Luton Landlords & Letting Agents Limited, R (on the application of) v Luton Borough Council

LORD JUSTICE LEWIS: INTRODUCTION

1. This appeal concerns a claim for judicial review of two designations dated 25 October 2023 made by the respondent, Luton Borough Council, pursuant to Parts 2 and 3 of the Housing Act 2004 (“ the 2004 Act ”). One designated the whole of the borough as an area where houses in multiple occupation (“HMOs”) had to be licensed. One designated part of the borough, comprising the town centre and Park Town areas (which I will refer to as South Ward) as an area where a house which was let or occupied under a single tenancy or licence, or under two tenancies or licences in respect of different dwellings in the house, had to be licensed.

2. The claimant was a company incorporated on 3 December 2021 called Luton Landlords & Letting Agents Limited. It is a company limited by guarantee. Its sole director, and the only person named as having a controlling interest, is Mr Rajdvinder Singh Bains.

3. The claimant filed a claim for judicial review of the two designations on 24 January 2024. The statement of facts and grounds accompanying the claim form describes the claimant as “a limited company set up to support landlords in relation to selective licensing and additional licensing schemes”. No other information was provided in the claim form and there was no witness statement accompanying it. The claim form set out a number of grounds for claiming that the designations were unlawful. The respondent’s summary grounds of defence averred, amongst other things, that the claimant lacked standing to apply for permission to bring a claim for judicial review

4. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused on a consideration of the papers by Sir Peter Lane, sitting as a High Court judge. The claimant applied for that refusal to be reconsidered at an oral hearing. Mr Bains, and the solicitor instructed by the claimant, filed witness statements in advance of that hearing.

5. Heather Williams J (“the judge”) dismissed the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. First, she concluded that the claimant did not have standing to bring the claim as it had not established on the evidence that it had a sufficient interest in the matter. Secondly, she considered that each of the eight grounds of claim were unarguable.

6. The claimant has permission to appeal on the following grounds (I will continue to refer to it as the claimant, rather than the appellant, for convenience), namely: (1) the judge was wrong to find that the claimant did not have standing to bring the claim; (2) the judge was wrong to find that certain grounds of claim were unarguable as it was arguable that: (a) the respondent acted irrationally or unlawfully in relying on data included in a 2019 report when making the designations in October 2023; (b) the executive (which took the decision) was given false and misleading information about the financial viability of the schemes for additional and selective licensing; (c) the respondent acted unlawfully in requiring applicants who applied early for a licence to pay a fee which included both an amount reflecting the cost of processing the application and an amount reflecting the costs of enforcement of the licensing regime.

7. The claimant also applied for permission to rely on a fourth witness statement of Mr Bains dated 14 January 2026. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

8. The 2004 Act is, as its preamble says, an act which makes provision, amongst other things, about housing conditions and to regulate houses in multiple occupation and certain other residential accommodation.

9. Part 2 of the 2004 Act deals with the licensing of HMOs. They must be licensed if they fall within any prescribed description of HMOs and they are in an area which the local housing authority has designated as being subject to additional licensing (see section 55 of the 2004 Act ). Section 56 deals with the designation of such areas and provides that: “(1) A local housing authority may designate either– (a) the area of their district, or (b) an area in their district, as subject to additional licensing in relation to a description of HMOs specified in the designation, if the requirements of this section are met. (2) The authority must consider that a significant proportion of the HMOs of that description in the area are being managed sufficiently ineffectively as to give rise, or to be likely to give rise, to one or more particular problems either for those occupying the HMOs or for members of the public. (3) Before making a designation the authority must– (a) take reasonable steps to consult persons who are likely to be affected by the designation; and (b) consider any representations made in accordance with the consultation and not withdrawn. (4) The power to make a designation under this section may be exercised in such a way that this Part applies to all HMOs in the area in question. (5) In forming an opinion as to the matter mentioned in subsection (2), the authority must have regard to any information regarding the extent to which any codes of practice approved under section 233 have been complied with by persons managing HMOs in the area in question. (6) Section 57 applies for the purposes of this section.”

10. Section 57(4) provides, amongst other things, that the local housing authority must not make a designation unless they have considered whether there are any other courses of action open to them and whether they consider that designation will significantly assist to deal with the problem.

11. There are provisions governing approval and notification of designations. Section 60 deals with duration and revocation and provides that a designation ceases to have effect no later than five years after the date on which it came into force unless revoked previously. Authorities must review the operation of any designation from time to time.

12. Section 63 of the 2004 Act provides that applications for a licence must be made to the local housing authority and that the authority may require the application to be accompanied by a fee. Licences may include such conditions as the local housing authority considers appropriate for regulating the management, use, and occupation of the house concerned, and its condition and contents and must include certain conditions (see section 67). There is provision for appeals against a decision on an application. A person commits a criminal offence if he is a person having control of, or managing, an HMO which is required to be licensed but is not licensed, of if he is a licence holder and fails to comply with any conditions of the licence (see section 72).

13. Part 3 deals with the selective licensing of other accommodation (that is, accommodation which is not an HMO). Part 3 applies to a house if, broadly, (a) it is in an area designated under section 80 as subject to selective licensing and (b) the whole of the house is occupied under a single tenancy or licence, or under two tenancies or licences in respect of different dwellings in the house (see section 79). Section 80 deals with the designation of such areas and provides so far as material that: “(1) A local housing authority may designate either– (a) the area of their district, or (b) an area in their district, as subject to selective licensing, if the requirements of subsections (2) and (9) are met. (2) The authority must consider that– (a) the first or second set of general conditions mentioned in subsection (3) or (6), or (b) any conditions specified in an order under subsection (7) as an additional set of conditions, are satisfied in relation to the area. (3) The first set of general conditions are– (a) that the area is, or is likely to become, an area of low housing demand; and (b) that making a designation will, when combined with other measures taken in the area by the local housing authority, or by other persons together with the local housing authority, contribute to the improvement of the social or economic conditions in the area. ….. (7) The appropriate national authority may by order provide for any conditions specified in the order to apply as an additional set of conditions for the purposes of subsection (2). …..”

