Elena Gennadievna Kroupeeva v Mikhail Viacheslavovich Kroupeev

1. This is my judgment on the outcome of the application for financial remedies made by the applicant wife, Elena Gennadievna Kroupeeva (“W”), in Form A dated 8 July 2024, against the respondent husband, Mikhail Viacheslavovich Kroupeev (“H”).

2. W is represented by Justin Warshaw KC and Tom Dance, instructed by Payne Hicks Beach. She previously instructed Vardags, who ceased acting for her shortly before the first directions appointment hearing. I am grateful to Justin Warshaw KC and Tom Dance for their submissions made on behalf of the applicant.

3. H formerly instructed Harbottle & Lewis, but they ceased acting for him in February 2024, the day before he was due to make a payment under a legal services payment order (“LSPO”) which I made on 28 January 2025. Since that time, H has acted in person. He has not attended any court hearings in person although he has attended several hearings by CVP and has instructed leading and junior counsel on a direct access basis on a number of occasions.

4. Although H has not entirely disengaged from these proceedings since February 2025, his engagement has been significantly tainted by his ongoing breach of various court orders. These breaches include his failure to make financial disclosure and file evidence as ordered and his failure to pay money pursuant to LSPO, maintenance pending suit and costs orders. In respect of some of these breaches, suspended committal orders were made against H, which were subsequently activated due to his ongoing breach. H remained in breach of those orders throughout the final hearing.

5. H was not represented at the final hearing and attended by telephone from Cyprus. He relied on the worldwide freezing order dated 11 April 2025 to argue that he had no access to funds to pay for representation. As I will explain below, I am satisfied that the exceptions included in the worldwide freezing order permitted H to spend up to £10,000/month in respect of legal fees. I further find that it was open to H to apply at the hearings before me in September 2025 and January 2026 for a further exception had he needed or wished to do so, such a further exception having been sought and granted in respect of an earlier hearing. I therefore find that it was H’s choice not to be represented within these proceedings, specifically at this final hearing, and that he could have obtained legal representation had he wanted to do so. Consequently, I consider that his Article 6 rights have not been breached. Summary Factual Background

6. The essential background facts are as follows. H and W are both 59 years old and of Russian origin. They met as 18 year old students in a small town about 2 hours from Moscow. After H had completed his military service, they married in June 1988. They moved to London in 1993. They both hold dual Russian-British citizenship. H also claims to be tax resident in Cyprus.

7. There are two adult children of the family, Alice (born 1997, age 28) and Roman (born 2004, age 21), who live with W (and formerly with H) at the former matrimonial home in St John’s Wood, London. Since moving to the UK, W has been a homemaker and primary carer for the children and has not undertaken any paid work outside the home, while H has worked as an international businessman involved in oil, gas, energy and related investments through various corporate and trust structures.

8. H’s business interests developed from his early career in Russia’s energy sector. Having worked for the Ministry of Energy in Russia and developed business contacts there, particularly with members of the Shafranik family, the parties’ move to London in 1993 was part of a deliberate strategy to develop a business presence in the energy sector in the UK. H established Waterford Finance & Investment Ltd (“Waterford”) as distinct from Waterford Finance and Investment Limited (UK) (03478593), Waterford Finance & Investment Limited (UK) (03100777) and Waterford Finance and Investment Limited (Cyprus). , originally in Guernsey, later in the Seychelles, as the principal holding vehicle for various long-term oil, gas and energy-related investments, predominantly in higher-risk emerging markets. The Rossini Trust, an offshore discretionary trust originally settled in 1995, holds the entire share capital of Waterford. H and the children are discretionary beneficiaries, as was W until the beginning of these proceedings.

9. Over time, Waterford acquired and traded in significant holdings in a number of companies. For example, in 2008/9, Waterford sold its stake in a UK-listed company called Emerald Energy for c.£138m. Waterford currently holds a controlling stake in Gulfsands Petroleum Plc (“Gulfsands”), an unlisted UK oil company with a 50% interest in a production sharing contract for Block 26 in Syria, and a majority stake in Jupiter Energy Ltd (“Jupiter”), an ASX-listed company with assets in Kazakhstan, and a minority stake in a Turkish company, Serra Gayrimenkul Yatirim, which owns a hotel/villa complex in Turkey. Waterford (directly or through subsidiaries) also held or holds interests in various other entities and investments associated with projects in Africa, Russia and elsewhere. H also operates out of Cyprus, where he is a director and sole shareholder of Casten Holdings Ltd (Cyprus) (“Casten”) and Waterford Finance and Investment Limited (Cyprus). He has disclosed a director’s salary there and a more modest salary from Gulfsands.

10. Historically, the trustees of the Rossini Trust advanced substantial shareholder and director loans to H, deriving from the assets and/or profits of Waterford (and possibly a further company called Lynminster Limited (“Lynminster”)). H accepts that it was this funding which underpinned the acquisition of the parties’ various real properties and financed their family expenditure during the marriage. In December 2024, the former trustee of the Rossini Trust based in Guernsey, Fides Trust Limited, was replaced with a trustee in the Seychelles, Apollo Business Solutions (Pty) Limited, and Waterford was “migrated” to the Seychelles in circumstances I will refer to below.

11. In his updating disclosure, H said that Waterford and its associated companies are “de facto bankrupt”, with illiquid assets and large debts to third party creditors, specifically two entities called Ermak Venture Limited (“Ermak”) and Fenix Assets Management Ltd (Seychelles) (“Fenix”). Thus, he says, Waterford has a negative or negligible net value. W disputes this, relying on the limited disclosure H has provided, publicly available information and historic deals (including the Emerald Energy transaction in 2008/9) to suggest that Waterford, Casten Waterford (Cyprus) and related entities still represent very substantial, though opaque, business wealth, all under H’s effective control.

12. During the marriage the parties enjoyed an exceptionally high standard of living, described by W as “of the highest possible” and by H as “generous”. Since 2005, the family have lived in a mortgage-free seven-bedroom house in St John’s Wood, finished to a luxury specification, and had the use of several other homes abroad, including villas in Portugal and Turkey, as well as multiple properties in Russia. The household was supported by a retinue of staff: in London a housekeeper, driver/handyman and at least one cleaner (W says two), with further staff maintaining the Russian homes and a long-standing nanny who later became a housekeeper.

13. The family’s travel arrangements also reflected substantial wealth: historically they used a private jet purchased through Waterford in 2008 and, after its sale (said by H to be in 2018, although that is not accepted by W), chartered private jets for personal travel, including to Portugal, alongside frequent business-class flights. Holidays were taken several times a year in five-star hotels worldwide, with an annual Christmas trip to Mustique, renting a villa at a cost said to exceed £200,000 per trip, plus premium flights for the family and staff. W described substantial expenditure on designer clothing (including twice-yearly shopping trips to Milan) and luxury goods, and H maintained collections of fine wine, watches and guns. The children were privately educated in England, and H met the costs of school fees and significant living expenses for them and, H accepted, for the children of a further family for whom he took on financial responsibility.

14. The marriage broke down in August 2023 when W discovered that H had been maintaining a “second family” in Russia, including his son, Mikhail (now aged 16), whose mother is called Ekaterina, and Ekaterina’s son by former partner, Alexander. W described being “shocked and devastated” by this revelation. The parties separated in August 2023. This was therefore a long marriage of about 35 years.

15. It is W’s case that, from 2023, H progressively reduced the level of financial support he had been providing to W throughout the marriage. Her case is that she formerly had access to c.£40,000/month via a bank account and credit card, on top of H’s direct funding of the running costs, including staff, of all the properties and paying for travel and holidays, but that by late 2024, the “status quo” had effectively been terminated. It is W’s case, not denied by H, that since the hearing on 17 March 2025, H has not paid anything at all to her, to the children or in respect of the costs of the former matrimonial home or the family’s staff and that he has either charged her for use of, or prevented her having access to, the property in Portugal.

16. H’s case is that he has had limited liquid funds, that he could not afford to meet W’s legal costs, let alone his own, and decided instead to prioritise his other personal and business spending to “survive” for 12 months. He accepts that in the 12 months from October 2024 to September 2025 he has spent over £523,000 on his Amex card. He also accepts that he has continued to pay for Mikhail’s private education at an English boarding school and Alexander’s tuition fees and living expenses at a London university, whilst also continuing to contribute to towards Ekaterina’s living costs. Summary Procedural Background

17. Following the breakdown of the marriage, W initially applied for a divorce but subsequently, and before that application was served upon H, she agreed to H’s request not to apply for a divorce for five years whilst H “put his affairs in order.” Instead, she commenced proceedings for judicial separation which were served on H in June 2024. W filed Form A, dated 8 July 2024. H responded by making a sole application for divorce issued on 31 July 2024. Consequently, W’s application for judicial separation was set aside by consent on 22 August 2024 and her Form A was “linked” to the divorce proceedings initiated by H. A conditional order of divorce was made on 19 February 2025.

18. Upon W’s application dated 27 September 2024, the financial remedies application was allocated to a judge of High Court level sitting in the Family Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice. The case was allocated by Peel J to me and listed for a 1 day First Directions Appointment hearing on 28 January 2025.

19. Over the course of the next few months, various applications were made by the parties: 19.1. H’s D11 application dated 21 October 2024 (“the Imerman application”). 19.2. W’s application for MPS, dated 3 December 2024 (“the MPS application”). 19.3. W’s application for an LSPO, dated 3 January 2025 (“the LSPO application”). 19.4. H’s application to adduce expert evidence from Evidence Matters Ltd in relation his Imerman application, dated 17 January 2025 (“the Evidence Matters Ltd application”). 19.5. W’s (unissued) application in relation to the instruction of experts (“the Part 25 application”) dated 24 January 2025.

20. I made an order on 6 December 2024 to list a further 1 day hearing to determine the MPS application, having considered there would be insufficient time to determine it at the hearing on 28 January 2025.

21. Two weeks before the hearing on 28 January 2025, W’s solicitors, Vardags, came off the record and about a week before that hearing were replaced by Payne Hicks Beach.

22. At the hearing on 28 January 2025, at which both parties were present and represented by leading and junior counsel, I made various case management directions, including: 22.1. replies to questionnaires and disclosure of documents from H and W, including a timetable for W to refine her questionnaire, any disputes about questions to be determined by me on paper, and H to answer the approved questions; 22.2. the appointment of single joint experts to value: (i) the former matrimonial home, (ii) the Portuguese property, (iii) the Russian properties, and (iv) “the Businesses” (Waterford, Waterford Cyprus, Waterford UK and their subsidiaries/investments save Serra), appointing Luke Steadman of Alvarez & Marsal as SJE for the businesses; the property valuers’ fees were capped (£5,000 + VAT for the former matrimonial home, £6,250 + VAT for Portugal) and directed to be met by H in the first instance; likewise the Russian valuations and the business valuation (capped at £180,000 + VAT); my order set a timetable for expert instructions, delivery of reports, and written questions to experts; 22.3. updating disclosure before a private FDR, disapplying the in-court FDR and requiring the parties to attend a private FDR before Nigel Dyer KC on 23 July 2025, followed by a post-PFDR directions hearing before me in September 2025.

