Aniko Veronika Kiraly, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

1. THE DEPUTY JUDGE:

2. The matter is listed for, firstly, an application to vary the order of Mr Ockelton, Deputy High Court Judge, dated 5 September 2025, refusing the claimant's application for interim relief: namely, a mandatory order requiring the defendant to reinstate her benefits and to pay her the amounts withheld; and, secondly, permission to apply for judicial review to be considered pursuant to the order of Deputy High Court Judge, Robert Palmer KC, dated 22 September 2025.

3. Given that, at this stage, consideration of the application for interim relief is contingent on whether I grant permission, both parties agree that I should deal with the application for permission first. Permission

4. The test for granting permission is that the claimant must satisfy me that there is an arguable ground for judicial review which has a realistic prospect of success. This is the test that I have applied to each ground, whether I express it exactly in those terms or not.

5. The basis of the claimant's judicial review claim is that she seeks to challenge the defendant's decision to close her universal credit and personal independent payment claims and issue an overpayment demand. Both those decisions were communicated by decision letters dated 23 May 2025. This claim was lodged on 26 August 2025.

6. The claimant is of Hungarian origin, who came to the UK in January 2011 and has indefinite leave to remain. There is evidence that she suffers from health issues, which certainly caused the defendant to consider at one time that she was eligible for state benefits. She was awarded the housing element of universal credit on 25 January 2021 and, on 25 October 2022, she was awarded universal credit to include a housing element for her to reside in a rented property at 26 Beningfield Drive in St Albans (“26 Beningfield”.

7. On 26 August, the claimant travelled to France. Her position, supported by a statement from her sister, is that she did so in order to consult a psychiatrist there. The actual medical report from that psychiatrist has not been provided to the defendant or to this court.

8. On 12 March 2025, the claimant was selected for review by the defendant's enhanced review team. As part of that review, the claimant was asked to provide evidence that she did, in fact, return to the UK from her trip to France in August 2022 and was also asked for various pieces of evidence of different types to prove that she is resident in the UK. The claimant says that she did provide much of the evidence requested but there were some items she was asked to provide that she could not: for example, photographs outside of her house which she said she could not take because she is agoraphobic. In addition, she said that she was unable to provide evidence of her return from France because her sister handled the flight or ferry tickets and she did not retain them and neither of them received passport stamps because that was not a requirement in August 2022.

9. She also points out that she was asked to take photographs from outside her front window and a full body photograph of her standing in her front window holding a dated newspaper but she said that she was not able to provide these, because she was away from home at the time.

10. The evidence that was provided was considered by the defendant and was deemed unsatisfactory.

11. On 17 April 2025, the defendant suspended the claimant's claim for universal credit on the basis that she had failed to provide evidence to verify her claim and her presence in the United Kingdom.

12. On 1 May 2025, a telephone interview took place at which the transcript that is in the bundle shows that the claimant said that she was then staying with her friend in Reading and that she had been evicted from 26 Beningfield in October 2022, but that her sister was still paying the landlord for the tenancy at this property so that the claimant could return to it one day.

13. The claimant refused permission for the defendant to speak to the landlord or the estate agency of 26 Beningfield.

14. The defendant requested further evidence from the claimant. The defendant did provide some further evidence and said that she was unable to provide the letter from her private psychiatrist, which confirmed her travel to France, because the defendant denied her an extension to do so and she did not receive the document on time. She did provide a photograph of her standing beside a British plug socket holding a dated newspaper. She said that the photograph was taken on 15 May 2025. She said that she could not provide a photograph of her looking out of the window of her friend's property where she was staying whilst holding a dated newspaper, because her friend would not consent to this and instead asked her to leave the home and not to involve her with the DWP. That is why she could not provide those photographs.

15. On 16 May 2025, the defendant's agent reviewed all the evidence and referred the case to a decision maker.

16. On 23 May 2025, the decisions, which are the subject of this judicial review challenge, were taken: firstly, to disallow the housing element of the claimant's universal credit payments from 25 August 2022 onwards; secondly, that other universal credit payments were disallowed from the same date. By another letter, dated 23 May, the claimant was informed that she had been overpaid universal credit in the sum of some £53,500.

