KS v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

1. This appeal raises two issues: the general issue of whether in the assessment of credibility the benefit of the doubt (hereafter “TBOD”) should be a guiding principle; and the more specific issue of whether a tribunal judge errs in law if he fails when assessing the credibility of a minor to give to that person’s evidence a “liberal application of the benefit of the doubt”. 2. TBOD is a commonly invoked rule in asylum law. We venture nothing here about use of the notion more generally except to note that its origins trace back to Aristotle. In Roman law (as expressed in the maxim in dubio pro reo) and some continental legal systems it has been seen in criminal law as a corollary of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof of beyond reasonable doubt (in Germany in that context it is a constitutional principle). It plays a part in international criminal law: see e.g. Natetilic and Martinovic , Case No. IT-03-66-A, cited in Fatmir Limaj et al , Appeals Chamber ICTY, 27.9.07, paragraphs 20-22. Seeming use of the principle is made in international humanitarian law in the context of the presumption in favour of protection of civilians: see Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which states that “[i] n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian ”. See further E. Wilmshurst and S. Breau, Perspective on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (CUP, 2007), pp. 10-11, 111-112, 406. Domestically, the benefit of the doubt rule has been frequently applied in age assessment cases: see e.g. TS v London Borough of Croydon [2012] EWHC 2389 (Admin) , but here, as in its deployment in UKBA guidance to caseworkers on Assessing Age, 17 June 2011, at para 2.21, it is seen as a criterion derived from asylum law. Its locus classicus is to be found in paragraphs 203-204 of the 1979 UNHCR Handbook, wherein it is seen as a rule that it is “frequently necessary” to apply when assessing the credibility of an asylum claim. It is referred to in some of the literature (and was referred to by us in case management directions) as a “principle” but for reasons which will become apparent we think, on reflection, that to call it a “principle” or even a “rule” risks confusion; we prefer, depending on the context, to refer to it by the more neutral term “notion”. Paragraphs 203-204 provide: “203. After the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his story there may still be a lack of evidence for some of his statements. As explained above (paragraph 196) it is hardly possible for a refugee to ‘prove’ every part of his case and, indeed, if this were a requirement the majority of refugees would not be recognised. It is therefore frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. 204. The benefit of the doubt should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility. The applicant’s statements must be coherent and plausible, and must not run counter to generally known facts.” 3. The notion is also seen by the Handbook as one that needs a “liberal application” when assessing the credibility of asylum claims made by minors. Paragraphs 213-219 state: “213.There is no special provision in the 1951 Convention relating to the refugee status of persons under age. The same definition of a refugee applies to all individuals, regardless of their age. When it is necessary to determine the refugee status of minor, problems may arise due to the difficulty of applying the criteria of ‘well-founded fear’ in his case. If a minor is accompanied by one (or both) of his parents, or another family member on whom he is dependent, who requests refugee status, the minor’s own refugee status will be determined according to the principle of family unity (paragraphs 181 to 188 above). 214. The question of whether an unaccompanied minor may qualify for refugee status must be determined in the first instance according to the degree of his mental development and maturity. In the case of children, it will generally be necessary to enrol the services of experts conversant with child mentality. A child – and for that matter, an adolescent – not being legally independent should, if appropriate, have a guardian appointed whose task it would be to promote a decision that will be in the minor’s best interests. In the absence of parents or of a legally appointed guardian, it is for the authorities to ensure that the interests of an applicant for refugee status who is a minor are fully safeguarded. 215. Where a minor is no longer a child but an adolescent, it will be easier to determine refugee status as in the case of an adult, although this again will depend upon the actual degree of the adolescent’s maturity. It can be assumed that – in the absence of indications to the contrary – a person of 16 or over may be regarded as sufficiently mature to have a well-founded fear of persecution. Minors under 16 years of age may normally be assumed not to be sufficiently mature. They may have fear and a will of their own, but these may not have the same significance as in the case of an adult. 216.It should, however, be stressed that these are only general guidelines and that a minor’s mental maturity must normally be determined in the light of his personal, family and cultural background. 217. Where the minor has not reached a sufficient degree of maturity to make it possible to establish well-founded fear in the same way as for an adult, it may be necessary to have greater regard to certain objective factors. Thus, if an unaccompanied minor finds himself in the company of a group of refugees, this may – depending on the circumstances, indicate that the minor is also a refugee. 218. The circumstances of the parents and other family members, including their situation in the minor’s country of origin, will have to be taken into account. If there is reason to believe that the parents wish their child to be outside the country of origin on grounds of well-founded fear of persecution, the child himself may be presumed to have such fear. 219. If the will of the parents cannot be ascertained or if such will is in doubt or in conflict with the will of the child, then the examiner, in cooperation with the experts assisting him, will have to come to a decision as to the well-foundedness of the minor’s fear on the basis of the known circumstances, which may call for a liberal application of the benefit of the doubt.” 