14. Additional conditions have been made by order by the relevant Secretary of State: see The Selective Licensing of Houses (Order) 2015 (“the Order”). The material provisions are contained in articles 3, 4 and 6 of the Order which provide, so far as material, that: “3. Conditions specified for the purposes of section 80(2) of the 2004 Act (1) The following conditions are specified as additional conditions for the purposes of section 80(2) (b) of the 2004 Act , which a local housing authority must consider are satisfied in relation to the area before making a selective licensing designation under this provision— (a) that the area contains a high proportion of properties in the private rented sector, in relation to the total number of properties in the area; (b) that the properties referred to in sub-paragraph (a) are occupied either under assured tenancies or licences to occupy; and (c) that one or more of the sets of conditions in articles 4 to 7 is satisfied. …..

4. Conditions in relation to housing conditions The first set of conditions is— (a) that having carried out a review of housing conditions under section 3(1) of the 2004 Act , the local housing authority considers it would be appropriate for a significant number of the properties referred to in article 3(1)(a) to be inspected, with a view to determining whether any category 1 or category 2 hazards exist on the premises; …..

6. Conditions in relation to deprivation. (1) The third set of conditions is— (a) that the area is suffering from a high level of deprivation, which affects a significant number of the occupiers of properties referred to in article 3(1)(a); and (b) that making a designation will, when combined with other measures taken in the area by the local housing authority, or by other persons together with the local housing authority, contribute to a reduction in the level of deprivation in the area. …..”

15. There are provisions governing approval, notification, revocation and duration of designations (see sections 82 to 84 of the 2004 Act ). There are also provisions governing applications for licences, licence conditions, and appeals against conditions (see sections 87 to 94 of the 2004 Act ). A person commits a criminal offence if he has control of, or manages, a house which is required to be licensed but is not licensed, or if he is a licence holder and fails to comply with the conditions of the licence (see section 95). THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND The background to the making of the designations

16. The respondent operated an additional licensing scheme between 2013 and 2018. It considered making both a new additional licensing scheme and a selective licensing scheme. Designations were made in about 2020. A company was incorporated on 23 June 2020. There was pre-action correspondence between solicitors instructed by that company and the respondent about the lawfulness of the designations. The designations were withdrawn. That company was dissolved by a compulsory strike-off on 30 November 2021 and ceased to exist after that date. The company had the same name as the claimant company in this appeal, and, as it happens, Mr Bains was the director. The company was, however, a different legal entity from the claimant in this appeal. The reports to the executive

17. Following consultations, two reports were prepared for the executive, the relevant decision-making body within the local authority, one dealing with additional licensing under Part 2 and one with selective licensing under Part 3.

18. The report on additional licensing set out the background. It considered the current position. It noted that the proportion of properties in England which were privately rented had increased from 10% in 2004 to 19% in 2019. It referred to the fact that the respondent had commissioned a report from the Building Research Establishment (“the BRE”) to provide data and information on the condition of the private sector stock. It noted that the BRE report, published in December 2019, estimated that the private rented sector in Luton accounted for 29% of the 83,438 dwellings in Luton, which was higher than the national average of 19.6% in 2021. The report considered the negative impacts that poor housing has on tenants and the wider community. It considered how licensing could help identify irresponsible landlords and assist other landlords.

19. The report summarised the statutory criteria that the respondent had to consider when deciding whether to make a designation. It noted how having more than one household living in a property could increase the risk to health, safety and welfare if the property was not managed properly. It noted that the respondent had continued to receive complaints across the borough about HMOs averaging at 221 per year since August 2018 (when the previous scheme came to an end). It identified the issues that had been encountered. It contained further information about the housing stock in Luton and considered other, national data.

20. Under the heading “finance”, the report made the following observations so far as material: “35. The Council is able to set fees for licensing schemes to make them self-funding (but not to make a profit) and the level of fee would be set in conjunction with the Portfolio Holder, reported to Executive and reviewed through the Scale of Fees and Charges process.

36. Fee setting is of critical importance in assuring the effectiveness of an additional licensing scheme. The scheme would be operated on a full cost recovery basis for all of the administration, processing, inspection, compliance and enforcement functions. The costs for monitoring and enforcing against unlicensed operators can also be included in the fee setting calculations.

37. An Additional Licensing Scheme fee structure is included at Appendix F and incorporates an “early bird” flat-rate fee of £150, for completed full applications (with all relevant supporting documentation, certificates and the correct fee) submitted and received by the Council in the first three month period of operation of the scheme…. …..

39. Although self-funding, there would likely be a revenue cost to the Council before any income were realised. The officers administering the scheme would need to be in post and operational in order to assess applications and set fees for each property before a licence is issued. This is the learning from previous attempts to implement a scheme as existing resources were stretched when fees began to be paid.

40. The BRE report indicates that there are around 3,800 HMOs which would require a licence under a Borough-wide Additional Licensing scheme. There can be no guarantee that landlords will come forward to license and so it is proposed to phase in the staff as the scheme develops.”

21. The report proposed that the executive authorised officers to proceed with the implementation of an additional licensing scheme across the borough. It noted alternative options which had been considered but were not proposed. Those included the following at paragraph 60. “60. Executive could instruct officers to refresh the BRE stock modelling report in order to update the data relating to the Private Rented Sector before considering further. Whilst an update would provide the Council with up to date information relating to the private rented sector, it would lead to a further delay of around 3 months and may provide no additional information to assist the Executive in reaching a decision.”

22. A second report was prepared on a selective licensing scheme. That set out the information on the current position in relation to the private rented sector nationally and in relation to the borough, and referred to the data in the BRE report of December 2019. As the selective licensing scheme was only proposed for the South Ward, the second report dealt with the position in relation to that ward and said: “15. The BRE report identified South ward as having a very high number of private rented properties – the ward contains 9,042 dwellings, of which almost half (49.1%) are privately rented. The report also identified South ward as having the most private rented sector properties (1,035) with HHSRS category 1 hazards.

16. Since that time, the 2019 BRE estimation of the size of the private rented sector, has been confirmed when the Office for National Statistics released a Statistical Bulletin from the 2012 Census (Appendix C) which put the national average of privately rented accommodation at 20.3%, and regionally for the East of England at 18.3% (Appendix D).”

23. The second report reminded the executive that a selective licensing system had to meet certain statutory criteria (which were summarised Appendix E to the report). It set out how the authors of the report considered the selective licensing system met those criteria. It noted the high proportion of properties in the rented sector, noting that South Ward had a higher average proportion (49.1%) against the national figure. It referred to the appropriateness of reviewing housing conditions. It also referred to the fact that the area was suffering from a high level of deprivation, referring to the data in the BRE report. It considered other national data.