17. The claimant made a reconsideration request and, on 2 June, the defendant provided reasons for its decision. Those reasons addressed the documents that the claimant was asked to provide and the defendant's view of the documents that she did provide. Specific reference in this reasons letter refers to Amazon receipts provided by the claimant which showed her declared address and name. However, the defendant's view was that these orders were made online and, and therefore this does not prove that she was living at 26 Beningfield at the time. The bank statements provided showed online payments, no cash withdrawals or payments by card in person and clear reference to transfers to a second bank account, the statements of which had not been provided. As to the photographs provided, the defendant's view was that these could not be used to verify that the claimant was in the UK. Although they are dated, there is no note or proof of where the photographs were taken. A letter provided from the claimant's sister confirmed that she left the UK on 26 August 2022 to travel for medical treatment abroad, but the medical evidence for this treatment had not been provided. The sister's letter advised that the claimant returned on 1 September 2022 but no travel documents have been provided. The reasons letter concludes that, "Having reviewed all the evidence gathered by the review, I am satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities and the documentary evidence provided, you do not qualify for universal credit from the assessment period 25 August 2022".

18. The claimant complains that the defendant has not properly considered the evidence that she provided. For example, she said that her other bank account is only a saver's account so is not relevant. She disputes the defendant's conclusion that the photos she provided are not sufficient to establish her presence in the UK. She says that she was unable to provide the psychiatrist's letter from August 2022 because the defendant would not provide her with an extension of time to do so. I paraphrase her objections but those are a summary of the objections she made.

19. On 3 June 2025, the claimant requested a mandatory review of the defendant's decision. On 6 June 2025, she sent a pre-action protocol letter to the defendant. In June 2025, the claimant was asked by the defendant to provide any further evidence in support of her position to a job centre upload link. The defendant's decision maker is informed that the claimant would not upload evidence to this link, nor attend her local job centre to provide the evidence. She was told that the only other option was a home visit and was asked where she was living. The claimant declined a home visit and she was told that the mandatory reconsideration process may then have to conclude on the available evidence. It does appear from the mandatory consideration notice that the claimant did subsequently provide the defendant with a statement of grounds for mandatory reconsideration and evidence index link, both documents being dated 2 June 2025. She also provided her pre-action protocol letter.

20. On 2 July 2025, the defendant responded to the pre-action protocol letter, saying that it upheld its decision and reminding the claimant that she could pursue her complaint via the First-tier Tribunal review process.

21. On 17 July 2025, the claimant attempted to issue a claim for judicial review but it appears that this was unsuccessful because she did not provide the decision under challenge.

22. On 26 August, the claimant lodged the present claim.

23. On 15 September 2025, the defendant sent the claimant a mandatory reconsideration notice, which declined to change its 25 May 2025 decisions and provided reasons. The reasons are detailed and they refer to all the documents and evidence provided by the claimant and detail why the defendant concluded that these are insufficient to satisfy the eligibility requirements for the benefits that she had been paid and that the defendant had, stopped. The letter concludes: "I am satisfied that you are aware of the evidence needed to comply with the review. You failed to provide evidence to confirm that you have returned to the UK from your trip on 26 August 2022. I am satisfied the reviewing officer took into consideration your health conditions and circumstances whilst the review was ongoing and the outcome of the mandatory reconsideration was that the decision dated 23 May 2025, which decided that you were not entitled to Universal Credit from 21 August 2022 and terminating your Universal Credit entitlement and award from 25 August 2022, is correct and cannot be revised".

24. The notes to that letter informed the claimant that if she disagreed with the decision, she could appeal it within one month of the date of the letter to the First-tier Tribunal Social Security and Child Support (“the Tribunal”) and that the Tribunal is independent from DWP (ie independent from the defendant). She was informed that the Tribunal would look at the decision again and make an impartial decision on her entitlement to universal credit. The letter also informed her of how to appeal and invited her to go to a particular part of the Government website which explains how to appeal and informs her of the various mechanisms for lodging an appeal. As I said, the letter is dated 15 September, so the expiry date of the appeal time limit (ie one month) is 15 October 2025, which of course does not expire for another seven days, so the claimant is still within time to lodge that appeal to the Tribunal. The issues to be determined Is the claim brought out of time?