4. What is said about minors in these paragraphs has been supplemented by the UNHCR Refugee Children Guidelines on Protection and Care , 1994 which at page 101 state that: “(e) The problem of ‘proof’ is great in every refugee status determination. It is compounded in the case of children. For this reason, the decision on a child’s refugee status calls for a liberal application of the principle of the benefit of the doubt. This means that should there be some hesitation regarding the credibility of the child’s story, the burden is not on the child to provide proof, but the child should be given the benefit of the doubt.” 5. They have been further supplemented in 2009 by the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1A(2) and 1(F) of the 2951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees , which provide that: “[65] Due to their young age, dependency and relative immaturity, children should enjoy specific procedural and evidentiary safeguards to ensure that fair refugee status determination decisions are reached with respect to their claims. The general measures outlined below set out minimum standards for the treatment of children during the asylum procedure. They do not preclude the application of the detailed guidance provided, for example, in the Action for the Rights of Children Resources Pack, the Inter-Agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children and in national guidelines. [68] For unaccompanied and separated child applicants, efforts need to be made as soon as possible to initiate tracing and family reunification with parents or other family members. There will be exceptions, however, to these priorities where information becomes available suggesting that tracing or reunification could put the parents or other family members in danger, that the child has been subjected to abuse or neglect, and/or where parents or family members may be implicated or have been involved in their persecution. [73] Although the burden of proof usually is shared between the examiner and the applicant in adult claims, it may be necessary for an examiner to assume a greater burden of proof in children’s claims, especially if the child concerned is unaccompanied. If the facts of the case cannot be ascertained and/or the child is incapable of fully articulating his/her claim, the examiner needs to make a decision on the basis of all known circumstances, which may call for a liberal application of the benefit of the doubt. Similarly, the child should be given the benefit of the doubt should there be some concern regarding the credibility of parts of his/her claim.” 6. Given the widespread approval by courts and tribunals worldwide of the 1979 Handbook as a source of guidance on asylum law issues, one would expect to find plentiful use by them of TBOD notion as set out in paragraphs 203-204 and 213-219. There are some high-profile cases where reliance is placed on it: see e.g. in Canada, in Chan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593; in the US, in Matter of S-M-J , 21 I & N. Dec 722, 725 (B.I.A. 1997); in the Czech Republic in SN (Belarus) Ministry of Interior , (2005) 6 Azs 235/2004-57 Cz.Sup.Admin.Ct., Dec 21, 2005. (We shall deal with the position in the UK below but it suffices to say here that there have not been any high profile cases directly engaging with the notion). 7. Although concerned not with the Refugee Convention but with the prohibition of ill-treatment in its non-refoulement context to be found in the ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights has invoked the notion in many cases. Thus in R.C. v Sweden , App. No. 41827/07, 9 March 2010, the Court stated at [50]: “The Court acknowledges that, owing to the special situation in which asylum seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of their statements and the documents submitted in support thereof. However, when information is presented which gives strong reasons to question the veracity of an asylum seeker's submissions, the individual must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged discrepancies (see, among other authorities, Collins and Akasiebie v. Sweden (dec.), no. 23944/05 , 8 March 2007, and Matsiukhina and Matsiukhin v. Sweden (dec.), no. 31260/04 , 21 June 2005). In principle, the applicant has to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see N. v. Finland, no. 38885/02 , § 167, 26 July 2005 and NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904/07 , § 111, 17 July 2008). Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts about it.” (see also SHH v UK [2013] 57 EHRR 18.” 8. In I v Sweden App. no. 61204/09 at [60] the Court drew upon its reasoning in R.C. v Sweden as follows: “The Government have questioned the applicants’ credibility and pointed to various inconsistencies in their stories. The Court accepts that, as a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individuals concerned (see R.C. v. Sweden , no. 41827/07, § 52, 9 March 2010). But at the same time it acknowledges that owing to the special situation in which asylum seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of their statements and the documents submitted in support thereof. However, when information is presented which gives strong reasons to question the veracity of an asylum seeker’s submissions, the individual must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged discrepancies (see, among other authorities, N. v. Sweden , no. 23505/09, § 53, 20 July 2010 ).” 