KMR v AER

1. I have had sight of a Core Bundle of 941 pages (CB), a Documents Bundle of 1690 pages (DB), a Bundle provided by Phillips Valuers (PVB), a Bank Statements bundle (BSB), and a Bundle of Production Orders (POB). References to the bundles are rendered as [CB page] or [POB paragraph/page]. I have also had sight of the position statement on behalf of the applicant, the written closing statement of the respondent running to 23 pages of typed A4, which was partially read out by the respondent. This document is marked ‘Without Prejudice’. I have not considered it to be as such, particularly as it is the closing submission of the respondent, and does not attract the without prejudice protection accorded to settlement proposals. I have also had sight of a tabulated list of the art, including low, median, and high estimates in US dollars and pounds sterling. This judgment has been prepared without representations being made on costs to ensure the matter can be handed down as swifty as possible. I shall hear any costs or consequential applications at the conclusion of the handing down.

2. I offer my apologies to the parties for the delay in rendering this judgment, caused by a conflation of deadlines, illness, and scheduling issues, including finding a time for the court to list this matter for handing down, after the initial hand-down date was vacated due to my own illness. It was not my intention to prolong the difficulties that are obvious for both parties.

3. Given the assets, jurisdictional questions, issues surrounding the validity of a nuptial agreement, and the general conduct of these proceedings; it is my intention to send this judgment for release to the National Archives, therefore, the parties are not referred to by name. I have prepared it anonymously and the parties are denominated by random three-letter markers, or their respective roles in the proceedings, in line with the guidance for publishing judgments to increase the transparency of the family courts.

4. I have used headings and titles for ease of reference in this judgment, they are not substantive parts of the judgment and are not to be used to impart any special status to a particular paragraph. Definitions and Chronology

5. In this matter, there are a number of entities of which the respondent is a director, partner, member, shareholder, or principal, yet none have been formally valued. In some he holds more than one role, for example, shareholder and director. As some of these entities have similar names, for ease of reference, I have noted them as follows; i. ‘ BBA AG ’; a public company or Aktiengesellschaft registered in Switzerland, wholly owned by BBH SA, ii. ‘ BBH SA ’; a public company or Société Anonyme registered in Luxembourg, wholly owned by the respondent, iii. ‘ DC LLP ’; a limited liability partnership, registered in England, in which the respondent holds 18% of the equity, at the time of rendering this judgment, has a proposal to strike off against it, iv. ‘ DC SA ’; a public company or Société Anonyme registered in Switzerland, in which the respondent holds 34.4% equity and 39.4% of the voting rights through his holding company BBH SA , v. ‘ SCI W ’; an undefined private investment vehicle of the respondent, vi. ‘ VE’ ; a company or Société a Responsibilité Limitée registered in France, in which BBH SA owns a 26.87% shareholding,

6. There are likewise various other companies and entities involved in this matter, with somewhat overlapping parts within the case, Some have provided evidence to the court, some have simply provided services to the parties, and others have provided services and advanced loans, both secured and unsecured, which are the subject of dispute between the parties; i. ‘ Bonhams ’; a multinational auction house, who have provided finance secured against, or storage of, the art, furniture, antiquities and collectables owned by the parties. Where the name appears with a city or country name, that indicates a facility in that locale, ii. ‘ Cadogan ’; a multinational provider of bonded and unbonded storage and logistics, and have provided inventories and valuations of the art, furniture, antiquities and collectables owned by the parties. Where the name appears with a city or country name, that indicates a Cadogan Tate facility in that locale, iii. ‘ Christies ’; a multinational auction house, who have provided finance secured against, or storage of, the art, furniture, antiquities and collectables owned by the parties. Where the name appears with a city or country name, that indicates a facility in that locale, iv. ‘ Constantine ’; a multinational provider of bonded and unbonded storage and logistics, and have provided inventories and/or valuations of the art, furniture, antiquities and collectables owned by the parties. Where the name appears with a city or country name, that indicates a Constantine facility in that locale, v. ‘ Gallerie Dazy ’; the gallery operated under the name Gallerie Christian Dazy, by M. Christian Dazy of 8 Rue Ambroise Martin, 74120 Megeve, France, vi. ‘ Magin ’ a London-based provider of bonded and unbonded storage who have provided storage of the art, furniture, antiquities and collectables owned by the parties, vii. ‘ Phillip’s ’; a multinational auction house, who have provided assessments and valuations of the art, furniture, antiquities and collectables owned by the parties. Where the name appears with a city or country name, that indicates a facility in that locale, viii. ‘ Sotheby’s ’; a multinational auction house, who have provided finance secured against, and storage of, the art, furniture, antiquities and collectables owned by the parties. Where the name appears with a city or country name, that indicates a facility in that locale, ix. ‘ the Swiss notaire ’; M. Besso, the notaire in Lausanne, who, it is alleged by the respondent, drafted and witnessed the execution of the nuptial agreement between the parties.

7. There are two children of the family, A and B, and are 16 and 13 years old, respectively. They both reside with the applicant.

8. The applicant was, at the time of the hearing, residing in a rented property in W8, London, and was not in employment, having last previously worked before the birth of the parties’ children. It was stated that she worked in investments for a now-defunct investment bank in the United States of America, her oral evidence was that she had been earning an annual salary of approximately US$1 million in 2011. She is a US national. She was born on 25 May 1971 and is 55 years of age.

9. The respondent was, at the time of the hearing in a rented property in SW13, London, but formerly resided with the applicant at the former matrimonial home of in N17, London (‘FMH’). He is a French national, and was born on 27 February 1973, and was 53 years of age. He is employed by, or holds office in, several entities, detailed in paragraph 5 of this judgment. He is by profession a commodities trader, his annual income is difficult to ascertain and is explored in this judgment.

10. This matter is a final hearing for financial remedies arising from the dissolution of a legal marriage contracted between the parties on 20 February 2009, there is a detailed chronology compiled by those that instruct Mr Thorpe, a redacted copy of which I shall annex to this judgment, I do not reproduce the same at length as it runs to some fourteen sides of typed A4. This is indicative of the difficulties of this case, and the many interactions that the parties have had with the court, as all but nine lines of this chronology deal with many failures of the respondent to comply with court orders. Items in Issue

11. I am asked to adjudicate upon the following issues in this matter; i. The true extent of the assets disclosed by the parties, ii. The validity of the nuptial agreement between the parties, primarily considering which should be the applicable law, that of England and Wales, Switzerland, or France, and secondarily, any effect upon the distribution of assets, iii. The effect of the Family Trusts involving the applicant, governed by the laws of New York State, upon the assets of the parties, iv. The fair apportionment of assets as between the parties with reference to the s.25 Checklist, v. Any consequential applications upon handing this judgment down. Preliminary Points

12. On the first day of the substantive hearing, the respondent indicated that he was no longer legally represented and sought an adjournment to allow him to prepare his case. He accepted that he had been legally represented, indeed he had counsel booked for the hearing, and he was being assisted until 11 September 2025. He had not completed his s.25 statement and accepted that he was late in doing so. When asked by me how far he was in preparing this he indicated that he was around ‘half ready’, and he had completed three to four pages. I asked him to access his draft statement on his mobile phone after he confirmed it was being prepared using Microsoft Word. He confirmed that he did not have access to his emails or his Microsoft 365 account on his telephone, and did not have a laptop or tablet computer on his person.

13. Despite there being no formal application before the court, I treated the respondent’s request as a formal application to adjourn, and separately a formal application for relief from sanctions, pursuant to Lieven J’s ruling in TRC v NS [2024] EWHC 80 (Fam) .