23. I also made an LSPO requiring H to pay £195,789 to W’s solicitors by 11 February 2025 towards her past and future legal costs up to the further consideration of W’s LSPO application at the MPS hearing fixed for 17 March 2025. H failed to make this payment on time or at all. H had, however, paid his own solicitors c.£330,000 for work undertaken by them before they ceased acting for him on 10 February 2025 and he paid a further £42,000 subsequently. H wrote openly to W’s solicitors offering: “I will pay Elena £300,000 which is about half of the money in the account. She will meet her own costs after that and I will meet mine, including Portugal and Turkey.”

24. On 18 February 2025, H applied for permission to appeal (i) the LSPO and (ii) the order that he pay the SJE business valuation fees in the first instance. That application was later dismissed by Moylan LJ on 26 June 2025 as being “totally without merit”.

25. By the time the matter came back before me on 17 March 2025, H was in substantial breach of the orders I had made on 28 January 2025, as follows: 25.1. H had failed to select valuers for the former matrimonial home and Portuguese property from those proposed on behalf of W (although he belatedly chose Knight Frank and CPU) and failed to engage with the drafting of, or to sign, the letters of instruction; 25.2. H had failed to propose valuers for the Russian properties and failed to engage with the draft letters of instruction; 25.3. H had failed to engage with the letter of instruction for the SJE business valuer and in fact had written to the SJE to instruct him not to undertake any valuation work (as he was appealing my order in that regard); 25.4. He was in breach of the £195,789 LSPO order, as set out above.

26. Consequently, at the hearing on 17 March 2025 I also considered a further application made by W on 3 March 2025 to: 26.1. vary my earlier case-management directions in the light of H’s non-compliance; 26.2. make an order preventing H from applying for a final order of divorce until after W’s financial remedies application had been determined; and 26.3. adjourn the PFDR.

27. I was also asked to: 27.1. make a further LSPO in respect of W’s future costs up to and including a PFDR; 27.2. add to the LSPO in W’s favour the costs of the SJE’s (on the basis that she would pay them in the first instance); and 27.3. make orders for the sale of certain of H’s personal belongings to meet the LSPO in the event of ongoing non-payment by H.

28. On 17 March 2025, I made orders as follows: 28.1. a second LSPO of £430,000 in W’s favour for her costs up to and including a PFDR and SJE disbursements (which I have formerly ordered to be paid by H in the first instance); 28.2. delivery up of H’s watches (c.£320,000) and gun collection (c.£160,000) for sale to meet H’s LSPO liability. 28.3. MPS at an annual rate of £229,018 (approx. £19,084 pcm), plus the payment of listed outgoings on the former matrimonial home; 28.4. directions for service of documents upon H by post to Waterford (UK) in London and by e-mail; 28.5. directions for the progression of W’s request for a judgment summons in relation to H’s default under the first LSPO; 28.6. specific disclosure by H of bank statements and items missing from his Form E; 28.7. revised orders for single joint experts to value the former matrimonial home, the parties’ Portuguese and Russian properties and H’s businesses; 28.8. prohibiting H from applying for a final order of divorce pending a final financial remedies order; 28.9. adjourning the PFDR and fixing a further directions hearing; 28.10. a costs order of c.£93,000, to be offset against the LSPO made on 18 January 2025; and 28.11. refusing H’s application for permission to appeal.

29. I also gave directions on W’s application for a judgment summons in respect of the unpaid LSPO of £195,789.

30. On 25 March 2025, in the immediate aftermath of my 17 March 2025 orders, W made an urgent without notice application for a worldwide freezing order. Her sixth statement explained that on 19 March 2025 the family driver, Val, had asked Alice and Roman to sign a series of “official‑sounding” documents referring to the Rossini Trust, Waterford, Asia Gas & Oil, a Seychelles entity and UBP. The children reported that they had been told they were signing documents to protect their position on H’s death but were not allowed time to read or photograph the documents. W feared that H was moving assets or engineering changes to trust and banking arrangements to defeat her claims and/or complicate enforcement.

31. There followed a number of hearings and orders: 31.1. on 25 March 2025, Poole J made a without notice worldwide freezing injunction, including an order that H file affidavit evidence as to the documents which his children had been asked to sign, returnable on 11 April 2025; 31.2. on 11 April 2025, Harrison J made an on notice worldwide freezing order and a costs order against H; 31.3. on 7 May 2025, I made an order under s.39 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 nominating W’s solicitors to sign instructions to procure the release (for sale) of H’s shotguns. 31.4. on 14 May 2025, Trowell J made an interim charging order; gave directions on W’s application for judgment summons and her intended contempt application, listing the same before Harrison J on 18 June 2025; he also gave permission to W to amend her Form A; 31.5. on 20 May 2025, Ms Nicola Davey, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, made a third party disclosure and preservation order; 31.6. on 5 June 2025, MacDonald J made a final charging order; 31.7. on 9 June 2025, Harris J ordered a witness summons; 31.8. on 11 June Mr Nicholas Allen KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, made a further preservation order and orders relating to the witness summons and preservation orders; 31.9. on 18 June 2026, Harrison J heard the judgment summons and contempt applications and on 25 June 2025 he made a suspended committal order against H within the judgment summons proceedings; 31.10. on 17 July 2025, Harrison J amended the worldwide freezing order; 31.11. on 23 July 2025, Harrison J made a final committal order in relation to the contempt proceedings; and 31.12. on 28 July 2025, Poole J activated the suspended committal orders made in the contempt and judgment summons proceedings.

32. The matter returned to me for a directions hearing on 23 September 2025, when I made directions as to: 32.1. joinder of, and service of documents from the proceedings upon, The Rossini Trust, Apollo Business Solutions (Pty) Limited, the trustees in the Seychelles, Waterford (Guernsey/Seychelles) and Hirundo LLC (pursuant to W’s application made on 12 September 2025); 32.2. section 25 statements; 32.3. updating financial disclosure; 32.4. dispensing with an FDR; 32.5. listing a final hearing and PTR and giving directions as to attendance and bundles; 32.6. I also made an attachment of earnings order, and 32.7. a third party disclosure order against American Express; and 32.8. I adjourned to the end of the final hearing W’s application in relation to H’s hard drive (which was subject to the Preservation order dated 1 June 2025) and W’s application in relation to Ms Aygul Rakhimova.

33. At the PTR on 26 January 2026, I made further case-management directions in advance of the final hearing.

34. At the final hearing, which began on 23 February 2026, H attended remotely via CVP having made an application to do so shortly before the final hearing, which I granted. It was his case that it was only possible to connect via audio, not video, from Cyprus. Mr Warshaw sought to adduce the evidence of a Cypriot lawyer via CVP to demonstrate that attendance via video from Cyprus was possible. H objected on the basis that his security may be jeopardised. I permitted the application on the strict understanding that no details of the case or as to H’s whereabouts were to be disclosed to the Cypriot lawyer. However, despite two attempts, the Cypriot lawyer was unable to connect via CVP. Mr Warshaw therefore withdrew his application. W’s Case

35. The case advanced on behalf of W is that, after a long marriage to which she has made a full contribution, and since the parties’ wealth is entirely matrimonial, she has a full sharing claim.

36. As to the size of her sharing claim, she relies upon: 36.1. The scale of the visible assets held by H; 36.2. H’s role within the Rossini Trust/Waterford and other corporate structures and the extent of historic provision to the family from/through those entities; 36.3. Adverse inferences as to H’s financial resources both personally and held through the Rossini Trust and corporate structures, such inferences being based upon: 36.3.1. H’s limited disclosure; 36.3.2. publicly available information regarding H’s business dealings, including historic transactions in which H was involved, including through the Rossini Trust and corporate structures; 36.3.3. gaps and inconsistencies within in H’s financial disclosure and his written, documentary and oral evidence; 36.3.4. H’s contempt of court orders; 36.3.5. the incident in which the parties’ children were made to sign unknown documents in the back of the car on 19 March 2025; 36.3.6. the movement of the Rossini Trust from Guernsey to the Seychelles during the course of these proceedings; 36.3.7. the dismissal of H’s long-term PA and the removal of her access to historic data (which W may otherwise have obtained through third-party disclosure); 36.3.8. the standard of living enjoyed by the family for an extensive period during the marriage and its sudden termination when the marriage broke down; 36.3.9. H’s secrecy regarding, and funding of, his “second family”; and 36.3.10. H’s actual recent spending on his Amex card.

37. In relation to the assets held within the Rossini Trust/Waterford structure, it is primarily argued on behalf of W, relying on Hope v Krejci and Others [2012] EWHC 1780 (Fam) and DR v GR and Others (Financial Remedy: Variation of Overseas Trust) [2013] EWHC 1196 (Fam) , that the entire setup of the Rossini Trust/Waterford structure, including its wholly owned and subsidiary companies and company owed assets, when viewed as a whole, is a nuptial settlement capable of variation. Alternatively, it is argued that the prohibition upon “telescoping” through the corporate veil (save in the limited circumstances identified in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 ) applies to the property regime to which s.24(1) (a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 refers, but not to the variation powers of the court under s.24(1) (c). Therefore, whether the Rossini Trust alone or the entire Rossini Trust/Waterford structure including its subsidiaries and underlying assets constitutes the nuptial settlement capable of variation, either way the court may transfer to W specific assets, including those held within subsidiary companies, by way of a variation pursuant to s.24(1) (c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

38. Specifically, W seeks: 38.1. transfer to her of the former matrimonial home in London (c.£14.4m); 38.2. the transfer to her of a property in Portugal held by Hirundo LLC, a Delaware company of which H is the exclusive shareholder (c.£10.5m); 38.3. transfer to her of some of the properties held directly by H in Russia (c.£15.6m); 38.4. further transfers to her of assets held within the Rossini trust, specifically 50% of the Gulfsands shares held by Waterford and the Turkish villa (c.£2.6m) held within a subsidiary company called Serra Gayrimenkul Yatirim; 38.5. a lump sum payment of £30 million; 38.6. a further sum of c.£2.1m referable to W’s outstanding costs and other debt;, and 38.7. continuing MPS pending payment of the lump sums.

39. It is W’s case that the above assets total c.£73 million (plus 50% of the Gulfsands shares). H’s Case

40. H’s case is that he has given full and frank disclosure to the court of all his assets and liabilities. He accepts there are some deficiencies, yet he maintains that his disclosure was a fair reflection of his financial resources and, although it was not perfect, that he had done his best.

41. H does not accept that any of the assets held through the Rossini Trust, including Waterford and its subsidiaries, are his assets or that they are relevant to meeting W’s claims. H relies on the fact that the trust was settled by a third party and that Waterford was settled into the trust by a third party. H asserts the trustees’ independence to the point that he could be removed as a beneficiary if they chose.

