overnight and immediately knew something was not right”. She proceeded to ready herself to go and collect C straight away.

115. Ms P reiterates in both of her subsequent statements that she understood the Appellant to be asking for C to stay overnight. This is further backed up by reference to the bodyworn footage of the HCEOs and police.

116. The Appellant’s evidence is that within her childminding business, ‘sleepover’ was not used to mean an overnight stay. She describes it instead as a type of game, a pretend sleepover. She explained to the panel that in the Caribbean culture, sleepovers are not the norm. She asserted that Ms P would have known that she did not mean an overnight stay.

117. The panel notes that the text exchange exhibited to Ms P’s 3 rd statement at H74 does not shed any light on whether there was a mutual understanding of the meaning of ‘sleepover’ or not. The panel is mindful that it is extremely difficult to read tone or intention into a written text message and so has approached this with caution but did note that Ms P’s response to the request appeared to be one of surprise, and this was coupled with an immediate decision to collect C without further delay.

118. Mr Saigal put it to the Appellant that the dictionary definition of ‘sleepover’ is an overnight stay; that it is its ordinary meaning. In response, the Appellant adduced late evidence in the form of the Merriam-Webster online dictionary’s definition of sleepover. She stated that the importance of this was that it shows there is more than one interpretation of the word, because the Merriam-Webster dictionary has a separate heading, ‘Kids definition’, after the main definition. The panel note, however, that under both headings, the meaning given is the same: an overnight stay.

119. Placing ‘sleepover’ into context, the panel notes that on the night of 12 March 2024, Ms C had dropped her children off shortly before 6pm and had informed the HCEOs that she was working nights. The Appellant’s text to Ms P (H74) then relayed that these children were having “a bit of a sleepover”. Whilst the Appellant denies that it was intended that the children would stay the night, the Panel considers that any reasonable observer would have gained the impression that an overnight stay is what was planned.

120. The panel’s finding is that ‘sleepover’ meant an overnight stay. We find that to be its ordinary meaning, and we accept that is also what Ms P thought it to mean. We find that on balance of probability, when the Appellant texted Ms P about a ‘sleepover’ on the evening of 12 March 2024, she was offering Child C an overnight stay. Was the eviction from 3 Steele Walk unlawful? Is this relevant to the Tribunal’s decision?

121. Notwithstanding the High Court Order of 18 April 2024, the Appellant has continued to assert that the eviction from the premises at 3 Steele Walk was unlawful, and she has continued to use that as a means to justify or mitigate her actions on the day in question.

122. The Tribunal can deal with this in relatively short order. The order of the Honourable Mr Justice Murray gives clear reasons for the High Court decision that “there is no arguable basis currently for concluding that the Appellant was wrongfully evicted.”

123. This Tribunal accepts entirely the decision of the High Court in this regard. We would note that, even if that were not the case, the Tribunal certainly has no jurisdiction to interfere with such a decision. Until or unless that High Court decision is overturned by proper, formal process, then this Tribunal accepts it as being factually and legally correct.

124. The Appellant’s oral evidence to the panel was that the reason she was evicted is that the landlord believed she was illegally operating an unregistered childminding business. The Panel accepts that if that is what the landlord believed, clearly, he was mistaken. However, we need not concern ourselves with the landlord’s motivation for wanting to evict the Appellant.

125. We move on, then, to consider whether the Appellant’s continued belief that the eviction was unlawful is relevant to the decision at hand. This panel finds that it is not. This Tribunal is concerned with the suitability of the Appellant to be registered as a childminder. That decision is not contingent upon whether or not the eviction was lawful. What is relevant, however, is how the Appellant responded to the threat of eviction and the eviction itself in the context of her suitability to be registered as a childminder.

126. The Appellant’s case is that some of the behaviour she has exhibited can be excused or explained by the poor and/or unlawful conduct of others towards her. But as she was keen to remind the Panel during the hearing, context is important. Whilst the Panel accepts that the events leading up to and including 12 March 2024 were no doubt stressful and very difficult for the Appellant, her behaviour must be viewed within the context of her professional obligations as a childminder. Allegedly unlawful actions of others would not automatically justify or mitigate behaviour that falls below the professional standards expected of an individual in a position of such responsibility.

127. The Tribunal therefore finds that the lawfulness or otherwise of the eviction is not a determinative factor for this decision-making process. Was there an agreement to pause the eviction until 9.45pm?

128. In response to the allegations made by the respondent that the Appellant had been taking steps to delay the eviction by, for example, inviting Child C to stay later than planned (and/or to sleep over), the Appellant states that an agreement was reached between herself, the HCEOs and Police Officer Brookes that the eviction would be delayed until 9.45pm, after all the minded children had gone home.

129. The HCEOs denied that there had been any such agreement. Mr Thomas’ oral evidence was that no agreement was reached. He told us that the fact that there were children present did not mean the eviction could not necessarily proceed. The HCEOs have to assess the situation and the presenting risks. When dealing with children, best practice is to be careful, and to try to get suitable adults to attend to take care of the children. That may involve contacting the parents or in extreme situations, the Police.

130. Similarly, Miss Dover says that no such agreement was reached, and she did not think PC Brookes thought an agreement had been reached, either. The reason he left the premises when he did was because the Police only attend for breaches of the peace, and at that time, there was not one.

131. A short clip from the bodyworn video footage of Miss Dover was played in the hearing room. During the clip, at 2.02pm, Miss Dover asked the Appellant what was the last time that children get picked up. The Appellant’s response is that “…actually, two of them are not here, so then the latest one’s 9.45 for [Child C].”

132. But the evidence demonstrates (and the Appellant does not now deny) that in fact, Child C was due to be collected much earlier than this. It is Child C’s parent who the Appellant later contacts, first asking if she can stay until 6pm, and then inviting her for a sleepover. The Appellant’s oral evidence in respect of this was that she did not recall mentioning Child C at that time.