14. I considered the three-fold test expounded in Denton v TH White Ltd. [2014] EWCA Civ 906 , and the invocation of Sumption LJ in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12 at paragraph 18 regarding the applicability of the Rules and Orders to all litigants, represented or not, and determined the following; a. In respect of the respondent’s application to adjourn due to the inadequacy of his own preparation; i. This was obviously a serious and significant breach as we were on the first day of a five-day final hearing, and risked imperilling the trial date, ii. There was no good reason before the court for the failures that led to this situation; there had been clear directions and deadlines, including simplified directions and multiple unless orders given previously by the court, which the respondent had failed to comply with, iii. In all the circumstances and considering the overriding objective to do justice between the parties as proportionate cost, when considering the financial assets of the parties, the prior conduct of the parties, and compliance with orders, I determined that there was no good reason for the court to exercise discretion in favour of the respondent. b. In respect of the application for relief for the late filing of the s.25 statement; i. This was again obviously a serious and significant breach as we were on the first day of a five-day final hearing commencing, and there was no complete evidence before the court on behalf of the respondent, ii. There was no good reason before the court for the failures that led to this situation; there had been clear directions and deadlines, including simplified directions and multiple unless orders given previously by the court, which the respondent had failed to comply with, iii. In addition to this, there was the difficulty that the respondent had now had the benefit of reviewing the applicant’s evidence in compiling his own. In all the circumstances and considering the overriding objective to do justice between the parties as proportionate cost, when considering the financial assets of the parties, the prior conduct of the parties, and compliance with orders, I determined that there was no good reason for the court to exercise discretion in favour of the respondent.

15. Consequent upon the finding above, I dismissed both applications and elected to continue with the hearing, notwithstanding the detriment to the respondent.

16. On the first day during the respondent’s cross-examination of the applicant, at approximately 3.15pm, I offered him the chance for a short adjournment to marshal his thoughts and prepare a cogent cross-examination, having had to redirect him on more than one occasion. He declined this offer.

17. On the second day of cross-examination of the applicant, I was invited to find that the applicant had used confidential documents, being the document referred to in the judgment as ‘the respondent’s list’ to build her case. It was, on the respondent’s assertion, a confidential document belonging to him, within the meaning of Tchenguiz and Ors. v Imerman [2010] EWCA Civ 908 . I found that the wife was able to rely upon her recollections of this document in her evidence, even if she did not adduce the list itself as an Imerman document. This is based upon the judgment of Mostyn J in UL v BK [2013] EWHC 1735 (Fam) at paragraphs 56 (v) and (vi).

18. At the hearing on 19 September 2025, the end of the first block of days, I gave an extension and variation to the Freezing Injunction initially given by District Judge Mulkis on 8 February 2024. I extended it to cover all aspects of the artworks held by the respondent, or through any of his interests in the entities listed in paragraph 5 of this judgment. I also extended the scope of the injunction to prevent any dissipation of assets held in the property owned by the respondent in the 1 er Arrondisement, Paris 75001, France (hereafter ‘ the Paris apartment ’). These items are photographed and inventoried by the applicant at [CB301-CB394] but some do not appear on the Cadogan inventory at [CB851].

19. This injunction is in force until 31 December 2026 or further order of this court and is binding upon any person notified of the same, per paragraph 19 of that order, and I have not discharged this injunction as yet. Evidence

20. I have heard extensive oral evidence from both parties over many days, and do not seek to reproduce the entirety of this here; should either party require a verbatim note then they are able to seek a transcript in the usual manner. For clarity, I have considered all of the evidence I have heard, if I do not explicitly mention a piece of evidence it is not the case that I have not considered it; I simply do not find that it warrants specific mention within my judgment.

21. The applicant was invited, under supplemental examination in chief, to elaborate upon a number of issues with the disclosed inventories. She confirmed that she had carried out an inventory of the artworks held at the FMH before she moved out. Details of these pieces included those that she had removed including a gilded marble table [CB859], three items gifted to her by her father [CB862], a replica of a Henry Moore sculpture of rings, also gifted to her by her father [CB870], and a sketch gifted by her father [CB871].

22. There were also references to items not present upon the respondent’s Form E which had appeared upon ‘the respondent’s list’; these included items catalogued by Constantine at [CB838], and are highlighted to question the accuracy of the respondent’s disclosure. The respondent appears to have carried out his own valuations and either informed the applicant of these during the currency of the marriage, or upon the purchase of specific items. He seeks to resile from these valuations within these proceedings, invariably preferring the lower valuations given by the various valuers. One example was when he asked about a piece by Lufkin, where the value included in ‘the respondent’s list’ was £70,000, and yet Philips had valued this at only £7,000; this was not a typographical error. I had to remind the respondent that he was not a FPR25 expert in art for these proceedings, notwithstanding his own or others' perceptions of his expertise.

23. In his cross-examination of the applicant, the respondent often confused assertion or argument for cross-examination, he had to be asked to rephrase questions regularly. He also asked questions that the applicant could have had no realistic prospect of knowing the answer to; not least his line of questioning around which items of art had been sold after his initial Form E was filed. This included reference to a painting by, or in the style of, El Greco and a piece named ‘ Christ as a Man of Sorrows ’, both of which he stated had been sold, yet it had still appeared on the respondent’s Form E and his Replies to Questionnaire some months after the alleged sale.

24. The applicant was cross-examined at length upon her potential interest in the trusts set up in New York by her parents. The respondent raised issue that the applicant’s apartment in New York was transferred into the trust in 2019. Her evidence was that these trusts were created for tax efficient holdings and are mirrored in terms in that they place all assets of the applicant’s parents, including the apartment that she jointly owned with them, into a joint trust for their benefit, and in the event of the deaths an interest in the whole arose for both the applicant and her siblings; these are effectively living wills which do not bind the survivor in terms of distribution. In any event, the applicant’s contingent interest would not become a vested interest until the death of the survivor. This is supported by the opinion of the New York attorney responsible for drafting the Trust documents. His evidence is found at DB325. There is no s.37 application from the respondent in this particular matter, nor is there seemingly an indication from the respondent that this should be considered as matrimonial property. It was confirmed upon re-examination that the applicant’s parents had offered to assist the parties with purchasing a house rather than waste money on renting, however this offer was rebuffed by the respondent.

25. The respondent requested confirmation of the applicant’s understanding of his business affairs; she confirmed that her understanding was, per paragraph 75 of her s.25 statement, that the respondent owned 34% of DC SA, and that this company had been successful in a long-running litigation against a French bank in 2019 and secured a judgment in the sum of US$ 52 million. The respondent indicated that this matter was being appealed and the sum may be as low as US$ 12 million, later he said this may be as low as US$ 6 million.

26. The respondent’s evidence was haphazard, woolly, and lacked definition. He was asked pointed and direct questions regarding his compliance with orders, the timing, dates and locations of events. He could not answer them candidly and had to be instructed by both Mr Thorpe and myself on more than one occasion to answer the question put to him, not the question he wished to answer. In addition he had to be reminded not to swear during his evidence.

27. The evidence of the respondent regarding the valuation of his business interests and art collection was at times farcical; he blamed the applicant for not pushing the single joint expert instructions when it was his conduct and failure to engage with the Letter of Instruction at [DB81] to Christies, and failed to agree to the instruction of Mr Dodge to value the businesses. At the same time the respondent complained that the judgment obtained by DC SA for US$ 52 million should be considered in the valuation of the businesses in the absence of a formal valuation.