42. H asserts that W is attempting to ascribe value to numerous assets that either no longer exist or that have no current value.

43. H argues that W’s case ignores the reality of the creditor’s run against Waterford which he says has been brought about by these proceedings and by W’s collusion with Denis Shafranik to defraud Waterford of Gulfsands shares. H says that Fenix is a genuine creditor, owned by a large Russian family that is subject to sanctions, that Ermak is owned by the Shafranik family, and that both families can be “very dangerous”.

44. H denies that his recent spending undermines his case, stating that having left the former matrimonial home with nothing, he needed to buy clothes etc. in order to present professionally as the non-executive chair of Gulfsands and he needed to incur business expenditure to fulfil that role.

45. H asserts that the family’s available resources had been reducing for several years before the marriage broke down and that their lifestyle at the end was not what it was formerly.

46. H complains that W’s offer would give her 96% of the assets, leaving him with 4%. H offers to share the assets he has disclosed with W in the terms of his open offer, namely: 46.1. the former matrimonial home will be transferred to W; 46.2. The Altufevskoe flat in Moscow will be transferred to W; 46.3. the parties’ chattels in England, Portugal and Turkey will be divided, each party retaining their “valuable things”; 46.4. H will pay W £300,000 (which was what he asserted was half of his cash when he made the offer in February 2025 and has, he says, reduced since then); 46.5. Each party would meet their own costs; 46.6. W will have access to Portugal and Turkey on dates to be agreed for the next 18 months (unless H sells it sooner); and 46.7. A clean break. W’s Evidence

47. W’s written evidence is contained in her Form E, ten subsequent statements and two affidavits. She was cross-examined briefly by H, over the audio connection. In particular, she answered questions as to the following: 47.1. As to the level of spending during the marriage, W recalled that H would from time to time say that he was not happy with the level of spending. She recalled her typical response, suggesting that he rent out or sell some of their properties, whereupon H would suggest they talk about it later, and after some time it would not come to anything. W accepted that H had voluntarily spent money on various relatives, including hers, but she said she was not aware at what level. 47.2. In the context of H denying that he had an office in Moscow and presenting his relationship with Yuri Shafranik as a friend rather than as a business partner, W was clear that H had an ongoing business relationship with Yuri Shafranik, that they shared an office in Moscow which H had explicitly described to W during the marriage as “my office”, that she recalled collecting H from his office - she agreed she had not in fact been inside - to drive together to a New Year party and that she knew the names of and had interacted with his Moscow PA and that H and Yuri Shafranik frequently spent time together at family social gatherings, taking themselves to one side to discuss what she assumed to be business matters. 47.3. In response to H’s question about what she knew about any interest he may have in Soyuzneftegas and a winery in Crimea – which he denies – W referred to what she had been told by H during the marriage in the context of his business relationship with Yuri Shafranik. She also recalled H arranging for a delivery of his wine, from the Maganom appellation in Crimea, to a church and recalls that they would drink the wine and that it won a prize in France. 47.4. As to the Rossini Trust, W gave evidence that when Roman was about 5 or 6, H told her that the Rossini Trust was a family trust and that Roman was a beneficiary. 47.5. H specifically challenged W as to the sale of a Mercedes car by her to H’s driver, Val. W’s response was that Val had paid half (£15,000) of the agreed amount (£30,000) and would transfer the car to him when he paid the balance (£15,000), although she wished to do so after the divorce was over and in the context of him returning various keys and remote controls for the former matrimonial home that she says he took when he left. 47.6. H asked W if she had met with and received any money from Denis Shafranik. W answered that she had met him and he had given her £4,000 for utility bills and groceries. W denied that Denis had asked her for anything in return and denied colluding with him to defraud Waterford.

48. Overall, I was left with the clear impression that W gave straightforward, matter of fact evidence in answer to questions. Her evidence was coherent and consistent with her documentary evidence. Her tone and presentation showed a demonstrable restraint of her frustration and anger at how she feels she has been treated by H, in particular since the breakdown of the marriage and in relation to his financial support of his “second family”, at how H has conducted himself in these proceedings and at what she firmly believes to be H’s outright lies concerning the nature and extent of his wealth. H’s Evidence

49. H’s written and documentary evidence was contained in his original Form E, three statements, an updated Form E and his position statement for the final hearing (was supported by a statement of truth).

50. However, the gaps in H’s financial disclosure and written evidence are, in my view, highly relevant: 50.1. H has not provided the missing documentary evidence required by the rubric to his original Form E, despite being ordered to do so on 17 March 2025 and despite having been found by Harrison J on 25 June 2025 to be in contempt of court for this breach. 50.2. H has not replied to W’s questionnaire and request for documents, despite having been ordered to do so on 28 January and 17 March 2025 and despite having been found by Harrison J on 25 June 2025 to be in contempt of court for this breach. 50.3. H has not provided a full run of his UBP bank statements despite being ordered to do so on 17 March 2025 and despite having been found by Harrison J on 25 June 2025 to be in contempt of court for this breach. 50.4. H has not provided an affidavit explaining why Alice and Roman were asked to sign documents on 19 March 2025, nor has he provided copies of all such documents shown to them on that day, as ordered by Poole J on 25 March 2025, and despite having been found by Harrison J on 25 June 2025 to be in contempt of court for this breach. 50.5. H has not complied with the order made on 23 September 2025 to serve updating financial disclosure: his updated Form E dated 27 January 2026 does not append to it the documents that he was ordered to provide, most notably updating bank statements, business accounts and trust accounts.