133. The panel also reviewed the bodyworn footage of PC Brooks (SS9.1 to SS9.4). Whilst it is clear that he was trying to find a peaceable solution to the situation, there is no indication in the footage of an agreement being reached. PC Brooks went through the options with the HCEOs, the Estate Agent and the Landlord. He established that the HCEOs’ instructions were to remain at the property and wait for the children to be collected, at which point they would finish carrying out the eviction. He and the Agents have been told by the Appellant that the last pick-up is due to take place at around 9.45pm, and he expresses doubt, together with Miss Dover, that this is genuinely the case. Before leaving, he explains to the Appellant that the Agents will be remaining until the children are collected and will then complete the eviction.

134. Mr Saigal submitted in his opening remarks, and the panel accepts, that something based upon a deception, and used as a ploy to break the resolve of the HCEOs cannot properly form any so-called agreement with the HCEOs. It is simply an attempt to mislead, to delay the eviction process.

135. In the panel’s analysis, there was no agreement as to a specific time until which the eviction will be delayed. The plan was for the eviction to be completed as soon as the children had been collected, regardless of what time that was. Did the TSO HCEOs unlawfully imprison children inside the property? Is this relevant to the Tribunal’s decision?

136. The Appellant has made much of her belief that the HCEOs unlawfully imprisoned the minded children and her childminding assistants inside the property during the process of the eviction.

137. This alleged imprisonment occurred when the Appellant left the property shortly after 6pm to speak with a parent, Ms P. The agents took the opportunity to lock the door, preventing her return. There were initially three children remaining in the property at that time, together with two childminding assistants.

138. The Appellant says that the alleged false imprisonment is relevant for reasons which can be summarised as follows: firstly, because the unlawful actions of others go some way towards justifying her own conduct in reacting to those actions. Secondly because the unlawful actions of individuals should cause the Tribunal to question their reliability as truthful witnesses in these proceedings. In other words, unlawful imprisonment by the HCEOs calls into question their integrity and character.

139. The evidence of the HCEOs was that they made it clear to the adults still in the home that they were free to leave at any time; they just had to ask, and the door would be unlocked. This is corroborated by the bodyworn footage of Miss Dover. At 18:25 the HCEOs can clearly be heard telling the assistants that they are free to leave. One of the assistants accuses them of locking her in. It is repeated that she is free to leave, and she responds by saying “I’m staying here, make your life harder.” At 18:29 an assistant again claims to be locked in and the HCEOs again remind her that she is free to leave, and that everything is being recorded on video. At 18:32 during the tussle at the front door when Ms P attends to collect Child C, the Appellant herself appears to encourage one of the assistants to remain inside: “[name], go in….”

140. That the HCEOs had no intention of keeping anyone inside the property against their will is also illustrated by the fact that they let Ms P into the property to collect Child C and then let her and the child out again. The Tribunal was not, therefore, persuaded on the balance of probabilities that any false imprisonment had occurred, but we would note of course that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine criminal matters. The police decision not to investigate the allegations appears still to be under review, and this is something the Tribunal cannot and will not interfere with, but the panel’s view is that it is unlikely that there was an unlawful imprisonment.

141. This leads to the question of whether it is relevant to the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal finds that it does not matter whether the HCEOs acted lawfully or otherwise in locking the doors to the premises. What is important to the Tribunal’s decision is the manner in which the Appellant conducted herself before, during and after that day. Did the police act unlawfully in removing children from the property during the eviction process? Is this relevant to the Tribunal’s decision?

142. Another allegation made by the Appellant is that the Police acted outside of their powers in removing the remaining two children from the premises and placing them into a police car. Once again, she suggested that this to some extent justifies her own actions. She also argued that the only identifiable harm that came to any children on that day was as a result of the police actions, and not as a result of her own actions.

143. The term “police protective custody” has been used to describe the police actions on the evening of 12 March 2024. Police protective powers are governed by s46 of the Children Act 1989 . The Tribunal is satisfied that the term is used incorrectly in this case to describe the actions of the police, because although they did remove the children from the property, the aim was to reunite them with their parent rather than to accommodate them elsewhere.

144. However, that does not mean necessarily that the police acted outside of their lawful powers in taking the steps that they did. They were entitled to remove the children from the property to a place of safety (the Police car) whilst efforts were ongoing to have them collected. The panel was surprised that the Appellant sought on the one hand to persuade us that the HCEOs had unlawfully imprisoned the children, and yet on the other hand that the Police had acted unlawfully in removing them from that situation.

145. In any event, once again, this is a distraction from the key issues under scrutiny in this case. The Tribunal finds that it is not relevant to the decision-making process whether the Police acted within their powers or not. Once again, what is important to the Tribunal’s decision is the way the Appellant conducted herself before, during and after that day. Does the Appellant’s right to a private and family life take precedence over her safeguarding duties towards children in her care?

146. The Appellant sought to persuade the panel that any less than exemplary behaviour on the part of herself or her assistants was excusable because once the HCEOs had entered and attempted to carry out the eviction, that was interference with their private and family life. Therefore, they were no longer under any professional duties to behave in a certain manner and were not obligated to continue providing appropriate care to the minded children. She used this argument to excuse the periods of time, evidenced by the bodyworn video footage, where she and/or the assistants became distressed, shouted, swore, and used derogatory and defamatory language. It is worth noting here for context that the Appellant’s two assistants are also her daughters, and were also residing at the premises in question, and this is why she argued that this applied to all three of them.

147. The panel note that the Appellant was in charge of the childminding business and had chosen to have children in her care on the day in question despite the obvious risks. She was therefore responsible for the children, and had a duty of care towards them, for the duration of the time they remained in her care. The same can be said for her assistants, who were in her employment on the day in question. Is filming on a mobile phone the same thing as having CCTV in the premises? Were the Respondent’s staff reasonable in declining to be filmed during monitoring visits?

148. CCTV is an acronym for Closed-Circuit Television. It is used to refer to surveillance systems that use cameras for monitoring purposes, usually to enhance security. The camera feeds are transmitted to specific monitors and/or recording systems and are not broadcast publicly.

149. During monitoring visits after the Appellant’s suspension, she or her daughters sought to record Ofsted staff using their mobile phones. The Appellant stated that this is in keeping with her own policies for the safety of staff and children. However, she described what she was doing, more than once, as using CCTV.