28. The respondent would not confirm if a shareholders agreement existed in respect of any of his businesses, despite the nature of the DC SA waiver signed by the spouses would necessitate such an agreement to stipulate such a waiver was necessary, when pushed he stated that an agreement existed but that it was not a shareholders agreement.

29. It was accepted under cross-examination that the respondent had no corroborative evidence of the sale of many of the pictures he stated had been sold and the funds credited to his accounts with Sotheby’s and Christies. Likewise he could not definitively say how much he had asked for when approached by Galerie Dazy to sell Torrero 1966 by Buffet. The gallery documents gave no indication of a proposed or achievable price.

30. It was put to the respondent that he effectively exercised financial control over the applicant by drip feeding money, placing small amounts into her accounts tocover only the immediate necessities, as shown in [BS3], the respondent stated that this was incorrect and the applicant always had access to his credit cards. He accepted that he did cancel these cards at some point after 2022.

31. When asked about his approach to collecting and maintaining his collection the respondent admitted that he would sometimes overprice pieces sent to auction to avoid having to sell. He also admitting placing items into storage and failing to pay the bills and the items being sold to recoup the storage company's losses. It is possible that some of the items sold in this manner are those items stated by the applicant to be missing.

32. The respondent argued that he was entitled to disregard orders for items to be sold by the applicant at auction to discharge his debts, and instead unilaterally listed them for sale by private treaty, despite knowing this would delay the sale, and knowingly inflated the prices as described previously, to discourage sale. In addition he accepted that when the applicant attempted to sell L’Ecorche pursuant to a court order, he contacted the auction house, on behalf of BBA AG, to say that she did not have good title and that the painting belonged to BBA AG. He accepted that he understood this would be a red flag to the auction house and result in the lot being removed from sale.

33. Documents at [DB1318] and [POB49-53] were put to the respondent showing that Christies and others used the respondent and his various businesses interchangeably to refer to the ownership of the artworks, and it was suggested this was indicative that the separation of ownership was artificial. This was denied.

34. The respondent was squarely asked if he had forged the applicant’s signature on an agreement to extend a credit line with Sotheby’s [DB1349]. He was given the customary warning against self-incrimination but chose to answer;he denied that he had done so and indicated that he did not accept the applicant’s position that she had not signed this.

35. A completion statement from the sale of a Paris property was put to the respondent, an original was a [DB827], with a purported translation at [DB751]. It was stated orally by him that this document had been received by recorded mail, however the address on the letter was not an address used by either party, and the translations differ. It was put to the respondent that this was a false document created by him. He denied the same. Assets

36. The ES2 provided by the parties has undergone a number of amendments during these proceedings, based upon the piecemeal disclosure of the respondent. I am grateful to Mr Thorpe for his assistance in ensuring I was provided with the most up-to-date ES2 at each turn. The ES2 is meant to be a snapshot of the parties positions regarding all of the assets available, the applicant’s position has been consistent throughout. The respondent has failed to engage in a meaningful way, has altered parts of the wife’s case on the ES2 and has deleted items that are in issue. I am invited to find that this was merely an administrative error, rather than a calculated decision to frustrate these proceedings.

37. Some of the issues with the ES2 and the valuations were compounded when the respondent only signed a release form to allow valuations to take place by Philips on the Thursday before the hearing was due to commence on the Monday, some 72 hours before the hearing commenced, and 48 of those hours were on a weekend.

38. The respondent owns the Paris apartment in his own name. It is valued by the applicant at £667,525 net of mortgage and costs of sale. This is the valuation relied upon by the applicant. This valuation is based upon a gross price of €1.5 million, less €687,346 mortgage and 3% notional costs of sale, being €45,000, with the balance of €767,654 converted to sterling. The respondent asserts that the actual valuation is £1,217,400, less the mortgage of £597,692, less costs of sale of £36,522 and an unevidenced 17% French ‘social participation’ tax of £100,000, leaving a net value of £483,186. He states that this is a pre-marital asset, purchased in 2003, before the parties met, and should not be included.

39. The true extent of the respondent’s business holdings are more problematic as he has not fully disclosed his interests until he was cross-examined, and even then there were deviations from the established paper evidence and his own oral evidence. In comment and reply to the oral evidence of the applicant, the respondent stated that his 34% ownership of D SA, was in turn wholly owned by BBH SA. It is noted that this secondary company is wholly owned by the respondent therefore the distinction is somewhat artificial and was described by Mr Thorpe as a ‘wrapper’ for the purpose of cloaking the respondent’s assets from the applicant, the court, and the various tax authorities they interact with in the United Kingdom and Europe. The respondent was given the requisite warning by me that he did not have to give evidence or answer any questions that may implicate him in criminal investigations.

40. These businesses are valued by the applicant at £3,728,691; and are comprised of the following (using the conversion rates in the ES2); i. £83,781 representing the 34.4% equity in DC SA, ii. £5,216 representing the 18% equity in DC LLP, iii. £1,881,074 representing the 34.4% share of the litigation in paragraph 25 of this judgment, assuming the judgment stands at US$6,559,644 or £5,468,238.37, and the appeal by DC SA is unsuccessful iv. £1,646,144 representing the 34.4% share of the interest on the judgment debt above calculated at 5% per annum since February 2012, v. £112,476 representing the 26.87% share in VE.

41. These businesses are valued by the respondent at £894,207; and are comprised of the following; i. £72,853 representing the 34.4% equity in DC SA, ii. £5,216 representing the 18% equity in DC LLP, iii. £1,659,204 representing the 34.4% share of the litigation in paragraph 25 of this judgment, assuming the judgment stands at US$6,559,644 or £5,468,238.37, and the appeal by DC SA is unsuccessful iv. £1,064,655 representing the 34.4% share of the interest on the judgment debt above calculated at 5% per annum since February 2012, v. £97,085 representing the 26.87% share in VE. Various costs and deductions are then made to reflect unevidenced Swiss tax rates, withholding taxes, proposed dividends at 60%, and these total £1,846,526. It is unclear why there are discrepancies in the respondent’s valuations for DC SA and the litigation, when the value DC LLP is the same as that given by the applicant.

42. The art collection as a whole is stated in the ES2 to be worth £1,812,376 on the respondent’s case, albeit through various permutations of corporate ownership, and deducting items that are either held by BBA AG or have been sold. Upon the applicant’s case in the ES2, this is worth in the region of £3,135,827.

43. The tabulated list of art was as far as the court understood, created by Mr Thorpe and the respondent towards the end of the first tranche of days, with the low, high, and median valuations, including sources for the same where possible. In the request for clarification it is stated that this document was created by the respondent alone in 2023. It does not make a significant difference to these findings and the position adopted by the respondent does not make factual sense given the annotations reflecting the Philips valuations which post-date 2023. This has used a US$ to £ conversion rate of $1 to £0.7352. This also has fourteen explanatory notes where there is a discrepancy between the Philips valuation and that of the respondent for a particular piece. I have found this to be incredibly useful and thank the parties for taking the time to craft this document. This states that this art collection is worth between £3,655,782 and £4,919,590.80, with a median valuation across the entirety of the collection of £4,287,686.40.