51. Mr Warshaw’s cross-examination of H sought to fill in some of these gaps. H’s oral evidence in this regard can be summarised as follows: 51.1. H gave conflicting accounts as to how he was funding his recent travel expenditure; he first stated that it was paid for through an agent who was in turn paid by Waterford via the trustee of Rossini Trust. He later stated that he paid for it on a card, describing his earlier evidence as a mistake rather than misleading or a lie. 51.2. H accepted that he had obtained those UBP statements which he had disclosed by requesting them by e-mail from his banker (whom he declined to identify). He did not explain why he had declined to ask for or provide any further UBP statements. He accepted that Waterford also had accounts at UBP which it used to pay funds to Gulfsands. 51.3. When asked why he had not replied as ordered to the questionnaire concerning his Cypriot apartment and the payment of rent, he replied “Why does it matter?”, and offered some details of the lease and of how much rent he paid. 51.4. When asked why he has not replied, as ordered, to other questions in the questionnaire he stated, rhetorically, that because he could not answer 90% of the questionnaire (his reason being that a significant number of questions related to the Rossini Trust/Waterford structure which were not his personal assets, and so should have been directed to the trustee) why should he answer the rest as he would have been criticised anyway? In respect of other questions, he explained that he did not reply because he could not remember the detail or information sought (including in relation to transactions between August 2023 and August 2024). 51.5. H agreed that he had spent c.£523,000 on his Amex card in the year to September 2025. 51.6. H repeatedly stated that he was unable to reply to questions regarding Waterford and when it was suggested that he was refusing because the answers would reveal the truth about his wealth, his answer was there is no wealth and no evidence of any. Specifically, he stated that any value of Gulfsands and Jupiter was speculative and, less the liabilities, was nothing. 51.7. H accepted that he was able to communicate with the trustee of the Rossini Trust (both the former trustee in Guernsey and the current trustee in the Seychelles) by e-mail, although he declined to give the name of the new trustee and stated that he had deleted the e-mails. H also accepted that he had spoken to the new trustee about a month ago. 51.8. He explained that the move from Guernsey to the Seychelles was “pure luck” arising because the former Guernsey trustee got into some regulatory difficulty and needed to find an alternative trustee for the Rossini Trust. The former trustee eventually located the current trustee, Apollo Business Solutions (Pty) Ltd, in the Seychelles, having had difficulty identifying another Guernsey trustee to take on the trust because of H’s place of birth. H said he had nothing to do with that choice, and the fact that he had visited the Seychelles, where he had gone fishing, 6 months earlier was merely a coincidence. H also stated that because the trust moved to the Seychelles, Waterford had to migrate there as well, which it did in February 2025. 51.9. H accepted that he did not disclose the trust’s or Waterford’s move to the Seychelles, which occurred the month after he swore his Form E, to W or the court at the hearing on 28 January 2025, when he was represented by solicitors and counsel, or in fact at all until the pre-trial review hearing on 26 January 2026. He did not do so because the “jurisdiction change was not a material event”. 51.10. He accepted that he obtained the 2023 trust accounts from the former Guernsey trustee. When asked if he had requested the trust deed from the trustee, he stated that he had not asked them. When asked about a letter of wishes, he replied that the Rossini Trust was “quite unique” and that he did not have a letter of wishes. H agreed that he asked the trustee to procure the letter from Mr LaBlache, an attorney in the Seychelles where the trust is now located, that he exhibited to his s.25 statement. 51.11. H relied on the fact that the trustee made provision to him by way of loans not distributions as proof that he had no control over the trust. Again, he relied on the lack of proof that the trustees did what he said as proof of their independence, although he admitted that he had deleted the e-mails he had sent to the trustee. 51.12. H proffered an explanation, for the first time, that it was not him but the trustee who, via the London Waterford office and Val the driver, had sought Alice and Roman’s signatures on documents on 19 March 2025. He stated that the documents they had been required to sign had been destroyed, stating on one occasion that they were destroyed on site by his driver, Val, and later on stating, “I’ve destroyed them”. 51.13. As to the origin of the Rossini Trust, H described how in 1995 when he first arrived in London, he heard the idea of a Guernsey Trust from two Australian venture capitalists who were using a Guernsey Trust. Although he said he knew nothing about such trusts at the time, he recalled his original understanding was that the trust would hold investment companies and he would be a beneficiary. H’s case, supported by the letter from M. LaBlache, was that the trust was settled in December 1995, some 7 years after the marriage. H recalled that the original beneficiaries were three Guernsey charities, but that he, W and their children were subsequently added as beneficiaries. M. LaBlache stated that H was added as a beneficiary in 2006. H did not know when exactly W and the children were added as beneficiaries, and said there was no evidence in that regard. However, he was firm in stating that he did not settle the trust, nor did he settle Waterford into the trust. He described his relationship with the trustees by stating that they have the ultimate decision, but that he found the investment opportunities. 51.14. H accepted that the trustee sometimes referred to the trust as the Mikhail Kroupeev Family Trust because that was what listing authorities needed to see. 51.15. H was clear that just as he was appointed a beneficiary by the trustee, he could be removed as one. He stated that the former trustee in Guernsey removed W as a beneficiary when these proceedings started, at the time when H had asked her to wait for 5 years while he got his finances in order. H accepted that he had told the trustee about the proceedings which, he said, triggered their decision to remove W as a beneficiary to remove any conflict between beneficiaries, probably on the rationale that W would “get half anyway”. 51.16. When challenged as to Waterford’s ongoing acquisition of Gulfsands shares from 2011 onwards, H explained that he was pursuing a strategy of “bottom-feeding”, i.e. acquiring shares at a low value in a distressed asset, fixing the problem and selling out. He described his decision to acquire Gulfsands as a triumph of hope over experience and described how Ermak and Fenix had provided funds to increase Waterford’s stake in Gulfsands. 51.17. H explained, referring to documents he had disclosed to W’s solicitors on 23 January 2026, that Fenix, whom he described as a “white knight”, had loaned funds to Waterford in 2021 pursuant to a Private Equity Investment Agreement, hence why he had referred to Fenix as a “third-party creditor” of Waterford. He referred to a document he provided in January 2026, a statement from EFG Bank in Monaco, which he said showed the payment by Fenix to Waterford of $14.5m in 2021. The statement does not identify either Waterford or Fenix and H explained that his was because when the bank sends statements by e-mail, they remove the account holders’ name for security purposes. H went on to assert that the Private Equity Investment Agreement gave Fenix the right to convert the loan to equity, which H says Fenix did in a Framework Agreement dated November 2024, recording the transfer of 24.6% of Waterford’s then shareholding of 62.2% in Gulfsands to Fenix as of 1 January 2024. H described this as a result of the creditor’s run caused by these proceedings. 51.18. When asked to explain why Fenix’s shareholding was not referred to in the Gulfsands annual statement, published in 2025, H explained that to have another Russian name - presumably a member of the Russian family who H stated were the family behind Fenix - in the share register would be bad for future funding, so the transfer to Fenix was not registered. When it was suggested to him that this was a false declaration, he responded that “looking through the legalities”, Fenix paid the money and later described this as a “small irregularity”. As to why there was no further documents in this regard from Waterford, H replied that any such questions should have been directed by W to the trustee of the Rossini Trust not to him. H asserted that he did not need to make such disclosure as he did not personally own Waterford. 51.19. H was asked to account for the further $10m referred to in the Framework Agreement. H said that was in anticipation of a further purchase of shares from Richard Griffiths (another shareholder), but in fact that never happened and the funds were never made available by Fenix. H denied that he owned Fenix or that it was a vehicle for his own funds. H’s oral evidence recorded that Fenix had received the correspondence from PHB and had chosen not to engage. 51.20. As to the current value of Waterford’s stake in Gulfsands, H was referred to the Annual Report dated May 2025, in which it was stated that the estimated net share of expected monetary value to Gulfsands was $1.5 to $2bn. He replied that a discount of 99% should be applied to any such value because of the cost and risk involved in getting from the current situation to the receipt of any such value. 51.21. As to the fact that Waterford’s holding in Gulfsands was moved from one nominee company to another during the proceedings without notice to W or the court, H replied “I did not know, who cares?”. 51.22. Regarding Waterford’s interest in Jupiter, H’s evidence was that it has acquired more shares because the price was low, a further example of “bottom-feeding”. 51.23. As to the references to Lynminster Limited, he said that the £31m paid by Waterford for Lynminster was part of a wider settlement, including offsets, which is why it was subsequently liquidated. He explained the discrepancy in dates - it was not in fact struck off until April 2024, yet did not appear, even at nil value, in the 31 December 2023 trust accounts - as being simply because the Isle of Man took so long to implement the strike-off. He said that two further companies, Arrow Business Limited and Pebblestone Holdings Limited which were included in the $31m deal were liquidated as part of internal restructuring possibly, he thought, because they formerly held minority shareholdings in Jupiter. 51.24. H was asked to explain the other investments in the 2023 Waterford accounts and about the Rider to his updated Form E, in which referred to over $200 million of Waterford’s losses. H said that he had not given the details previously as required by the questionnaire that he had been ordered to reply to because they were all “immaterial investments” and because they were “Waterford’s, not mine”. As to the balance of Waterford’s investments, H described them as variously “written off”, “toxic”, “sanctioned”, “abandoned”, “a disaster”, “take 30 or 40% off - it’s a minority shareholding of a public company”, “forced sale”, “sold to Denis Shafranik”, “empty”, “did not deliver anything”, and “residual… more expensive to liquidate”, but provided no documentary evidence to support his replies. 51.25. When asked about Casten Holdings Limited (Cyprus), H was initially confused as to whether it was his company or was held within the Rossini Trust. When pressed, H remembered that it used to own a company that had an interest in a gold-mine. H said his salary from Casten was paid into his Revolut account but could not explain why it did not appear on the Revolut statements that H had disclosed. When asked where W’s salary from Casten was paid, H replied, “it does not matter where it came from”. As to Casten’s investments, H referred to them as “empty companies” which W could take if she wanted, but he provided no documentary evidence to support his assertions. 51.26. Regarding Waterford (Cyprus), H was asked to explain why he had previously stated that a wholly owned company called Rubenston had been liquidated, whereas his updating disclosure showed that it had been transferred to his nephew for €1,000, despite it having been in the accounts at a value of €572,000 a year before. He answered that he did not know what was in Rubenston. 51.27. He was asked about an e-mail from Denis Shafranik sent in October 2024, in which potential security for H’s loans with Ermak Ventures Limited was being discussed. H denied that one of the companies which Denis was suggesting as security, Realty Invest, was his and asserted that it was in fact Denis’s own company. 51.28. H was asked about other investments and companies, including Mistyvale, Sterling Energy and Sterling Resources which he explained, without reference to any documentary evidence, were historic loss-making ventures. 51.29. H flatly denied that he had any interest in Sun Valley Winery or Soyuzneftegas. He said that W should go to the relevant websites to establish that he has no such ownership. He denied sharing an office with Yuri Shafranik, because he said they had no business to share. 51.30. He answered questions as to the Turkish villa, reasserting that it was not his property and that he only had a minority interest in the holding company, that he had ceased paying the service charge so his right to occupy had lapsed. He denied that the family ever had exclusive use of the property, and repeated that it ultimately belonged to the trust, not him. 51.31. H accepted that he had paid the school fees for his son by another woman, Mikhail, and the university and living costs Mikhail’s brother (who is not his son). He also accepted making payments to Mikhail’s mother and paying for flights for her. At one point in his evidence, he said that he had not spoken to Mikhail’s mother for 5 years and later said he had coffee with her a few months ago. He said that the inconsistency was because English was not his native language.

52. Having considered all H’s evidence and making allowance for the fact that I could not observe him while he gave telephone evidence, I nonetheless found H’s evidence to be profoundly unsatisfactory and lacking credibility. His financial disclosure remained riddled with gaps and inconsistencies. Many of the explanations that he gave in oral evidence for the first time could and should have been provided in replies to questionnaire and with documentary evidence in support. This would have given W’s advisors time to consider his replies and make follow up enquiries either independently or of H. Most significantly, the holes in H’s disclosure as to the assets held within the corporate and trust structures could and should have been addressed by the single joint expert whose instruction and opinion evidence were ordered over a year ago. That this did not happen is plainly and solely a result of H’s contemptuous breach of a court order in respect of which his appeal was rejected as being “totally without merit”. His repeated apologies proffered during his oral evidence, whilst superficially reasonable, rang hollow when considered in the context of his repeated and ongoing contempt of court and his obvious ability to have remedied his defective and inadequate disclosure at any point over the last 13 months. I therefore find his claims to respect the court’s orders to be somewhat insincere.

53. I do, nonetheless, bear in mind the possibility that H’s numerous explanations, however unevidenced, are in fact true. However, in almost every case I find that possibility to be inherently unlikely and in some cases remote. On the contrary I find that, if his explanations were indeed true, H could and would have provided an evidential basis for what were, without such evidence, no more than bald assertions, many made for the very first time in oral evidence on a phone from Cyprus, at a time when H remained in contempt of numerous disclosure orders. In particular, I am satisfied that, had he chosen to do so, H could have obtained up to date and historic documents pertaining to the Rossini Trust and Waterford.

54. Consequently, where there is a conflict of evidence between H and W, I prefer the evidence of W. Where there is an absence of evidence, I will consider drawing inferences, as set out below. The Relevant Law

55. The law I must apply is contained in s.25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 . The application of the s.25 factors has been set out in numerous authorities, notably WC v HC [2022] EWFC 40 , and Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 , and I will not repeat the essential principles here, although I have reminded myself of them.

56. As to the drawing of adverse inferences, I refer to the summary of the law that I gave in the case of Mahtani v Mahtani [2025] EWFC 35 at ¶¶34-38:

34. … The court’s duty to consider drawing adverse inferences can be traced back to the decision of Sachs J in J v J [1955] P 215 , in which he stated: “In cases of this kind, where the duty of disclosure comes to lie on a husband; where a husband has – and his wife has not – detailed knowledge of his complex affairs; where a husband is fully capable of explaining and has had opportunity to explain, those affairs, and where he seeks to minimise the wife's claim, that husband can hardly complain if, when he leaves gaps in the court's knowledge, the court does not draw inferences in his favour. On the contrary, when he leaves a gap in such a state that two alternative inferences may be drawn, the court will normally draw the less favourable inference – especially where it seems likely that his able legal advisers would have hastened to put forward affirmatively any facts, had they existed, establishing the more favourable alternative. The obligation of the husband is to be full, frank and clear in that disclosure. Any shortcomings of the husband from the requisite standard can and normally should be visited at least by the court drawing inferences against the husband on matters the subject of the shortcomings insofar as such inferences can be properly be drawn.”

35. In the Court of Appeal case of Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482 , Moylan LJ stated as follows: [86] My broad conclusions as to the approach the court should take when dealing with non-disclosure are as follows. They are broad because, as I have sought to emphasise, non-disclosure can take a variety of forms and arise in a variety of circumstances from the very general to the very specific. My remarks are focused on the former, namely a broad failure to comply with the disclosure obligations in respect of a party’s financial resources, rather than the latter. [87] (i) It is clearly appropriate that generally, as required by s 25 of the 1973 Act , the court should seek to determine the extent of the financial resources of the non-disclosing party. [88] (ii) When undertaking this task the court will, obviously, be entitled to draw such adverse inferences as are justified having regard to the nature and extent of the party’s failure to engage properly with the proceedings. However, this does not require the court to engage in a disproportionate enquiry. Nor, as Lord Sumption said, should the court ‘engage in pure speculation’. As Otton LJ said in Baker v Baker, inferences must be ‘properly drawn and reasonable’. This was reiterated by Lady Hale in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 , [2013] 2 AC 415 , [2013] 2 FLR 732 , at para [85]: ‘… the court is entitled to draw such inferences as can properly be drawn from all the available material, including what has been disclosed, judicial experience of what is likely to be being concealed and the inherent probabilities, in deciding what the facts are.’ [89] (iii) This does not mean, contrary to Mr Molyneux’s submission, that the court is required to make a specific determination either as to a figure or a bracket. There will be cases where this exercise will not be possible because, the manner in which a party has failed to comply with their disclosure obligations, means that the court is ‘unable to quantify the extent of his undisclosed resources’, to repeat what Wilson LJ said in Behzadi v Behzadi. [90] (iv) How does this fit within the application of the principles of need and sharing? The answer, in my view, is that, when faced with uncertainty consequent on one party’s non-disclosure and when considering what Lady Hale and Lord Sumption called ‘the inherent probabilities’ the court is entitled, in appropriate cases, to infer that the resources are sufficient or are such that the proposed award does represent a fair outcome. This is, effectively, what Munby J did in both AlKhatib v Masry and Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and, in my view, it is a legitimate approach. In that respect I would not endorse what Mostyn J said in NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam) , [2012] 1 FLR 1211 , at para [16](vii). [91] This approach is both necessary and justified to limit the scope for, what ButlerSloss LJ accepted could otherwise be, a ‘cheat’s charter’. As Thorpe J said in F v F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359 , although not the court’s intention, better an order which may be unfair to the non-disclosing party than an order which is unfair to the other party. This does not mean, as Mostyn J said in NG v SG, at para [7], that the court should jump to conclusions as to the extent of the undisclosed wealth simply because of some non-disclosure. It reflects, as he said at para [16](viii), that the court must be astute to ensure that the nondiscloser does not obtain a better outcome than that which would have been ordered if they had complied with their disclosure obligations.