150. The Respondent’s policies do permit the use of CCTV in settings. However, Ofsted staff were generally unhappy about being recorded on the mobile phones of the Appellant or her daughters. They therefore asked on more than one occasion that the Appellant stop recording them. Ms Hardy told us in her oral evidence that the Respondent’s internal guidance to staff is to decline being filmed and to continue with the visit if safe to do so. A number of childcare settings do use CCTV, which is usually a fixed camera in certain rooms, a Ring doorbell or similar. Ms Hardy would not necessarily class a mobile phone as a CCTV device.

151. Ms Brown’s oral evidence was that she was within her rights to ask not to be recorded. She commented that “it is extremely difficult to have a meaningful conversation with a camera in our faces.” The panel accept that the wording “in our faces” is unfortunate. However, considered in the context of the case and the Appellant’s relationship with the Respondent’s staff, it is understandable. Ms Hardy indicated that the Appellant had on one occasion told her that she was filming her because she (Ms Hardy) had “lied last time”, and she also recalls the Appellant’s behaviour on one of the suspension visits as being argumentative and hostile.

152. The panel therefore asked itself whether the Respondent had been unreasonable in asking the Appellant not to record the monitoring visits on mobile telephones. We noted that there is a significant difference between a recording on a mobile phone, and one via CCTV, this being that a recording made on a mobile phone can easily be stopped and started and therefore operated selectively whereas CCTV cameras generally run constantly and from a fixed location. Staff conducting monitoring visits can therefore arrange to have a conversation with the childminder off camera in a private room (and we were told, this is often what happens). Having a mobile phone camera pointed at you in circumstances which at times, have been hostile, is not the same thing at all. The panel find that the Respondent’s staff were reasonable to decline to be filmed in this manner. Did the Appellant make every reasonable effort to meet with Ofsted during the period of her suspension?

153. Ofsted sought to have a meeting with the Appellant to discuss the concerns that had led to her suspension (and later, to give her the opportunity to make representations in respect of the decision to cancel her registration). Meetings were offered on a number of dates, the full list of which can be seen at page H299 in the bundle.

154. On some occasions the Appellant’s reasons for not being able to attend could be viewed as reasonable. For example, her reason for cancelling the meeting arranged for 04 June 2024 was that she was unwell. On other occasions, meetings did not proceed for reasons that cannot be viewed as reasonable. Two examples are worth considering.

155. The first is the meeting planned for 21 June 2025 at Ofsted’s offices in Cambridge. The Respondent had asked on a number of occasions for the Appellant to confirm that she would be attending this meeting. When she did not respond, to save staff from a wasted trip, the meeting was cancelled. The Appellant attended anyway and became irritated with the Respondent. The Appellant told us that she was not looking at her email very often at that time, which is why she missed the notice of cancellation. However, that does not explain why she did not respond to the Respondent’s multiple requests for her to confirm her attendance or otherwise before this.

156. The second is the meeting scheduled for 27 August 2024 at the offices of Central Bedfordshire Council. This had been arranged to be convenient to the Appellant as it was a location not far from her home address. The Appellant did not make it to that meeting. The Appellant’s case is that she was unable to find the premises having been given an incorrect postcode. The Respondent’s case is that the address has two postcodes, and that their staff (who said that they were unfamiliar with the area and that they had driven from considerable distances, including from Sheffield) were able to find the address using the same postcode as that given to the Appellant. Mrs Gilpin confirmed that there are clear signs to the Council’s offices from the roundabout on the main road which the Appellant would have arrived on.

157. Mrs McCabe’s second witness statement records that initially, the Appellant claimed that she was at the address on Monk’s Walk. The map attached to Mrs Gilpin’s second statement (admitted in late evidence on day 1) demonstrates that Monk’s Walk is the road which leads to the Council’s office and a large car park. It was only after it was established that she was not at the address that the Appellant claimed to be unable to find it. She then became uncontactable by telephone or by the Respondent’s staff members, who told us during their oral evidence that they had continued for some time to make efforts to find her so that the meeting could go ahead.

158. This is highly surprising to the panel given what was at stake for the Appellant. The panel found it highly unlikely that the Appellant would have been unable to find the Council’s office. Even if that had been the case, it is astonishing that she did not make significant efforts to seek help to find it and further, that she had become uncontactable afterwards. The Schedule of Allegations

159. We now move on to set out the Tribunal’s findings in respect of the Schedule of Allegations. Part A – Concerns about the Appellant’s suitability to work with children arising from events on and around 12 March 2024 1) The Appellant’s actions on and around 12 March 2024 demonstrate she is unsuitable to work with children.

160. As has been detailed earlier in this decision, the Tribunal has found that the Appellant lied to, and sought to mislead, staff at the TSO in her attempts to evade eviction. She made a decision to have minded children on the premises on 12 March 2024 which the Tribunal has found to be an unreasonable and unsafe decision. During 12 March 2024 itself, the Appellant continued to prioritise her own needs by failing to contact the children’s parents to arrange their collection and by using the presence of children to try to delay the eviction, including making efforts to set up an overnight stay for some of the minded children.

161. The Tribunal’s finding is that the Appellant’s actions leading up to and including 12 March 2024 certainly demonstrated an unsuitability to work with children at that time. As the Appellant points out in her response to the Scott Schedule, the examples given are all now historic.

162. Whether this remains of concern is therefore a matter to be considered in light of the Appellant’s insight, remedial actions, and attitude in the period since 12 March 2024 to the present date. However, the Tribunal would note that the Appellant’s actions before and during 12 March 2024 were particularly serious in that there was repeated and intentional dishonesty and a complete disregard for the safety and wellbeing of the minded children. 2) The Appellant’s lack of insight into the events that occurred on and around 12 March 2024 including a profound lack of awareness of her actions and the impact that this had on children’s emotional wellbeing demonstrates she is not suitable to work with children.

163. In her response to the Schedule of Allegations the Appellant has stated that the Respondent has sought to breach her human right to respect for private and family life, that the Respondent has sought to breach her right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and has failed to show how her ‘insight’ demonstrates an unsuitability to work with children.

164. The Tribunal considers that a response of this nature only serves as an illustration of the Respondent’s concerns. The Appellant has continued throughout the appeal process and the final hearing to be unable or unwilling to accept full responsibility for the events that have resulted in the cancellation of her registration and, indeed, for the events of and after 12 March 2024. Instead, she has sought to divert attention to what she perceives to be the shortcomings and wrongdoings of others and has continued to seek to justify her actions.

