Laurence Gerald Factor v Houssam Haddad & Ors

CICC Judge Briggs: Introduction

1. Laurence Factor is an insolvency practitioner. Sweetland Limited had made an exit from administration into liquidation. Mr Factor is the appointed liquidator of Sweetland Limited (“Sweetland”). Mr Factor made an application dated 2 April 2024 (the “Application”) that sought recovery of money from the Respondents. The Application relies on claims vested in Sweetland and causes of action under the Insolvency Act 1986 .

2. The hearing of the Application was listed for a 7 day trial commencing 20 January 2026. Mr Factor applied for an adjournment on the first day of trial.

3. The issue to be decided is whether the Application should be struck out for failure to provide information sufficient to comply with an unless order made on the first day of the trial (the “January Order”). The background to Sweetland

4. The first Respondent (“HH”) relocated to the UK when he was 15. He was born in Lebanon, and says he had little formal education.

5. Sweetland Limited was incorporated in 1997 by HH, who ran it as a family‑owned Lebanese pastry business. Over time, share ownership was divided equally between HH and his brothers the fourth Respondent (“AH”) and the sixth Respondent (“WH”). The business operated from a factory at 11 School Road, owned by a partnership of the three brothers and leased to Sweetland.

6. Other family members worked in the business in various roles. The third Respondent (“MY”) is the brother of HH’s wife; the fifth Respondent (“SH”) is married to AH; and the seventh Respondent (“RH”) is married to WH.

7. Initially HH was the sole shareholder and de jure director.

8. The second Respondent (“AP”), the only non‑family Respondent, is a retired chartered accountant who became involved with Sweetland from 2016. Mr Factor alleges that AP acted as a de facto or shadow director; HH’s evidence is that AP sought a 10% shareholding but was refused.

9. A breakdown in family relations occurred in mid‑2020. HH says he signed a statement of affairs prepared by his nephew Sami without understanding its purpose, believing later that AH, WH and their sons were attempting to take control of the business. HH subsequently rejected liquidation and appointed administrators out of court in September 2020. The Event

10. Prior to the breakdown in family trust and the appointment of administrators, a trigger event that led to Sweetland seeking assistance from AP. The event was the receipt of a notice that the Factory was to be purchased compulsorily for the purpose of building a part of the London to Birmingham High Speed Railway (“HS2”).

11. The compulsory purchase (the “Event”) had a significant impact on Sweetland. I understand the following factual consequences of the Event are not in dispute: 11.1. First, HS2 would reimburse only depreciated replacement cost for equipment, leaving Sweetland to fund any betterment. Much of its equipment was fully depreciated. 11.2. Secondly, HS2 operated a retrospective reimbursement model, save for an initial £250,000. Sweetland therefore had to fund relocation and fit‑out costs upfront and claim reimbursement later via DAC Beachcroft LLP. 11.3. Thirdly, Sweetland identified and leased temporary premises in early 2018 and a long‑term “New Factory”, which required substantial fit‑out to British Retail Consortium standards. 11.4. Fourthly, Sweetland moved into the New Factory in July 2018. 11.5. Fifthly, to fund relocation and fit‑out costs pending HS2 reimbursement, the Respondents and their families borrowed against their homes and other properties.

12. These matters form the context for several of the payments challenged by Mr Factor, including mortgage redemptions and transfers to family members. Covid-19

13. Sweetland, like many businesses, was affected by the Covid‑19 pandemic. HH describes the business as understaffed; AP states there was “some concern” about continued trading, though he characterises this as a temporary sector‑wide pressure. Mr Factor’s pleaded case

14. Mr Factor argues that AP was more than a consultant and claims he acted as a de facto or shadow director.

15. The amended points of claim dated 13 November 2024 pleaded out the relief sought in the Application. The claims are as follows: (i) Sweetland was insolvent at one of the three alternative points in time. First, throughout 2019, secondly from February 2020 and thirdly as a result of transactions made in or around March 2020. (ii) A series of payments made from Sweetland are challenged. First, £20,000 withdrawn from its bank account in two tranches of £10,000 on 9.07.19 and 20.06.20. (iii) Second, £35,000 withdrawn from the bank account between 17.09.20 and 23.09.20. (iv) Third, £13,457.06 paid to cover a mortgage obligation of HH. (v) Fourth, payments to St James’ Place. (vi) Fifth, a payment of £383,299.78 to MT Finance to discharge a mortgage in the name of HH, MY, AH and SH. (vii) Sixth, is a similar payment of £347,532 to MT Finance to discharge a mortgage owed by WH and RH. (viii) Seventh, that payments totalling £181,925 paid to MY between January 2019 and September 2020. (ix) Eighth payments made to AP of £173,894.42 between 11.03.20 and 16.03.20. Case management and Disclosure

16. The Application came before Judge Prentis on 28 November 2024. Paragraph 7 of his order required the parties to give search‑based extended disclosure by 4pm on 28 February 2025 in accordance with the approved Section 1A Disclosure Review Document (“DRD”). The deadline was later extended to 13 August 2025.

