Karam Aly v John Simon Esplen & Ors

1. The matters that have been referred to the Tribunal are competing application for first registration of a detached house and surrounding land known as Ashbourne, Cilcain, Pantymwyn, Mold (“the Property”). The Property is shown tinted blue on an extract from the Notice Plan (to the Applicant’s application) below. Notice Plan

2. The Applicant is the registered proprietor of the neighbouring property known as The Lodge. She was represented at the final hearing by her daughter Ms Matthews. The First Respondent is acting as attorney for his aunt, Jane Esplen, who in turn is acting in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of Margaret Mary Hunter, who lived at the Property before her death on 14 th July 2001. The Second Respondent lives at Voel Awel and the Third Respondent at Tall Pines, both of which can be seen on the extract above. There is a public footpath between the Property and Voel Awel, which I walked on the site visit.

3. In or around 2021, the Applicant made an application in respect of the Property, but this was defective and did not progress. However, Ms Esplen became aware of it and sent an objection. This seems to have prompted her to make an application for first registration based on paper title, to which the Applicant objected on the grounds that the paper title had been extinguished by her adverse possession of the Property. The Applicant then made her own application for first registration based on adverse possession, to which the Respondents objected.

4. Both applications have been referred to the Tribunal. The Second Respondent was granted permission to withdraw his objection to the Applicant’s application, and the Third Respondent has been barred from defending the proceedings due to her failure to provide a statement of case, such that the matter has proceeded between the Applicant and the First Respondent only. That said, both the Second & Third Respondents gave evidence in support of the First Respondent. I will refer to them as Ms Wineyard and Mr Morris going forward, to make clear that each was involved as a witness rather than as a party. I note for completeness that being barred from defending proceedings does not prevent involvement as a witness.

5. The First Respondent’s application is for first registration based on paper title. It is recorded by HM Land Registry as having been made on 8 th November 2022 (albeit requisitions were raised, which explains why there is an FR1 with the later date of 31 st May 2023). The First Respondent relies on a conveyance of 30 th March 1950 between Charles Watson Huddleston and Ms Hunter. The Applicant does not dispute that this is a conveyance of the Property, and that Ms Hunter was at least for a time the paper title owner. Rather, she avers that the paper title has been extinguished under section 17 of the Limitation Act 1980 .

6. The matter turns on whether the Applicant can demonstrate a continuous 12 year period of adverse possession prior to 8 th November 2022, in which case she will be entitled to first registration, otherwise the First Respondent will be entitled to first registration as paper title owner. The latest date for the Applicant to have gone into adverse possession is therefore 8 th November 2010. Principles

7. It is not in dispute that the Applicant must demonstrate both factual possession of, and an intention to possess, the Property.

8. Factual possession “ signifies an appropriate degree of physical control… The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed. In the case of open land, absolute physical control is normally impracticable, if only because it is generally impossible to secure every part of a boundary to prevent intrusion… Everything must depend on the particular circumstance, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so" [Slade J in Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452 at 470-1, cited with approval in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] UKHL 30 ].

9. An intention to possess is the intention “ to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title… so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow” [Slade J in Powell at 471-2, cited with approval in Pye ].

10. The evidence of factual possession will often be sufficient to demonstrate the intention to possess, but this will not always be so: “ It is in cases where the acts in relation to the land of a person claiming title by adverse possession are equivocal and are open to more than one interpretation that those acts will be insufficient to establish the intention to possess ” [Lord Hutton in Pye at paragraph 76].

11. In those cases, an applicant must make it “ perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can ” [Slade J in Powell at 472]; he “ should be required to adduce compelling evidence that he has the requisite [intention to possess] ” [at 476].

12. As well as referring to these principles, both parties made more nuanced submissions with reference to other case law, to which I will return as necessary later. The Property

13. The Property comprises a detached house (“the House”) and surrounding land. The House is in a very poor state – it is boarded up, the roof is collapsing, and there is asbestos. Much of the surrounding land is overgrown, particularly to the front of the House and along the boundaries with the road and the public footpath. There is a more open area to the rear of the House (“the Rear Garden”) – a triangular area effectively bordered by the House, a post and wire fence that runs approximately parallel to the public footpath (“the Fence”), and the hedge that runs along the boundary with The Lodge (“the Hedge”).