165. It is the case that the Appellant has carried out a risk assessment and has undertaken training since 12 March 2024. However, her attitude towards authority, towards other professionals and her continued insistence on diverting attention away from her own actions to those of others is strongly suggestive that in doing so she has merely paid lip service to her regulator’s expectations. During her oral evidence she was still unable to accept that the minded children were placed at risk of harm solely as a consequence of her actions and indeed, continued to deny that any child had experienced harm.

166. The Tribunal noted from the bodyworn video footage of Miss Dover that there were times during 12 March 2024 that it is inconceivable that the minded children could not overhear the Appellant and/or her assistants shouting. Child C was exposed to shouting, swearing, and witnessed at least part of a physical tussle when Ms P came to collect her. It is inconceivable that the children were unaware that something unusual was going on or that there were a number of uniformed strangers present in the property throughout the day. We further noted that after 12 March, all of the children experienced a sudden and unplanned change in their routines. Mr W spoke of what he and his wife considered to be “separation anxiety” and a clear indication that Child N was aware at an age-appropriate level that something bad had happened, as indicated by her asking staff at her new setting whether they were going to make bad decisions too.

167. It is quite apparent on the evidence that any child present at the premises on the day of the eviction was exposed, throughout the day, to a risk of significant emotional harm and therefore highly concerning that the Appellant continues to deny this and to minimise her role in it. 3) The Appellant’s address [this being her current address, redacted for her safety and privacy] has not been verified as a suitable childminding premises.

168. The Appellant’s response to the Schedule is that she has no intention of childminding from her current premises. During the course of the hearing, this resolve was not quite as clear. There was disagreement between the parties about the meaning of the correspondence from the agents for her current landlord and whether permission of the landlord is even required.

169. However, given that the Appellant has been suspended continuously since July 2024 and therefore has not been in a position to childmind from her new premises even had she wanted to do so, it is hardly surprising that arrangements are not currently in place that would permit this.

170. The Tribunal finds that this is not a relevant consideration for the present proceedings. It is something that, should the Appellant’s registration be reinstated, could be resolved. Part B – Breach of Early Years Foundation State (EYFS) relevant requirements 4) Policies and Procedures a) The Appellant failed to take lead responsibility for safeguarding children in her setting on 12 March 2024.

171. The Appellant’s response to this focuses on the fact that the EYFS allows for assistants to care for children unsupervised for up to 2 hours. She states that whilst she was attempting to deal with the eviction situation, she relied upon her assistants to be responsible for safeguarding the children.

172. When the HCEOs attended at the property, the Appellant told them that she was the only adult present on the premises. If they were minors, they would not have been suitable persons to care for the children. She would have been the only person present who was suitable to look after the children.

173. It is now known of course that the assistants were adults, and they were deemed suitable to be looking after the children. However, at many points during the video footage the panel noted that neither of them was engaged in that task. Instead, they were engaged in interacting with, and videoing, the HCEOs and police in attendance.

174. The Appellant’s response to this was to assert that her assistants’ right to a private and family life was being breached by the HCEOs and therefore they were, in effect, entitled to derelict their duties (see paragraphs 146 to 147 above). If, as she asserts, they were entitled to put their own rights before the safeguarding of the children, then it is not reasonable to state that it was appropriate for them to be looking after the children at that point.

175. The Appellant has also asserted, similarly, that her own rights to a private and family life were in the circumstances of the 12 March 2024 incident more important than the safeguarding of the children in her care. It appeared to the panel that she sought to switch the status of herself and her assistants from childminders to private individuals and back again at will.

176. The other adult present for much of the day was Ms R, who the Appellant asserts was her emergency contact. She was not approved by Ofsted but did not necessarily need to be to carry out the emergency contact role. Paragraphs 203 to 207 below consider Ms R’s suitability to look after the children in more detail but in summary, the panel has found that the Appellant’s use of her emergency contact on 12 March 2024 was inappropriate.

177. Perhaps most fundamentally, the Appellant’s failure to take lead responsibility for safeguarding children in her setting on 12 March 2024 is the fact that there were children present at all. Miss Mohan, in respect of the two children escorted from the premises by the police, stated in her oral evidence that from her experience as a LADO, there was clear harm to the two children present. She said that the children should not have been present at the eviction. She had found it extremely distressing to watch the children being taken to the police car, despite having been a social worker for a long time. Miss Mohan’s opinion was that based on the footage, it was clear that the children were harmed.

178. The Appellant’s argument throughout has been that that harm was attributable to the actions of the police rather than her own actions. The Tribunal has, however, found that it was reasonable to assume that the HCEOs would attend on that date, and that the risk assessment around this was entirely inadequate. Causally speaking, the Police actions were a direct result of the Appellant’s actions. The panel has also found that the Appellant did not take adequate steps to remedy the situation during the course of the day; she did not contact the children’s parents or take any other steps to safeguard the minded children.

179. The Tribunal is satisfied that this allegation is made out to the requisite standard. The Appellant failed to take lead responsibility for safeguarding children in her setting on 12 March 2024. b) The Appellant failed to take the appropriate action when allegations have been made against her, namely notifying the LADO

180. The first witness statement of Miss Mohan dated 12 August 2024 sets out at paragraphs 5 to 7 (page H76) that on 13 March 2024, the day after the eviction, the LADO service received 3 separate referrals in regard to the Appellant. One was in respect of another matter, but the other two were of note. One was from Ofsted itself, and one was from a parent (referred to in Miss Mohan’s statement as Parent A, but referred to in this decision as Mr W).

181. The Appellant’s written objections to the Respondent’s NOI, specifically paragraphs 148 to 150, commencing at H583, deal with this allegation. The Appellant asserts that she spoke with Ms Hardy of Ofsted on 13 March 2024, within 24 hours of the incident. Ms Hardy informed the Appellant that she would inform the LADO on the Appellant’s behalf. The Appellant states that she also contacted the LADO by phone on 13 March 2024.