44. I state at this point, and unequivocally, that based upon the evidence of the parties, and particularly upon the piecemeal and grudging disclosure of the respondent, I do not believe that I have been given full disclosure of all assets by the respondent. I am not sure that the respondent himself is actually aware of everything he has. The reason I say this is I have seen the photographs of items haphazardly stacked and squirrelled away in the wardrobes and corridors of the Paris apartment. I have been told late in the day that there were other secure storage facilities that had not been disclosed, and that various pieces of art were also stored at the shared serviced office building used by D LLP as their registered office, all with no discernible cataloguing system. I have been told that items the respondent mentioned within his own disclosure as being in his possession at the time of compiling his Form E, were in fact sold over ten years ago. He has indicated that a a particular Buffet piece hanging in his home in fact belong to his brother, and that eleven pieces belong to one or more of his many businesses, I have no confidence that if I asked the respondent to tell me where a specific piece was, that I could rely upon the accuracy of his answer.

45. The respondent is a noted collector of the post-war French artist Bernard Buffet. He has accumulated a reasonable quantity of these paintings, lithographs, and prints. He has various iterations of similar pieces, and a number of larger or statement pieces, as well as pieces that are clearly in demand, and command a good price at auction, such as . So much so that the auction houses and galleries noted previously have been willing to both exhibit these pieces and offer lending based upon their perceived worth, often running into hundreds of thousands of pounds.

46. The evidence of the respondent regarding the valuations is difficult to follow as he asserts that some pieces, hung in his home and office, belong to either companies that he has an interest in, or to his brother, despite them being pieces that he clearly has a collector’s interest in, such as the Buffet pieces depicting a bottle and carving block; the respondent was not quickly able to decide which name should be ascribed to this piece when asked, this was the 1947 piece named Nature Morte a la Bouteille . There are a total of twelve iterations of the Buffet Nature Mort paintings with various accompaniments, including multiple bottles (1947 a la bouteilles), and bread (1951 a pain). These twelve pieces jointly are valued, using the median, at £433,768. The respondent asserts that four of these are owned by BBA AG, with the remainder owned by him personally.

47. The respondent also asserts that somewhere in the region of 50% of the art collection is a pre-marital asset; on the ES2 he states that the following are either pre-marital or belong to BBA AG; i. Torero by Buffet, ii. Malcontenta by Buffet, iii. Abstraction by Herbin, iv. All works by Folmer, v. All works by Bertrand, vi. All works by Beard, vii. All works by Cocteau, viii. All works by Brayer, ix. The Arbus furniture, x. The Aboriginal artwork xi. The African artwork xii. The Uruguayan artwork.

48. There are three difficulties with the respondent’s position; primarily he does not state which pieces are pre-marital acquisitions and which are asserted as being the property of BBA AG so I cannot assess which pieces would potentially be non-matrimonial.

49. Secondly, on the list of art agreed between himself and Mr Thorpe, only the following were noted as belonging to anyone other than himself; i. Juggler/Jongleur by Buffet, ii. L’Ecorche by Buffet, iii. Autoportrait by Buffet (stated to belong to BBH SA), iv. Two Clowns by Buffet, v. Nature Morte a la tete de veau by Buffet, vi. Nature Morte au jeu de carte by Buffet , vii. Nature Morte au moulin by Buffet (noted as being in Paris despite the ES2 indicating that this had been sold for £36,760), viii. Portrait de J Negulesco by Buffet, ix. L’Oiseau by Buffet (stated as belonging to the parties’ younger son), x. Portrait of Gentlemen by Murray, xi. Horreur de la Guerre , by Buffet.

50. Clearly these lists do not accord as they place significantly more assets within the ownership of BBA AG, and not in the ownership of the respondent. This is particularly true of the bulk of the Buffet collection but does not accord at all with the value in the ES2 attributed to the BBA AG art collection, being £1,183, 672, when one considers the median valuations of the Juggler, L’Ecorche , and Two Clowns alone are £1,029,280.

51. The third issue of difficulty is there is no evidence of this alleged ownership by BBA AG before the court, and in any event, BBA AG is wholly owned by BBH SA, which in turn is wholly owned by the respondent. The pieces may not be legally owned by the respondent, but he is the sole beneficial owner of these assets, however they may be held.

52. The applicant has made a number of sensible concessions where a piece has clearly been sold or transferred. She has generally relied upon the valuations of third parties or the respondent himself. Debts

53. The applicant has disclosed total debts of £1,205,366, comprised of £1,006,591 in respect of legal costs, £30,506 hard commercial debts to various lenders and credit card companies, and what would ordinarily be deemed to be soft debts to friends and family of £168,269. In this instance the soft debts are supported by agreements and payment requests and are therefore deemed to be true debts, pursuant to P v Q (Financial Remedies) [2022] EWFC B9.

54. The respondent discloses total debts of £378,172, comprised of £220,588 as an alleged overdrawn director’s loan account with BBH SA, used to partially settle a personal debt of the respondent to Sotheby’s of $380,000, leaving a personal debt of the respondent to Sotheby’s of £57,353. There is a hard debt of £15,000 on an American Express credit card, and legal debts of £50,000. In addition, there are purported soft loans of £45,000 owed to family. The hard debts are £72,353, excluding the director’s loan account.

55. For ease, I make it clear at this point that I do not deem the familial loans of the respondent to be true debts and do not use these in my calculations in the absence of written agreements or repayment schedules.

56. There is a joint debt of £19,950 to Cadogans and Constantine for the ongoing storage costs of the art. This may have increased since the papers were submitted to me for this judgment and any calculation would need to reflect the same.

57. The respondent indicated in his cross-examination that he had negotiated the rent on a previous FMH in Lowndes Square down from £12,000 per month, to £6,000 per month, to assist with financial difficulties. This is not evidenced and indeed, the original agreements confirm that the rent was the higher amount [DB326]. The oral evidence of the applicant was that this was a unilateral decision of the respondent and caused arrears to accrue. This is not evidenced as a debt in either parties’ position but I have nothing save a bare assertion from the respondent as to the accuracy of this. Chattels and Investments

58. There are numerous chattels in this matter, which have formed the bulk of the argument; they are contained within the various inventories, and the ES2, I have dealt with the respondent’s art collection elsewhere in this judgment, despite it being comprised of chattels.

59. The applicant’s fairly modest collection is valued by her at £100,000, and by the respondent at £96,609. In the ES2 it is comprised of seven specified pieces and an unspecified ‘Cadogan Inventory: multiple pieces’. Given the fairly modest discrepancy in the valuations, I simply value this at £98,304.50, being the midpoint.

60. There were some small items of jewellery, when one considers the entirety of the marital pot they are fairly modest, the details are found at [CB824]. The applicant stated that the majority, some 85-90% of these were sold to pay her day to day living expenses, including the rent on her home for the following month, in the absence of any payments from the respondent. The respondent states that these are still significant in value, perhaps as high as £100,000. In light of the evidence of sales, I ascribe a notional value of £10,000.

61. The investments of the parties have been stated in the ES2 to be £525 for the applicant, and in the region of £176,088 for the respondent. He confirmed that this was an endowment product which was encashed to facilitate the sale of a previous Paris property that does not form part of these proceedings. This was not actively disputed by the applicant and I have no reason to doubt this. Bank Accounts

62. Both parties hold similar amounts in their various bank accounts, both are £5,000 or less in their entirety, and I do not factor these modest amounts in for this calculation. Pensions

63. Neither party has any pension of note. Earning Capacity

64. I have considered the oral evidence supplied by the applicant, in my estimation, it is reasonable to suggest that she may be able to obtain some form of work to support herself, and should be encouraged to do so. It is, however, plainly unrealistic that she would be able to resurrect her investment banking career after close to a twenty-year absence, and still command the levels of income that she previously enjoyed. If the respondent genuinely believes this to be possible, then he is somewhat far from the mark.