24. The second report dealt with finance in the same terms as paragraphs 35 to 40 of the first report (set out above) save that it adjusted the figures to reflect the fact that the selective licensing scheme applied to houses other than HMOs and to one part of the borough only. The report recorded, among the options considered but not proposed, that the executive could instruct officers to carry out an update of the BRE report which, whilst it would provide up to date information, would delay matters by three months and might provide no additional information to assist the executive in reaching a decision. The report proposed that the executive authorise officers to proceed with the implementation of a selective licensing scheme within the South Ward. The making of the designations

25. On 24 April 2023, the executive resolved to authorise the Service Director, Housing in consultation with the Portfolio Holder for Population Wellbeing (Housing, Waste & Climate Change) to proceed with the implementation of an additional HMO licensing scheme across the borough and a selective licensing scheme within the South Ward. The reasons given in each case were to improve property conditions and to reduce the problems with housing in the private rented sector

26. Designations were made but were not brought into force. Ultimately, on 25 October 2023, the Service Director made a designation for additional licensing and one for selective licensing. The additional licensing designation had 7 paragraphs. Paragraphs 1 to 3 dealt with how the designation was to be cited, when it was made and came into force. Paragraph 4 provided that the “designation shall apply to the whole of the borough of Luton”. Paragraph 5 defined the HMOs to which the designation applied. Paragraph 6 dealt with the effect of the designation, namely that HMOs “shall be required to be licensed”. Paragraph 7 dealt with notification.

27. Paragraphs 1 to 3 of the selective licensing designation dealt with how the designation was to be cited, when it was made and came into force. Paragraph 4 provided that the designation should apply to an area edged in black on a map annexed to the designation (that is, the South Ward). Paragraph 5 provided that the designation applied to “any house which is let or occupied under a tenancy or licence within the area described” unless it fell within specified exemptions. Paragraph 6 dealt with its effect (that such housing had to be licensed) and paragraph 7 dealt with notification. The claim for judicial review

28. A pre-action letter dated 15 December 2023 was sent to the respondent. The letter stated that the solicitors had been instructed by Luton Landlords and Letting Agents Limited (that is, the current claimant). No other details of the claimant were given.

29. By a claim form filed on 24 January 2024, the claimant sought judicial review of decisions described as the 25 October 2023 designations by which the respondent designated its area as an area subject to additional licensing under Part 2 and part of its area formerly known as South Ward as an area subject to selective licensing under Part 3 of the 2004 Act . The remedies sought were a declaration that the designations were unlawful, an order quashing the additional licensing and the selective licensing schemes, and interim relief. As indicated, the statement of facts and grounds described the claimant as Luton Landlords and Letting Agents, “a limited company set up to support landlords in relation to the selective licensing and additional licensing schemes”.

30. The respondent’s summary grounds of defence stated that the claimant was a limited company which was not itself a landlord or letting agency or a person otherwise affected by either of the licensing schemes being challenged. It referred to the assertion that the claimant had been set up to support landlords and said that the court had been provided with no information, beyond ownership and management, about the claimant company’s sources of funding, its activities, whom it purposed to represent in bringing the claim, or what work (beyond pursuing the litigation) it had actually undertaken to support landlords in relation to either scheme. In those circumstances, the respondent submitted that the claimant had not shown that it had a sufficient interest in the matter.

31. Sheldon J granted a stay of the implementation of the designations by order dated 2 February 2024. The application for permission to apply for judicial review itself was considered on the papers by Sir Peter Lane who refused permission, noting that the claimant did not have standing for the reasons given in the summary grounds of defence. Sir Peter Lane continued the stay until the conclusion of a request for the refusal to be considered at a hearing.

32. The claimant did apply to have the refusal of permission considered at an oral hearing in accordance with CPR 54.12. Mr Bains, the claimant’s director, made a witness statement in advance of that hearing which is dated 1 May 2024. In that statement he said that he was the director of the company Luton Landlords & Letting Agents Limited which he referred to in the statement as LLALA. He said that LLALA “is a membership organisation. It was set up in 2020 and its membership is open to both landlords and letting agents”. Mr Bains said “We” – which in context appears to be a reference to the claimant company – had a circular that went to all agents, and it distributed leaflets. Mr Bains said that membership fees were fixed at a guide contribution of £50. Mr Bains said “We also deal with the Council on behalf of members raising concerns and making representations”. He said that “I was asked by members to take up the issue of licensing with the Council”. He said the “association currently has 31 members”. He continued by saying that LLALA was also in discussions towards the end of 2022 with the respondent’s private sector housing department. Later Mr Bains goes on to say that “We have been engaging with the [respondent] on matters locally in respect of the private rented sector since 2020”.

33. Mr Bains exhibited a number of e-mails to his statement. The most relevant e-mails are the following. One dated 10 February 2024 is from Raj Bains, and underneath is the words “Ultimate Connexions Ltd. Estates Sales and Property Management Services” (which is another company of which, it seems, Mr Bains is a director). At the bottom of the e-mail is a list of four companies, of which Luton Landlords & Letting Agents Ltd. is one. The text of the e-mail says “We have a tenant” (the most natural reading of the e-mail is that it is a reference to Ultimate Connexions having a tenant) and explains that the tenant wants to apply for external cladding and asking what procedure should be followed. It also asked for details of the requirements needed to qualify and whether there was a limit. The most natural reading of this e-mail is that it is a request from Ultimate Connexions on behalf of a tenant for whom it supplies services seeking assistance for that tenant to obtain cladding (or funding for cladding) from the respondent. There are a number of other e-mails exhibited from Raj Bains Ultimate Connexions which refer to one or more companies – but not the claimant company – at the bottom of those e-mails. There is one e-mail dated 8 February 2024 but the identity of the recipient is redacted. It is from Raj Bains of Ultimate Connexions but includes the names of four companies (including the claimant) at the bottom. The subject of the e-mail is given as “selective and additional licensing schemes – announcement”. The text refers to an e-mail and announcement received from the respondent.

34. There was also a witness statement from the solicitor having conduct of the matter for the claimant. It is primarily a response to a witness statement made by an officer of the respondent in connection with an application for security for costs. The solicitor says at paragraph 6 that, for the avoidance of doubt, “I am aware that the Claimant has a membership and have met with the group”. No further details are provided.