182. The panel noted that it would be somewhat irregular for an individual to refer themselves to the LADO. In circumstances such as those under examination here, the Respondent would have been the Appellant’s point of contact, and the Respondent would then refer the matter to the LADO, which is what appears to have happened.

183. The Respondent had made a separate allegation that the Appellant had failed to notify the Respondent about the incident on 12 March 2024. It was accepted by both parties that the Appellant spoke with Ms Hardy on 13 March 2024. The Appellant told us that she thought that was all that she needed to do. In any event she went on to give formal notification within the statutory timeframe prescribed for doing so, a point which Mr Saigal accepted during the hearing.

184. The panel does not find this allegation to be made out. c) The Appellant did not implement her policies and procedures to keep children safe on 12 March 2024 or ensure her assistants followed her policies and procedures

185. The evidence in respect of this allegation is overwhelming. The Tribunal finds below that the Appellant’s risk assessment prior to 12 March 2024 was wholly inadequate. On the day itself, she took no steps to have the children collected, and we have found above that she failed to take lead responsibility for safeguarding children.

186. The Appellant has sought to assert variously that she left her assistants in charge, but also that her assistants were not responsible for following policies and procedures because their right to a private and family life was being violated, and we have already dealt with that above.

187. It is quite clear that adequate policies and procedures to keep the children safe were not implemented either by the Appellant or her assistants on 12 March 2024. 5) Risk Assessment a) The Appellant did not complete a risk assessment and ensure that she took all reasonable steps to ensure that children in her care, and any assistants, were not exposed to risks on 12 March 2024.

188. The Appellant’s case is that she did carry out a risk assessment. She did not believe the eviction would go ahead. Her position is that she has reflected upon the events of 12 March 2024 and now accepts that, with hindsight, she should have given greater weight to the prospect of the eviction actually proceeding.

189. The Tribunal’s finding above is that the reasonable response to the eviction notice would have been to anticipate that it would take place or, even if it did not, that there was a risk of considerable disruption on the given date. Despite this, the Appellant took no steps to ensure that minded children would not be present.

190. The obvious step to ensure that children in her care were not exposed to risks on 12 March 2024 would have been for the Appellant to notify the families in advance that she was unable to accept children for minding on that day.

191. Setting that aside for a moment and looking at the events of 12 March alone, the Tribunal has found that the Appellant did not take adequate or appropriate steps to contact family members to have the minded children collected. Indeed, as we have found, she did the opposite. She attempted to prolong the stay of Child C and also accepted the return of two other children (the two who were eventually removed by the police) after they had gone to a medical appointment, despite the situation by then having been ongoing for a number of hours and despite knowing, by this stage, that her application for a stay had been unsuccessful. This means that once again, whatever risk assessment may have been undertaken on the day itself, that assessment was grossly inadequate.

192. Turning to her assistants, the panel would simply observe that in taking the steps that she did, the Appellant placed them in an extremely difficult position and most notably, left them open to the risk of damage to their own professional reputations within the childminding industry.

193. On balance of probability the Tribunal is satisfied that the Appellant’s risk assessment was wholly inadequate and she did not take all, or indeed any, reasonable steps to ensure that children in her care, and any assistants, were not exposed to risks on 12 March 2024. b) Despite the Appellant completing risk assessment training and formulating a ‘reflective risk assessment’ dated 21 September 2024, this document as a whole continues to show a lack of insight and incapacity to put children first.

194. The Appellant’s reflective risk assessment commences at page I1429 in the bundle. It opens with the words “On the 12 th of March 2024, during normal childminding operations, I was faced with an unexpected and distressing situation” (our emphasis). The first paragraph goes on to describe the HCEOs arriving at 10am “despite” an urgent application having been made to stay the eviction and does not mention that that application had only been made that morning (indeed, the bodyworn footage indicates that she was still trying to make the payment for that application on the telephone once the HCEOs were already present). It refers to the eviction itself as “illegal.”

195. Later paragraphs seek to perpetuate some of the untruths that the Appellant has maintained, such as that she had asked the parents to collect their children “asap,” and that an agreed decision was made to delay the eviction until after hours. Under the heading “Additional Considerations” (I1430) the Appellant writes that “it was advised not to call parents for early collection”, a statement which makes absolutely no sense in the context of the day’s events.

196. The heading “Reflective Consideration and Learning Points” covers, among other things, “preparedness for unexpected events” (but this was not an unexpected event) and “unlawful eviction.” It suggests that the Appellant had cooperated with police and social services to ensure that the situation was handled in the best interests of the children and asserts that the event was managed “successfully.”

197. This is simply not an accurate reflective assessment of what happened on 12 March 2024. No opportunity is taken to reflect upon the myriad wrong decisions that the Appellant took before and during the eviction. Instead, the document seeks to justify the Appellant’s actions and tries to persuade the reader that she handled the event well.

198. The Tribunal finds that this allegation is made out on the balance of probability. The Appellant’s continued lack of insight was demonstrated throughout the hearing by the by oral evidence and indeed, by her conduct within the hearing more generally. It must therefore remain a matter of significant concern for the regulatory body. 6) Safety of Premises. The Appellant did not take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of children on the premises on 12 March 2024.

199. The Respondent has not raised concerns about the structure or physical safety of the premises that the Appellant was using. The thrust of this allegation is that the premises were the subject of an eviction notice due to be executed on 12 March 2024. This made it unsuitable for the children to enter it that morning.

200. In a sense, therefore, this allegation is a repetition or rewording of the allegations made about the Appellant’s risk assessment. It is quite clearly made out on the evidence. 7) Suitable people a) The Appellant had people working as assistants not deemed suitable by Ofsted, failing to ensure any person who may have regular contact with children was suitable.

201. The Appellant had two registered assistants (who are also her adult daughters). Ms Hardy was asked about the form appearing at H212 in the bundle which records both the Appellant’s daughters as not suitable to work with children. Ms Hardy explained that this is most likely because of a system error. The form is completed centrally by an administrative team and Ms Hardy did not know who might be responsible for changing it. Ms Hardy accepted that the Appellant’s two daughters are, in fact, deemed suitable by Ofsted.