9. Yet at least if academic studies are a guide, cases decided under the Refugee Convention utilising the notion are surprisingly few in number. And, as epitomised by the Chan case, there has not always been judicial consensus about its scope or precise utility. At [142] of Chan , Major J for the majority stated that: “My colleague, La Forest J. argues that no conclusions can be drawn from individual items of evidence and that on each item the appellant should be given the benefit of the doubt, often by considering hypotheticals which could support the appellant's claim. This approach handicaps a refugee determination Board from performing its task of drawing reasonable conclusions on the basis of the evidence which is presented. This approach is also fundamentally incompatible with the concept of "benefit of the doubt" as it is expounded in the UNHCR Handbook: ‘204. The benefit of the doubt should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant's general credibility. The applicant's statements must be coherent and plausible, and must not run counter to generally known facts . [Emphasis added.]’”. 10. Earlier at [56] La Forest J had stated that: “The appellant's account of events so closely mirrors the known facts concerning the implementation of China's population policy that, given the absence of any negative finding as to the credibility of the appellant or of his evidence, I think it clear that his quite plausible account is entitled to the benefit of any doubt that may exist. With respect, I see no merit in the approach taken by some members of the court below and by my colleague Major J. to seize upon sections of the appellant's testimony in isolation. Indeed, I find such a technique antithetical to the guidelines of the UNHCR Handbook (see paragraph 201).” 11. James Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status , C.U.P. 2014 construe the notion as an aspect of the lower standard of proof and in that context question whether it adds anything of substance: “While it is sometimes said that the claimant is entitled to the “benefit of the doubt” if there is an insufficiency of evidence, this principle in substance adds little to the intentionally low threshold of the test of well-founded fear. That is, because the applicant’s responsibility is only to show that there is a real chance of being persecuted, this standard already accounts for the possibility of “lack of evidence for some of [the applicant’s] statements" [UNHCR Handbook. para 203] said to justify the application of the “benefit of the doubt” rule. Coupled with the shared duty of fact-finding and the ultimate responsibility of the decision-maker to recognise refugee status when warranted on the merits however the claim may have been framed or argued] , it is doubtful that there is much that a super-added “benefit of the doubt” principle could, or should, add.”( pp.120-121). 12. In the context of assessment of credibility, some academic studies have highlighted the lack of consistency in state practice over the relationship between TBOD and the burden and standard of proof: see e.g. J Sweeney, “Credibility, Proof and Refugee Law” (2009) 21 1JRL 700, 707. 13. The research findings of UNHCR in its May 2013 CREDO study, Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems , in the context of a survey of several EU countries, were that: “Some decision-makers may lack a clear understanding of the purpose and relevance of the principle of the benefit of the doubt, in particular with regard to: • The asserted facts in relation to which the principle of the benefit of the doubt is considered; • The point at which a consideration of the benefit of the doubt is undertaken; • The criteria and considerations taken into account in determining whether to grant the benefit of the doubt.” (pp.229-230). 14. In seeking to improve understanding, UNHCR’s conclusion in this study (at pp.246-7) was that TBOD should only come into play at the end point of the credibility assessment, after the decision-maker has sought to accept or reject what asserted facts he can: “Following such assessment, there may nevertheless be an element of doubt in the mind of the decision-maker about the credibility of some asserted relevant facts. It is in relation to such facts, and at the end of the credibility assessment, that UNHCR suggests that consideration must be given, in a separate step, to whether to afford the benefit of the doubt.” The EU Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC (QD) 15. Within the EU matters have been further complicated by the fact that the EU Qualification Directive (QD), whilst not making reference to TBOD as such, sets out in Article 4(5) a number of safeguards relating to the assessment of evidence: “5. Where Member States apply the principle according to which it is the duty of the applicant to substantiate the application for international protection and where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation, when the following conditions are met: (a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application; (b) all relevant elements, at the applicant’s disposal, have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant elements has been given; (c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case; (d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and (e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.” 16. Opinion as to whether or to what extent the safeguards in Article 4(5) embody the notion of TBOD is divided. UNHCR in its CREDO study states that it “encourages Member States to interpret Article 4(5) QD as a whole, and provisions (d) and (e) in particular in accordance with the principles of the UNHCR Handbook”. The UKBA, Asylum Policy Instructions, Considering Asylum Claims and Assessing Credibility, February 2012 (hereafter the APIs), state at paragraph 4.3.4 that what Article 4(5) is saying is “that if an applicant meets all five criteria, a decision-maker should give the benefit of the doubt – there would, after all, be no reason not to…”. 