25. First, is the claim brought out of time? The defendant contended that the claim was brought outside the three-month time limit. The decisions challenged are dated 23 May 2025 and the claim was filed and issued on 26 August. At first sight, this does appear to be outside the three-month limit as the claim should have been filed by 23 August. However, the claimant is correct when she says that the Civil Procedure Rule (“CPR”) 2.8(5) provides that, when the period specified for doing any act at the court office ends on a day when the office is closed that act shall be in time under these rules, if done on the next day on which the court office is open. The 23 August was a Saturday, the court office was therefore closed and it did not reopen until Tuesday 26 August, because Monday, the 25 th , was a Bank Holiday. The claim is not, therefore, out of time. Does the claimant have an alternative remedy?

26. The second issue is whether the claimant has an alternative remedy. This is addressed in the Administrative Court Guide (“ACG”) at §6.3.3, which points out that judicial review is a remedy of last resort. If there is another route by which the decision can be challenged, which provides an adequate remedy for the claimant, that adequate remedy should generally be used before applying for judicial review. Examples of alternative remedies include statutory appeals. If the court finds that the claimant has or had an adequate remedy, it will generally refuse permission to apply for judicial review.

27. The defendant in its acknowledgment of service refers, appropriately, to two cases: the first is the judgment of Lord Dyson in R (Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Britain) v Charity Commission [2016] EWCA Civ 154 at [19] in which it is stated: " If other means of redress are 'conveniently and effectively' available to a party, they ought ordinarily to be used before resort to judicial review … It is only in a most exceptional case that a court will entertain an application for judicial review if other means of redress are conveniently and effectively available. This principle applies with particular force where Parliament has enacted a statutory scheme that enables persons against whom decisions are made and actions taken to refer the matter to a specialist tribunal … To allow a claim for judicial review to proceed in circumstances where there is a statutory procedure for contesting the decision risks undermining the will of Parliament …"

28. The defendant also refers to Sales LJ, as he then was, in R (Glencore Energy Limited v HMRC [ 2017] EWHC Civ 1716 at [55 to 56]. §55 reiterates that the High Court is ordinarily a remedy of last resort. However, it states that "… since it is a matter of discretion for the court, where it is clear that a public authority is acting in defiance of the rule of law the High Court will be prepared to exercise its jurisdiction then and there without waiting for some other remedial process to take its course".

29. This paragraph then goes on to deal with what should be taken to qualify as a suitable alternative remedy: the court should have regard to the provision which Parliament has made to cater for alternative procedures and remedies by legislation and the court should be slow to conclude in its discretion that the public interest is so pressing that it ought to intervene to exercise its judicial review function along with, or instead of, that statutory procedure.

30. Here, the statutory procedure that Parliament has enacted is an appeal to the Tribunal. Under section 8 of the Social Act 1998 (“the Act”), it is for the defendant to decide any claim for a relevant benefit, which includes universal credit and also PIP (personal independence payments) under section 8(3). Section 8(2) says: " Where at any time a claim for a relevant benefit is decided by the Secretary of State— (a)the claim shall not be regarded as subsisting after that time; and (b)accordingly, the claimant shall not (without making a further claim) be entitled to the benefit on the basis of circumstances not obtaining at that time".

31. The decisions (ie 23 May 2025 decisions) are plainly covered by section 8. The right to appeal a decision of the defendant under section 8 is codified under section 12 of the same Act, the substance of which is that, in respect of these decisions, a right of appeal to the Tribunal is provided. I note, therefore, that Parliament has expressly created a statutory forum with specialist knowledge and expertise regarding decisions of this nature.

32. The procedure for bringing an appeal is set out in the Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Job Seeker's Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance Decisions and Appeals Regulations 2013 (“the 2013 Regulations”). At Regulation 52, a claimant is to obtain written reasons for the defendant if none have been provided and then commence their appeal to the Tribunal thereafter. There is a requirement in Regulation 51 for the Secretary of State to give the claimant written notice of the decision and of the right of appeal.

33. As regards the decisions of 15 May 2025, which are the only decisions of which this court is seized, because they are the decisions which are the subject of the claimant's application for judicial review, I note that in the 15 September mandatory reconsideration notice decision, the defendant did explicitly inform the claimant of this route of appeal to the Tribunal and how to go about it and, as I have said, the claimant is still within time to bring an appeal to the Tribunal, because she has until 15 October 2025 to do so.