14. The following photographs, taken from HM Land Registry’s survey from March 2024, illustrate some of the features: (a) Looking from The Lodge through the gap in the Hedge across the eastern tip of the Property towards the public footpath, with the Fence visible (b) Looking west from the eastern end of the Property, the Hedge to the left, the House and a green shed (“the Shed”) in the distance, the Fence to the right (c) Looking northwest, with the House, the Shed and the Fence visible (d) Looking east from in front of the House, with the Hedge and the Fence visible (e) Front door to the House, taken looking across the front of the House towards the public footpath

15. Other notable features are an old wooden garage located along the boundary with the road, and also a pedestrian access from the road through a gate that is currently fenced over (“the Gate”). Summary of the parties’ respective positions

16. In general terms, the Applicant’s case is that she has used the Property as an extension of her own property, The Lodge. She says that, after Ms Hunter died, the Property was left empty, and that Ms Esplen only visited once, in 2009. Part of the background is that she avers she has experienced issues with trespassers at the Property, including trespassers accessing it from the driveway at The Lodge. There is a video of urban trespassers at the Property on YouTube, which I confirm I have watched.

17. The acts the Applicant relies upon can be summarised as follows: (a) securing the house, including boarding up windows and erecting signs; (b) repairing the boundary fence between the Property and The Lodge in 2005 and later growing and maintaining hedges to prevent trespass; (c) installing motion-activated lights; (d) erecting the Fence with signs to prevent access from the public footpath; (e) erecting the Shed and using it to store tools; (f) installing some paving; (g) clearing, cultivating and using the Rear Garden, including bonfires; (h) involvement in a tree preservation order regarding trees at the Property; (i) co-ordinating with Scottish Power as regards overhanging branches and maintenance of electrical infrastructure.

18. As well as her own evidence, she relies on the evidence of two neighbours, Dr Harradine and Mr Hayward, discussed further below where appropriate.

19. The First Respondent accepts that the Applicant has carried out some acts at the Property, but says that they have not been carried out for long enough, and in any event are insufficient to show factual possession or an intention to possess.

20. Insofar as there is a dispute about what has been done and when, he says that Ms Esplen visited more than once, but accepts that the last visit was 2016 at the latest, and she does not give much evidence about the state of the Property at that time anyway. Rather, he relies on the evidence of Ms Wineyard and Mr Morris, who say that the acts have been relatively recent. I note for completeness that the only acts claimed to have been done by or on behalf of Ms Esplen herself are the payment of council tax and water rates since Ms Hunter’s death, and boarding up windows in 2006, both of which are supported by bills/invoices. The Applicant’s case

21. The Applicant’s statement of case includes an overarching allegation that the acts include “ securing the property as well as improving the grounds to extend the garden space used by The Lodge ” unchallenged for 20 years (so, from 2003). However, it is not always specific about what acts were done when, nor did the Applicant provide a separate witness statement providing any further details.

22. It is convenient to mention at this point that the Applicant has represented herself throughout these proceedings, albeit with the help of her daughter Ms Matthews, who, it transpired, had drafted the statement of case, and who appeared as a lay representative at the final hearing. Ms Matthews did not provide a witness statement and was not permitted to give oral evidence (I discuss this further below). She had prepared a timeline (as part of the disclosure exercise) and a skeleton argument, both of which contain more detail than is set out in the statement of case and evidence.

23. It has been difficult to identify what the Applicant says happened when, and furthermore to identify whether the assertions made in the timeline, skeleton argument, and/or at the final hearing were properly pleaded or supported by evidence. I have borne in mind that the Applicant was not legally represented and have allowed a certain amount of flexibility in this regard, albeit I have not accorded any weight to assertions that were not properly backed up by evidence.