35. A witness statement was made by Joanne Nelson, who is employed as head of private sector housing for the respondent. It was made on 7 July 2024. Ms Nelson said that she knew and had dealt with Mr Raj Bains but that had never been in his capacity as director or representative of Luton Landlords & Letting Agents Ltd. She said that the contacts had always been with Mr Bains as a local landlord or as representative of Ultimate Connexions Ltd. She said that there were no e-mails identified relating to Luton Landlords & Letting Agents Ltd between 1 January 2022 and 31 October 2023. The first reference to the company was in an e-mail dated 30 January 2024 in the footer of an e-mail from Raj Bains at his Ultimate Connexions e-mail address. The e-mail did not concern either of the schemes in issue and was sent after proceedings were issued. It was Ms Nelson who, through her witness statement, first informed the court that a company called Luton Landlords & Letting Agents Ltd. with company number 12692763 had been incorporated on 23 June 2020 and that company had been dissolved on 30 November 2021. It was Ms Nelson again who, through her statement, first informed the court that the claimant company – bearing the same name as a company that had been dissolved but with a different company number (i.e. 1371168) had been incorporated on 3 December 2021. The judgment below

36. In relation to standing, the judge referred to section 31(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (“ the 1981 Act ”) which requires a claimant to have “a sufficient interest”. She observed that a discussion of the general principles applicable to this test was to be found at paragraphs 19 to 29 of R (Good Law Project Limited) v Prime Minister [2022] EWHC 198 (Admin) . She summarised the evidence of Mr Bains and Ms Nelson. She noted that one instance where a group may have sufficient interest is where it sues on behalf of its members who share a common interest in the litigation. She referred to that as “associational standing” using a phrase which appeared in an earlier case. She summarised the submissions of the parties and concluded as follows (referring to Mr Bains’ witness statement dated 1 May 2024 as “Bains 1” and Ms Nelson’s witness statement as “Nelson 1”): “45. I am not satisfied that the claimant has a “sufficient interest”. I do not consider that the evidence shows associational standing in the sense that I have described: that is to say the claimant being an organisation representing members who have a common interest in the issues raised in these proceedings.

46. I have borne in mind the totality of the evidence, but, in summary, these are my reasons for reaching this conclusion.

47. The timeline that I have referred to indicates that the claimant and the previous company of the same name were incorporated at times when a legal challenge to the defendant's licensing decisions was about to be embarked upon. Whilst I have taken into account the contents of Bains 1, I am struck by the complete absence of supporting documentary material, in circumstances where the claimant was incorporated back in December 2021. If it had existed as the kind of membership pressure group or membership representative organisation that Bains 1 describes, it is surprising that no supporting documentation exists that could have been produced in evidence. By way of example only, there are no emails to the defendant's officers from or on behalf of the claimant and no records of other communications made by or on behalf of the claimant in the capacities that Mr Bain describes in Bains 1 (which I have already summarised). Furthermore, none of the following has been produced: leaflets sent out to prospective members, communications with the members or notes of the meetings that the claimant had with its members. It is unclear how this membership organisation is structured. There are no members in the sense of shareholders. There are no articles of association, for example, setting out how this membership organisation is structured. I note as well that the company’s articles of association are simply of a very general nature.

48. In short, no documentation has been provided that supports the contents of Bains 1 as to the nature and role of the claimant. Further, as I have already explained, the emails that Mr Bains does exhibit to his witness statement, in fact, tend to show the converse, namely that his communications with council officers have been in other capacities, which is also rather striking.

49. In the circumstances, I regret to say that I simply cannot have confidence in the account given by Mr Bains since it would be expected that some at least of this documentation would exist if the claimant had, indeed, been involved in the various activities that he described from late 2021 onwards. I bear in mind too, that Bains 1 was produced at a time when the claimant was fully aware from the summary grounds of resistance and Sir Peter Lane's decision on permission that standing was very much in issue and, therefore, the importance of providing such documentation was readily apparent. In addition, these lacunas were pointed out in Nelson 1, but no attempt has been made to rectify them.

50. Accordingly, I am left with the concerns that I have expressed. Mr Manning also accepted in submissions, when I put the point to him, that the “we” referred to in Bains 1 in relation to the claimant's activities is, in fact, a reference to Mr Bains. I can only wonder why he felt the need to say “we” rather than clarify that he was referring to himself in these passages. This is a further cause for concern in a context where transparency and candour are so important in judicial review proceedings. At no point does Mr Bains name anyone other than himself as having been involved in liaising with the council as the claimant or on behalf of the claimant.

51. For these reasons, I can only place very little weight on those parts of Bains 1 that otherwise might support or would support the proposition that standing exists, for example, where he refers to the number of members and their alleged common interests.

52. As I have indicated, Mr Bains is the only named individual and taking this together with the formal company documentation that I have already described, it seems relatively clear that the claimant is, in fact, Mr Bains’ alter ego. In this regard my real concern is that he has not been frank about this in the witness evidence that he has provided to the court.

53. The circumstances are, therefore, factually distinct from the [ R v Leicestershire County Council Ex p. Blackfordby and Boothorpe Action Group Ltd . In that case, there was clear and unchallenged evidence before the court as to an engaged group of local residents, who had set up the applicant company and also unchallenged evidence as to the purposes of them doing so. Whereas in this case, Mr Bains’ evidence is highly unsatisfactory for the reasons I have indicated. [2001] Env LR 2 ] case

54. For completeness, I note Mr Manning's submission that the defendant did not raise objection to the claimant's standing until the present litigation. However, this point does not detract from my conclusion, as the parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent; standing goes to the court's jurisdiction and it is for the court to determine: paragraph 29, Good Law Project .

55. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary for me to decide the further question that otherwise would have arisen as to whether the selection of the claimant for the purposes of this litigation was in order to avoid the consequences of an adverse costs order should the claim not succeed. As I am already satisfied that standing has not been established, it is unnecessary for me to reach a final view on that point.

56. I, of course, accept, that as a local landlord, Mr Bains would have had standing in his own right had he chosen to bring these proceedings as the claimant, but he did not do so. During the course of his submissions, Mr Manning suggested that Mr Bains would be willing to be added as a second claimant to these proceedings if I had concerns about standing after hearing the submissions. This proposal came very late in the day, given how long the question of standing has been an issue in these proceedings and has not been the subject of any formal application to amend the proceedings. In any event, since, as I will go on to explain, I consider that the grounds are unarguable, I do not propose to accede to that application and I do not need to decide what course I might have taken in that regard had I considered the grounds to be arguable.”