34. As to the adequate alternative remedy issue and whether the Tribunal represents an adequate remedy in this case, the claimant deals with this at §§ 21 to 55 of her skeleton argument. In short summary, she asserts that, firstly, an appeal to the Tribunal is not a convenient or effective route because this is a case where the defendant is acting in defiance of the rule of law. Therefore, she submits that the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction then and there, relying on, principally, the Glencore authority that I have already cited (supra). The claimant also asserts that the Tribunal process is constrained by section 12(8) of the Act which says that, in deciding an appeal, Tribunal (a) need not consider any issue that is not raised by the appeal; and (b) shall not take into account any circumstances not obtaining at the time when the decision appealed against was made. The claimant contends that this provision gives rise to a lack of jurisdiction to look at her case as a whole or to take into evidence and into consideration her contentions that, for example, she was obstructed by the defendant from participating effectively in the mandatory review and prevented from providing further evidence. She also submits that the mandatory review meant that a decision was made without hearing her side and she considers that she would be prevented from putting further material before the Tribunal.

35. The claimant also contends that the Regulations give rise to a right of appeal only where written notice of a decision has been given and she contends that there are decisions for which decision letters have not been issued, such as in relation to her personal independence payment closure. I reiterate that, whether or not this is right, the only decisions of which this court seized are the decisions contained in the two letters of 23 May 2025, so that is the focus of this court’s jurisdiction The grounds for judicial review

36. I turn then to the grounds for judicial review. The claimant lists 16 grounds. I have reviewed these grounds carefully and I agree with the defendant that they can be grouped together in the way in which the defendant suggests. I have, however, considered the merits in respect of each ground and the arguments for and against each ground. Grounds 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7

37. I deal firstly with grounds 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7. Ground 1 alleges procedural impropriety. The claimant accepts that it is a basic requirement that for a person to be in receipt of benefits, they have to be habitually resident in the UK. She submits, however, that the defendant's verification process, which required particular types of documents and photographs to be submitted to prove residence in the UK, was unfair because this amounted to a process that it applied en masse rather than a process bespoke to the claimant's case and, in particular, to her health issues.

38. The defendant submits that, in respect of all these grounds, the claimant has an alternative remedy via the Tribunal and that that is a convenient and effective means of redress that was set up by Parliament and that, where Parliament has enacted a statutory scheme, this court should be very slow indeed to proceed with a judicial review rather than leave the statutory scheme to have jurisdiction.

39. The defendant further submits that the claimant has confused her settled immigration status with her entitlement to benefits. Further, that the defendant's process of requiring evidence was reasonable, having regard to the need for the claimant to demonstrate she lived at 26 Beningfield and that she had done so during the period that she received benefits. Therefore, the claimant was entitled to ask for the specific documents that it did, in order to be satisfied of that, and that the documents and photographs that the claimant provided were inadequate.

40. Ground 3 alleges misrepresentation of the claimant's temporary absence abroad and unlawful supersession to avoid the applicable legal framework. The claimant alleges that it was Wednesbury unreasonable to require her to provide, so long after the event of her leaving the UK in 2022, evidence that she did, in fact, return. She also alleges that the evidence that she did provide should have been considered sufficient to uphold her entitlement to benefits. The defendant submits, again, that it was reasonable to require the claimant to prove that she returned to the UK in August 2022 and that she lived at 26 Beningfield. She was unable to evidence either of these things. In particular, the defendant points to the fact that she was evicted from 26 Beningfield in October 2022 and has not provided evidence that she ever, in fact, returned to live there.

41. Ground 4 alleges misrepresentation of the claimant's temporary absence due to her care needs and disregard of the applicable legal framework. As to this, the claimant appears to allege that the defendant deliberately fabricated and also concealed evidence that would have proved that she was resident at 26 Beningfield as required, The defendant denies the allegations made and says that it is for the claimant to prove that she remained resident at 26 Beningfield, which she has failed to do.

42. Ground 6 alleges abuse of power, including improper unauthorised purpose, ultra vires decision making and discretion fetter. In essence, the claimant puts forward reasons why she disagrees with the view that the defendant took of the evidence she provided. She also criticises what she describes as the defendant's " en masse one-size-fits-all" process as being unfair to her as a disabled and vulnerable person.

43. The defendant submits that this ground discloses no conduct of the type alleged. The defendant is entitled to investigate whether claimants are entitled to the benefits they claim and that this is in pursuit of the legitimate aim of ensuring proper spending of public money.

44. Ground 7 alleges Wednesbury unreasonableness. The claimant rightly cites the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. V Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.