65. The respondent’s earning capacity is stated with the ES2, and I have no doubt that these are broadly correct, giving his annual salaries and fees for directorships from his various sources, as a composite total of £89,789. This does not however have any regard to his equity rights in terms of share dividends. I find that this is likely significantly under declaring his income. Housing Needs

66. There are two children of the family to be considered, within the meaning of s.25(1), who currently reside with the applicant and have done so since the separation. I am mindful that both boys have lived their entire lives with their mother, both pre- and post-breakdown of the parents' marriage.

67. I am not told by the respondent if he has made any s.8 applications for a Lives With order in respect of the children; however, I was made aware of a failure to pay a considerable amount of costs, arrears in respect of maintenance and school fees for the boys which had been subject to orders of previous judges. At the time of the hearing this was in excess of £780,000. I had to give an interim order for the immediate sale of Lion by Beard, Nature Morte in orange by Buffet, and Cheeta by Beard by the applicant, and that the respondent should pay the applicant the sum of £20,000 within a short period of time between 19 September and 20 October 2025 to ensure the children’s schooling was not disrupted. He made this payment to avoid the sale of the painting.

68. The applicant currently lives in a rented apartment which meets her needs, and those of the children. She is reliant upon the funds from these proceedings to pay the rent and household expenditure. The respondent has failed to pay the court-mandated maintenance and school fees until threatened with the sale of his artwork. The respondent likewise lives in rented accommodation in London that meet his and the children’s needs, should they stay. This is not suitable on a long term basis as the children require a stable home and there are sufficient assets to allow for this to be purchased outright. Offers

69. Open offers have not been exchanged in line with the directions due to the wholesale failure to comply with the disclosure directions by the respondent.

70. The detailed position of the applicant is as follows and is found at [CB5-8]; i. The entirety of the art collection, wheresoever held in the UK, (and subject to any lien that may be held against any individual piece) shall be transferred to the applicant too be sold and the proceeds of sale to provide for her housing up to a cap of £1.75m. Any surplus having paid all costs relating to the sale to include but not limited to insurance/ transportation/ professional fees and CGT, shall be applied as a credit against the sum provided for in paragraph [ii] below. ii. Respondent to pay to the applicant a lump sum of £1.75m. This in no way meets her need and will provide her with an income of £81,000 for 30 years. iii. Interest will be payable at the court rate in relation to the lump sum referred to at paragraph ii above at the court rate. iv. Any balance from the sale of the art collection and or assets in France will be applied to payment of sums due pursuant to paragraphs xiv - xv below. v. 50% of the respondent’s interest in BBH SA shall be transferred to the applicant and the assets of that holding company shall be appointed out between the parties on the following bases: a. The art collection shall be appointed to the applicant, b. DC SA shall be appointed to the respondent, c. DC LLP shall be appointed to the respondent. d. VE shall be appointed to the respondent. e. BBH SA shall be wound up by the parties at the conclusion of the litigation between DC SA and the French bank and following payment of any sums due to the applicant pursuant to para vi below. vi. The respondent shall keep the applicant fully informed as to the progress of the litigation and the following provisions shall apply: a. There shall be a contingent lump sum in the event that DC SA should achieve a judgment in its favour in excess of US$6,559,644, plus interest thereon: b. The respondent should pay a lump sum to the applicant of 33% of 34% of any such judgment in favour of DC SA, (including interest thereon). c. There shall be an order against the respondent to prove the judgment paid and interest thereon within 14 days of receipt. d. The Contingent Lump sum shall be payable 14 days thereafter. vii. Interest shall accrue on any unpaid sums at the judgment rate. viii. The respondent shall provide the following in child support: £12,000 p.a. per child forthwith until the relevant child attains the age of 18 or ceases full time education, (1st degree only); with the payments being divided 50:50 between the child and the applicant whilst that child is at university, (with provision for a gap year). ix. A school fees order such that you shall pay the school fees for the relevant child direct to the Bursar of such school as they may attend to include all extras on the school bills. x. Medical insurance for the children and cost of GP visits. xi. The cost of the children’s travel to and from school. xii. The cost of A’s tennis lessons/coaching, tournaments, and travel to and from tennis. xiii. The cost of B’s kickboxing lessons and travel to and from kick boxing. xiv. The cost of B’s orthodontist. xv. Upon the winding up of BBH SA pursuant to para v(e) above, and payment to the applicant of the contingent lump sum a clean break be enacted. xvi. Arrears of maintenance and the LSO shall not be remitted and remain a hard debt. xvii. All outstanding costs orders to paid.

71. The respondent makes an offer in the closing submission submitted to the court; it is not clear that this has ever previously been put to the applicant and if not, it is grossly inappropriate to do so at this point. The Law and Findings regarding the applicable lex and nuptial agreements

72. Before considering the applicable law in respect of the Financial Remedies matter, and any apportionment of the assets, I must consider that of the applicable law for deciding any issues of the validity and effect of the purported nuptial agreement. I have considered the seminal case of Re: Annesley [1926] Ch. 692 and am satisfied that the domicile of both parties, based upon permanent and habitual residence, and shared common intention, was in London, notwithstanding their different nationalities, or the respondent’s unfulfilled hopes of relocating to Switzerland as admitted when challenged upon paragraph 10 of his statement at [CB603]. It is clear that their family life was created and centred around their family home in London, and the parties saw England as their home. The laws of England are therefore both the lex domicilii and the lex fori that I apply.

73. The applicable law therefore is that laid down by the Supreme Court in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 ; a party may be held to an agreement that is freely entered into, with the benefit of, or the chance to take, legal advice upon the effects of the same, and one that ultimately does not displace the presumption for the welfare of any applicable child at s.25(1) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (‘ the 1973 Act ’).

74. The evidence of the respondent on this issue is at [CB602] that a valid ante-nuptial agreement was executed in Lausanne on 16 March 2009. This agreement was in English and the applicant was given the chance to seek independent advice whilst in Paris. It is his oral evidence that he cannot recall when or where this was signed; it may have been in Paris, or Lausanne, and he cannot account for the lack of a Notaire’s seal or apostille upon the purported agreement. The respondent’s evidence at paragraph 6 of his statement at [CB603] and his oral evidence was that this agreement was simply to preserve the shares of his company. The respondent could not account for the defects in the agreement, for example the suggestion that the parties were Swiss residents, he tried to suggest that they split their time between London and Switzerland. This was incorrect. The respondent also gave evidence that the French and English renderings were identical and translated by the Swiss notaire. This was subsequently admitted to be incorrect, and that he had used an online translation service to do so and had summarised the Swiss law, despite not being qualified to do so.

75. The evidence of the applicant on this issue is at [CB640]; she accepts that at some point she signed a document, she thought in a hotel room in Paris, which was in effect a release or waiver that all spouses of the officers and shareholders in DC LLP had to sign. This was an agreement between the officers that their shares would not be diluted in the event of a divorce by one of their number. She does not accept, and explicitly disclaims signing any form of general nuptial agreement, either ante- or post-marriage. Her evidence was that she would not have signed such an agreement and that the respondent was aware that she had previously called off a wedding when a last-minute agreement was sprung on her. Her evidence likewise was that she could not have signed an agreement in Lausanne on 16 March 2009, as she was not in Switzerland, but was in this jurisdiction from 22 February 2009 until 8 June 2009, this was expressly stated by the respondent as unchallenged. There can be no confusion that this might have been the extension to the Sotheby’s loan facility document as she also expressly refused to sign this document. Her oral evidence and written records to that effect are found at [CB833 ff.].