36. In Ditchfield v Ditchfield [2023] EWHC 2303 (Fam) , Peel J said at ¶15: The potential consequences of failure to disclose have been clearly set out in a series of cases summarised in Moher v Moher [2019] EWCA Civ 1482 , [2020] Fam 160 , [2020] 1 FLR 225 . The law is clear. The court is entitled, in the absence of full and frank disclosure, to draw adverse conclusions where appropriate and to the degree of specificity or generality deemed fit. A non-disclosing party cannot complain if the lack of disclosure leads the court to make an order which by necessity is based on less secure foundations than the court would wish; that is the fault of the miscreant party. As Thorpe J (as he then was) said in F v F (Divorce: Insolvency: Annulment of Bankruptcy Order) [1994] 1 FLR 359 , at 367: ‘… if in consequence the obscurity of my final vision results in an order that is unfair to [the husband] it is better that than that I should be drawn into making an order that is unfair to the wife.’

37. In Hersman v De Verchere [2024] EWHC 905 (Fam) , Moor J stated, at ¶25: The second point, however, is that I do not have the benefit of any up to date evidence from the Wife. Mr Amos KC, who again appears on behalf of the Husband, has not had the chance to cross-examine her as to her earlier statement or what has happened since then. I have already made it clear that this is deliberate on her part. She could easily have attended by video link and I am clear that she has the resources to be represented if she wished to instruct a lawyer. In these circumstances, I am entitled to draw adverse inferences against her, but this does not mean I can draw any inference I like. An inference must be properly drawn.

57. As to W’s application to vary a nuptial settlement under s.24(2) (c), the relevant case law includes: Prinsep v Prinsep [1929] P 225 ; E v E (Financial Provision) [1990] 2 FLR 233 ; Brooks v Brooks [1996] AC 375 ; Mubarak v Mubarak [2001] 1 FLR 673 ; N v N & F Trust [2005] EWHC 2908 (Fam) ; Ben Hashem v Shayif [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ; D v D and Others and the I Trust [2009] EWHC 3062; (Fam); Hope v Krejci [2012] EWHC 1780 (Fam) ; DR v GR & Ors. [2013] EWHC 1196 (Fam) ; BJ v MJ [2011] EWHC 2708 (Fam) ; AB v CB [2014] EWHC 2998 (Fam) ; Joy v Joy-Morancho [2015] EWHC 2507 (Fam) ; NR v AB [2016] EWHC 277 (Fam) . I summarise the law set out in these authorities as follows: 57.1. A ‘settlement’ is any arrangement which makes some form of continuing provision for both or either of the parties to a marriage, with or without provision for their children. 57.2. Such a settlement is ‘nuptial’ if it is made upon the husband in the character of husband or in the wife the character of wife, or upon both in the character of husband and wife. 57.3. A settlement that had no nuptial element at its inception cannot subsequently become nuptial merely because it makes some form of continuing provision for the parties or their children. However, where a non-nuptial settlement makes such ongoing provision, the arrangement by which it does so may, itself in isolation, be characterised as a nuptial settlement to which s.24(1) (c) applies. 57.4. These principles will enable to the court to answer two key questions: whether a nuptial settlement exists and, if so, what is the property within that settlement, for it is only in respect of the property within the settlement that the courts powers of variation under s.24(1) (c) apply. 57.5. Whilst the court’s power to vary a settlement is in principle unfettered, that power should not be exercised to interfere with a nuptial settlement any further than is necessary to do justice. 57.6. ‘Doing justice’ requires the court to: (i) consider the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 , s.25 factors; (ii) be fair to both parties to the marriage, looking at the matter as a whole; (iii) interfere only to the extent necessary to do justice between the parties; and (iv) be slow to deprive innocent third parties of their rights under the settlement and, to the extent that it does adversely affect their rights, the court should seek to compensate the adversely affected beneficiaries in some suitable way. 57.7. As to the ‘unfettered’ exercise of the court’s power to vary a nuptial settlement, the case law shows an extensive range of possible outcomes including the transfer out of property or cash to one spouse absolutely, the granting of a life interest, varying or extending a license, creating an annuity and adding or removing beneficiaries, trustees or protectors.

58. As to the proposition, advanced by Mr Warshaw and Mr Dance in reliance upon Hope v Krejci and DR v GR , that the court can deploy its powers of variation under s.24(1) (c) to extend through a corporate holding structure to the underlying assets, I agree with Mr Warshaw that there is no appellate authority on the point. I will therefore consider the following first instance decisions in some detail: 58.1. In E v E , the nuptiality of the Swiss/BVI trust was not in issue but was conceded on the advice of chancery counsel because “the property of the trust in effect is the last matrimonial home”, and the court therefore had the power to vary it. The ratio of Ewbank J in that case appears to have been that because the matrimonial home was making continuing provision, the arrangement through which it was held (a trust and a Panamanian Company) was a nuptial settlement for the purposes of s.24(1) (c). The nuptiality of the settlement derived from the continuing provision of the underlying asset (the matrimonial home), and the holding structure (i.e. the arrangement by which the provision was made) was consequently variable. 58.2. In N v N and F Trust , which concerned a marital home owned by a Bahamian company whose shares where held by a Guernsey trust, Coleridge J’s ratio was the same as Ewbank J in E v E : the continuing provision made by the licence to occupy the marital home was what made the licence and the arrangement by which that licence was held nuptial and consequently subject to the court’s powers in s.24(1) (c) (although his actual declaration was not clear as to whether the whole property or just the licence to occupy was within the variable nuptial settlement). 58.3. In Ben Hashem v Al Shayif , Munby J adopted the same reasoning: it was the continuing provision of the home which made the arrangement (i.e. a licence to occupy a home owned by a Jersey company owned by H and his children) nuptial. It is notable that the subject matter of the ‘settlement’ in Ben Hashem v Al Shayif was found to be simply a revocable licence, underlying the need to identify precisely what provision is in fact being made. 58.4. In D v D and I Trust , Baron J, having expressly considered the three cases referred to above, found the nuptial provision comprised (a) the farm that provided a home, and (b) the farming enterprise that provided income. Baron J concluded, “… this produces a sufficient nuptial element to convince me that the entire property and, therefore , the trust which holds its ultimate title (through the two BVI entities) constitute a post-nuptial settlement…”. Thus, again, the nuptiality of the arrangement derived solely from the fact that an underlying asset was making the requisite continuing provision and the court was therefore able to vary the arrangement by which that provision was being made, looking through an intermediate corporate structure as necessary. 58.5. In BJ v MJ , the nuptiality of the settlement derived from the ongoing provision made by the underlying assets: for example, the former matrimonial home, Green Farm, was owned by the No. 1 trust. Furthermore, No. 1 trust was designed with the intention that its assets, which also included the tax-sheltered cash within a company called Giloch, were (subject to No. 2 trust) “established to benefit all the members of the family” and the trusts were plainly designed with a view to doing so. Therefore, Mostyn J concluded, “In my judgment, the No 1 trust is unquestionably a post-nuptial settlement”. The value of Giloch could be, and indeed over history had been, allocated to either No. 1 trust or No. 2 trust. The determination of which trust would actually receive the value hung on the fortuity of the timing of a meeting. No. 2 trust was therefore “an integral, indeed key, component of the overall scheme. It is the left hand to the No 1 trust’s right hand.” No 2 trust was not designed to defeat the ongoing provision made by the underlying assets in No. 1 trust, but the two trusts together were designed to facilitate tax-efficient ongoing provision to the husband and wife. In those circumstances Mostyn J held that the nuptiality of No. 1 trust should extend to No. 2 trust as well, because the two trusts were, in effect, inseparable, like two sides of the same coin. 58.6. In AB v CD , Mostyn J concluded on the evidence, specifically the power of the trustee to advance all the capital to the husband during his lifetime, that all the property in the settlement, not only the right to occupy, was included in the arrangement and subject to the court’s powers of variation under s.24(1) (c). It was at the subsequent stage of deciding how to exercise the powers of variation that Mostyn J said, “when deciding whether and, if so, how it should be varied, the intention of the settlor and the knowledge of the parties that ultimately the value of the settlement would revert to the estate, must be given heavy respect.”

59. These cases are therefore authority for the proposition that an arrangement can be characterised as nuptial and is variable pursuant to s.24(1) (c) by virtue of the ongoing provision made by its underlying assets. These assets were mostly, but not always, former matrimonial homes, but where further financial provision was made, the source of that provision was included within the variable arrangement. Thus, where an asset is making such continuing provision, the arrangement by which it does so, which may include an intermediate corporate entity or entities, constitutes a nuptial settlement comprising the nuptial property, all of which is variable under s.24(1) (c).

60. It therefore follows that a court can, in circumstances where continuing provision is made to the parties to the marriage by an asset held through an intermediary company, define the nuptial arrangement to include both the nuptial asset(s) (or right(s) over the nuptial asset(s)) and the holding structure, and vary it accordingly. But in doing so, the court cannot impute nuptiality to any part of a settlement or arrangement that extends more widely than that which is making continuing (nuptial) provision.

61. Mostyn J made this very point in DR v GR at §16, reiterating the express requirement that the “arrangement makes some form of continuing provision”. The object of the trust in DR v GR - The Brown Sugar Trust, which owned shares in an offshore company which in turn owned shares in UK companies which in turn owned two retirement villages - was found by Mostyn J to benefit all members of the family. In DR v GR Mostyn J can therefore be understood as following the orthodoxy applied by other judges by which the nuptiality of an arrangement derived from some form of continuing provision by its assets for the parties to the marriage.