202. The Tribunal had no reason to doubt Ms Hardy’s evidence in this regard. On balance the Tribunal does not accept that the Appellant’s childminding assistants were not deemed suitable by Ofsted. b) The Appellant allowed people to have unsupervised contact with children being cared for that had not had their suitability confirmed by Ofsted, namely Ms R.

203. The other individual present on 12 March 2024, (who I shall refer to as Ms R), was not working for the Appellant and was not approved by Ofsted. Ms Hardy explained that individuals who have not yet been deemed suitable are not able to be left in sole charge of children.

204. The Appellant’s case is that Ms R was one of her emergency contacts. An emergency contact, said Ms Hardy, is someone who the minder can call on in an emergency, to provide very short-term, interim care whilst the provider arranges for the children to be collected. This individual does not need to be registered with Ofsted; it can be anybody.

205. Ms Hardy would therefore have expected Ms R to be caring for the children for no more than an hour or two. In the circumstances of 12 March 2024, she would have expected the children to go home very swiftly. Having them stay and be cared for by Ms R for much of the day was in her view, not a proper use of an emergency contact.

206. Miss Dover’s oral evidence was that whilst in the premises, she witnessed “mainly the young girl that worked there” undertaking the care of the children. The two assistants, the Appellant’s daughters, instead spent time videoing the HCEOs whilst the Appellant herself spent a lot of time on her laptop. This is corroborated by viewing the bodyworn footage of the HCEOs and the police.

207. The Tribunal finds that on balance of probabilities, notwithstanding that Ms R was one of the Appellant’s emergency contacts, the extent to which she was utilised to care for the children on 12 March 2024 was improper. The finding would be more properly set out as that the Appellant made improper use of her emergency contact during the events of 12 March 2024. 8) Training and supervision of assistants’ skills. That the Appellant on and around 12 March 2024 was not accountable for the quality of the work of her assistants and did not ensure that they were competent to undertake their roles and responsibilities.

208. There were times during the events of 12 March 2024 where the bodyworn video footage clearly indicates that neither of the Appellant’s assistants were actively engaged in looking after the children. Indeed, the Appellant even asserted that they were not obliged to do so given her assertion that their human rights were being breached.

209. However, the panel notes that both assistants were deemed suitable to care for children by the Respondent. To that extent, it was reasonable for the Appellant to assume that they were competent and that she could rely on them to mind the children. Indeed, within the bodyworn video footage, the panel observed some examples of good practice by the assistants, for example one of the assistants caring for Child C and the twins and getting Child C ready to leave.

210. The Tribunal would not want this allegation to be interpreted as an allegation that the assistants were directly at fault for the events of 12 March 2024. They were working under the leadership, guidance, and instructions of the Appellant.

211. However, due to the course of events and as a direct result of the Appellant’s decisions, she found herself during the course of 12 March 2024 unable to directly oversee their work because she was excluded from the premises, and with her encouragement, they refused to leave or bring the children out. 9) Staff : Child ratios. That the Appellant on and around 12 March 2024 was not meeting the requirement that staffing arrangements must meet the needs of all children and ensure their safety. She did not ensure that children were adequately supervised on 12 March 2024.

212. At times it is clear that there are at least two adults with the minded children. But the fact that both assistants can be seen on the bodyworn video footage at the same time, regularly, often engaging with the HCEOs for periods of time, means that we cannot be certain that the children were suitably minded at all times.

213. The Appellant stated that the children were within earshot of the assistants at all times, but given the noisy exchanges that were going on at times between the adults, particularly when the twins and Child C were upstairs, and also when the twins were upstairs and Ms P was collecting Child C, times when both assistants were downstairs, we cannot be confident that the assistants would necessarily have been able to hear the children and respond to any incident.

214. The panel accepts that technically, the Appellant may be correct in asserting that the regulations were followed and for that reason, we cannot find the allegation made out.

215. However, the spirit of the regulations, intended to safeguard children, was not abided by, giving the Tribunal concern for what the Appellant considers to be the effective safeguarding of children. As has already been stated in this decision, there should not have been any children present at the premises on 12 March 2024. 10) Information and record keeping. a) The Appellant on and around 12 March 2024 did not share relevant information about the eviction (with parents and carers, other professionals working with the child, the Police, social services and Ofsted or their CMA) as appropriate.

216. The Tribunal has found above that the Appellant did not share relevant information about the eviction with parents and carers. She did not warn them of the possibility that the eviction might take place, and she did not take adequate steps to contact them to arrange collection of the children once the eviction was underway.

217. It is acknowledged that the Appellant spoke with Ms Hardy of Ofsted by telephone on 13 March 2024, and she went on to formally notify the Respondent within the deadline. The police already knew about the events of the day because they were present.

218. A childminder would not need to notify social services of the eviction unless one of the minded children was a child in the Local Authority’s care, and this part of the Respondent’s allegation is therefore not clear.

219. The Tribunal finds that the allegation is made out insofar as it relates to the parents and carers of minded children. b) The Appellant failed to cooperate with the Police and provide parents’ contact details resulting in the children being taken into the care of the police.

220. We have already considered above whether it is correct to assert that the children were taken into police protective custody. We have determined that strictly, it is not. The Police wanted the parents’ contact details so that they could get the children collected, not in order to take the children into their protective custody.

221. That does not mean, however, that the Police did not temporarily take the children into their care. When they removed the two remaining children from the house and placed them into the Police car, they temporarily took over the care of the children until the parents arrived.

222. That this happened, as we have already discussed above, is a direct result of the Appellant’s actions and that included a failure to cooperate with the Police and provide parents’ contact details. The allegation is made out. 11) Changes that must be notified to Ofsted or the relevant childminder agency. The Appellant did not as soon as reasonably practicable notify Ofsted of significant events including that she was evicted on 12 March 2024 and also of an eviction from a previous address at [redacted].

223. It has already been established that the Appellant did speak with Ms Hardy of Ofsted by telephone the day after the eviction. She also completed the formal notification process within the time limit permitted. It was this timeframe that she was required to adhere to, rather than acting “as soon as reasonably practicable.” The allegation is therefore unfair and the panel makes no finding about it. Part C – Concerns about the Appellant’s honesty and integrity. 12) The Appellant has not acted with honesty and integrity as she has failed to work openly with Ofsted.