37. In relation to the grounds of claim that remain and form part of the grounds of appeal, the judge concluded that none of those grounds was arguable. In summary, she considered that the executive had decided to proceed on the data available to it in the BRE report, rather than obtain further data. The judge concluded that that was a reasonable position to adopt. On the question of whether the executive was misled as the two licensing schemes would not be self-sufficient if everyone made an “early-bird” application where they paid a reduced fee (i.e. £150, comprising the £122 for processing the application and £28 for the costs of enforcement) as compared with the fees otherwise payable (i.e. £366, being £122 for processing the application and £244 for enforcement), the judge concluded: “86. This is the one point in the grounds that has caused me some reflection, given the terms of the reports to the Executive to which I have already referred. I have no doubt that the other grounds are unarguable, but I have reflected on this matter.

87. However, I am ultimately persuaded by Mr Gullick's submission that, whilst the material before the Executive could be read as suggesting that the schemes could be run on a revenue neutral basis if all landlords paid the early-bird fees, the overall effect of the AL Report and the SL Report must be considered. If one just gives it a moment's thought, it must have been clear to the Executive, since they were informed that the schemes could not be set to make a profit (as that would be unlawful), that take-up of the discounted fees applicable under the early-bird scheme, rather than the payment of the full fee based on the running costs, must involve a loss to the defendant. This simply follows from the fact that the early-bird price was less than the full cost. On this basis I am persuaded that the accurate position would have been apparent to the Executive in making the decisions and thus that this aspect of Ground 3 is also unarguable.”

38. The judge considered that the argument that it was unlawful to require an applicant making an “early-bird” application to pay the £28 for enforcement at the time that it made its application for a licence had not been pleaded. She considered however that the point was unmeritorious. The judge dismissed the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. She discharged the stay. THE APPEAL

39. Andrews LJ granted permission to appeal. The consequence is that this court must decide if the judge was wrong to consider that the claimant did not have a sufficient interest in the matter to bring a claim for judicial review. This court will also have to consider whether the judge was wrong to say that the three relevant grounds of claim were unarguable. It is clear that Andrews LJ was not, by granting permission to appeal, expressing a concluded view that these points were arguable. Andrews LJ also granted a stay of the commencement of the two schemes until determination of the appeal or further order.

40. Finally, I would note that the appellant’s notice included an application that Mr Bains “be joined as a second Claimant in these proceedings”. Andrews LJ refused that application. GROUND 1 – SUFFICIENT INTEREST

41. Mr Manning, with Ms Sedgley, submits that the judge was wrong to conclude that the claimant had not demonstrated that it had a sufficient interest in the matter and so had standing. He submitted that the judge ought to have accepted the evidence of Mr Bains in his first witness statement in which he said that the claimant was set up as a membership organisation and that it had 31 members. That witness statement had not been contradicted and so should have been accepted. He also relied on the witness statement of the claimant’s solicitor in which the solicitor said that he was aware that the claimant was a membership organisation and he had met the group. He also relied upon Mr Bains’ second witness statement dated 21 June 2024 which primarily dealt with another matter (whether there was a delay in bringing the claim) but where Mr Bains said that as “a group, we arranged a meeting on 16 November 2023 and considered the position”. Mr Manning also relied upon the fact that the claimant had brought a judicial review claim in relation to another licensing scheme in March 2022. That was comprised by consent before the court considered whether or not to grant permission. The respondent had not challenged the standing of the claimant at that stage. He submitted that the purpose of the standing requirement was not to introduce technical rules to act as a snare for a claimant but to separate out meddlesome persons from those who have a genuine interest in the claim. Alternatively, he submitted that it was open to Mr Bains, who had a sufficient interest as he was a landlord with properties affected by the schemes, to use the company as a vehicle for bringing the claim as his alter ego.

42. Mr Gullick KC, with Mr Cannings, for the respondent, emphasised that the issue for this Court was whether the judge below was wrong in her conclusion that the claimant company had not demonstrated that it had sufficient interest to bring the claim. The issue was, effectively, whether the claimant company was bringing the claim on behalf of others. The relevant witness statements were made after that issue arose. The judge was entitled to conclude that the evidence provided did not demonstrate that the claimant company was acting as a representative of others when bringing the claim. Discussion and conclusion Preliminary observations

43. Section 31(3) of the 1981 Act provides that: “(3) No application for judicial review shall be made unless the leave of the High Court has been obtained in accordance with rules of court, and the court shall not grant leave to make such an application unless – (a) it considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates, and (b) the applicant has provided the court with any information about the financing of the application that is specified in rules of court for the purposes of this paragraph.”

44. The question of whether a particular claimant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the claim relates will involve consideration of, amongst other things, the nature of the interest of the claimant in the matter that is the subject of the claim. Individuals, or legal persons such as companies, will generally be regarded as having a sufficient interest in respect of decisions taken specifically in relation to them, or which affect them in some way.

45. Other groups or legal entities may have a sufficient interest in a matter for the purposes of section 31(3) of the 1981 Act . Some groups act in a representative capacity, bringing a claim on behalf of, or to protect the interests of, their members. This has been referred to by commentators, and in some case law, as associational standing, although the phrase is, perhaps unhelpful, and does not fully reflect the basis upon which the body concerned has standing, i.e. the body is acting on behalf of, the interests of its members or those it represents. These types of situations typically but not exclusively involve bodies such as unions or professional bodies. Claims may also be brought by pressure groups who may be particularly active, and have particular expertise, in a particular area (such as environmental groups or social welfare groups) or be formed to campaign on particular national or local issues. They may have sufficient interest to bring a claim to challenge a particular measure, particularly if they have established expertise in an area. The fact that a company is incorporated to bring a challenge in such circumstances would not, of itself, prevent the company having a sufficient interest in the matter.

46. There may be instances where a measure or decision affects the public generally, not merely a particular individual or even a group of individuals. In appropriate cases, the courts have held that an individual, or a group, may bring a claim because there is a serious issue of public importance which needs to be addressed (see the observations of Lord Reed in Axa General Insurance Ltd. v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46 ; [2021] 1 AC 868 at paragraph 170). It is also relevant to note that the courts have adopted an increasingly liberal approach to standing in such cases.

