Cihan Carcabuk v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

Preliminary matters

1. References in this decision to a ‘section’ are references to the applicable section of t he Road Traffic Act 1988 .

2. In this decision, we use the following terms to denote the meanings shown: ADIs: Approved Driving Instructors (those whose name appear on the Register) . Appellant: Cihan Carcabuk. Application: The Appellant’s application to the Registrar for registration as an ADI. Register: The Register of Approved Driving Instructors maintained by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency. Registrar: The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors (the Respondent). Registrar’s Decision: The decision of the Registrar, by way of letter to the Appellant dated 19 September 2025, to refuse the Application . Tribunal Rules: The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009. Introduction - background to the appeal

3. This was an appeal against the Registrar’s Decision.

4. The reasons for the Registrar’s Decision were, in summary, that the Appellant had been convicted on 10 September 2025 for failing to give information as to the identity of a driver, resulting in six penalty points, and accordingly the Registrar considered that the Appellant is not a fit and proper person to become an ADI. The appeal The grounds of appeal

5. The Appellant challenged the Registrar’s Decision, arguing that they were a fit and proper person. The Appellant’s appeal relied, in summary, on the grounds that: a. The Appellant considered that they were innocent of the offence in question but pleaded guilty on advice from solicitors to avoid a greater sanction. b. He had never had any points on his driving licence before and only does now as a result of pleading guilty. c. This was a first and isolated offence and refusal of the Application would have a severe impact on his livelihood. The Registrar’s case

6. The Registrar resisted the appeal. The Registrar’s Statement of Case maintained that the Appellant’s driving licence being endorsed with six penalty points cannot be ignored and that the offence in question was committed whilst progressing though the qualification process. The Registrar accordingly upheld their view that the Appellant was not a ‘fit and proper person’ to become an ADI. Mode of hearing

7. The Appellant asked for the appeal be decided without a hearing. The Respondent did not request an oral hearing, effectively indicating their consent to the appeal being determined without a hearing. The Tribunal has the benefit of the bundle referred to in paragraph 9 below. Having reviewed the same, we did not consider that further information was required from either party in order to make an informed decision.

8. The Tribunal was therefore satisfied that the appeal was suitable for determination on the papers in accordance with rule 32 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 and that it was fair and just to conduct the appeal in this way. The evidence and submission

9. The Tribunal read and took account of a bundle of evidence and pleadings.

10. All of the contents of the bundle and the parties’ submissions were taken into account, even if not directly referred to in this decision. The relevant legal principles

11. Section 123(1) prohibits the giving of instruction in the driving of a motor car for payment unless the instructor’s name is entered in the Register, or they are the holder of a current licence issued under section 129 .

12. Conditions for entry and retention on the Register require a person to be, and continue to be, a “fit and proper person” pursuant to section 125(3)(e) and section 127(3)(e).

13. The requirement to be a “fit and proper person” is not simply that the person is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor, but that they are a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. Accordingly, the requirement to be a “fit and proper person” extends beyond instructional ability alone and, in assessing whether someone is a “fit and proper person”, account has to be taken of their character, behaviour and standards of conduct. This involves consideration of all material matters, including convictions, cautions and other relevant behaviour, placing all matters in context, and balancing positive and negative features as appropriate.

14. The entry of a person’s name on the Register carries with it an ‘official seal of approval’ and consequently maintenance of public confidence in the Register is important. The Registrar therefore has the duty of ensuring that ADIs are ‘fit and proper’ persons to have their names entered in the Register. As part of that, the Registrar exercises functions of scrutiny and that is why there are stringent disclosure requirements expected of ADIs and those wishing to become an ADI.

15. In cases involving motoring offences, it is expected that anyone who is to be an ADI will have standards of driving and behaviour above that of an ordinary motorist. Teaching people of all ages (including those aged under 18) to drive safely, carefully and competently is a professional vocation requiring a significant degree of responsibility. Such a demanding task should only be entrusted to those with high personal and professional standards and who themselves have demonstrated a keen regard for road safety and compliance with the law.

16. In cases involving non-motoring offences, the standing of the Register could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidence could be undermined, if it were known that a person’s name had been permitted onto, or allowed to remain on, the Register when they had demonstrated behaviours, or been convicted or cautioned in relation to offences, substantially material to the question of fitness. Indeed, it would be unfair to others who have been scrupulous in their behaviour, and in observing the law, if such matters were ignored or overlooked.