62. It follows, in my opinion, that Mostyn J’s conclusion at ¶48, “I conclude on the facts of this case that the entire structure comprises a variable postnuptial settlement and that I am empowered to deal directly with, and to make orders in respect of, the trust assets owned by the companies” whilst ostensibly extending the ambit of the court’s power under s.24(1) (c) more widely, must nonetheless be read in the light of, and be subject to, the accepted limits on that power established and exemplified in the cases I have referred to. The statutory power to vary a nuptial settlement, including underlying assets held within a corporate structure, is subject to the requisite factual finding that continuing provision is being made from such underlying assets and by identifying the arrangement by which that provision is made. It is such a finding that brings an arrangement, both as to its structure and contents, within the scope of the courts’ powers under s.24(1) (c) and which distinguishes the arrangement from those which are subject to the prohibition against “[cutting] across the statutory schemes of company and insolvency law, which were essential for the protection of those dealing with a company” under s.24(1) (a), as stated by the Supreme Court in Prest . However, it is not in my view permissible to include as part of a variable settlement, assets which have not been part of an arrangement which was making continuing provision. The Section 25 Factors

63. The parties’ children, Alice and Roman, are age 28 and 21 respectively and do not therefore fall within s.25(1) .

64. s.25(2) (a) and (b): I will address the parties’ financial resources and needs below.

65. s.25(2) (c): The standard of living before the breakdown of the marriage was, on any view extremely high.

66. s.25(2) (d): The parties are both age 59 and the marriage lasted over 35 years.

67. s.25(2) (e): W states that she has thyroid and cholesterol issues, which require bi-annual blood tests and medication for life. She also states that she now also requires therapy in respect of the emotional trauma of the breakdown of the marriage and discovery of H’s teenage son from his secret ‘second family’. H has not given any evidence concerning his health.

68. s.25(2) (f): Both parties have made full, if incommensurable, contributions over a long marriage, and neither has contributed wealth or resources from outside the marriage (i.e. there are no pre-, post- or extra-marital assets).

69. s.25(2) (g): neither party relies on conduct under this sub-paragraph.

70. s.25(2) (h): There are no financial recourses to which this section applies, and I deal with the Rossini Trust below. The Parties’ Financial Resources W’s Assets and Income

71. W’s assets are, on any view, extremely limited. She has c.£9,000 in bank accounts, c.£(9,000) in debts to utility companies and Council tax and she owes c.£2.1 million to Vardags and PHB in legal costs (some of which is secured by a charge against the former matrimonial home).

72. W has no earned income and, not having worked in paid employment throughout the marriage, I find that she has no realistic earning capacity now or in the foreseeable future. H’s Assets The former matrimonial home

73. This property is owned outright by H. It is mortgage-free. It has been valued by a single joint expert at c.£14.9m. Excluding the charge of c.£840,000 which is securing sums owed by H to W (including LSPO, MPS and costs), it has equity of c.£14.4m. The Portuguese Villa

74. This property, known as Villa Sunset, has been valued by a single joint expert at c.£10.5m (based in current GBP/Euro FX rates). The legal title to the property is owned by Hirundo LLC, a Delaware company which I find is operating as an SPV holding company, of which H is the sole shareholder. Hirundo LLC was joined as a party to these proceedings on 23 September 2025 and served with notice. They have not replied. H accepts that he is the 100% beneficial owner of Hirundo LLC and the property. H’s open offer is that it be sold, implying that he has control over the property. Whilst it was suggested by H earlier in these proceedings that Villa Sunset may stand as Granatny security for a loan of $5.5m loan from Ermak, it has since been accepted by Ermak that they hold no such security. I find, accepting W’s evidence, that this property was enjoyed by the family as a second home during the marriage. Properties in Russia

75. H owns (or has an interest in) 19 houses, apartments, plots, garages and parking places in Russia, located in Konakova, Udomlya, Moscow and Nikolina Gora. W says that the three properties in Udomlya belong to the widow and six children of H’s deceased brother but are held as to 2/3 in H’s name to avoid them being sold or used by a religious sect of whom the widow is a member. I do not include them as an asset of H. H does not dispute that the remaining 16 properties are solely owned by him.

76. H attributes a total value to the remaining 16 properties of c.RUB1.3bn, being c.£12.3m (on current RUB/GBP FX). W was unable to find comparables to challenge H’s valuation of the Dacha at Nikolina Gora, despite believing H to have undervalued it. However, she does assert a higher value for the property, plot and parking spaces at Granatny Lane, Moscow, which she based upon the price per square metre of an almost identically sized property and another larger apartment in the same location. W therefore attributes a total value to the 16 properties of c. RUB1.7bun/£16.3m.

77. H refused to comply with orders to obtain single joint expert evidence as to the values of these properties: when the SJE attempted to visit to the properties to value them, H denied them access. I find that he could have complied with that order had he wished to do so. I also find that, since W sent him her open offer dated 22 September 2025, H has been aware of which Russian properties W seeks to have transferred to her sole name. He has nonetheless refused to adduce or permit evidence as to the values of the properties. I therefore accept the higher value attributed by W. The Turkish Villa

78. This is a luxury private villa (villa no.8, known as Villa Serra) within a complex of 9 similar private villas, including some communal facilities. There was a dispute between H and W as to whether, as W recalled, the family had exclusive access to the villa or whether, as H asserted, they enjoyed occupation for part of the year only pursuant, he said, to a time-share/maintenance contract with Nefto-Invest Limited, a Cypriot company, wholly owned by Waterford (Cyprus), which expired in 2024 (no copy of which was provided by H). For the reasons set out above, I accept W’s evidence and find that the family had exclusive access to the property.

79. H refused to comply with the order that this property be valued by a single joint expert. From the evidence I have seen, it appears that the company which owns the complex within which the villa is located, Serra Gayrimenkul Yatirim, is owned as to 13.78% by Waterford, in turn owned by the Rossini Trust. It is for that reason that H asserts that he did not comply with the order for an SJE valuation. In his Form E, H stated “In the Waterford accounts, the value attributed to Waterford’s interest in Serra is a notional (and effectively arbitrary) $3,500,000.”. H says that since 2025, the Turkish shareholders have started a complete re-development of the villa complex, a project in which Waterford has not been able to afford to participate. H provided some photographs of what he said was the redevelopment work to the villa, but W’s case was that the photos did not show villa no. 8 at all and were not recognisably photos of any part of the villa complex.

80. I find that the shares in Serra Gayrimenkul Yatirim owned by Waterford, within the Rossini Trust, gave H the ability to occupy the villa, for which he had to pay outgoings, including service charges. However, I have no details or evidence as to the contractual or other basis by which the right of occupation was conferred and concluded that while H may a “right”, his ability to occupy the villa and use the common facilities may fall somewhat short of an enforceable right to do so. I nonetheless find that the villa was made available to the family by way of continuing provision as a holiday home for their exclusive use during the marriage. I do not find that it is currently subject to any redevelopment. The Rossini Trust (“the trust”)

81. In his Form E, H stated: “The children and I are discretionary beneficiaries of an offshore trust called the Rossini Trust. Until recently my wife was also a discretionary beneficiary of the Trust. In practice I consider that the Trust essentially has no value, regardless of any notional value that it might appear to have. The Rossini Trust has one asset, being the entire shareholding of an offshore company called Waterford Finance & Investment Limited (“Waterford”). Waterford has four principal assets: a. A shareholding in Gulfsands Petroleum PLC (“Gulfsands”), being 62.19% of the total shareholding. b. A shareholding in Jupiter Energy Ltd (“Jupiter”), being 60.61% of the total shareholding. c. A shareholding in Serra Gayrimenkul Yatirim (“Serra”), being 13.784% of the total shareholding. d. Loans owed by me to the company (as referred to in Section 2.9 of my Form E), which in practice I do not expect to repay, and which are not therefore a meaningful asset of the company.”

82. H provided a set of trust accounts for the year end 31 December 2023, which included a set of Waterford accounts of the same date, as well as the Gulfsands annual report and accounts (2023) and the Jupiter annual report (30 June 2023). Thereafter, H has declined to answer any of W’s subsequent questions about the trust or to provide any trust documents as required by the questionnaire to which he was ordered to reply, for which failure he has been found to be in contempt of court, which contempt is continuing.

83. As to the origin of the trust, I accept H’s evidence that it was settled during the marriage, in 1995, following conversations he had with two Australian venture capitalists, and that his original understanding was that the trust would hold investment companies in which he was involved and that he would be a beneficiary. I accept that H did not settle the trust, nor did he settle Waterford into the trust. I accept that the shares in Waterford were settled into the trust in 2003 and that H, W and the children were subsequently added as beneficiaries, replacing the three Guernsey charities.

84. I find that the trust and/or Waterford has loaned and/or distributed H money over the course of the marriage which he had used to acquire property and maintain the family’s standard of living. I accept H’s evidence that he will not have to repay the outstanding loans because Waterford has paid a notional dividend to the trust to write off some of the debt “as an accounting exercise”.

85. I accept that the legal title to the Portugal property (Villa Sunset) was transferred out of the trust structure to H personally when the entire shareholding in Hirundo LLC (the company owning Villa Sunset) was transferred to him for nil value on 15 June 2021. I also accept H’s evidence that Waterford formerly owned Waterford Finance & Investment (UK) but that this was transferred to his sole name in 2024.

86. I find that Waterford, through its shareholding in Serra Gayrimenkul Yatirim, has made the Turkish villa available to the family during the marriage for their exclusive occupation, although the maintenance was paid for by Waterford Finance and Investments Limited (Cyprus), a company wholly owned by H.