47. It is also right to note that, at the permission stage, the court is primarily concerned with excluding hopeless cases where a claimant cannot establish he has a sufficient interest in the matter because, for example, he has no private interest in the matter and is not acting in the public interest or is otherwise a “meddlesome busybody”. The present case

48. The present case involves the application of established principles to the particular facts of this case. The claimant is a company limited by guarantee incorporated on 21 December 2021. The matter in issue is the designation of the respondent’s borough as an area where additional licensing of HMOs is required and the designation of one part of the borough, South Ward, as an area where selective licensing of houses occupied under a single tenancy or licence (or under two tenancies or licences in respect of different dwellings contained in a house) is required.

49. The claimant company does not itself have any direct interest in the subject matter of the claim. It does not own any houses which are HMOs or which are let under a tenancy or licence. It will not have to apply for any licences. The claimant does not, therefore, have a sufficient interest in the matter on that basis.

50. The claimant company, however, claims that it has a sufficient interest in the matter as it is a limited company “set up to support landlords in relation to the selective licensing and additional licensing schemes” as it asserted at paragraph 6 of its statement of facts and grounds. That was challenged, and indeed, permission was refused on the papers on the basis that the claimant did not have a sufficient interest. It was in that context that Mr Bains put in his witness statement to provide information intended to support the claimant’s claim that it had a sufficient interest because it was acting on behalf of its members.

51. In the circumstances, the judge was not wrong when she concluded that the evidence before her did not establish that the claimant had been set up to support landlords in relation to the licensing schemes. First, the materials exhibited to Mr Bains’ first witness statement did not show that the claimant company was dealing with the respondent on behalf of its members. Rather, as the judge observed at paragraph 48 of her judgment, the exhibits to Mr Bains’ witness statement “tend to show the converse, namely that his communications with council officers have been in other capacities”. Secondly, there was an absence of evidence of the sort that one would have expected to be exhibited if the claimant company was a membership organisation acting for its members on issues concerning the licensing schemes. In paragraph 47 of her judgment, the judge gave examples of the kind of material which one might have expected to see but which was absent. There were no communications to or from the claimant company to the respondent’s officers. There were no communications with members or notes of meeting with members. Thirdly, there was no other documentary evidence to indicate that the claimant, which is a company limited by guarantee, was a membership organisation. It had no shareholders and consequently no members in the sense of shareholders. There were no articles of association setting out how the membership organisation was structured. Its articles of association were of a very general nature.

52. Against that background, the judge gave, as she was entitled to, little weight to those parts of Mr Bains’ first witness statement referring to the number of members, or to the statements in Mr Bains’ second statement, and that of the claimant’s solicitor, referring to a group. Those generalised statements were insufficient to demonstrate that this claimant company was acting on behalf of any members in relation to the licensing scheme. Further, I would add that the fact that there had been proceedings issued before, which had been settled, does not assist in resolving this issue as the question of sufficient interest was not, it seems, raised and certainly not determined in those earlier proceedings.

53. In all those circumstances, the judge was not wrong to conclude that the claimant had not established that it had a sufficient interest in the way it had claimed. Ancillary Matters

54. There are four further matters to deal with. Mr Manning asserted that if the claimant company was not acting in a representative capacity for its members then it was acting as the alter ego of Mr Bains. He submitted that Mr Bains had standing (as he was a landlord and owned properties which he says were affected by the licensing schemes - which I understand to mean he would have to obtain an additional and a selective license for properties that he owned). He submitted that a company may be set up to act on behalf of an individual by bringing a claim for judicial review on that individual’s behalf.

55. First, that was not as a matter of fact the basis upon which the claimant company was said to be acting when it issued this claim. Secondly, there is no ground of appeal that the judge erred as she ought to have allowed standing on this basis. Thirdly, there is no guarantee that the court would have accepted that the company would have had a sufficient interest to bring the claim on t this basis. If the parties and the court had been told that this was the basis upon which the claimant company was acting, that would have been likely to have raised other issues. A court may refuse standing to one claimant if there are other claimants who are better placed to bring the claim (see, e.g., the observations in the Good Law Project case at paragraph 28 and R (Jones) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2020] 1 WLR 519 at paragraphs 9 to 17, and 60 to 62). On this basis, the obvious person to challenge the designation would be Mr Bains as he was the owner and landlord of properties affected by the designations. It is not apparent why a company should be established to act on his behalf when he is the person directly affected by the designations. It would obviously raise questions as to whether the claimant company would be able to meet any costs order made against it in any judicial review proceedings. I do not, therefore, consider that this court should consider or find that the claimant company had standing on this basis.

56. Secondly, the claimant applied on 16 January 2025 to adduce a fourth witness statement by Mr Bains which exhibits further e-mails. I have read the statement. I would not grant permission for this statement to be adduced in evidence. The evidence relates to events after the decision of the judge refusing permission in November 2024. It primarily relates to, and exhibits e-mails about, matters in October 2025 which, it is said, show that, at that date (i.e. almost a year after the refusal of permission) the claimant company was seeking to arrange a meeting with officers of the respondent. That does not, in my judgment, amount to evidence that the claimant company was acting on behalf of members at a much earlier stage, i.e. when the designations were made in 2023, or when the claim for judicial review was issued in January 2024 or, at the latest, when the question of sufficient interest was finally determined by the High Court in November 2024 – whichever is the relevant date for considering the question of sufficient interest. Nor do I accept that this Court can consider the matter of permission afresh. Pursuant to CPR 52.8, this Court is hearing an appeal against the decision of the judge to refuse permission.

57. Thirdly, a claimant is under a duty to disclose all material facts when making a claim for judicial review. Material facts are those known to the claimant or those which he would have known if he had made proper and necessary inquiries (see R v Jockey Club Licensing Committee Ex p. Wright (Barrie John) [1991] COD 306). That principle was applied when claims, or applications, for judicial review were made ex parte, that is without notice to the proposed defendant (see, e.g. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Ketowoglo [1992] Imm A.R. 268). In my judgment the principle continues to apply even though the claim form will now be served on the proposed defendant and any interested party. It is right that the court, and other parties to proceedings, are told of facts material to the claim for judicial review which are, or should be, known to the claimant but which may not be known to them. For completeness, I note that defendants are also under an obligation to make candid disclosure to the court of its decision making process, explaining relevant facts, and its reasoning process (see, for example, paragraph 6.2 of Practice Direction 54A in relation to the acknowledgement of service and the established case law in relation to the position once permission to apply for judicial review has been given).