17. Some of the factors in the preceding paragraph can also be relevant in cases involving motoring offences. The role and powers of the Tribunal

18. An appeal to the Tribunal against the Registrar’s Decision is undertaken by way of a ‘re-hearing’; the Tribunal ‘stands in the shoes’ of the Registrar and takes a fresh decision on the evidence before it, giving appropriate weight to the Registrar’s Decision (as the Registrar is tasked by Parliament with making such decisions). The Tribunal does not conduct a procedural review of the Registrar’s decision-making process but, in reaching its decision, the Tribunal may review any findings of fact on which the Registrar’s Decision was based and the Tribunal may come to a different decision regarding those facts.

19. The powers of the Tribunal in determining the appeal are set out in section 131(3). In summary, for the purposes of the appeal, the Tribunal is empowered to make an order for the grant or refusal of the Application, as it thinks fit.

20. However, under section 131(4A), if the Tribunal considers that any evidence adduced on the appeal had not been adduced to the Registrar before the Registrar’s Decision, it may (instead of making such an order) remit the matter to the Registrar for him to reconsider the Registrar’s Decision.

21. Where the Tribunal makes an order for the refusal of the Application, it may also, pursuant to section 131(4), direct that (in essence) the Appellant cannot apply to have their name entered in the Register for a period of up to four years. Discussion and findings

22. As we have noted, the Registrar has the duty of ensuring that those who have their names entered in the Register are ‘fit and proper’ persons. Part of this is ensuring that prospective ADIs understand their responsibilities and can show that they not only know the rules but follow them.

23. In this case, the Appellant had been convicted for failing to give information as to the identity of a driver. As we have noted, the Appellant considered that they were innocent of the offence in question but pleaded guilty to avoid a greater sanction.

24. We find it difficult to accept that, in this instance, the Appellant would plead guilty to something he said he was innocent of. The Appellant stated that this was because he “ didn’t have enough evidence to prove my side of the story ”.

25. The Appellant’s explanation of the circumstances leading to the offence was that he lent his car to someone for the day and they committed a driving offence, so the Appellant asked for their information and sent this to the police, who then replied saying that the information provided was inaccurate. The Appellant stated that the person in question had since been ignoring him, leading him to consider that they had deliberately given false information.

26. The Appellant therefore appeared to be suggesting that he had lent his car to someone he did not know (or did not know well). If that is the case, we consider that to be surprising and somewhat reckless. As a prospective ADI, we would expect the Appellant to be sufficiently aware of the identity of the person to whom they had lent their car. In part, this is because the identity of the driver would, of course, be relevant for the purposes of insurance; either for the Appellant to check that the driver was insured to drive their car, or to have them named on the Appellant’s insurance.

27. We understand that if there was a genuine reason why the Appellant could not provide information as to the driver, and there was no attempt on his part to withhold such information deliberately or negligently, then the Appellant could have had a defence to the offence in question. It seems to us that if the Appellant had a justifiable explanation, as he was suggesting, then he would have been able to give that explanation in his defence, rather than pleading guilty to it.

28. As we have noted, the Appellant asserted that he ‘did not have enough evidence’ to prove his side of the story. However, it seems to us that if it was genuinely the case that the driver had given the Appellant false information as to their identity then the Appellant would be able to adduce a reasonable amount of evidence to support his case. This could include, for example, the information which the driver did provide after the incident in question, the Appellant’s explanation as to what he was told by the driver and why he believed it, together with the contact details and other information which the Appellant previously held for the driver. The Appellant stated that the driver was ignoring him, so evidently the Appellant had contact details for them and it is possible that this could have been sufficient for the police to identify them.

29. We have taken into account the Appellant’s arguments, including his submission that he had never previously had any points on his driving licence. However, in our view the standing of the Register could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidence could be undermined, if the Appellant’s name remained on the Register following his conviction for failing to give information as to the identity of a driver.

30. As we have noted, an assessment of whether someone is a ‘fit and proper person’ can involve consideration of various factors. This is because the issue is not simply whether someone is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor; it is whether they are a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. That is why there are stringent disclosure requirements for ADIs and those who wish to become one. In this case, a conviction for failing to give information as to the identity of a driver is something which we consider carries significant weight in the assessment of whether the Appellant is a fit and proper person to be named on the Register, even if this was a first and isolated offence.

31. We were also mindful of the Appellant’s submission that refusal of the Application would have a severe impact on his livelihood. However, we do not consider that to be a material factor, given that the Appellant is not currently an ADI (so this is not his current livelihood).

32. For all of the reasons we have given, we find that the Appellant does not currently meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person to have their name entered in the Register. On balance, taking into account all the circumstances, we conclude that the Registrar’s Decision was correct.

33. We therefore dismiss the appeal and we order that the Application is refused. Signed: Stephen Roper Date: 13 February 2026 Judge of the First-tier Tribunal