17. On the other hand, the IARLJ CREDO study, “Assessment of Credibility in Refugee and Subsidiary Protection Claims under the EU Qualification Directive: Judicial criteria and standards”, in C.Grutters, E.Guild and S.de Groot (eds) Assessment of Credibility by Judges in Asylum Cases in the EU, observes at p.48 that the optional terms of Article 4(5) have resulted in a co-existence of two approaches to assessment of credibility, one under Article 4(5) and one relying on the UNHCR principles of “shared duty” and “benefit of the doubt”: “In Member States which consider that it is the duty of the claimants to submit all elements needed to substantiate their applications (as expressed in Article 4.1 (first sentence), and 4.5 QD), judges who have residual doubts as to credibility (arising where claimant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence), must resolve such doubt by applying, at a minimum, Article 4.1 ( second sentence), the provisions of Article 4.2 –4.4, and in particular 4.5 (a)-(e). However, in other Member States where the UNHCR Handbook [195]-[205] “shared duty” and “benefit of the doubt” principles (or principles of a like nature) are adopted domestically, judges, noting also the terms of Article 3 QD, should apply these principles (in lieu of Article 4.1 (first sentence), and 4.5 QD). Article 4 of the QD provides that “Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection. In cooperation with the applicant it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application”. ” 18. At p.50 the IARLJ study notes that “In Germany and Austria for example, the “benefit of the doubt” principle is a concept in criminal law only, but unfamiliar in refugee and subsidiary protection law. They follow the approach of Article 4.1 and 4.5 QD.” In order to straddle these two approaches this IARLJ study prefers use of the concept of “residual doubt”. The UK 19. The notion of TBOD has featured very little in UK case law dealing with international protection issues. The 1979 UNHCR Handbook articulation of it was approved in Jatikay (12658) 15 November 1995 (IAT) but there have been no AIT or UTIAC cases that have engaged with it in any significant way. There have been a number of Court of Appeal cases referring to the notion of a liberal application of TBOD, but these essentially cite the UNHCR formulation of this notion, e.g. as found in the Guidelines on International Protection , 22 December 2009 without specific comment: see below para 26. The only Court of Appeal case which touches squarely on it is MD (Guinea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 733 ; we shall return to what it has to say below at paragraph 61. 20. Despite figuring little in UK case law, TBOD notion is given great prominence in the aforementioned APIs, which also see it as an integral part of paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules. Paragraph 339L specifies that: “It is the duty of the person to substantiate the asylum claim or establish that he is a person eligible for humanitarian protection or substantiate his human rights claim. Where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects will not need confirmation when all of the following conditions are met: (i) the person has made a genuine effort to substantiate his asylum claim…; (ii) all material factors at the person’s disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of material has been given; (iii) the person's statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the person's case; (iv) the person has made an asylum claim… at the earliest possible time, unless the person can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and (v) the general credibility of the person has been established .” 21. By way of an attempted gloss on paragraph 339L, paragraph 4.3.4. of the APIs states: “4.3.4 Benefit of the doubt and general credibility Facts which are internally credible but lack any external evidence to confirm them are deemed to be “unsubstantiated ‟ or “uncertain ‟ or “doubtful ‟ . However, a decision must be made whether to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt on each uncertain or unsubstantiated fact – this means that the decision maker must come to a clear finding as to whether the fact can be accepted or rejected. It is not acceptable to come to a final conclusion that a claimed fact (about which you are uncertain), “may have happened ‟ . The benefit of the doubt needs to be considered and applied appropriately to these uncertain facts when considering all the evidence in the round at the end of the credibility assessment. This means that the benefit of the doubt can only be considered after a finding on the material facts that are to be accepted or rejected has been made. … However, it is important to understand paragraph 339L and its limitations. What it is saying is that if an applicant meets all 5 criteria, a decision maker should give the benefit of the doubt – there would, after all be no reason not to do so. However, the reverse is not automatically true. Because an applicant fails to meet one or more of the criteria, this in itself does not permit a decision maker to disregard all unsubstantiated areas of an applicant’s claim because an unsubstantiated statement can be credible if it is generally internally consistent, compatible with known facts and plausible. It is, once again, a matter of determining the weight to be given to these issues in the light of the material facts of the case. … Decision makers must ensure that wherever possible, the applicant is given the opportunity to provide a reasonable explanation where and when required under the provisions of 339L. If the applicant has met all 5 of the criteria set out in Paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules, the benefit of the doubt should be given to any unsubstantiated facts. If the applicant has not met all the criteria, decision makers nevertheless must consider whether giving the benefit of the doubt to any uncertain facts is justified. … Any decision not to apply the benefit of the doubt to a material claimed fact that is otherwise internally credible must be based on reasonably drawn, objectively justifiable, inferences. “ 22. The APIs also consider that in relation to children there should be a liberal application of the notion. The respondent’s associated Asylum Policy Guidance (APG) contains the following principles to be applied in the determination of a claim to asylum by a child: “(1) more weight must be given to objective indications of risk than to the child’s state of mind; (2) other factors to consider might include: documentary evidence, objective country evidence; (3) a case owner must not draw an adverse credibility interference from omissions in the child’s knowledge if it is likely that their age or maturity is a factor or if there are logical or other reasons for those omissions; (4) the benefit of the doubt will need to be applied more generously when dealing with a child particularly where a child is unable to provide detail on a particular element of their claim.” 