58. The duty on a claimant to disclose material facts requires that the claimant provide a candid, accurate and sufficiently detailed description of facts material to the claim for judicial review. In the present case, the first witness statement of Mr Bains does not do that. First, he says that the claimant company was set up in 2020. That is not factually correct. It was established much later in December 2021. Secondly, Mr Bains omits to mention that there was a company (bearing the same name as the claimant company) which was set up in June 2020 and was then dissolved, and ceased to exist, in November 2021. Thirdly, the impression is given to a person reading the witness statement as a whole that the claimant company has been active on behalf of members since 2020. That is reinforced by the fact that at least one of the e-mails which is exhibited is dated 11 March 2020. The text of Mr Bains’s statement gives the e-mails, including this e-mail, as an example of communications from the claimant company to the respondent’s officers about selective licensing, but that impression is not correct as the claimant company did not exist in 2020, or for the first 11 months of 2021. Mr Bains was, of course, a director of the first company and of the second company and would have known of the existence of the two companies.

59. A failure to provide material facts may have consequences. It can be a reason for refusing permission to apply – although neither the judge, nor I, consider that permission in this case should be refused on that basis. It can be relevant conduct when assessing liability for costs. More prosaically, if a claimant does not provide evidence, or if its evidence is found to be deficient, that may be relevant when a court assesses whether the claimant’s evidence is sufficient to establish a particular matter. In the present case, it is not necessary to consider these matters further. It is necessary, however, to stress the importance of claimants providing candid, accurate and sufficiently detailed evidence of the facts upon which the claimant relies as part of a claim for judicial review.

60. Fourthly, the judge raised the matter of whether Mr Bains should be added as a second claimant in the event that the claimant company did not have standing. The judge noted that there was no formal application to amend to join Mr Bains and the suggestion came late in the day. In the event, the judge said that, as she did not consider the grounds of claim were arguable and permission would have been refused in any event, it was not necessary to decide what course she might have taken if the grounds were arguable. It is understandable that a court would be reluctant to refuse permission to bring a claim if it had been brought promptly, and if there were arguable grounds for considering that a decision or measure of a public body might be unlawful, and if there was a person with a sufficient interest in the matter prepared to conduct the claim (and to be potentially liable for costs if the claim were unsuccessful). In those circumstances, a court might be prepared to allow an application to add another claimant and grant permission for that claimant to bring the claim. In this appeal, if the judge had erred in considering that none of the grounds were arguable, and if there were a real reason why the claim should proceed, I might well have considered if there were ways in which the appeal could be allowed and the claim for judicial review be allowed to proceed. There would have been difficulties, not least the fact that Andrews LJ refused an application for permission to join Mr Bains as a second claimant, and those difficulties might have proved insuperable. However, for the reasons set out below, I consider that the judge did not err in finding that the grounds of claim still relied upon were not arguable. It is not necessary, therefore, to explore this issue further. THE SECOND ISSUE – DID THE RESPONDENT ACT UNLAWFULLY BY RELYING ON THE DATA IN THE 2019 REPORT? Submissions

61. Mr Manning submitted that the respondent erred by having regard to the data in the BRE report published in 2019. That data was either 4 years old, or in relation to deprivation, was 7 years old. He submitted that a designation ceased to have effect after five years. It was, therefore, irrational and so unlawful, for the respondent to rely on the data in the BRE report or irrational not to obtain further data. Mr Gullick submitted that the judge was correct to conclude that this ground was not arguable for the reasons she gave. Discussion and conclusion

62. The data contained in the December 2019 BRE report was material which the respondent was entitled to take into account when deciding whether the statutory criteria for making each of the two designations were satisfied. The proper analysis of this ground, however, is that it is said that it was irrational, and so unlawful, for the respondent not to have obtained further, more up to date information.

63. In that regard, the executive was expressly invited in respect of each of the two designations to consider whether it wished to update the data in the BRE report. The reports pointed out that this could provide the respondent with up to date information but that that would lead to a delay of around 3 months and might not provide any additional assistance. It was not irrational for the executive to decide to proceed with its decision to authorise officers to make a designation in those circumstances. It had to weigh the data it had, the consequences in terms of delay of seeking further information, and the likelihood of that information not assisting. The decision it made to proceed on the basis of all the material it had was a rational one.

64. That conclusion is reinforced in relation to the additional licensing scheme by the following considerations. The relevant criterion in section 56(2) of the 2004 Act was that the respondent considered that a significant proportion of HMOs was being managed sufficiently ineffectively as to give rise to one or more particular problems for the occupants or members of the public. The report identified the number of complaints received about HMOs (averaging 221 a year since 2018). It identified the problems that had occurred. The data in the 2019 BRE report estimated the number of private sector dwellings in the borough. In oral submissions, Mr Manning accepted that that figure was not relevant to the specific condition in section 56(2) of the 2004 Act but submitted that it could be relevant to section 57(4) as the respondent might not know whether any alternatives should be pursued unless they had sufficient information about the current position. The fact that the data was not directly relevant to the statutory criterion reinforces the conclusion that the respondent acted rationally by proceeding on the basis of all the information presently available.

65. In relation to selective licensing, the principal relevant statutory criterion was that the area in question, here the South Ward, contained a high proportion of properties in the private rented sector. The data in the 2019 BRE report showed that South Ward contained 9,042 dwellings of which 49.1% were privately rented. The 2021 national census showed that the national average of privately rented accommodation was 20.3% and the average for the east of England was 18.3%. Mr Manning accepted that the fact that the figure for a ward was above the national average was something that was relevant to the question of whether a high proportion of properties were privately rented but objected to the comparison of 2019 data for South Ward with later national or regional data. In context, the respondent was entitled to infer that there was little prospect that the 49.1% of properties that were privately rented in the South Ward would have fallen below the national average in 2021 of 20.3% when it came to authorise the making of the designations in 2023, four years later. In context, it was a rational course of action for the respondent to base its decision on all the material it had, including the 2019 BRE report, and not to incur delay in making the decision. This ground is not arguable. THE THIRD ISSUE – THE BASIS ON WHICH THE LICENSING SCHEMES WOULD BE FINANCED. Submissions