24. I now consider the principal acts relied upon by the Applicant in turn, identifying exactly what the Applicant is alleging, determining any relevant disputes of fact, and considering whether the acts alleged are sufficient to amount to adverse possession. I address them in broadly chronological order. Repairing the boundary

25. The earliest specific act identified is the Applicant’s husband Graham Matthews (who passed away in 2008) repairing the boundary between the Property and the Lodge, despite it not being his responsibility. It does not feature in the statement of case or the timeline, but it is mentioned in the Applicant’s skeleton argument and the written evidence of Mr Hayward. Mr Hayward, who was a neighbour between 2002 and 2012, recalls Mr Matthews repairing the fence in or around 2005/6, “ which wasn’t his responsibility, enabling to keep his property safe and the start of them maintaining the area ” .

26. The Applicant’s statement of case also avers that a hedge has been grown/maintained along the boundary with the Lodge “ to provide a natural boundary between the two properties, this serves as two purposes to eliminate trespassers onto the grounds of The Lodge and to also make Ashbourne feel more like a garden to enjoy in ”. It is not specific as to when this began. I note for completeness the timeline does not mention it; the skeleton argument makes reference to 2010.

27. Due to the lack of evidence, I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probability that the boundary was repaired or maintained before 8 th November 2010. In any event, I do not see how maintaining the boundary demonstrates either factual possession of or an intention to possess the Property. It maintains the physical distinction between the two parcels, meaning there can be no argument that the Property has been enclosed as part of The Lodge. Moreover, it is equivocal – it could quite easily be attributed to a desire to maintain the boundary of The Lodge rather than an intention to possess the Property. Indeed, the evidence is that it was intended to deter trespassers from using The Lodge to access the Property. Tree preservation order

28. The Applicant’s case in relation to the tree preservation order is that she has been involved in the protection and maintenance of trees at the Property since 2007/08, and that this shows factual possession and an intention to possess.

29. The Applicant says she has been involved in discussions with the Council from 2007/08. In March 2009, a tree preservation order was made in relation to three trees at the Property, and a copy was sent to The Lodge, informing them the order had been made as an owner occupier of adjacent land. In her statement of case, she states, “ This was in our interest for potential future use, community interest due to retaining future property plans and to maintain green space. It also contributed to aesthetic value towards adjacent property and current property, contributing to nature beauty and increase property value ”.

30. In October 2009, the Applicant received a letter from her solicitor, seemingly following up after he had made enquiries of the Council. It states that a Mrs Conway of the Council “ feels that you will need assistance and guidance with regard to the pruning and general maintenance of the protected trees….. Mr Body [Chief Forestry Officer] will be more than happy to contact you directly to discuss any concerns you may have about the trees. He will also be able to give you constructive guidance as to how you can manage these trees insofar as they encroach upon your property ”.

31. In September 2012, the Council granted the Applicant consent to remove branches on one tree that were overhanging the road at the entrance, and from another tree adjacent to the drive.

32. I do not see how the discussions with the Council and/or works carried out to remove overhanging branches demonstrates either factual possession of or an intention to possess the Property. The thrust of the Applicant’s point is, I think, that she was acting as an occupying owner would, by dealing with trees on the Property. The difficulty with this is that everything that was done can equally be attributed to her interest as an adjacent landowner. Indeed, the correspondence and the works are focused on the trees insofar as they overhang The Lodge, rather than the trees in and of themselves. Securing the House

33. It is clear from the Applicant’s evidence overall that there is a link between problems with trespassing and certain of the acts relied upon, as further explained below. The two therefore go hand in hand in terms of identifying and assessing the evidence, and I deal with both here.

34. The Applicant’s skeleton argument asserts that there were repeated break-ins at the Property from 2009, asserts that this was the start of the Applicant’s active involvement in securing and maintaining the Property, and specifically mentions sealing and resecuring the front door multiple times.

35. The Applicant’s statement of case refers to securing and locking the House, but is scant on detail as to exactly what was done and when.

36. In her oral evidence, the Applicant said that hinges were installed in 2010 or 2011, with heavy hinges being installed in 2025. It was accepted that she probably meant brackets rather than hinges (she was able to identify what she was talking about in the photographs).