23. It has been confirmed to us by the respondent that the terms of the Secretary of State’s asylum policy guidance as expressed in [40] of AA (unattached children ) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 16 (IAC) are still current. 24. It is to be borne in mind that in relation to minors, there is also a specific immigration Rule that appears to reflect some aspects of BODT notion. Paragraph 351 of the Immigration Rules provides that: “A person of any age may qualify for refugee status under the Convention and the criteria in paragraph 334 [dealing with Grant of Asylum] applied to all cases. However, account should be taken of the applicant’s maturity and in assessing the claim of a child more weight should be given to objective indications of risk than to the child’s state of mind and understanding of his situation. An asylum application made on behalf of the child should not be refused only because the child is too young to understand the situation or have formed a well-founded fear of persecution. Close attention should be given to the welfare of the child at all times.” 25. It is only right to observe that despite TBOD notion as such featuring very little in UK case law, the notion of a liberal application of TBOD was endorsed by the (former) Asylum and Immigration Tribunal in the Guidance Note No 8 for adjudicators and immigration judges as to how they should deal with appeals by unaccompanied children under the age of 18 seeking asylum. Paragraph 5 gave the following advice in relation to the assessment of evidence: "5.1 In assessing the evidence of a child, it should not be assumed that the child does not have a well-founded fear of persecution, merely because they do not have sufficient maturity to have formed a well-founded fear. (UNHCR Handbook on Procedures for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva, 1992, paragraphs 213-219). 5.2 It should be borne in mind that the younger a child is, the less likely they are to have full information about the reasons for leaving their country of origin, or the arrangements made for their travel. 5.3 Depending on the maturity of a child and the appropriate weight which can be attached to their evidence, the emphasis might be upon documentary and expert evidence, rather than the oral evidence or statement of the child. 5.4 The assessment of the well-roundedness of the child's fear 'may call for a liberal application of the benefit of the doubt' (UNHCR Handbook, paragraph 219, Jatikay (12658) 15 November 1995 (IAT)).” 26. This was cited without comment by Dyson LJ in ZJ (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 799 at [16]; see also HK (Afghanistan ) [2012] EWCA Civ 315 , at [34] and DS (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 305 at [14]. The Appeal 27. The appellant is a national of Afghanistan. He arrived in the UK, hidden in a lorry, on 18 June 2008 and had claimed asylum on 19 June 2008 at which time he claimed to be aged 14. By a determination sent on 8 January 2013 First-tier Tribunal (FtT) Judge Knowles dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent on 6 May 2011 to remove him from the United Kingdom after refusing him international protection or other relief under the Immigration Rules or the ECHR. 28. The basis of the appellant’s claim was that he would face risk on return to Afghanistan both from the authorities (who would view him adversely because his father was a Hezb-i-Islami commander and his elder brother was also active in that organisation) and from the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami also (who would seek to forcibly recruit him). He said that the incident that made him leave his home area in the District of Khogani in the Province of Nangarhar was a bomb explosion in 2008 which targeted the Americans and also injured the district governor. His family home having been searched on at least two occasions in 2007, the appellant feared that following this explosion his family would be considered suspects. The appellant said that before he left his home area, the Taliban had approached him in what he believed was a prelude to them forcing him to join them. 29. The appellant’s screening interview took place on 19 June 2008; his asylum interview took place on 10 February 2011. In support of his asylum claim, the appellant did not provide his own national identity card but he produced what he claimed was his father’s identity card and also a photograph said to show his father with Gulbuddin Hakmatyr, the leader of Hezbi-i-Islami. He also said that since his arrival in the UK he had been in contact by phone with his mother twice. 30. In her refusal letter the respondent stated that the appellant had failed to give a credible account either of his age or events in Afghanistan. The respondent considered the identity card and photographs unreliable. 