66. Mr Manning submitted that the executive were told that the licensing schemes would be self-financing. That was wrong for two reasons. First, the fact that applicants could apply early meant that they would pay a reduced fee which would not cover the cost of enforcement. If all those needing a licence made such an “early-bird” application, the scheme would not be self-financing. The judge was wrong to conclude that this point would have been obvious to the executive. Secondly Mr Manning relied on extracts from e-mails of officers in the process up to the preparation of the two reports of the executive. He submitted that these showed that the scheme would not be self-financing and the executive was therefore misled. Discussion and conclusion The factual Position

67. In terms of the fees, it is clear from the appendix to each of the reports that the fee for applications for a licence was fixed at £122 and that was intended to defray the costs of processing the application. If an application was granted, a further fee of £366 was payable which was intended to defray the costs of monitoring and enforcement. The “early bird-fee”, for those who applied within the first three months of the relevant scheme, was £150. That would cover the £122 cost of processing the application but would leave £28 for enforcement (not £366 as would be the case for ordinary or non “early-bird” applications).

68. One of the themes in the e-mails to which Mr Manning referred is that the officers considered that there was a target of achieving savings of somewhere in the region of £37,500 from the licensing schemes and the officers concerned would not approve an appendix which did not explain how that would be achieved. At least one other e-mail pointed out that charges for the licensing of relevant properties could not be used to generate a profit as that would be unlawful. Other e-mails concern whether the number of staff required to operate the schemes should be set out in the report. The Legal Position

69. As a matter of law, the key question is whether, on a fair reading of the report as a whole, the members of the relevant decision-making body (here the executive) were materially misled on a matter bearing on their decision (see, for example, the observations of Lindblom LJ in R (Mansell) v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council [2017] EWCA Civ 1314 , [2019] PTSR 1452 at paragraph 42). Similar observations were made by Sir Geoffrey Vos Chancellor at paragraphs 62 to 64, where he emphasised that a challenge should be based on some distinct and material defect in the report.

70. On financial matters, the sections on finance (summarised above) made the following clear. First the respondent could set fees at a level which would make a scheme self-funding but they could not be fixed at a level intended to generate a profit. Second, the scheme would be operated on a full-cost basis so that fees could be fixed to recover processing of applications and the costs of inspection and enforcement. The costs of monitoring and enforcing the scheme against unlicensed operators could also be included in the fees. The proposed fees, and the components of the fee reflecting the cost of processing applications on the one hand, and the cost of enforcement on the other, was set out in an appendix. Third, there would be an “early-bird” flat rate fee of £150 for completed applications received within the first three months of the operation of the scheme. Fourth, although the scheme was intended to be self-funding, there was likely to be a revenue cost initially, that is before fees were paid, as staff had to be in post to assess applications and set fees before a licence was issued.

71. The reports were not misleading and did not contain any defect. The points referred in the previous paragraphs are correct and set out the correct legal and factual position. First, on the question of the impact of the “early-bird” flat-rate fees, as the judge said, this must have been obvious to members of the executive since they were told that fees could not be set so as to make a profit and that discounted fees (the “early-bird” fees) were less than the amount that a standard applicant would be charged to offset enforcement costs. Secondly, on the question of the e-mails from the officers, it is clear that the reports themselves, which went to the decision-makers, were correct. These grounds are not arguable. THE FOURTH ISSUE – THE UPFRONT CHARGE FOR ENFORCEMENT COSTS AS PART OF THE “EARLY-BIRD” FLAT FEE

72. Mr Manning submitted that the two licensing schemes were based on a fee for an “early-bird” applicant which included both the cost of processing an application (£122) and the cost of enforcement (£28) to be paid at the time that the application was made. That was contrary to the decision in R (Gaskin) v Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council [2018] EWHC 1996 (Admin) , [2019] PTSR 567 .

73. Mr Gullick submitted that, in so far as applicants had paid the £28 related to enforcement costs on application for a licence, that would be refunded to them if the application was refused. In the future, the respondent did not propose to require payment at the time that the application was made. Discussion and Conclusion

74. I assume, without deciding, that the parties are correct in their assumption that the provisions of the Provision of Services Regulations 2009 (adopted to implement a European Union Directive at a time when the United Kingdom was a member of the European Union) continues in force. I further assume that those provisions make it unlawful to require the payment of that element of the fee intended to defray enforcement costs at the time when an application for a licence is made (as opposed to requiring payment when an application is granted). Those assumptions do not, however, make this ground of the claim for judicial review arguable.

75. First, the claim is that the designations made on 25 October 2023 are unlawful. The designation of the areas where additional, or selective, licensing is required does not, however, depend on the operation of the licence fee. The terms of the designations, summarised above, show that they are concerned with bringing about a situation where licences for relevant properties under Part 2 or Part 3 of the 2004 Act are required. The charging structure for the issuing of such licences is separate. Indeed, the reports refer to the level of fees being set, reported to the executive, and reviewed through what is described as the scale of fees and charges process. The validity and lawfulness of the designations is not conditional, or dependent, on the lawfulness of the way in which fees are set and recovered. Those are two separate matters. A claimant may be able to bring a claim that charges have been unlawfully levied, and may be able to recover any charges unlawfully paid. But that would not invalidate the designations requiring a licence to be obtained for a particular property. Similar, assuming that Gaskin is correctly decided, it may be unlawful for the respondent to refuse to process an application unless a fee reflecting the element to defray the costs of enforcement was paid at the time of application for a licence. That would not, however, render the designations unlawful.

76. Secondly and separately, even if the charging system and the designations were to be seen as part of one system, it would only be defective in so far as it required an upfront payment of the amount of the application fee relating to enforcement. That aspect could be separated out from the arrangements and appropriate remedies granted, and the remainder of the scheme, including the designations, would be lawful. See R (Hemming) v Westminster City Council (No.2) [2017] UKSC 50 , [2018] AC 676 at paragraph 10. CONCLUSION

77. I would dismiss this appeal. The judge was correct to conclude that the claimant company did not have a sufficient interest to bring a claim for judicial review challenging the lawfulness of the designations in this case. The judge was also correct to conclude that there was no arguable ground of challenge. Consequently, she was correct to refuse to grant this claimant permission to apply for judicial review of the designations. LADY JUSTICE ELISABETH LAING

78. I agree. LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE

79. I also agree.