37. The Applicant’s statement of case is also scant on detail as to the problems with trespassers. It states, “ In recent years due to lockdown (covid-19) explorers peaked and therefore made the property more vulnerable… This then considerably effected our property and adjacent property with explorer’s trespassing both property’s by using our driveway to gain entry in the middle of the night ”, but does not say when the trespassing started or how often it occurred prior to lockdown. The inference is that the problem escalated in lockdown.

38. The Applicant was cross-examined about the trespassing. She said variously that trespassing was popular at certain times of year, e.g. Halloween; referenced 2010, 2016, 2017 and 2023; said there would be 3 or 4 people every couple of weeks; and insisted there were “ always ” trespassers every two weeks from 2010.

39. The statement of case goes on to state, “ Living near and dealing with a vacant property for an extended period has indeed caused stress and anxiety. In order to prevent anti-social behaviour and trespassing we ensured regular inspections of daily walks around the property to ensure no break ins have occurred and to also secure entry points that any accessible areas to deter unauthorized entry. We utilised useage of boards, barbed wire, locks and barriers as much as possible ”.

40. In terms of the other acts relating to trespassers: (a) the usage of boards I take to be a reference to wooden panels that have been used to board up the Property. The Applicant’s statement of case avers that chipboard panels have been installed and repaired over the years. It is vague as to dates, other than in the following two respects: firstly, it gives an example of chipboard panels being internally fitted in the porch area in 2013 (with reference to a photograph which shows that the board itself was stamped 03/01/13, which I take to be the production date rather than the installation date); and secondly, it refers to wooden chipboards being installed to the rear windows in 2021; (b) in her oral evidence, the Applicant said that barbed wire was not installed until 2020; (c) in her oral evidence, the Applicant said that the Fence (insofar as this might amount to a barrier) was not erected until 2021; (d) nothing is said in the statement of case about the Gate being blocked off (again, insofar as this might amount to a barrier), but it is mentioned in the evidence of Mr Morris. He asserted in his written evidence that he noticed an old fence panel had been placed across it to prevent access in 2021. It was put to him in cross-examination that the Gate was blocked off in 2015 or 2016, from which I infer that this is when the Applicant says it happened; (e) in her oral evidence, the Applicant said that signs on the door of the House were put up in 2019; (f) in her statement of case, there is reference to installing motion activated lights, but without any detail as to date. In her oral evidence, the Applicant mentioned 2017 & 2019. The skeleton argument gives a date of 2019.

41. What is clear from this analysis is that the Applicant is not saying she carried out all of these acts at once. Rather, they are a series of acts that she has carried out over the years, all of them after 8 th November 2010. It is not possible to infer from the other acts when the House was first secured.

42. There are clear issues with the Applicant’s evidence about securing the House. Most obviously, there is a straightforward lack of evidence about what was done and when. In addition, there are inconsistencies: 2009 is identified as a key date in the skeleton argument, whereas the Applicant in her oral evidence did not refer back that far, her specific evidence being that the hinges were installed in 2010 or 2011; and the statement of case suggests an escalation during lockdown, whereas the oral evidence suggests that trespassers had been a very frequent problem since 2010. Because of these issues with the evidence, I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probability that the Applicant secured the House prior to 8 th November 2010.

43. If I am wrong and the House was secured prior to 8 th November 2010, I can see that this might amount to factual possession – an appropriate degree of physical control – of the House. However, I cannot see that this, taken on its own, amounts to factual possession of the Property as a whole – it shows a degree of control over a distinct part of the Property only.

44. In any event, I am not satisfied that, in the particular circumstances of this case, securing the House demonstrates an intention to possess either the House or the Property. One matter that the Applicant’s evidence is clear about is that she was troubled by trespassers and associated anti-social behaviour in the vicinity of The Lodge. On her own case, most of the acts were expressly carried out to discourage and deter that. It seems to me that the Applicant’s intention was to exclude trespassers, not the world at large including the paper title owner. Clearance, cultivation, use

45. This part of the Applicant’s case is not focused on trespassers but rather is about her use and enjoyment of the Property as an extension of her garden.