87. Based on the above facts, I find as follows: 87.1. The Rossini Trust was settled during the marriage with the intention of holding investments in which H was directly involved for the benefit of him, his wife and his children. I do not find that the existence of an initial period, during which the trust held no such assets and/or the only beneficiaries were three Guernsey charities, detracts from the underlying intention behind the settling of the trust but was merely a consequence of the practical steps taken to establish it, as intended, over a period of time. Once Waterford was settled in the trust, H, W and the children were appointed and the three charities were removed (or perhaps relegated) as beneficiaries, the trust began to make the ongoing provision to H and W as originally intended. 87.2. The Rossini Trust, directly and/or through Waterford, made continuing provision for H, W and the children during the marriage, including by way of loans (at least some of which have been written off), the transfer to H of the Portugal villa and Waterford (UK) and provision of the Turkish villa for the exclusive use of the family during the marriage. I therefore find that the Rossini Trust and Waterford together comprise a nuptial settlement within the meaning of s.24(1) (c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 . This nuptial settlement, or arrangement, specifically includes those underlying assets of Waterford from which such continuing provision has been made. This undoubtedly includes the 13.78% shareholding in Serra Gayrimenkul Yatirim. 87.3. Moreover, because of H’s refusal to provide any financial disclosure as whether and if so how the specific underlying assets of the Rossini Trust, including Waterford, Lynminster, Arrow and Pebblestone, Gulfsands, Jupiter and many other subsidiaries and investments, past and present, have or have not played a part in the arrangement by which the continuing provision that I have identified above has been made, I have no evidence whatsoever in that regard. In the absence of any evidence, which H could have provided had he wished to do so, first, I am unable to determine which elements of the Rossini Trust/Waterford structure in fact made such continuing provisions, and second, I find it to be inherently likely that there was further and other continuing provision made for the benefit of H and W through the Rossini Trust/Waterford structure which H has chosen not to disclose or to evidence in these proceedings. 87.4. I therefore proceed to draw the adverse inference against H, from such unspecified and unevidenced continuing provision, that the entire trust structure, including all its directly owned and underlying assets, including subsidiary companies and investments, form part of the arrangement that has made such continuing provision to H and W as spouses, and for the children. I consider this adverse inference to be properly drawn and appropriate as to its generality, bearing in mind the evidence I have of the extent of capital and income provision that has been made to the family during the marriage and the absence of evidence as to its specific origin within the Rossini Trust structure. I do not consider the inference I have drawn to be unfair to H in circumstances where I have done so in part because of the absence of evidence that I find H could have provided in compliance with financial disclosure orders within these proceedings had he chosen to do so. 87.5. Therefore, in addition to my finding at paragraph at ¶87.2 above, I further find on the basis of the inference I have drawn, that the Rossini Trust, including all its directly owned and indirectly owned underlying entities and assets, including all subsidiary companies and investments, are a nuptial settlement which is variable by virtue of s.24(1) (c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 .

88. As to the value of the trust assets, I remind myself that all of the assets of Waterford including all its subsidiaries and investments (save as to the shareholding in Serra Gayrimenkul Yatirim) should have been subject to a single joint expert valuation, had the first appointment order been complied with. H refused to permit that valuation to take place, unsuccessfully appealed against the order, and remains adamant the assets of the trust and/or Waterford are not his and should be of no concern to this court. Similarly, he declined to answer any questions or provide the requested documents concerning the trust and its assets.

89. Consequently, the only documentary evidence adduced by H as to the value of the Rossini Trust is the 2023 trust and Waterford accounts and the Gulfsands and Jupiter annual reports provided by H with his Form E. In the riders to his two Forms E, his s.25 statement, his statement for the final hearing and in oral evidence, H made various assertions as to how any value of Gulfsands and Jupiter should be discounted by up to 99% and as to hundreds of millions of dollars of losses incurred in various other projects or investments. W has obtained various other documents in the public domain.

90. I also remind myself that H’s Amex statements for the 12 months to September 2025, obtained by W pursuant to a third-party disclosure order, indicate that H is maintaining a very high lifestyle, spending c.£520,000 on that card alone in the 12 months to October 2025, much on luxury items, travel for himself, his son Mikhail, Mikhail’s mother, Ekaterina and Ekaterina’s son, Alexander, and high-end accommodation. H is clearly incurring other ongoing expenditure, which is not included on this card, of which he has given no disclosure. I must therefore consider the extent to which H’s lifestyle is or is not consistent with his financial disclosure and his wealth as he asserts it to be. Gulfsands

91. Over the past 14 years, Waterford has, at H’s behest, invested millions in acquiring an initial 17% interest in Gulfsands, increasing that stake over the years to over 62.25% by the time of the final hearing. And H, through Waterford, has been trying to acquire another 10%.

92. I do not accept H’s assertion - see ¶51.17 above - that Fenix owns 24.6% of Waterford’s 62.25% shareholding in Gulfsands. H’s evidence is contradictory: in his Form E, he referred to Fenix as a third party creditor, referring to c.$16m of debt, with no documentary evidence in support. H did not answer the questions posed about Fenix in W’s questionnaire. He referred again to Fenix as a creditor in his s.25 statement. The bank statements he relied upon in his updated Form E to show a sum being allegedly advanced by Fenix neither identified Fenix as the payer, nor Waterford as the payee. The two documents that H now relies upon (again, in his updated Form E) to show that, contrary to his Form E and s.25 statement, Fenix is a shareholder in Gulfsands and not a creditor of Waterford, were dated (i) 1 January 2021, i.e. before his Form E, and (ii) 14 November 2024, i.e. before the first appointment, the latter purporting to record the position as at 1 January 2024, also before H’s Form E was sworn. Fenix was notified in correspondence dated 17 November 2025 of these proceedings and W’s claim in respect of the Gulfsands shares, but did not respond. I find H’s explanation as to why Fenix is not recorded as a shareholder in the Gulfsands 2025 Annual Report, i.e. to hide the identity of another Russian investor, to be inherently improbable. As I set out below, I find it more likely than not that Fenix is a vehicle for H’s wealth and that the documents produced with H’s updated Form E are a sham. I find that H’s references to another “dangerous” Russian family being behind Fenix - which is also based in the Seychelles - are a tactic to persuade W not to look further into this opaque arrangement.

93. Gulfsands’ most recent annual report, published in May 2025, presents a more optimistic outlook than previously. Using various discounts, the highest of which is 50%, the value of Gulfsands’ interest in the Syrian PSC is put at between £540m and £4.45bn. The report also refers to an alternative valuation exercise, “This evaluation did not take into account any of the above-ground risks associated with the assets, but they did consider a range of possible valuation scenarios and indicated a central range of risked Expected Monetary Value (“EMV”) of the Block 26 assets, including both Contingent and Prospective Resources, of $1.5 billion - $2.0 billion (net share to Gulfsands).”

94. Despite this, Gulfsands’ investment in the PSC is included in its 2024 balance sheet at cost, being $102m. Gulfsands’ total equity in the 2024 balance sheet was $99m. Yet using even the highest discount in the financial models in the 2025 Annual Report (i.e. 50%), the value of Gulfsands’ interest in the PSC would be $540m, over 5 times more. And the further risks illustrated in the 2025 Annual Report (delay, oil price, discount rate, forecast capex and forecast opex) illustrate volatility rather than a clear reduction from $540m.

95. Waterford owns 62.2% of Gulfsands, which would give as pro-rata value of c.$62m based on its 2024 balance sheet. In the 2023 accounts of Waterford, it’s investment in Gulfsands was included in the substantially lower sum of $23.6m. And if a figure of $540m were used in the Gulfsands’ balance sheet in place of the cost value of $102m, the value of Waterford’s interest in Gulfsands would increase to $334m. The figure would rise to $1.2bn if a $2bn valuation figure were used. In the absence of further documentary or expert valuation evidence, which is H’s fault alone, I draw an inference that Waterford’s investment in Gulfsands is worth at least $334m. I have considered whether this inference is unfair to H and do not think it is: I have conducted a proportionate enquiry, relied on evidence rather than pure speculation and conservatively used figures the bottom of the range of estimated values contained in the Gulfsands’ published annual report. I also bear in mind the words of Moylan J in Moher , quoted at ¶56 above, “although not the court’s intention, better an order which may be unfair to the non-disclosing party than an order which is unfair to the other party.”

96. I also find that, in order to realise that value, a significant amount of capital and operational expenditure will be required from the shareholders to build and operate the infrastructure necessary to extract and sell the currently unmined oil. I have no reliable evidence as to what this will cost, but I do accept the logical argument made by H that, to the extent that the current shareholders are unable to contribute pro-rata towards that expenditure, their shareholdings will be diluted or forfeited. Jupiter

97. H stated in his updated Form E that Waterford has a c.61% stake in Jupiter. The only documentary evidence of value is the 2023 annual report, using figures to 30 June 2023 which indicates a negative balance sheet, but reported c.AUD44m of profits. Waterford’s investment is included in its 2023 accounts at US$9.8m which H explained in his updated Form E was using an old share price with a 25% discount for illiquidity and risk. H says that the value is illiquid, due to the potential liabilities of Jupiter in relation to its Kazakh interests. In the absence of evidence to corroborate or depart from the figure in the accounts, I adopt the figure, rounded to c.US$10m. Serra

98. The only evidence I have is the “arbitrary” figure of $3.5m. H asserts that this value was accepted by W. It was not. I nonetheless adopt the figure of $3.5m. other entities and investments, liabilities and debts

99. I have no documentary evidence as to the value of Waterford’s other investments. Nor do I have any documentary evidence as to value of Lynminster, which may or may not be held directly by the Rossini Trust, of through Waterford. I bear in mind that Lynminster was acquired for $31m in 2020. I do not accept H’s assertions, made without reference to any documentary evidence, that that sum has been written off by way offsets in a joint venture with the Shafraniks. Although I accept that the company has itself been struck off in 2024, the value which it formerly had, illustrated by the $31m that was paid for it 6 years ago, has not been explained and I draw an adverse inference against H that the missing value is an undisclosed resource within the Rossini/Waterford structure. I have asked myself if this inference is fair: I have considered the evidence that H has provided and the lacunae in that evidence, and I have drawn an inference that is as grounded as the evidence permits. I remind myself of the words of Peel J in Ditchfield , quoted at ¶56 above, “A non-disclosing party cannot complain if the lack of disclosure leads the court to make an order which by necessity is based on less secure foundations than the court would wish; that is the fault of the miscreant party”.

100. In an e-mail chain between Denis Shafranik and Waterford in 2024, Denis referred to Realty Invest as a company which may be able to provide security for Ermak’s loans to Waterford. Realty Invest does not appear in any of Waterford’s accounts or elsewhere in H’s disclosure. I find that it is an undisclosed resource of H’s that had the potential to stand as at least partial security for debts of c.$42m, but I cannot attribute any specific value to it.

101. As to the historic losses referred to by H, I make no findings other than drawing the adverse inference, in the absence of documentary evidence, that they are not current liabilities.

102. As to the alleged creditors, Ermak has instructed Fladgate and have asserted that they are a creditor of Waterford, owed debts of c.$42m. They have been forced to accept that they have no security for those debts. W accepts that position, but she notes and I accept that the correspondence surrounding those debts shows a surprisingly relaxed approach to Ermak’s security and future repayment. This is compounded by the fact that, despite the level of indebtedness, they nonetheless permitted the sale of Lynminster to Waterford in 2020 on the basis of at least partially deferred consideration. I do not find that H’s allegation, that W is colluding with Ermak/the Shafraniks to defraud Waterford of its shares in Gulfsands, to be proven out on the evidence. In view of the size of Ermak’s debt, upon which H relied, and the value of the Gulfsands shares (even at cost), I do not consider it likely that a single payment of £4,000 to W is evidence of a fraud at that level, or at all. I also note that it was a result of W’s solicitors’ correspondence that Ermak was forced to concede that they in fact had no security for their debt, which does not support W working with Ermak to perpetrate a fraud on Waterford.