76. The court ordered the disclosure of the entire file of papers of the Swiss notaire. This was not complied with, instead they were transferred to the offices of the company lawyer of the respondent’s businesses in Switzerland who emailed the respondent and invited him to collect the same from their offices. When these were produced they had numerous discrepancies.

77. The respondent could not account for the ten-day discrepancy in the date of the agreement of 6 March 2009 at [DB473] and that in his statement which stated it was executed on 26 March 2009, the difference in translation, the lack of the notaire’s apostille, or the material difference in the wording, and consequently, effect of paragraph 3.

78. Consequently, my finding is that this purported ante-nuptial agreement is a falsehood. Not only is it not valid, I am satisfied that it was created by the respondent or on his behalf, with the intention of misleading the applicant and this court. The effect of purported Nuptial Agreement on the Marital Pot

79. I remind myself of the items that I am required to adjudicate on as defined in paragraph 11 of this judgment; firstly the true extent of the assets disclosed by the parties, I have dealt with what I deem the ascertainable marital pot to be, by reference to the verifiable figures, and evidenced matters; I am unable to, with an absolute level of certainty, say what this is however I can make an informed estimate or a ‘ballpark figure’ based upon the evidence before me, notwithstanding the finding that there has been some material non-disclosure by the respondent. I am entitled to make an inference that, as this uncertainty is caused by the non-disclosure of the respondent, his needs can be met by his undisclosed assets or any award I make is fair, per the reasoning of Moylan LJ in Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482 at paragraphs 87-90.

80. This estimate results in a marital pot of £6,840,013.50 comprised of; i. £3,728,691 in respect of the respondent’s business assets in BBH SA, DC SA, DC LLP, and VE. I have preferred the applicant’s figures as those supplied by the respondent do not stand up to scrutiny, nor are any of the deductions evidenced. I am not satisfied that the respondent’s position regarding the deductions from the damages in the litigation is accurate. I am satisfied that some of this is pre-marriage, the respondent has not engaged in the valuation of the businesses, therefore I am left with no evidence to ascribe a pre or post marriage value so use the entirety. ii. £3,135,827 in respect of the respondent’s art collection, in whatever guise it is held as detailed in the ES2. Whether this is held by one of his businesses or him personally, it is clear that he is the driving force behind this collection and chooses to hold the collection in such a way as to mask it. I have used this figure as the joint list produced does not seem to allow for the items that have been sold, whereas this figure from the ES2 allows for the recording of sale of the pieces such as Juggler and Cheeta . iii. £98,304.50 in respect of the applicant’s art collection, gifted to her by her family, my reasoning for this sum is given in paragraph 59 of this judgment. iv. The parties’ personal bank accounts and minimal investments are excluded as inconsequential. v. The values of the Paris apartment and the applicant’s Family Trusts are excluded as non-matrimonial. vi. The commercial debts of £122,809 are deducted from the figures above. vii. The soft debts and unevidenced overdrawn director’s loan accounts are excluded.

81. The purported agreement has been found to be a fallacy and therefore has no effect upon the marital pot available for distribution. The General Law

82. The governing principles for matters before the Financial Remedies Court are well known, and the case law complex and extensive. The underpinning legislation is s.25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 , or the ‘ s.25 Checklist’ which details the various factors that a court must consider when dividing matrimonial assets and debts. Since its inception the act has been interpreted by the courts and developed further, rendering a detailed, and sometimes conflicting, scheme of dealing with the matters.

83. The starting point is White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 ; this case established that the yardstick to which all judges ought to measure their consideration is that the parties should have an equal share in the matrimonial assets. This does not create a presumption, and Nicholls LJ was keen to emphasise this in White . This case dealt with a so-called ‘sharing’ case, where the assets of the parties outstripped their respective needs and created a surplus to be shared, as is the case in this matter.

84. In respect of the notional costs of sale, the parties have utilised the accepted or conventional method as expounded by Nicholls LJ in paragraph 7 of his judgment in the matter of Behzadi v Behzadi [2008] EWCA Civ 1070 , and confirmed in the matter of SJ v RA [2014] EWHC 4054 (Fam) .

85. The Supreme Court handed down their recent decision in Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 , which has confirmed the position of the Court of Appeal in the same matter that pre-acquired assets and inheritances are not necessarily subject to the equal sharing principle, and that the intention of the parties are crucial in establishing matrimonialisation of property. This case expressly disapplies the findings of Charman v Charman (No.4) [2007] EWCA Civ 503 at paragraph 66, which suggested that all property of the parties would ordinarily be subject to sharing in the absence of some specific exceptions.

86. The Paris apartment was purchased by the respondent in 2003, plainly prior to the marriage and any period of cohabitation. The parties have never lived together in this property as a main residence, or treated it as a matrimonial home. It has not been matrimonialised.

87. It is clear that the applicant’s New York apartment on West 85 th Street was incorporated into the applicant's Family Trust in 2019. It was acquired by her in 2012, which was post-marriage, but was not, on either parties’ evidence, purchased using marital funds. It was transferred into a trust which may eventually benefit the applicant along with her two siblings. There is no suggestion that the respondent’s valuation in the ES2 of £1,395,000 is correct, or achievable. It was supported by a link to ‘realtyhop.com’ webpage which, when I clicked on the same, did not prove what the respondent thought it did. I am not satisfied that this was intended to be a matrimonial asset. The s.25 Checklist and Findings in respect of the factors

88. I do not slavishly reproduce the entire s.25 checklist, and only deal with the factors which I deem significant; if I have not mentioned the specific factor then, for clarity, I have considered it, but do not deem it to be relevant to this matter. I specifically include consideration of s.25(1) as the first consideration as there are two minor children of the parties.

89. s.25(1) deals with the welfare of any relevant children, in this instance, there are two children who must be considered. They require homing, and the court has already determined that they should be maintained and their school fees be paid. I see no reason to displace this finding.

90. s.25(2) (a) deals with the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future ; however the applicant is at a disadvantage due to age and her inactivity in a highly specialised labour market. I accept entirely her evidence that her experience is now worth significantly less than it was when she stopped working. By the very nature of a commodities or investment trader, one must remain up to date and maintain one skills and contacts. She did not do so on the basis she was to become the homemaker or child-rearer, and the respondent would provide for the family The respondent has access to multiple revenue streams and is likely to benefit from any reassignment of the shares of the deceased director in DC SA in line with the undisclosed shareholders agreement, and any upflift in the damages recoverable if the litigation concludes in the favour of the respondent’s business.

91. s.25(2) (b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage; the children of the marriage reside with their mother, the applicant. Her needs are therefore inextricably entwined with those of the children, who are the court’s first, but not paramount, concern. It is plain that the respondent requires a property large enough for her and the boys. Her current accommodation allows this therefore at a relatively modest rent when compared to the previous home. It would be preferable for a measure of stability and for the applicant to be able to purchase a property free of mortgage, as she has not worked for some considerable time, she is unlikely to be able to command the mortgage offers that the respondent would.

92. There is no doubt a special place held by the FMH, as it is “the cradle of the family”; however, in this instance, it was not a pre-acquired asset, it was a rented property and has since been relinquished.

93. s.25(2) (d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; I accept that the applicant is older than the respondent, however both are still of an age where they are able to accrue assets for at least fifteen to eighteen years, however this is subject to the limitation noted above regarding income generation for the applicant.