45. The claimant contends that the defendant’s decisions about the evidence it required and the evidence she supplied were wrong and therefore Wednesbury unreasonable.

46. The defendant submits that this ground fails to deal with the fact that the claimant was evicted from 26 Beningfield in October 2022 and that she has failed to provide evidence that she nevertheless in fact remained living there.

47. Decision in relation to grounds 1 to 16

48. My decision in relation to all these grounds is that they all simply amount to different ways of alleging that the claimant disagrees with the defendant's decision and she also disagrees with the defendant's methods of investigation, evidence gathering and evaluation. As can be seen from the summaries that I have given supra, although each ground is headlined in public law terms, in fact, the claimant's objections are really based on factual issues relating to her case. She accepts that she is only entitled to benefits if she is habitually resident in the UK and is (and always has been) resident at 26 Beningfield, but she disagrees with the defendant's decision that she has failed to provide any sufficient evidence that she was. Her complaints that the defendant adopted an en masse process are at odds with the fact that the evidence shows that the defendant asked for evidence that was plainly tailored to the key issue in her case, which was, and remains, was she resident at 26 Beningfield from August 2022 onwards and did she return to the UK after her trip to France? She may disagree with the specific evidential requests made by the defendant, but it was, of course, open to her to submit additional or alternative evidence which she did. It is plain that this is not a case of the unusual and extreme type envisaged by Sales LJ in Glencore , where a High Court would take jurisdiction over the other Parliamentary-provided route of the Tribunal.

49. I do not consider that it is clear or indeed arguable that the defendant has acted in defiance of law or that this is one of those exceptional cases as identified in Glencore . Instead, in my view, this is a case which falls squarely within the second part of §55 of Glencore: ie a case where Parliament has provided an alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Tribunal which is a route that this court should be slow indeed to disregard. This is a case where this court should do so. This is in my judgment a case in which there is a more appropriate remedy by way of an appeal to the Tribunal. The claimant still has time to lodge such an appeal. I do not agree, for completeness, with the claimant's other points that the Tribunal process is constrained by section 12(8) of the Act. The fact that the Tribunal need not consider any issue not raised by the appeal does not prevent it from considering any issue that the claimant raises as part of her appeal, which, no doubt, if she does choose to lodge such an appeal, will include all the matters that she has raised in these proceedings. Similarly, the fact that the Tribunal shall not take account of any circumstances not obtaining at the time the decision was made does not prevent her raising matters, such as whether the defendant obstructed the investigation and whether the evidence-gathering process disadvantaged her. These are all matters that will require the hearing of evidence and evaluation of evidence, and I see no reason why these matters cannot be raised and considered in the Tribunal, if that Tribunal considers they are relevant to the ultimate decisions. I consider that the Tribunal is much better placed to hear and evaluate evidence than the Administrative Court, given that the Tribunal can, and does, hear evidence and make factual evaluative findings, whereas the Administrative Court on a judicial review hearing generally does not. Ground 5

50. I turn then to ground 5. Ground 5 alleges failure to follow policy guidance. The claimant points to the defendant's Suspension and Termination Guidance which requires decisions to be taken having regard to the merits and particular features of each case and in an objective and unbiased way. I paraphrase but that is the essence of it. The claimant asserts that that the defendant instead adopted a business-as-usual approach (ie an en masse approach) which ignored these requirements. The defendant submits that it did consider the claimant's case on its own merits and without bias and the defendant's decision was supported by the evidence, (or lack of it). The claimant's evidence was deficient for a large number of reasons and its decisions gave the factual reasons which are addressed in relation to the specific evidence provided by the claimant. Decision in relation to ground 5

51. My decision in relation to ground 5: I repeat my findings in respect of the previous grounds. The Tribunal is the appropriate forum to consider these issues, hear the evidence and to make evaluative findings as to whether the defendant's decision was correct on the evidence provided. Ground 2

52. Ground 2 alleges breach of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. The claimant asserts that the defendant's process ignored her right to remain in the UK under the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and asserts that the Padfield principle ( Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] UKHL 1 ) is violated because the defendant's policy frustrates and negates the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and prohibits the defendant from issuing such a policy.