224. The Appellant’s honesty and integrity are called into question by the findings the Tribunal has made about the untruths she has sought to perpetuate before and during the eviction. That she has stood by these falsehoods in her dealings with Ofsted means that she has not worked openly with Ofsted. Furthermore, she did not make every reasonable effort to meet with Ofsted to discuss their concerns. Her reflective risk assessment itself contains a significant distortion of the truth of the events of 12 March and is another example of her continuing failure to work openly with the Respondent.

225. The evidence demonstrates that this finding is made out. 13) The Appellant has shown little insight into her actions on and around 12 March 2024 and despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary maintained that other people and professionals including HCEAs and the Police were responsible for what transpired on that day.

226. This allegation is clearly made out by reference to the other findings that the Tribunal has made. We have found that the Appellant’s reflective risk assessment post-12 March 2024 is inadequate and lacks insight. She has continually sought to deflect the blame for the events of 12 March 2024 to others. The Appellant’s conduct of these proceedings has clearly demonstrated that that lack of insight remains an issue of significant concern. Part D – The Appellant’s lack of capacity to fulfil her role and responsibilities as a registered childminder and attitude to the regulator and other agencies. 14) Failed to demonstrate that she can fulfil her responsibilities as a registered childminder and work in cooperation with Ofsted and other agencies to keep children safe in line with Ofsted’s code of conduct: Collaborative inspection and regulation – Gov.uk.

228. The Tribunal finds this allegation to be made out. We consider further the Appellant’s attitude towards her regulator at paragraph 230 and again under the heading ‘The Tribunal’s conclusions with reasons’, below. For the sake of brevity we have not repeated that analysis here.

229. In summary, the Appellant has been dishonest and has acted without integrity, has failed to work constructively with Ofsted and other agencies, lacks insight into her actions and has continued to seek to justify herself by attempting to shift blame onto others. Other matters

227. The Appellant raised a number of grievances during the course of the hearing which, while they do not have an impact upon the Tribunal’s decision-making, are worthy of mention for the sake of completeness, because it is clear that the Appellant did not accept the Tribunal’s decisions in respect of them.

228. I therefore set out below the Panel’s decisions and/or views on those matters below. Was the panel’s question about Ms Steele’s alma mater relevant?

229. During the panel’s questions to the Appellant, we noted that she has referred several times to being a graduate of a Russell-Group university. She was asked which university that was.

230. The Appellant was offended by this question, which resulted in a lengthy tirade from her which was unpleasant and verged upon abusive. The Tribunal (alongside other organisations and professions) was accused of institutionalised racism and misogyny.

231. Furthermore, during the course of the Appellant’s evidence, she made allegations that there was collusion between Ofsted, the Local Authority, and the police. She accused Ofsted inspectors of being biased, racist, malicious, and hostile towards her. She accused their practice of being “outrageous” and stated that this will only be dealt with after this hearing has concluded.

232. The Appellant also stated that this country is institutionally racist and misogynistic. She said that this was not a fair hearing and that she has known this from the beginning. She said that the Tribunal system is not at all fair.

233. The Appellant opined that she was not receiving a fair trial. She was convinced that the question was not only irrelevant, but something which the Tribunal had no right to ask. The following day, she told us that questioning a person’s qualifications and credentials is a racist trope.

234. The panel remains of the view that the question was relevant. In the bundle of evidence for this appeal there are no fewer than 10 references by the Appellant to her status as a Russell-Group graduate. She has sought to link her status as a Russell-Group graduate to the key question of her suitability as a childminder.

235. If a party repeatedly draws attention to something which they consider relevant in terms of the Tribunal’s consideration of their suitability, then they can expect to be asked questions about it. It was not unreasonable to enquire which Russell-Group university she was referring to, and the same question would have been put no matter the Appellant’s ethnic and/or cultural identity and background. The issue of the Appellant stating as ‘fact’ things which have not been established as such:

236. Many times during her cross examination of witnesses and during her own oral evidence and submissions, the Appellant made assertions such as “we now know that…” in respect of matters of fact which are in dispute.

237. This would have given the impression to an observer that she was referring to matters that had now been established or agreed as fact, but very often, she was referring to matters she simply did not agree with or which remained points of dispute. Examples include that the eviction itself was unlawful, despite the High Court’s findings that it was lawful, that the HCEOs falsely imprisoned persons inside the property, and that the police acted unlawfully in removing children from the property. The Appellant became upset at times when it was raised with her that these matters were not established as facts.

238. The language used by the Appellant was unhelpful and the panel made two observations in respect of it: first, that the Appellant does not appear to respect decisions made by official bodies and/or persons in authority when contrary to her own opinions, and secondly that she sought deliberately to muddy the waters as to the ‘facts’ during the hearing.

239. We therefore note here that the Panel was alive to this issue during the hearing and has considered this as part of its overall assessment of the Appellant’s suitability to be registered as a childminder. The Tribunal’s conclusions with reasons

240. The Tribunal has made findings above and has given detailed reasons for each which do not need to be further discussed here. In our overall analysis of the evidence and consideration of whether the Appellant is suitable for registration as a Childminder, we had regard in particular to the following matters: Honesty and integrity

241. The Tribunal has found above that dishonesty has permeated the events resulting in these proceedings, right from the start. We have found that the Appellant created a raft of falsehoods in order to try to prevent the eviction. When challenged on these in her oral evidence she has sought to distance herself from them by claiming that others composed these emails without her full knowledge. She was dishonest during the events of 12 March by claiming she had contacted the parents to collect the children when that was not the case and when, in fact, later in the day she attempted to prolong the time during which children would be present.

242. The Appellant has since then continued to maintain her position in respect of those falsehoods and has continued to try to maintain her deception even in the Tribunal proceedings. The Tribunal has grave concerns about her honesty.

243. The Appellant’s dishonesty and her willingness to use the minded children as a shield to prevent eviction both call her integrity into question. The panel also noted that the video footage demonstrates that during the course of 12 March 2024 she said some very unpleasant things about others, including commenting that she did not know how many kids Mr Thomas had “fiddled with”, making racist remarks to the locksmith (together with her two assistants), calling the Police a “grooming gang” and repeatedly asserting her belief that there was bias in the way she was being treated.