94. s.25(2) (f) the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family; the applicant has given up a lucrative job to raise the children at the behest of the respondent. She could conceivably have outearned him. She was unable to do so due to the understanding reached between them. The respondent, conversely, has utilised funds that ought to have been used for the benefit of the family to fund his apparent addiction to acquiring art. Unless the court makes provision for the applicant and the children. I am not satisfied that he will do so voluntarily or pay over any sums he states are contingent on future events.

95. s.25(2) (g) the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it, pursuant to the comments of Peel J in the matter of Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130 , at paragraph 40, echoing the words of this clause. In this instance I am invited to consider the conduct of both parties.

96. The respondent seeks to criticise the applicant’s use of expensive lawyers and the excessive levels of LPSO and MPS. I have dealt with his allegations of non-disclosure regarding the New York apartment and the Family Trusts elsewhere. The choice to instruct solicitors or counsel is the choice of the applicant, and there is never a guarantee that one will recover one’s legal costs in full, or indeed, at all. It is noted that the respondent has not sought to set aside or appeal the LPSO or MPS orders at any point before doing so in his written closing submissions.

97. The type of conduct I consider is that which dealt with by Mostyn J, as he then was, in OG v AG [2020] EWFC 52 at paragraphs 34 to 39 of his judgment, particularly paragraphs 35, “34. Conduct rears its head in financial remedy cases in four distinct scenarios. First, there is gross and obvious personal misconduct meted out by one party against the other, normally, but not necessarily, during the marriage. The House of Lords in Miller v Miller [2006] UKHL 24 , [2006] 2 AC 618 confirmed that such conduct will only be taken into account in very rare circumstances. The authorities clearly indicate that such conduct would only be reflected where there is a financial consequence to its impact. In one case the husband had stabbed the wife and the wound had impaired her earning capacity. The impact of such conduct was properly reflected in the discretionary disposition made in the wife’s favour. Mrs Miller alleged that Mr Miller had unjustifiably ended the marriage discarding her in favour of another woman. Therefore, she argued that Mr Miller should not be permitted to argue that their marriage was short. This argument was rejected by the House of Lords which held that the conduct in question, although greatly distressing to Mrs Miller, should not find independent reflection in the court’s decision.

35. The conduct under this head, can extend, obviously, to economic misconduct such as is alleged in this case. If one party economically oppresses the other for selfish or malicious reasons then, provided the high standard of “inequitable to disregard” is met, it may be reflected in the substantive award.

36. Second, there is the “add-back” jurisprudence. This arises where one party has wantonly and recklessly dissipated assets which would otherwise have formed part of the divisible matrimonial property. Again, it will only be in a clear and obvious, and therefore rare, case that this principle is applied. In M v M [1995] 2 FCR 321 Thorpe J found that the husband had dissipated his capital by his obsessive approach to the litigation, which had included starting completely unnecessary proceedings in the Chancery Division. That dissipation was reflected in the substantive award. Properly analysed, that decision can be seen as a harbinger of the add-back doctrine rather than a sanction reflecting a moral judicial condemnation.

37. In this case the sums loaned by the husband to TT will all be added back to the matrimonial pot at full value. The husband does not resist this.

38. Third, there is litigation misconduct. Where proved, this should be severely penalised in costs. However, it is very difficult to conceive of any circumstances where litigation misconduct should affect the substantive disposition.

39. Fourth, there is the evidential technique of drawing inferences as to the existence of assets from a party’s conduct in failing to give full and frank disclosure. The taking of account of such conduct is part of the process of computation rather than distribution. I endeavoured to summarise the relevant principles in NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2012] 1 FLR 1211 , which was generally upheld by the Court of Appeal in Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482 . In that latter case Moylan LJ confirmed that while the court should strive to quantify the scale of undisclosed assets it is not obliged to pluck a figure from the air where even a ballpark figure is in fact evidentially impossible to establish. Plainly, it will only be in a very rare case that the court would be unable even to hazard a ballpark figure for the scale of undisclosed assets. Normally, the court would be able to make the necessary assessment of the approximate scale of the non-visible assets, which is, of course, an indispensable datum when computing the matrimonial property and applying to it the equal sharing principle.”

98. I am satisfied that the respondent’s conduct is of such a nature as to meet the requirements of paragraphs 35, that the economic oppression is significant enough that it would be inequitable to disregard it.

99. I am likewise satisfied pursuant to paragraph 38 that the attempts to cloak or dissipate assets was done in such a manner as to warrant their return to the marital pot, and I have done so in my calculations.

100. Finally, pursuant to paragraph 39 of Mostyn J’s judgment; the clear and wanton elements of non-disclosure and deceit in the face of the court over an extended period of time on the part of the respondent has significantly increased the costs of the applicant and should be punished in costs. Conclusion

101. I have amended this part of the judgment to account for the failures identified by the parties in some of my reasoning and and failure to address specific points.

102. For all of the reasons given above I make the following orders; a. The art collection, whether held by the respondent personally, or by one of the companies in which he holds a material interest shall be transferred to the applicant, in order that she is able to realise the sums made payable to her and not be frustrated by the ongoing wilful non-compliance of the respondent. These items are to be transferred within 7 days of of this order being handed down by publishing on 16 February 2026. b. the applicant shall market for sale such pieces of the art collection as may be advised by a selling agent to be selected by her, and the proceeds of sale to provide for her housing up to a cap of £1.5 million. Any surplus having paid all costs relating to the sale to include but not limited to insurance/ transportation/ professional fees and CGT, shall be applied as a credit against the sum provided for in paragraph [c] below. c. The respondent to pay to the applicant a lump sum of £1 million within 56 days. d. Interest will be payable at the court rate in relation to the lump sum referred to at paragraph c above at the applicable High Court rate. e. Any balance from the sale of the art collection business assets will be applied to payment of sums due pursuant to the following paragraphs. f. 50% of the respondent’s interest in BBH SA shall be transferred to the applicant and the assets of that holding company shall be appointed out between the parties on the following bases: i. Any art is dealt with in paragraph 102.a. of this judgment ii. DC SA, DC LLP, and VE shall be appointed to the respondent, iii. BBH SA shall be wound up by the parties at the conclusion of the litigation between DC SA and the French bank and following payment of any sums due to the applicant pursuant to para vi below. iv. There shall be a contingent lump sum in the event that DC SA should achieve a judgment in its favour in excess of US$6,559,644, plus interest thereon: v. The respondent should pay a lump sum to the applicant of 33% of 34% of any such judgment in favour of DC SA, (including interest thereon). vi. There shall be an order against the respondent to prove the judgment paid and interest thereon within 14 days of receipt with payment 14 days thereafter. vii. Interest shall accrue on any unpaid sums at the judgment rate. g. The respondent shall provide the following in child support: £12,000 p.a. per child forthwith until the relevant child attains the age of 18 or ceases full time tertiary education, (1st degree only), with provision for a gap year. h. A school fees order that the respondent shall pay the school fees for the relevant child direct to the Bursar of such school as they may attend to include 50% extras on the school bills, the remaining 50% shall be met by the applicant. i. Medical insurance for the children and cost of GP visits shall be borne equally between the parties. j. The cost of the children’s travel to and from school shall be borne equally between the parties. k. The cost of A’s tennis lessons/coaching, tournaments, and travel to and from tennis shall be borne equally between the parties. l. The cost of B’s kickboxing lessons and travel to and from kick boxing shall be borne equally between the parties. m. The cost of B’s orthodontist shall be borne equally between the parties. n. Upon the winding up of BBH SA pursuant to para f(iii) above, and payment to the applicant of the contingent lump sum in paragraph f(v) a clean break be enacted. o. Arrears of maintenance and the LSO to be paid, and should the same not be done by 28 days, the sums may be deducted from the sale of the artworks. p. All outstanding costs orders to be paid, and should the same not be done by 28 days, the sums may be deducted from the sale of the artworks. q. There be a clean break in life and death in line with paragraph 102.n.