17. The Disclosure Review Document identified the key issues requiring contemporaneous documents, including: the timing of Sweetland’s alleged insolvency; the purpose and destination of cash withdrawals; the basis on which family members may have been creditors; the reasons for mortgage and investment payments; the circumstances of the MT Finance loans; the nature of payments made in March 2020; and whether AP acted as a de facto or shadow director. These issues made clear that disclosure of financial records, internal communications, and third‑party materials was central to a fair resolution.

18. The DRD also recorded that Sweetland held electronic documents on an Outlook server and on “the Applicant’s Windows computer”. Mr Factor informed the court that Sweetland also had a server containing documents. He confirmed that no documents had been lost or destroyed and identified a list search terms of third‑party sources such as banks, solicitors, accountants and others, from whom he could have obtained documents.

19. On 23 April 2025 he signed the disclosure certificate stating that he had taken reasonable steps to preserve documents, acted honestly in the disclosure process, and produced electronic copies of documents in their native format, in a manner which preserves metadata. The certificate states: “I certify that I am aware of and to the best of my knowledge and belief have complied with the Disclosure Order. I further certify that the List of Documents at Appendix A complies with the definition of a List of Documents contained within the Practice Direction and is a complete list of all documents which are or have been in my control and which I am obliged under the Disclosure Order to disclose. I understand that I must inform the court and the other parties immediately if any further document required to be disclosed by paragraph 3.3 of Practice Direction 51U and the Disclosure Order comes into my control at any time before the conclusion of the case.”

20. At that time, several Respondents were acting in person. AP disclosed 4,364 documents. Respondents 4–7 disclosed 155 documents.

21. By contrast, Mr Factor disclosed only 56 documents despite having control of 49 boxes of papers, loose files, at least one server and at least one computer. First day of trial

22. On 9 January 2026 and prior to the trial listed on 20 January 2026, solicitors Keidan Harrison acting for AP wrote to Mr Factor: “It has been brought to our attention that, before HS2’s compensation scheme (the “Scheme”) would transfer approximately £1.25 million to Sweetland Ltd (the “Company”) on or around 10 March 2020 (referred to at paragraph 33 of your clients’ Amended Points of Claim), it required formal confirmation that the Company constituted a going concern. Claims to the Scheme were audited by its agent CBRE. We understand that CBRE instructed Quantuma Advisory Limited (“Quantuma”), who provide forensic accountancy services and insolvency practitioners, to conduct a review of the Company’s financial position and management capability (the “Report”). This Report appears to have been a condition precedent to the release of the final payment, reflecting the Scheme’s need to be satisfied that the Company was solvent and capable of continuing to trade before making payment. We understand that the Report was produced around the time our client left the Company in March 2020 (before he was formally terminated in May 2020) and sent to CBRE. There is reference in the disclosure provided by Respondents 4 – 7 of correspondence between the Company and Quantuma. Those documents are enclosed with this letter, and we ask that they are included in the trial bundle. We have reviewed your client’s disclosure, and the Report has not been produced. The Report is obviously material to the issues concerning the Company’s solvency. ”

23. The report was not produced before or at the trial.

24. A further letter was written on 14 January 2026 which detailed serious failures in the disclosure exercise undertaken by Mr Factor: “As set out in our client’s skeleton, your client has not provided disclosure of key categories of documents plainly within its possession or control, including documents which your client knows, or should know, exist which are adverse to your client’s case. Further, there has been no explanation of his search methodology, no completion of the S2DRD, and no confirmation that all known adverse documents have been disclosed. These omissions constitute breaches of CPR 31.6 (standard disclosure obligations), PD57AD Model D, which requires reasonable and proportionate searches and disclosure of adverse documents, as well as PD57AD (particularly paragraphs 10.8 and 12.1) requiring a signed Disclosure Certificate confirming compliance and methodology. Your client’s evident disclosure failings are extremely serious, particularly given your client’s status as an officer of the Court. The Court will wish to understand the extent of your client’s compliance with his obligations, and we consider that as an officer of the Court your client must be open and frank with the Court about his compliance.”