31. The FtT judge who dealt with the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision, heard evidence from GS and submissions from the representatives (Mr Bazini was also the appellant’s representative then). As well as a witness statement from a GS there was also one from a RS. The judge also had an expert report from Dr Giustozzi; a Croydon Council assessment report of 3 July 2008 stating that two workers from the Unaccompanied Minors’ Service has found that the appellant was “very obviously” over 18; and a report from Dr Michie drawn up following an examination of the appellant on 10 November 2008, who considered him then to be 16 years old. 32. The judge decided in relation to the appellant’s age to prefer the assessment of Dr Michie. The judge went on, however, to find that the appellant had not given a credible account of his experiences in Afghanistan or of his fears about return to that country. Prior to setting out his main reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account, the judge addressed the question of whether he should apply and follow the guidance contained in paragraphs 214-215 of the 1979 UNHCR Handbook which enjoin (as we have seen) that, in the case of a minor, there should be a liberal application of the TBOD. The judge stated at [ 82]-[83]: “82. Given this finding, I have had regard to the guidance contained in the UNHCR Handbook, Paragraph 214 of which states that the question whether an unaccompanied minor may qualify for refugee status must be determined, in the first instance, according to the degree of his mental development and maturity. Paragraph 215 advises that, where the minor is an adolescent, it will be easier to determine refugee status, as in the case of an adult, although this will depend upon the actual degree of the adolescent’s maturity. In the absence of indications to the contrary, a person of 16 or over may be regarded as sufficiently mature to have a well-founded fear of persecution. 83. I have approached the record of the appellant’s screening interview with particular caution because there he is recorded as having asked ‘who is Gulbuddin?’ and as having stated that he did not know why he would be arrested if returned to Afghanistan. Those responses are, in my view, so far out of kilter with the rest of the claim as to give rise to a possibility that, as an adolescent newly arrived in the UK and having to deal with officials in a strange country unassisted, the appellant might have been tired and confused and not done himself justice. Beyond that, however, I can find nothing in the evidence before me to suggest that the appellant’s mental maturity was such that he did not understand the questions he was being asked during his interviews. Indeed, any misunderstandings are put down to errors of interpretation. The appellant appears to have been sufficiently independent and mature to have undertaken successfully what must have been an arduous 5 month journey to the UK. There is nothing in Dr Michie’s report to suggest that the appellant was immature for his assessed age. He was certainly mature enough to give his solicitor a very comprehensive account of what he claims took place in Afghanistan and the circumstances in which he fled that country. In the light of all the evidence, it is my view that the appellant was sufficiently mature to comprehend the nature and severity of any risks in Afghanistan and to have a well-founded fear of persecution. In those circumstances, I do not believe that, where issues of credibility arise, the appellant need necessarily be given the benefit of the doubt on account of his age and maturity. I have, nevertheless, approached the evidence with caution insofar as I believe that the appellant’s relative youth may have affected its credibility.” 33. It is these paragraphs that are the principal target of the appellant’s grounds of appeal which are essentially twofold. First it is submitted that in reaching the conclusion that the benefit of the doubt should not necessarily be given to someone who was accepted as being 15 years old when he underwent his asylum interview the FtT judge misdirected himself in law. Second, it is argued that further and in any event the reasons given by the FtT judge for considering that he could depart from the normal approach that should be applied to minor asylum-seekers were “impermissibly circular/illegal and unreasonable”. In the latter respect it is argued that since it was the appellant’s evidence that he had been brought to the UK by agents, it was perverse to see his journey as evidence of independence and maturity. It was also argued that the judge had misconstrued Dr Michie’s opinion that the appellant was mature for his age; that simply meant he was relatively mature, not mature in absolute terms. Finally, it was contended that for the judge to treat the comprehensiveness of the appellant’s account as evidence of his maturity was circular and also inconsistent because elsewhere the judge counted against the appellant that his account was not comprehensive. 34. The grounds raise several other points. These, along with those outlined above, are helpfully encapsulated in [29] of the written skeleton, where it is said that the First-tier Tribunal judge erred in law in: (1) failing to give the appellant TBOD notwithstanding acceptance that he was a minor when he had his asylum interview (this describes the essence of what is set out above); (2) failing to make any credibility findings in respect of the witnesses called by the appellant; (3) failing to have regard to the expert evidence which suggested in fact that the evidence on various points was plausible within the context of Afghanistan; (4) finding that the appellant had suffered no disadvantage as a result of the SSHD’s failure to trace; and (5) erred in failing to apply the dicta in Singh v Belgium (33210/11), 2 October 2012 correctly. 35. These points were amplified by Mr Bazini at the two hearings before us. At the hearing on 2 December 2013 Mr Bazini reiterated points made in the written grounds and also answered several questions posed by the Tribunal. He said he accepted it was relevant for the judge to have considered maturity, but wrong of him to treat that as a basis for disapplying TBOD, as that notion (which he termed a “principle”) applied to minors as a class. In the alternative, he submitted, even if it could be said that when Dr Mitchie and the FtT judge considered his age, he was mature in absolute (as opposed to relative) terms, it remained that the events which he recounted took place when he was 13 or 14 and the judge had simply failed to address that problem. 