103. This split has been detailed in line with the offer of the applicant to try and explain the court’s reasoning, it recognises both the sacrifices made by the applicant to ensure the respondent was able to pursue his business interests, the material non-disclosure of the respondent, and the pre-acquired nature of some of the respondent’s assets. Costs

104. After delivering this judgment I received written submissions on costs, those of the applicant point to the many previous costs orders made, including the following: 8.2.24 DJ Mulikis To be assessed if not agreed. 3.6.24 HHJ Reardon To be assessed if not agreed. 20.2.24 DDJ Gill £66,091.76 16.10.24 HHJ Robinson £24,000 (including VAT) 25.2.25 HHJ Ashby £8,000 23.6.25 DDJ Jamieson £25,208 including VAT 12.9.25 DDJJ Holmes-Milner To be assessed if not agreed.

105. Having received written submissions from the respondent these, along with the request for clarifications, these bear all the hallmarks of being produced by generative AI, not least that they refer to the theoretical challenges that may be made by the respondent, whilst referring to himself in the third person, by name. It also suggests that my draft judgment ws placed into a LLM generative AI in breach of the embargo. I produce the submissions below for clarity retaining the original format, save for anonymising the name from ‘Mr SURNAME’ to ‘The respondent’; “ 1- Arguments the respondant [sic] would like to Raise in Defence Against Costs Orders

1. Criticism of Applicant’s Legal Costs: o The respondent [sic] has previously criticised the applicant for using expensive lawyers and incurring excessive legal costs. He may argue that the applicant’s choice to engage high-cost legal representation was unnecessary and contributed to the overall costs of the proceedings.

2. Challenge to the Level of Legal Costs: o The applicant disclosed legal costs amounting to £1,006,591, which [the respondent] may argue are disproportionate and unreasonable given the nature of the case.

3. Allegations of Excessive Levels of LPSO and MPS: o [The respondent] has raised concerns about the excessive levels of Legal Services Payment Orders (LPSO) and Maintenance Pending Suit (MPS) orders. He may argue that these orders were unjustified and contributed to the applicant’s high legal costs as they incentivised legal spending. They were also disproportionate to his income. [Te respondent] did pay some maintenance which was a significant part of his earnings over the period in so aiming to comply with the order. Further certain artworks amounting to more than £300000 were sold but no accountability has been provided on those. The applicant has already received more than £500000

4. Failure to Appeal or Set Aside Previous Orders: o While the judgment notes that [The respondent] did not seek to set aside or appeal the LPSO or MPS orders at any point before raising the issue in his written closing submissions, he may argue that these orders were unfairly imposed and should not be considered in the costs order.

5. Disputes Regarding Non-Disclosure Allegations: o [The respondent] may challenge the court’s findings of material non-disclosure and deceit, arguing that his conduct was not intended to mislead the court or increase the applicant’s costs. He may assert that any discrepancies in his disclosure were unintentional or administrative errors.

6. Disputes Regarding Economic Oppression: o The judgment found that [The respondent]’s conduct amounted to economic oppression, which justified the costs order. He may argue that his actions were not oppressive and that he did not intentionally withhold financial support or assets from the applicant.

7. Disputes Regarding Cloaking or Dissipation of Assets: o The judgment concluded that [The respondent] attempted to cloak or dissipate assets, warranting their return to the marital pot. He may argue that his actions were legitimate and not intended to frustrate the proceedings or increase costs.

8. Challenge to the Court’s Assessment of His Conduct: o The judgment heavily criticised [The respondent]’s conduct during the proceedings, including non-disclosure, deceit, and economic oppression. He may argue that the court’s assessment of his conduct was overly harsh or not supported by sufficient evidence.

9. Proportionality of the Costs Order: o [The respondent] may argue that the costs order is disproportionate to the circumstances of the case and does not adequately consider his financial position or the overall marital pot.

10. Request for Consideration of Litigation Misconduct: o While the judgment states that litigation misconduct should generally be penalised in costs, [The respondent] may argue that any alleged misconduct on his part should not affect the substantive disposition of costs. ”

106. None of the points raised by the respondent in challenges to costs are anything more than a suggestion of what may be done, none constitute actual challenges or submissions.

107. It is noted that the LSOs made remain unpaid in the sum of approximately £400,000 to the date of the Trial, and that the respondent made numerous attempts to derail the final hearing by making unwarranted applications. This is simply a further demonstration of the respondent’s wilful disobedience of court orders.

108. FPR 28.3 and the case law is well known in cases where a party has displayed such grossly wanton disregard for the court’s rules and orders that a costs penalty is appropriate and this is helpfully set out in in detail within the costs submissions of Mr Thorpe, and I accept that the appropriate order is as he suggests.

109. The respondent shall pay the costs of the financial remedies application, including all costs reserved orders, on an indemnity basis, save for the hearings of 20.2.24; 16.10.24; 25.2.25 and 23.6.25 where such costs were summarily assessed at the date of the hearing. The outstanding costs shall be the subject of assessment in the absence of agreement.

110. Credit is to be given for any sums paid pursuant to the legal services order of DDJ Gill of 20.2.24. Amendments and clarifications

111. After delivering this judgment I received a number of requests for clarification and amplification from both parties. I have amended the judgment where appropriate to address these points. Where I accept amplification of clarification has been required I have either done so within the body of the judgment, or by explanation below. Where I deem the request to be attempt to relitigate a point or a comment upon the court’s assessment of a parties’ evidence, I have not responded, save to identify that I have so deemed a request.

112. For clarity I was addressed by the applicant on the following matters; a. Open Offer not being fully considered, particularly the need to have the art collection transferred in specie , and the reasons for not making any order in full, b. Housing needs, c. Respondent’s failure to comply with orders, d. How the pot was identified and valued, e. How any successful appeal of the ongoing litigation between DC SA and their bank will be reflected in this award. f. The ongoing requirements of Chid Maintenance in respect of the children, g. Why 40% was awarded of the pot, and not 50%, h. Why the applicant’s evidenced and agreed loans are not reflected in this award.

113. I deemed the following requests to be attempts to relitigate or commentary; ‘c.’ is a matter of litigation conduct and is dealt with in costs, save for costs orders that had already been flouted, which I have now addressed. Issue ‘d.’ is dealt with in paragraph 78 of this judgment, issue ‘g.’ is a duplication of ‘a.’ and only dealt with my initial order of a lump sum, this has now been reframed and explained further in paragraph 102.

114. I was addressed by the respondent on the following paragraphs of this judgment; 5, 6, 8, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 40, 41, 43, 45, 50, and 78.

115. I deemed the following requests to be attempts to relitigate or commentary; requests regarding paragraphs 18, 22, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 48, and 50. The remainder have been changed within the judgment. Request for leave to appeal

116. Having delivered my determination upon costs, and dealt with the amendment and clarifications, I received a written request for permission to appeal from the respondent. The grounds for doing so were “ The respondent would like to ask the permission to appeal on several points of the judgement such as the valuation of the art, the valuation of the business , the qualification of some assets as matrimonial or non matrimonial, disclosure and conduct. ” (quoted verbatim and in full).

117. I refuse leave to appeal for the following reasons; a. These matters are all determinations of fact within the remit of the discretion of the district bench, b. There is no prospect of success based upon the quoted grounds of appeal as put forward by the respondent. -ENDS-