25. The response from the solicitors acting for Mr Factor, Keystone Law, to the letter was to say that they were disappointed that the issues about disclosure were raised so near to trial. A similar submission was made by Mr Factor at this hearing except he went further. He submitted that the delay in raising the disclosure failures was cynical. There was no evidence to support his assertion.

26. Several factors undermine the suggestion of cynicism advanced by Mr Factor. First, Mr Factor signed the disclosure certificate stating he had carried out certain searches when he had not. Secondly, the Respondents had been acting in person for much of the time; only HH and MY, and AP were able to obtain legal representation for the trial. Thirdly, AP had obtained advice in respect of his own disclosure obligations. His disclosure was not criticised. Fourthly Mr Factor represented in his disclosure that he has access to third parties such as banks and accountants yet no third-party documents were disclosed. Lastly, AP and the remaining Respondents were content to proceed with the trial. It was Mr Factor who made the application for an adjournment.

27. The application for an adjournment was based on Mr Factor’s reflection that due to his admitted failures there could be no fair trial.

28. Mr Factor accepted that he had failed: (i) to comply with the order of Judge Prentis (ii) to undertake the disclosure exercise with diligence and (iii) the lack of diligence extended to a failure, among other things, to search for adverse documents. Mr Factor sought an adjournment so that he could have an opportunity to undertake re-run the disclosure exercise.

29. AP, together with the other Respondents at trial, pressed the failures of Mr Factor, and made an application for costs thrown away. AP (supported by the other Respondents) made two other applications. The first is an application for security for costs and the second to strike out the Application. Two grounds were raised for the strike out. The first, that due to Mr Factor’s failures there could no longer be a fair trial. AP suffers from Parkinson’s disease. As it is a degenerative disease he may suffer greater impairment than he currently experiences by the time the adjourned trial is heard. Secondly, the events in question (the Event and the making of the impugned payments) extend back to 2018. The long delay to trial should not be made longer. Memories fade. Thirdly, it was explained that AP was only able to fund legal representation due to Keidan Harrison and counsel agreeing to act on a discounted and contingent basis. These lawyers may not be available or willing to act on the same basis a second time. Lastly, it was argued that Mr Factor had deliberately failed to carry out the disclosure exercise to the requisite standard. He was intent on winning the case and thought that he would get away with not searching for adverse documents as long as the Respondents acted in person.

30. Without determining whether the failures were deliberate, the court noted documentary support for the Respondents’ concerns, including the signed disclosure certificate and a witness statement asserting a lack of documentation to support any defence.

31. The court granted the adjournment but made an unless order (the “January Order”). It required Mr Factor to pay the costs thrown away on an indemnity basis and to make a payment on account. It also required him, by 4pm on 3 February 2026, to file and serve a witness statement giving full and frank particulars of: 31.1. the disclosure exercise undertaken and its defects; 31.2. all categories and sources of potentially relevant documents within his control or obtainable from third parties; 31.3. which documents were or were not in his possession and why; 31.4. steps taken to preserve documents and any documents lost or destroyed; 31.5. all known adverse documents not disclosed and the reasons for non‑disclosure; and 31.6. any further matters that ought properly to be brought to the court’s attention.

32. The order was made with the agreement of his legal team. It was expressed in clear terms and provided that failure to comply would result in the Application being struck out without further order.

33. The full order is as follows: “Unless the Applicant shall complete all of the following steps by the dates specified, the Main Application shall be struck out without further order (and the parties shall be entitled to write to the Court office for confirmation of the same): a. By 4pm on Tuesday 3 February 2026, the Applicant must file and serve on all the Respondents a witness statement (from the Applicant himself) (the “Disclosure Witness Statement”) setting out full and frank particulars of (i) the disclosure exercise undertaken by the Liquidator, (ii) the defects in the disclosure exercise undertaken, (iii) how and why these defects occurred and when the Liquidator became aware of them, (iv) all categories of and sources for potentially relevant documents that are or which previously have been in his control (including potentially relevant documents in the hands of third parties which the Liquidator is entitled to call for), (v) which of these documents are in the Liquidator’s possession, (vi) which of these documents are not in the Liquidator’s possession, and with respect of each category of documents, an explanation of why these documents are not in the Liquidator’s possession, (vii) an explanation of what steps have been taken and what steps have not been taken to preserve potentially relevant documents which are or which previously have been in the Liquidator’s control (including documents in the hands of third parties), (viii) what potentially relevant documents have been destroyed, and when and why this occurred, (ix) a list of all known adverse documents which were not disclosed, (x) an explanation of why these known adverse documents were not disclosed, and (xi) any further matters that ought properly to be brought to the Court’s attention.”