36. In relation to the evidence of Dr Giustozzi, Mr Bazini highlighted the failure of the judge to engage with this expert’s assessment of the photograph said to be of the appellant’s father together with Hekmatyr or the plausibility of the appellant’s claim to have met with approaches from the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami forewarning of their intention to forcibly recruit him. 37. As regards TBOD notion, he asked us to consider it as having application throughout all stages of consideration of an applicant’s evidence, as seemingly in the approach of the Strasbourg Court. 38. Mr Bazini said that in relation to assessing the evidence of a minor, if the decision-maker only applied TBOD “principle” at the end of the assessment, that would be too late, because by then (as in this case, when it was not applied at all) the decision-maker may have spent many paragraphs scrutinising the evidence with a rigour only appropriate when dealing with the evidence of an adult. 39. At another point in his submissions Mr Bazini sought to qualify the above argumentation. Stating that he did not wish to assert that there was only one definitive way of applying the rule: it could be throughout (the approach of the Strasbourg Court) or only at the end-point (the approach set out in the UNHCR Handbook). Both were valid applications. 40. Asked if to apply TBOD both holistically throughout the assessment and at the end would involve impermissibly giving TBOD twice over, Mr Bazini said that the holistic approach of being cautious to disbelieve was not strictly an application of TBOD “principle”. 41. As regards the issue of whether TBOD notion (which she also called a “principle”) could have two applications, Ms Everett for the respondent said that in principle there could only be one application of it. It was not clear to her how the holistic version of it was any different from the lower standard of proof; or at least she had difficulty in understanding how one could apply a lower standard and TBOD “principle” separately. 42. Ms Everett submitted that the judge clearly applied the lower standard of proof so already employed a liberal approach to the appellant’s evidence in that sense. It was clear that the appellant’s age was uppermost in the judge’s mind and he had made a proper fact-sensitive examination of its implications for how his evidence should be assessed. Indeed in paragraph 83 the judge applied the principle in the appellant’s favour in relation to his apparent ignorance in his screening interview of the identity of Hekmatyr; the judge had used that to discount one of the respondent’s reasons for finding the appellant not credible. She accepted that the appellant’s interview contained barely any discrepancies. She accepted that in depicting the fact of undertaking the journey to the UK as probative of the appellant’s maturity, the judge had not given “the best reason” and had been “rather speculative”, but submitted that viewed overall the judge’s assessment that the appellant had a mature understanding comported with the interview record. 43. She accepted that the judge did not adequately address some aspects of Dr Giustozzi’s evidence that went to the plausibility of the appellant’s account. In relation to the judge’s alleged failure to engage with the evidence of the witnesses, she said she was equally in difficulties. She said there was nothing perverse, however, about the judge’s findings in the documentary evidence. 44. We adjourned the hearing with directions which were confirmed in writing as being:- A. The relevance of the application of TBOD to the assessment of facts and circumtances required under Article 4 [QD] and paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules; B. Whether the terms of the Secretary of State’s Asylum Policy Guidance (APG), as expressed in AA (unattended children ) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 16 (IAC) at [40] are still current and, if so, how the terms of such guidance are to be applied to the assessment of facts and circumstances required under Article 4 [QD] and paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules; C. The relevance of the fact that, when assessing the credibility of an asylum seeker’s claim, the European Court of Human Rights have frequently concluded that it is necessary to give an asylum seeker the TBOD (e.g. [71] SHH v UK {2012} 57 EHRR.18); D. The relevance of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010, and whether such Guidelines are consistent with the application of the TBOD in the assessment of the facts and circumstances of an asylum seeker’s claim.” 45. In summary the appellants’ response to these questions was (in reply to A) to say that logically Article 4(5) and the corresponding Immigration Rule, paragraph 339L, must be approached applying TBOD to the claim; (in reply to B) the APG was to be read as lending support to the appellant’s submission that TBOD should be given to each and every aspect of a particular claim, and even more generously in respect of a claim by a child; (in reply to C) the approach of the Strasbourg Court was that if after applying TBOD there are “strong reasons” to question the veracity of a claim, then (but only then) the asylum seeker will need to provide a satisfactory explanation for the discrepancies. In relation to assessment of the credibility of a child (and in order to give effect to the principle of the liberal application of TBOD) it would require something very strong to overcome the presumption that child asylum seekers have TBOD; and (in reply to D) the Joint Presidential Guidance Note does not directly deal with TBOD issue. The respondent’s response was to say that (in reply to A) applying the TBOD to the assessment of facts and circumstances in Article 4 of the QD and paragraph 339L of the Rules is relevant when deciding what weight to attach to the evidence provided by an applicant. The guidance given in the UNHCR Handbook together with Article 4 together forms the basis of the respondent’s policy guidance to decision makers entitled “Considering asylum claims and assessing credibility”. This guidance does not affect the burden of proof, which remains on the applicant, nor does it alter the standard of proof. In the respondent’s guidance it is stated that a decision must be made whether to give an applicant the TBOD on each uncertain or unsubstantiated fact. TBOD needs to be considered