244. The Appellant argued that she was entitled to make such comments because at the time in question, she was acting in her private life and not in her capacity as a childminder. But the fact remains that she was at the time in charge of a childminding enterprise that was still underway. She had minded children at the premises and was in charge of two assistants who were also behaving inappropriately. Furthermore, whilst it is of course correct that the Appellant has a right to her family and private life, there are certain standards that professionals are expected to uphold at all times. It was accepted by all in the hearing that Childminders are professionals who should be treated as such, but this comes with responsibilities in respect of one’s conduct which the Tribunal finds the Appellant did not meet and which in any other regulated profession would be subject to consideration regarding suitability to be a member of the profession. Safeguarding

245. The Appellant has accepted that she made bad decisions, particularly about having children attend the premises for minding on 12 March 2024. However, she has continued to blame others for the harm, or risk of harm, to those children that resulted. Her reflective risk assessment is an example of this. Within that assessment she paints herself as someone who did all the right things, when that is clearly not the case.

246. The Appellant is clearly highly knowledgeable about safeguarding. She is well educated and has continued to keep her professional development up to date. She is self-reportedly passionate about children, their welfare, and their education.

247. The disconnect between her theoretical knowledge and her ability to put that into practice is therefore particularly concerning, because it does not appear that the issue would be resolved by, for example, undertaking further training. Risk Assessment

248. The Tribunal found that the Appellant’s risk assessment before and during the events of 12 March 2024 was seriously lacking. Likewise, the reflective risk assessment undertaken subsequent to these events is insufficient. Notwithstanding the training that the Appellant has undertaken, it was demonstrated throughout the hearing that the insight required to ensure that future risk assessments are adequate is simply not present. Working with others

249. Perhaps most importantly and most notably, when the panel asked the Appellant whether it was her view that the working relationship with Ofsted had irretrievably broken down, she said she did not think it had, but then was only able to outline things that she thought Ofsted should do differently in the future and not anything that she herself might be able to do to improve the relationship.

250. She made allegations during her evidence in chief that there was collusion between Ofsted, Bedfordshire Local Authority, and the Police. She accused Ofsted inspectors of being biased, racist, malicious, and hostile towards her. As already mentioned above, she accused their practice of being “outrageous” and stated that this will only be dealt with after this hearing concluded.

251. The Appellant is clearly passionate about her work as a child minder and presumably demonstrated her suitability to Ofsted during three inspections when her provision was graded Good. However, her attitude to working with her regulatory authority would now appear to be only on her terms.

252. It was very clear during the hearing that the Appellant has a fixed set of beliefs of the corruption, institutionalised racism, misogyny and prejudice that she believes is widespread in this country, particularly in key agencies including the police, Ofsted, the LA, and to some extent, the Judiciary. She relies on those beliefs to inform her decision making. Despite challenge by agencies, she remains fixed to those beliefs to the extent that she lacks respect for professionals in a wide range of occupations.

253. The Appellant has made a high number of complaints against professionals involved in her case. For example, she made official complaints to Ofsted regarding five Ofsted inspectors, including that they had perverted the course of justice, been malicious and breached their code of practice. She made official complaints and allegations against all three HCEOs, including that they had ‘falsely imprisoned’ her two assistants (her daughters) and the minded children on the day of the eviction. She also made complaints about the police who attended on the day of the eviction. She has made an official complaint about the Chief Constable of Bedfordshire Police. She has also made a number of complaints against the Local Authority and according to the evidence of Miss Mohan, the Ombudsman took no further action in relation to these complaints and informed the Appellant that due to the high number of complaints she had made, the LA appeals process has now been exhausted and that she would receive no more responses to her ongoing complaints. The Appellant stated that she loved making complaints and that she ‘always won’ when she complained to the IOPC. She stated in the hearing room that people would ‘lose their jobs.’

254. The Appellant also sent letters to both Mr W and Ms P threatening to sue them if they did not retract the allegations that they had made about her. These are exhibited in the bundle.

255. None of this gives rise to any confidence that the Appellant will be able to work with others effectively in the future. Whilst it is plausible that some of her complaints on occasion are genuine, what appears to have emerged is a consistent pattern of complaining about any individual who does not conform to her way of thinking, challenges her, or do as she believes they ought. Conclusion

256. The Appellant is clearly passionate about her work with children and is knowledgeable about the childminding profession. This was evident during the hearing. The Appellant appears to have a strong set of beliefs about herself and others that she is fully committed to maintaining, even when she is challenged by strong evidence that suggests an alternative perspective. She had a tendency to give lengthy answers that often did not directly address the questions being put to her. She evidenced a firm belief that a high number of professionals from Ofsted, the Police, the High Court Enforcement Officers, and the Local Authority had all been wrong in their dealings with her. She went further at times to state that some of the professionals had committed criminal offences and engaged in other highly inappropriate conduct. She evidenced an inability to see things from any other perspective, and she attributed the blame for the events in question almost entirely to many different professionals from these various agencies.

257. The documentary and oral evidence presented by the Respondent in this case all demonstrate that the Appellant is no longer suitable to continue as a registered childminder without being a risk to children and without there being a risk that she will bring the profession into disrepute.

258. The Respondent has provided extensive evidence in relation to events concerning the eviction, the Appellant’s involvement in the actions before and around 29 February and 12 March 2024, her interaction with the HCEOs, the TSO and the Police, her lack of insight in relation to harm to children as a result of her actions, and poor safeguarding of children from events surrounding an eviction process. The Appellant’s own evidence and her behaviour during the hearing supported the position of the Respondent. This was a surprise to the Tribunal given the Appellant’s previous track record of inspections rated as ‘Good’ but the evidence before us did not reflect such performance.

259. Whilst recognising that this will have an impact on Ms Steele's ambitions to be a childminder, the decision to cancel her registration is proportionate on the ground that she is unsuitable to be on the Register taking into account the need to safeguard children and the dishonesty she displayed during the hearing and that was evident from evidence presented in the bundle. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent has proven its case to the requisite standard and therefore upholds the decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration as a childminder. Decision : The appeal is dismissed. Tribunal Judge C Ashby 11 December 2025