103. It was suggested by H, without any documentary evidence in support, that Fenix was the corporate identity of a large Russian family who are subject to sanctions. I do not accept that Fenix is a genuine creditor or that it owns or is entitled to any of Waterford’s shares in Gulfsands. I draw the adverse inference that to the extent, if at all, that funds from Fenix were used to fund Waterford’s acquisition of Gulfsands shares, the funds used were beneficially H’s. I do not find that that results in a debt from Waterford to H as I do not know how the funds were accounted for within Fenix or Waterford’s accounts and how such debt may relate to Waterford’s loans to H and/or any writing off of those loans by the declaration of dividends or otherwise. Other Assets

104. As to the other assets which fall outside the Rossini Trust/Waterford structure: 104.1. Regarding the further $10m that H said was to be made available by Fenix to acquire more Gulfsands shares, I draw the adverse inference in the absence of documentary evidence that these are further funds beneficially owned by and available to H. I rely in this regard on my finding at ¶103 above and H’s evidence as to his lifestyle and the inherent unlikelihood of his proceeding at his current rate of outgoings towards a financial cliff-edge in the absence of such other available liquid resources. 104.2. Waterford (Cyprus): I reject H’s case, not supported by evidence, that this company and its subsidiaries are empty shells. It is owed c.$10.7m by Waterford, recorded in the 2023 accounts. In the absence of documentary evidence and bearing in mind my finding as to the value of Waterford’s investments, especially in Gulfsands, I find that this loan will be repaid and is an asset of Waterford (Cyprus). I have no evidence upon which to make any finding in relation to Stikito Limited. In view of the evidence that H transferred Rubenston Limited, which was formerly recorded in the accounts in the sum of $572,000, to his nephew for $1,000, and that H was unable to recall what was held within Rubenston Limited, I draw the adverse inference that his nephew is holding that company for H beneficially with a value of $572,000. I draw the inference that Waterford (Cyprus) is a financial resource of H’s of at least $11.3m, but I am unable to quantify the value beyond that. 104.3. Casten (Cyprus): I have no documentary evidence regarding the value of this company. H stated that Casten has a Cyprus bank account, that it pays him €240,000 p.a., although he could not recall where that, or W’s salary from Casten, is paid. H recalled that Casten formerly had an interest in a goldmine and another asset in the Philippines but maintained that it was now an empty dormant company. I draw the inference that Casten is a financial resource of H’s, but I am unable to quantify the value. 104.4. Waterford (UK): Waterford Finance and Investment Limited (UK) (03478593), Waterford Finance & Investment Limited (UK) (03100777). H’s written evidence referred only to one entity, Waterford Finance and Investment Limited (UK) (03100777) in which he confused the name and company number. Aygul Rakhimova, who served as company secretary for both companies until April 2025, gave evidence in June 2025 that Waterford Finance & Investment Limited (UK) (03100777) is winding down its operations. Yet, it is still active and was filing accounts as recently as September 2025, and H is named as the PSC at Companies House. I was not asked to attribute any value to it. As for Waterford Finance and Investment Limited (UK) (03478593), the PSC registered at Companies House is the trustee of the Rossini Trust, Apollo Business Solutions, in the Seychelles. I do not attribute any separate value to that company. 104.5. Sun Valley Winery: W is adamant that H invested in a winery in Crimea. She specifically recalls the winery, the wine and H having an interest in it. H denies ever having any interest in a winery. For the reasons set out above, I prefer W’s evidence and find that H does have an undisclosed interest in a winery although I am unable to attribute a specific value to it and so it does not directly affect the outcome of the case. 104.6. Suyezneftegas: W is also adamant that H and Yuri Shafranik had an interest in this company. She recalls visiting H’s office in Moscow from which he and Yuri managed their joint business affairs, including their interest in Soyuzneftegas. H denied any interest and asked how he was to prove a negative. For the reasons set out elsewhere in this judgment, including H’s breach of court orders that would have facilitated documentary and independent expert evidence on this issue, I prefer W’s evidence and find that H does have an undisclosed interest in Soyuzneftegas, although I am unable to attribute aa specific value to it and so it does not directly affect the outcome of the case. Summary of Financial Resources

105. I summarise my findings, including adverse inferences, as to H’s personally held financial resources as follows:

106. I find and infer the value of Rossini trust/Waterford structure, which I have also found to be a variable nuptial settlement, to be as follows:

107. It was not disputed, and I find, that all these resources are matrimonial property, in the sense that, despite their legal ownership, they been generated by the parties’ endeavours during the course of their long marriage. Meeting W’s Claim

108. W has a sharing claim in respect of all the parties’ financial resources since they are all matrimonial resources generated by the parties’ endeavours during the marriage. However, as is clear from my findings above, because of the manner in, and extent to, which H has failed to comply with his disclosure obligations, I am unable to quantify the extent of his undisclosed resources without resorting to pure speculation. I must therefore infer whether the resources that I can quantify are such that a proposed division represents a fair outcome.

109. As to W’s needs, I consider that they will be subsumed within her sharing claim. I rely upon the established position as stated by Williams J in IX v IY [2018] EWHC 3053 (Fam) at ¶19: “It is well established that the court's award, in cases where the parties' resources exceed their needs, will be the higher of that reached by the application of the sharing principle and that reached by application of the need principle.”

110. I do not consider, and it was not argued, that W has a compensation claim on the facts of this case.

111. I begin with the approach that I should transfer from H to W those assets which are most likely to result in her receiving actual financial benefit, namely: 111.1. the former matrimonial home in this jurisdiction (£14.4m), and 111.2. Villa Sunset in Portugal - situated in Portugal, owned via a company in Delaware (£10.5m).

112. I will also transfer to W the Russian properties that she seeks, with a total estimated value of £15.6m, namely: 112.1. In Konakova: Apartment 48, Gagarin Street; 135 Moshkovets (including the land, garden and house), and 135A Moshkovets and the garage; 112.2. In Moscow: Apt Altufevskoe and Apt Granatny Lane (including the apartment, 3 parking spaces and a plot of land); 112.3. In Nikolina Gora: the Dacha and the plot of land.

113. This provides W with c.£40.5m of assets out of an inferred total of at least c.£304m. That is only c.13%.

114. W also seeks the following further capital provision: 114.1. a transfer to her, by way of a variation of a nuptial settlement, of: 114.1.1. The Turkish Villa; and 114.1.2. 50% of the Gulfsands shares; 114.2. a further lump sum of £30m; 114.3. c.£2.1m on account of her costs.

115. I am satisfied, as a result my findings at ¶87 above, that I have the power to order a transfer to W of Waterford’s shares in Serra Gayrimenkul Yatirim and Gulfsands by way of a variation of a nuptial settlement. However, I consider that such provision may prove to be, if not worthless in her hands, nonetheless of significantly impaired value. My reasons are as follows: 115.1. as to the Turkish villa, it follows from my finding at ¶80 above that I do not consider that transferring the shares in Serra Gayrimenkul Yatirim to W will necessarily confer on her an enforceable right of ownership or occupation of Villa 8 specifically. 115.2. it flows from him my finding at ¶96 above that the ownership of Gulfsands shares may well come with significant concomitant liabilities which W will not be able to discharge, resulting in the dilution or even loss of any such shares.

116. I therefore propose to make further provision for W by way of a greater lump than she has sought, in lieu of the transfers of assets out of Rossini Trust/Waterford to which she may otherwise be entitled. In assessing the quantum of that lump sum I bear in mind the following: 116.1. the essentially ‘matrimonial’ character of all the assets, including those in the Rossini Trust/Waterford structure, save to the extent that the parties’ children are currently beneficiaries; 116.2. I must consider the children’s rights, and the value of those rights, and exercise caution and consider what compensation they may receive to the extent that my order affects their rights. 116.3. the more ‘liquid’ nature of the former matrimonial home, and Villa Sunset, and to a lesser extent, the Russin properties (on the basis that whilst they can be sold, the proceeds of sale cannot currently be exported out of Russia); 116.4. the risk-free liquid nature of any lump sum; 116.5. the likelihood that the Gulfsands and Jupiter shares are currently less liquid; although H has acquired the current shareholding in pursuit of his “bottom-feeding” strategy, neither company is currently showing the signs of an imminent turnaround that would facilitate straightforward liquidation of all Waterford’s shares in the immediate future; 116.6. the inherent uncertainty in the valuation that I have inferred for Waterford’s shareholding in Gulfsands, acknowledging that it could be worth many times more in due course, but could also be worth less; and 116.7. the departure from equality that the above factors justify.

117. Having borne these figures in mind, I find that a fair lump sum to award in W’s favour is £60m. This would give her total assets of c.£100.6m, being 33% of the total assets as I have inferred them (at least) to be. I consider this to be a fair award, the departure from equality being justified for the reasons set out above. It is also affordable by H: it requires him to liquidate a fraction of his available financial resources as I have found them to be and, depending upon the true nature and extent of his undisclosed resources which I have been unable to determine, it may be relatively easy for him to meet. I will hear further submissions as to time for payment and security pending payment.

118. The £60m that I have ordered includes provision to meet W’s income needs. Therefore, H shall remain liable to pay MPS (including all arrears) to W pending receipt by W of the first £15m of the £60m lump sum that I have ordered. The figure of £15m is based upon an approximate capitalisation of W’s revised budget of £710,000 in her s.25 statement. Upon any partial payment(s) by H, subsequent monthly payments shall be reduced by the percentage of the £15m that H has discharged to date (there being no discount for payments made part way through any given month).

119. In view of the foreseeable challenges that W may face in enforcing my award, I propose to adjourn her claims for a variation of the nuptial settlement as I have found it to be at ¶87 above. This means that my order does not directly affect the rights of the parties’ children as beneficiaries at this stage and, if H complies with this order, will not do so at all. However, if H does not comply with this order and it becomes clear that orthodox enforcement routes of my award are inadequate, I will consider an application to restore the application for variation of a nuptial settlement, on the basis that any such variation would count towards the discharge of the provision I am making now. I appreciate that this is a departure from a clean break, but only to the extent that I am offering H the opportunity to comply with a simpler, more straightforward clean break order instead of facing the added complexity of resolving and implementing a variation of settlement application and order. Other matters

120. I will hear further submissions as to: 120.1. whether all or part of this draft judgment, redacted or not, should be sent to Vardags, and what orders should be made regarding Vardags’ costs of their application, which are the subject to a Deed and were reserved to the final hearing; 120.2. time for payment and security pending payment including the extent to which the worldwide freezing order made by Harrison J on 11 April 2025 should be discharged or extended pending compliance by H with the orders I have made; 120.3. what orders should be made regarding the Hard Drive which is presently held by Harbottle & Lewis and the WhatsApp messages which are presently with an independent solicitor, pursuant to the order of Mr. Nicholas Allen KC sitting in private as a Deputy Judge of the High Court on 11 th June 2025 and any reserved costs; 120.4. what orders should be made in respect of Gula’s costs incurred in preparing her witness statement and attending court pursuant to a witness summons, which have been reserved to this hearing; 120.5. W’s claim for costs and the appropriate basis of assessment of cost; and 120.6. the drafting and terms of a final order.