and applied appropriately to these uncertain facts when considering all the evidence in the round at the end of the credibility assessment; in reply to B) the terms of the respondent’s APG as expressed in [40] of AA (unattended children ) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 16 (IAC) are still current. The concept of a more liberal application of TBOD does not change how it is to be applied to an applicant. Rather it is recognition that it may be more difficult for a child to prove their claim. TBOD is not a separate legal test (see MD (Guinea ) at [12]); (in reply to C) the “principle” of TBOD is well-established in Strasbourg jurisprudence, but by reference to paragraph 204 of the UNHCR Handbook it was something that will “only be given when all available evidence had been obtained and checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility…”; and (in reply to D) the Joint Presidential Guidance is largely concerned with procedural matters although at 10.3 Assessing Evidence, judges are reminded of certain factors that may affect a child/vulnerable person’s ability to give coherent evidence. The guidance contained does not equate to the application of TBOD but there is no inherent inconsistency between the two. 46. On 18 March 2014, prompted by the parties’ responses to the above questions, we issued further directions requesting submissions on the following further questions: (a) Whether or not acceptance of TBOD affects the standard of proof (the respondent submits that it does not); (b) Is the (appellant’s) contention that it is only after applying the TBOD that one turns to consider whether there are “strong reasons” to question the veracity of an applicant’s claim (and only if there are such reasons should an applicant be required to provide a satisfactory explanation for discrepancies) consistent with paragraph 204 of the UNHCR Guidelines? (c) In light of developments in the law in Europe, are the UNHCR Guidelines on TBOD still valid? 47. At the hearing on 15 May 2014 Mr Bazini rehearsed UK case law on the standard of proof applicable in asylum cases, in particular its restatement by the Court of Appeal in Karanakaran [2000] 3 All ER 449 , especially Brooke LJ’s statement at p.459 e that he interpreted the House of Lords’ judgment in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Sivakumaran [1988] 1 All ER 193 , [1988] AC 958 as “creat[ing] a more positive role for uncertainty” and his endorsement of the approach in leading Australian cases which at p.469h he characterised as follows: “This approach does not entail the decision-maker (whether the Secretary of State or an adjudicator or the Immigration Appeal Tribunal itself) purporting to find “proved” facts, whether past or present, about which it is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities. What it does mean, on the other hand, is that it must not exclude any matters from its consideration when it is assessing the future unless it feels that it can safely discard them because it has no real doubt that they did not in fact occur (or, indeed, that they are not occurring at present). Similarly, if an applicant contends that relevant matters did not happen, the decision-maker should not exclude the possibility that they did not happen (although believing that they probably did) unless it has no real doubt that they did in fact happen.” 48. Mr Bazini said that Karanakaran left unclear how TBOD notion is to work. The approach in Karanakaran is not easily reconcilable with the UNHCR’s two-stage approach or the two-stage approach of the Strasbourg Court or the approach set out in Article 4 of the QD: in all three it is only applies after the decision-maker has first satisfied himself about certain aspects of the applicant’s account. But in any event he agreed with the respondent that the principle could not affect the standard of proof. 49. As regards (c), Mr Bazini submitted that Article 4 specifies how the evidence of an appellant should be treated if certain conditions are met; it does not say what should happen if they are not met. The UNHCR position as set out in the 1979 Handbook seemed narrower. Its start-point was the concluding part of assessment when certain evidence had been presented. The law had moved on since the 1979 UNHCR Handbook so as to be more favourable to applicants. That was evident from the modified UNHCR position taken in its CREDO study. 50. So far as concerns (b), Mr Bazini said that this contention was based on the approach of the Strasbourg Court, which was more favourable still to applicants. Whatever approach was adopted, it was essential that it was a holistic one that looked at all the evidence in the round. 51. Ms Everett reiterated the respondent’s view that TBOD did not affect the standard of proof. In relation to (b), she did not consider that the Strasbourg and the UNHCR approaches were irreconcilable. Both attached particular significance to the fact that asylum-seekers had special difficulties in obtaining evidence from their countries of origin to support their claim. In relation to (c), she had nothing to add to what was said in the APIs. On any reading the “principle” was not one of universal application: if a decision-maker accepted an applicant’s story as credible, there was no need to have recourse to TBOD “principle”. The different approaches were best looked at as different ways of getting to the same place. 52. Both representatives also addressed us on the specific issue of the notion of a liberal application of TBOD notion in relation to children. It will be convenient to deal with their main points when considering that issue below. 53. Asked how they considered the Upper Tribunal should dispose of the case if we decided to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, Ms Everett said she was content to leave the matter to the Tribunal, Mr Bazini said we should remit it, so as to ensure the applicant was not prejudiced by being denied a full set of appeal rights if the outcome was negative. He asked that whichever course the Upper Tribunal took it bear in mind that there was no challenge to the witness evidence.