46. The Applicant’s statement of case refers to “ ongoing ground maintenance ”, the Rear Garden being “ cultivated ”, and bonfires “ to clear the grounds of garden waste” from both the Property and the Lodge. There are photographs of a table and chairs, a reference to enjoying the grounds, and mention of encouraging daffodils and bluebells (albeit it is not said how). However, it is silent as to when any of these acts started happening.

47. It is difficult to identify what the Applicant’s case is in this regard: (a) there was a broad submission that the Applicant began to take control of the Property in 2005, but it seems to me this is based on the evidence of Mr Matthews repairing the boundary rather than anything more – I cannot see any evidence of acts going back that far; (b) the Applicant’s oral evidence was that the Property was overgrown in 2009, that it was not possible to step in it; (c) the Applicant’s oral evidence was that she and her family cleared the Property in 2009. She also that she employed local people to help in 2012 and 2017. She described the 2012 works as “ removing all the bushes, weeds and branches, clearing it ”, but it is hard to see how that would have been necessary if the Property had been cleared in 2009 and maintained/used thereafter; (d) it is notable that the timeline asserts “ Vegetation removed, visible upkeep began ” in 2013; (e) it is notable that the skeleton argument refers to the overgrowth being cleared in 2017-2019, and does not mention anything specific to clearance or cultivation any earlier; (f) the Shed, said to be used for housing tools for ongoing ground maintenance, was not erected until 2020; (g) the photographs of the table and chairs are recent (showing the Shed and Fence).

48. It is convenient here to mention Dr Harradine, who gave oral evidence. He said he had noticed a clearance in vegetation over time at the top end, the bottom (near the road) being more fully wooded; he referred to bonfires, the boarding up, the wire on the roof, the Fence; he said he was aware of an intrusion problem; and he described seeing a general improvement. However, he was not able to provide any assistance in respect of dates. Some of the acts he mentions came after 2010.

49. The Applicant’s case is wholly unclear as to what was done and when in terms of clearance, cultivation or use as a garden. I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probability that the Applicant has been carrying out any of these acts since before 8 th November 2010.

50. Even if I am wrong and some acts were carried out before 8 th November 2010, it is not possible to safely identify the extent of those acts (to consider, for example, whether they go above and beyond the trivial), and so I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probability that the Applicant has demonstrated an appropriate degree of physical control of the Property in this way. Other acts

51. The Applicant’s statement of case refers to disposing of harmful waste left in an existing shed, but does not say when this happened. In her oral evidence, the Applicant referred to sheds that had been removed, which I understood to be next to the House, and I believe includes the existing shed mentioned in her statement of case. This was not properly explained in her written case, and there are no photographs of these sheds either. In any event, neither in writing nor orally did she say when any of this was carried out. I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probability that either waste or sheds were removed prior to 8 th November 2010.

52. The other acts relied upon by the Applicant come later than the key date of 8 th November 2010. I make the following brief remarks for completeness: (a) the statement of case refers to the Applicant being the main point of contact for Scottish Power. The correspondence shows that Scottish Power’s activity was in 2013 & 2020; (b) the statement of case refers to paving being installed to the front of the House, but does not say when, nor did the Applicant give a date when she was cross-examined. The timeline and skeleton argument, however, give a timeframe of 2017-2019. I also note that the paving referred to is the laying of stepping stones rather than substantial groundworks; (c) in her oral evidence, the Applicant said that steps in the gap in the Hedge (not mentioned in the statement of case or timeline or skeleton argument) were installed in 2019; (d) in her oral evidence, the Applicant said that the Shed was not erected until 2020; (e) the asbestos report obtained by the Applicant is dated April 2025. Conclusion

53. It is not in dispute that the Applicant has carried out various acts at the Property in more recent years. A key issue, however, is whether she can establish that these acts have been carried out for long enough.

54. Taken at its absolute highest, the Applicant’s case, in terms of acts of possession where there is any reference to them being carried out on or before 8 th November 2010, is that she repaired and maintained a boundary with her own property, she entered into discussions with the Council regarding a tree preservation order, she secured the House, and she carried out clearance of the Rear Garden.