34. The term “full and frank” connotes an obligation to make proper enquires, disclose facts that are known and any additional facts which would have been known if proper inquiries had been made and, to act in good faith with candour: Brink's-Mat Ltd v Elcombe [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1350 , 1357, 1359; Alliance Bank JSC v Baglan Abdullayevich Zhunus [2015] EWHC 714 [66].

35. The sanction embodied in an unless order takes effect without the need for any further order if the party to whom it is addressed fails to comply with it in a material respect. Nevertheless the court may have to decide if there has been default having regard to its purpose, to bring about compliance: Marcan Shipping (London) Ltd v Kefalas [2007] 1 W.L.R 1864. For the sake of completeness, the January Order was drafted with the agreement of Mr Factor’s legal team, the obligation is clear from paragraph 3(a), and Mr Factor explained orally that he had assistance from his legal team when producing his sixth witness statement.

36. It may be observed that January Order divides the obligations placed on Mr Factor into several categories. The first is to provide full and frank information about exercise he undertook: (i)-(iii). The second is to provide the same full and frank exercise in respect of relevant documents he has in his control or could obtain from third parties (if proper inquiries had been made): (iv-vi). The third category is to explain what steps were taken to preserve documents since they came under his control and what documents are lost or destroyed: (vii-viii). Other than providing full and frank particulars in respect of any other material relevant, the last category relates to adverse documents (ix-x).

37. The purpose of the order was to enable the Respondents and the court to understand what had and had not been done, and why. Compliance The first category (the disclosure exercise i-iii)

38. In his witness statement Mr Factor explained [4]: “I reviewed my case files in respect of Sweetland Limited (“Sweetland”) focusing only on those documents I considered to be relevant to my action against the Respondents and relevant to the Respondents’ replies”.

39. Mr Factor accepts that he failed to search [10]: 39.1. All the case files. 39.2. Files in his possession that related to the aborted pre-appointment dealings with Sweetland covering the period June 2020. 39.3. Files provided by the administrators after they had vacated office.

40. He also states [11] that the failure came about because of his ignorance of his obligations and [12]: “During my professional career, I had never previously been required to participate in a disclosure exercise. I was not therefore familiar with the procedure which I now understand is required.”

41. The statement does not address the defects in the exercise by reference to the DRD, nor does it explain how the signed disclosure certificate, asserting compliance with the order and preservation of metadata, came to be issued. Mr Factor accepts that he failed to search entire categories of documents, including case files, pre‑appointment files, and documents provided by the administrators. He attributes this to unfamiliarity with disclosure obligations. That explanation does not satisfy the requirement for full and frank particulars, nor does it address why he certified compliance.

42. Paragraph 82 of the skeleton argument produced on behalf of AP for trial states that there are a number of documents which did exist, were within the possession or control of Mr Factor and which would fall to be disclosed but which were not disclosed. These are: “a. The Company’s bank records, for its four bank accounts. The Liquidator evidently has these because he has produced schedules of payments based on them (discussed below). They are highly relevant to the issue of solvency. They are adverse to the Liquidator’s case. b. Records for the Company’s PayPal account, which received revenue from Sweetland’s website. These again are a known adverse document relevant to the issue of solvency. c. Sage accounting records. Again these are relevant to the issue of solvency. d. The proofs of debt submitted to the Liquidator (unless rejected by the Liquidator) and supporting materials. These are relevant to the issue of solvency. e. Communications with Sami and the Company’s accountants in June 2020, referred to in Factor-2 Factor-4. The Liquidator produced his statement of affairs in June 2020 on the basis of this information. f. The Company’s management accounts for 2019-2020 and its draft profit and loss for the period to 30 June 2019. Fortunately, these are in Andrew’s disclosure. They are highly relevant – and adverse to the Liquidator’s case. g. Documents relating to the review by Quantuma in 2020 on the Company’s solvency (commissioned by CBRE). Any such documents would be adverse to the Liquidator. h. The signed authorisation instructing DAC Beachcroft to make the impugned payments in March 2020. This is in the Liquidator’s control if not his possession. i. Material relating to the pre-pack sale – particularly any marketing exercise undertaken, details of the valuation, details of the buyer and material contextualising the decision to sell off the business at a very low price. Virtually nothing is known about the pre-pack sale except that the business was sold for an extraordinarily low sum.”

