UK case law

General Medical Council, R (on the application of) v Barton

[2007] EWHC ADMIN 143 · High Court (Administrative Court) · 2007

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Full judgment

1. MR JUSTICE WILKIE: This is an application by the General Medical Council (GMC) for an order extending an interim suspension for a further period of 12 months. 2. The subject of the order - Dr Barton - is represented. Initially, on instructions, she was seeking an adjournment which would only have been forthcoming on terms that she paid the costs thrown away by the adjournment. An opportunity was given for those instructions to be considered and, if need be, changed. She has agreed to submit to an order for the extension of the interim period of suspension, but subject to the inclusion of a liberty to apply clause. The claimant has not sought to argue against the inclusion of that provision, and, in my judgment, rightly so. 3. The matters the subject of investigation, it seems to me, are such that they ought properly to be fully investigated within a relatively short period of time. Matters have already been going on for some 18 months albeit, for about a year of that period, matters were at a stalemate because of the inaction on the part of the defendant. But nonetheless it seems to me that the claimant is seeking for itself quite a generous period of time in order to complete what on the face of it should not take terribly long. 4. It seems to me therefore right that the defendant should have the facility of bringing the matter back to court in order to try to hurry matters along if they are taking too long. Therefore, in my judgment, it is not only a proper provision to add but one which meets the justice of the case, and without the attendance of both parties today would not have been included. While therefore normally one would make an order for costs where such an order has been made and attendance has been necessary because of the absence of any prior consent, it seems to me that in the particular circumstances of this case it would not be just to make an order for costs against the defendant. Therefore notwithstanding Miss Bex's attractive argument to the contrary, I will make no order as to costs.