55. For the reasons I have already given, I am not satisfied that the Applicant can demonstrate that she did secure the House or clear the Rear Garden on or before 8 th November 2010. This is not because I have preferred the evidence on behalf of the First Respondent, but because the Applicant has not been able to establish her own case due to the gaps, uncertainties, and inconsistencies in her evidence.

56. In any event, and again for the reasons I have already given, I am not satisfied that these acts are sufficient to demonstrate adverse possession. I note for completeness that they are not sufficient even when taken collectively. Other matters

57. It is necessary to address some additional matters for completeness.

58. Firstly, as noted above, Ms Matthews was not permitted to give evidence herself. She sought permission at the start of the hearing, even though she had not provided a witness statement, and had not mentioned herself when she was asked during the site visit who would be giving evidence. She said it would not be fair on the Applicant otherwise, due to a language barrier (I will return to this issue later). Counsel for the First Respondent objected, on the basis that Ms Matthews was not a party, the First Respondent was entitled to advance warning, and the matter would need to be adjourned. I did not permit Ms Matthews to give oral evidence – to allow it would either be unfair to the First Respondent or would result in an adjournment; her application came too late.

59. In any event, I do not see that Ms Matthews giving evidence would have made any difference. She would have been limited to giving evidence based on what was in the statement of case, not introducing anything new, and the gaps in the Applicant’s case would have remained.

60. Secondly, there is Ms Matthews’ reference to a language barrier. It is worth noting that, on the papers, there was nothing to suggest that there might be any language difficulties, for example, documents had not been translated, and there had been no request to rely on an interpreter. The only warning was that Ms Matthews emailed the Tribunal the week before the hearing, referencing a language barrier, and asking that “ when she is questioned, simple and clear terms be used, and that acronyms or complex legal terminology be avoided where possible, to ensure she can understand to the best of her ability ”.

61. For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that the Applicant was able to understand the proceedings and the questions that were being asked of her, sometimes with the help of re-wording and/or repetition, and that she was able to communicate and convey her evidence. In particular, I note there were no communication issues in relation to the specific oral evidence I have referred to in this decision.

62. Ms Matthews made a submission in closing that the Applicant mixed up her dates. That may have been the case, but it was not due to a language barrier.

63. Thirdly, Ms Matthews referred to the Applicant being at a disadvantage because she was not legally represented, whilst the other side had a barrister and a solicitor (the First Respondent is himself a solicitor, albeit not in this field). This arose in two particular ways – one was that she was not aware of the legalities around providing witness statements, and the other was that she did not have access to case law.

64. As a general comment, it is incumbent on the parties to familiarise themselves with the relevant rules and procedure of the Tribunal, which apply to all parties whether they are represented or not. The Tribunal provides resources at the outset of the proceedings, its directions are clear, and its rules are easily accessible online. Not being legally represented is not an excuse.

65. I note for completeness that this applies equally to represented parties. Counsel for the First Respondent was not familiar with the form of statements of truth in the Tribunal, or rights of audience. Moreover, he was not aware of the relevant costs rules, expressing surprise that there is no requirement to demonstrate unreasonable conduct, and I do wonder whether his cross-examination of the Applicant would have been more limited had he understood the position correctly.

66. The reference to case law came about in the following way. Ms Matthews produced a skeleton argument ahead of the hearing, which at first blush presents a reasonable understanding of the law of adverse possession. However, on closer inspection, it does betray some errors. Counsel for the First Respondent suggested it had been generated using Artificial Intelligence (AI) and took objection to this. For her part, Ms Matthews explained that she had no legal background and readily accepted that she had used AI in carrying out her research.

67. As I explained during the hearing, there is nothing wrong with using AI of itself. The difficulty, however, is that AI is not always accurate. I also explained that, if a party wants to rely on case law in support of a particular proposition, they should bring copies of the case to the hearing, and should be able to explain why it is they say the case supports that proposition, for example with reference to a particular paragraph or statement.