43. Mr Factor’s response is as follows [6]: “• Certain of them are in my possession but unlikely to be relevant to disclosure. • Certain of them are not in my possession and never have been. • Certain of them have already been submitted in evidence. • Certain of them are not relevant to this action.”

44. Given the purpose of the January Order, the number of serious issues raised by AP (the other Respondents), the brevity of the response, and the failure to descend to any detail the witness statement does not provide an objective reader with much understanding. I find that Mr Factor has not complied with this part of the order. The distinction he seeks to draw between documents ‘not relevant to disclosure’ and documents ‘not relevant to the action’ is artificial. The statement that certain documents are “unlikely” to be relevant is designed to raise more questions than it answers, and tells the Respondents nothing.

45. He provides no explanation as to the admitted omission to search for and disclose adverse documents.

46. He has not explained which of the documents listed in paragraph 82 of the skeleton argument (which he purports to answer) are not in his possession or “never have been” and of those documents that “never have been” what efforts were made to obtain them. Neither has he explained why bank statements, management accounts, sage records, signed instructions for the DAC Beachcroft payments, and accounting documents are not relevant to the issues (such as the test of insolvency and the impugned payments).

47. The trial skeleton argument for AP highlighted other failures in the disclosure given by Mr Factor. In particular it was submitted that Mr Factor failed to disclose any interviews or examinations (although this is perhaps because they were not undertaken) and practically no enquiries were made of, or documents were obtained from, the following: “a. Any Haddad family members or others involved in the business. b. Any of the Company’s accountants (Bradwell & Partners, Frasers Young Ltd and Kingston Smith LLP) who acted on various aspects of the Company’s finances in the relevant period. c. The Company’s lawyers, DAC Beachcroft, who effected the transfers in March 2020 which the Liquidator impugns. d. The Company’s quantity surveyors in relation to the HS2 project, Baker Rose LLP. e. The Company’s former administrators, from whom the Liquidator should have sought answers regarding the pre-pack sale and sale price. f. AP (notwithstanding the role he occupied was of an accounting nature). g. Dhamendra Jeshani of Fraser Young Ltd.”

48. In paragraph 7 of his sixth witness statement Mr Factor seeks to answer the criticism in the following way: “some of the documents obtained as a result of my dealings with certain of those third parties are in my possession and some were never called for by me, as I did not consider them to be relevant to this action.”

49. The same issues arise in respect of paragraph 6 and those in paragraph 7. It is unnecessary to repeat them.

50. Paragraph 8 of his statement is revealing: “Shortly after I was appointed, Sami and Michael Haddad delivered a further 2 boxes of documents to me. Until I complete the repeat disclosure exercise, I will not be in a position to say whether the documents in those 2 boxes are relevant to this action.”

51. I infer from this evidence that Mr Factor, despite being appointed on 25 August 2021, has not reviewed the two boxes delivered to him shortly after his appointment. No explanation is proffered. He also states that he has 19 lever arch files of correspondence covering the periods before and after his appointment. He fails to state whether he has searched the files for relevant and adverse documents. He did not say that he had inspected and made decisions about these documents during his oral response in court. The second category (relevant and in possession documents iv-vi)

52. Mr Factor says [18]-[22] he is not aware of any relevant documents that had been available and are not now available. He is not aware of any relevant documents in the hands of third parties. To support these statement he refers to his earlier answers given in [6]-[10]. These paragraphs [6]-[10] refer to “certain” documents; or “I do not consider them to be relevant to this action”; or he had not reviewed “my case file in its entirety”.

53. The response given by Mr Factor does not comply with the spirit or the language of the January Order. This is easily tested by asking if the Respondents know more about the disclosure exercise now than on 20 January 2026: what documents are adverse to his case, what searches were undertaken, why he discounted “certain” documents as irrelevant, why “certain” documents are relevant and how assessments were made by reference to the issues between the parties.