68. It became clear that Ms Matthews had not brought copies of the cases referred to in her skeleton argument, but more importantly she had not read them, and so was not able to explain her arguments. She argued that she and the Applicant were at a disadvantage compared to the First Respondent (who was represented) and the Tribunal, who had access to the cases. I explained that many cases, and certainly the important ones, are available to the public. Moreover, the Tribunal is well used to dealing with litigants in person and explaining the relevant principles. Rather, the particular issue here is that she put forward positive propositions without being able to justify them. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not accept that the Applicant was at any disadvantage.

69. Fourthly, I deal with the arguments raised by Ms Matthews. One of the particular propositions she put forward was that the evidence of Ms Esplen paying rates at the property is not sufficient to rebut adverse possession. Whether this proposition is correct and/or whether the case she relied upon is good authority for it is not relevant in circumstances where I have found that the Applicant cannot establish adverse possession on her own evidence. Insofar as Ms Matthews argued that paying rates does not amount to ownership, I note that Ms Esplen is able to rely on her paper title.

70. Another was that long periods of inaction by the paper owner support the inference of adverse possession, said to be in reliance on the case of Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623 . I cannot see how this proposition arises from the Moran case, nor do I accept that it is correct. To succeed, the Applicant must go into adverse possession of the Property, and she cannot rely on the inaction of the owner as showing that she has done so.

71. Much of Ms Matthews’ argument was focused on criticising Ms Esplen’s lack of action, for example, describing her involvement as reactionary rather than showing active management. She also argued that documentary title does not defeat adverse possession, which is undoubtedly correct. However, these submissions miss the fact that the Applicant must show that she has gone into adverse possession, and her difficulty is that I do not accept she has.

72. Finally, because of the analysis above, it has not been necessary for me to make findings on certain disputes, for example, as to how often Ms Esplen visited the Property, or whether the First Respondent’s witnesses were correct in their evidence that acts had not been carried out at the Property until around 2020/1, or the extent of the trespassing problem, or the Applicant’s own plans and motivations for the Property. I have not set out or discussed any of this evidence in this decision.

73. However, it is worth recording the following: (a) firstly, Ms Esplen’s oral evidence. Ms Esplen is an elderly lady who, I was told, suffers from various health issues. The one that affected her giving evidence was that she has considerable difficulty hearing (and does not use a hearing aid). Ultimately, she was able to give her evidence with both myself and Ms Matthews sitting in very close proximity to her, raising the volume of our voices, and repeating and/or rephrasing questions, to ensure that she could hear. I am grateful to everybody, especially Ms Esplen herself and Ms Matthews, for being accommodating in this regard; (b) Counsel for the First Respondent was not permitted to pursue an argument that the Applicant wanted the Property for her son, who was allegedly restricted in his movements due to a recent criminal conviction, in circumstances where nothing about the conviction or sentencing had been mentioned in the written case and was not properly evidenced; (c) Counsel for the First Respondent was also not permitted to pursue an argument that the Applicant’s first application to HM Land Registry (which referenced being in adverse possession for 20 years and would have put her in adverse possession before Ms Hunter’s death) contained a falsehood when this had not been put to her in cross-examination. Conclusion

74. For the reasons given above, I am not satisfied that the Applicant can demonstrate adverse possession of the Property. I will therefore direct the Chief Land Registrar to cancel the Applicant’s application, and to give effect to the First Respondent’s application as if the objection of the Applicant had not been made. I urge the parties to co-operate in relation to any consequential matters arising from this decision.

75. I turn to consider costs. Ordinarily, the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party: see rule 13(1)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013 and paragraph 9.1(b) of the Practice Direction. Here, that would be an order that the Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs, unless there is some good reason to make a different order.

76. A party may claim costs even if they are unrepresented (litigant in person costs are allowed at the rate of £19 per hour unless the litigant can prove financial loss), and can also claim any properly evidenced disbursements. Costs are potentially recoverable from the date of the reference to the Tribunal, which, in the case of the First Respondent’s application, took place on 31 st October 2023.

77. Any application for costs should be sent to the Tribunal and the other side by 5pm on 24 th February 2026, and should include an estimate of the amount of costs sought. Further directions will then be given as appropriate. Dated this Tuesday 27 th January 2026 Laura D’Cruz By Order of The Tribunal