54. Given the centrality of these documents to the pleaded issues (insolvency, preferences, and the purpose of the impugned payments), the failure to identify them is a material breach of the January Order. The third and fourth category (preservation and lost or destroyed vii-viii)

55. The Respondents were alerted to the possibility that relevant documents may have been lost or destroyed by Keystone Law. Mr Sampson of Keystone law fairly explained by e-mail to Keidan Harrison on 17 January 2026: “In terms of specific documents or categories of documents, we have reviewed the paper file of emails relating to the July 2020 instructions to Newmans. We have been advised that this is relevant, and once emails to solicitors are removed, it will be provided to you. At this stage we are not in a position to say whether electronic records from that file remain available: it is our client’s practice to retain hard copies or emails and correspondence and we have not yet been able to access and consider the deleted files folder. ” (emphasis supplied)

56. As it was Mr Factor’s practice to delete e-mail correspondence and as Keystone Law stated that it could not access the deleted file, an explanation was called for. Even if there were print-outs it was impossible to verify whether the print-outs related only to the documents Mr Factor thought relevant to his case, not adverse documents and whether the printed documents comprised all documents deleted. Further the Respondents are rightfully alarmed at the prospect that other documents have been destroyed. This was the purpose of paragraph 3 (a) (vii)–(viii) of the January Order: “an explanation of what steps have been taken and what steps have not been taken to preserve potentially relevant documents which are or which previously have been in the Liquidator’s control...what potentially relevant documents have been destroyed and when and why this occurred.”

57. Without reference to the electronic documents Mr Factor answers [24]: “I am not aware that any known potentially relevant documents which are under my control have been destroyed.”

58. As the matter stands no reference is made to Sweetland’s electronic documents contained on hard drives, external servers or otherwise, in circumstances where it is known that Sweetland had its own email domain (implying the existence of a server on which emails are stored) and to have kept its own electronic records on the Sage accounting system. The response from Mr Factor fails to make transparent his control of these electronic records and if he no longer has control, what happened to them.

59. Without further explanation it is difficult to reconcile the information provided by Keystone Law on 17 January 2026 and the statement provided by Mr Factor in response to the January Order.

60. The absence of any explanation prevents the court from understanding whether relevant documents have been preserved, lost, or destroyed. This is a further material breach. Known adverse documents (ix-x)

61. The witness statement does not identify a single adverse document. The failure to identify known adverse documents, or to explain why they were not disclosed, is a clear and serious breach of the January Order. Matters that ought properly to be brought to the court’s attention (xi)

62. The witness statement does not adequately address the circumstances in which the disclosure certificate was signed, the role of the Applicant’s solicitors in supervising disclosure, or the discrepancies between his certificate and the disclosure actually undertaken. These matters were plainly relevant to the court’s consideration of the strike‑out application and should have been addressed. Materiality and consequence

63. The breaches identified are not technical or peripheral. They go to the core purpose of the January Order: to enable the court to understand the extent of the Applicant’s non‑compliance with disclosure obligations and to determine whether a fair trial remained possible. The omissions are extensive, they concern central categories of documents, and they deprive the Respondents of the ability to test the Applicant’s conduct. The failures are serious, unexplained, and continuing.

64. I find that Mr Factor has not complied with the January Order in a material respect. The consequence, expressly provided for in the order, is that the Application stands struck out without further order Conclusion

65. The January Order required the Applicant to provide full and frank particulars of the disclosure exercise he undertook, the defects in that exercise, the documents within his control or obtainable from third parties, the steps taken to preserve documents, any documents lost or destroyed, and all known adverse documents. Those obligations were clear, specific, and agreed by his legal team. They were imposed because the disclosure failures identified on the first day of trial were extensive, unexplained, and went to the heart of whether a fair trial remained possible.

66. The witness statement served in purported compliance does not meet those obligations. It does not describe the disclosure exercise undertaken, does not identify the documents within the Applicant’s control, does not address third‑party documents, does not explain preservation steps or any loss of documents, and does not identify any adverse material. These omissions are not minor or technical. They concern central categories of documents, financial records, accounting data, internal communications, and professional reports, directly relevant to the pleaded issues of insolvency, preferences, and the purpose of the impugned payments.

67. The failures are serious, they frustrate the purpose of the January Order, and they deprive the Respondents of the ability to understand or test the Applicant’s conduct of disclosure. No application for relief from sanctions has been made, and there is no basis on which the court could grant relief of its own motion. The breach is material and continuing.

68. As a result of this conclusion I shall declare that by the operation of paragraph 3(a) of the January Order the Application is struck out.

69. I shall invite counsel for AP to provide a draft order and for all parties to seek to agree any consequential matters arising from this judgment.