53. The defendant asserts that this ground is misguided. The defendant's process of assessing her eligibility for benefits is not in contravention of the EU-UKWithdrawal Agreement, because the right to remain, which is what the EU-UKWithdrawal Agreement concerns, is distinct from the right to obtain and retain welfare benefits. Decision on ground 2

54. I agree with the defendant that this ground is misguided for the reasons that the defendant gives. Grounds 8 and 9

55. I turn then to grounds 8 and 9, which allege breaches of GDPR. The claimant criticises the defendant for its approach to her Subject Access Requests (“SAR”) and other alleged data breaches. She asserts that the defendant's decisions in her case were as a result of data profiling or automated triggers which ignored her particular needs and circumstances. The defendant asserts that the claimant has an alternative remedy, if she considers that her GPDR rights have been breached, either by the defendant's internal complaints procedure and/or via a complaint to the Information Commissioner or the Information Tribunal . The defendant asserts, therefore, that this is not a ground for judicial review because it does not evidence any principle of public law that has been infringed, Decision on grounds 8 and 9

56. I agree with the defendant that there are alternative remedies of the type the defendant describes and which exist to deal with issues of which the claimant complains. These matters do not amount to public law errors of the type that would permit judicial review. Ground 10

57. Ground 10 alleges breach of the Equality Act 2010 (“ EA 2010 ”). The claimant alleges direct discrimination under section 19 of the EA 2010, because she says that the defendant's approach in her case, in particular as regards its requests for evidence and methods of evidence gathering, did not have regard to her specific circumstances and her disabilities. For the same reason, she alleges breaches of section 29, 20, 21, 22 and 13 of the EA 2010 and also alleges breach of the public sector equality duty codified in section 149 of the EA 2010.

58. The defendant submits that although there is no outright jurisdictional bar to bringing Equality Act claims as part of judicial review proceedings (see section 113(3) of the EA 2010 ), the Administrative Court should not do so where, firstly, there is an alternative remedy to bring a claim in the county court under section 114 of the EA 2010. Secondly, there are very clear disagreements of fact which would be inappropriate to settle other than by cross-examination and the hearing of live evidence. The claimant advances a number of very serious allegations, including malicious intent and being pressured by the defendant's agent, and the Administrative Court would be in an impossible position trying to determine those issues on the papers alone, because this court does not generally hear evidence. This is not a case, says the defendant, such as in R (Lunt) v Liverpool City Council [2009] EWHC 2356 (Admin) , where the EA 2010 claims sit comfortably and can be determined alongside a challenge to the decision of the defendant. The EA 2010 claim does not challenge the defendant's decision to suspend her payments but, instead, raises separate ancillary issues (ie the request for home visits and investigatory procedures), which are relevant to the process by which it arrived at the decision to stop her benefits, but are not matters that can lend itself to the High Court having jurisdiction or exercising jurisdiction to deal with these matters as part of a judicial review.

59. The defendant also points out that there are strong policy reasons for this court not seizing itself of EA 2010 claims too readily, because otherwise the court would be swamped with these claims. The defendant further asserts that the claimant's complaints do not, in fact, amount to breaches of the EA 2010 and that she has failed to particularise her claims. The defendant also points out that the public sector equality duty imposes an obligation on the defendant but does not create a cause of action (see section 156 of the EA 2010. Decision on Ground 10

60. I agree that this ground fails for the reasons that the defendant gives. The factual issues which underpin these grounds are all matters with which the Tribunal is best placed to deal. Cloaking these issues in alleged EA 2010 breaches is insufficient to elevate them to public law grounds that are appropriate for a judicial review and this is not a case in which this court should retain jurisdiction. Grounds 11 to 16

61. Grounds 11 to 16 allege breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”). Ground 11 alleges breach of article 14 of the ECHR, which states (in summary) that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground, and then named the number of grounds. But the central point is "shall be secured without discrimination on any ground".

62. Ground 12 alleges breaches of ECHR article 1, protocol I, which gives every natural person the entitlement to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and not to be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to conditions provided for by law and general principles of international law.

63. Ground 13 alleges breaches of article 3 of the ECHR, which states that no one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

64. Ground 14 alleges breach of article 6(1) of the ECHR, which states that, in determination of civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

65. Ground 15 alleges breach of article 8(1). This provides that everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, home and correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority to except such is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society.

66. Finally, ground 6 alleges breach of article 18. This provides that the restrictions permitted under the ECHR to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.

67. In relation to these grounds, the claimant makes the same points as in other grounds regarding her complaints about the defendant's investigations, evidence-gathering, conduct and the defendant's ultimate findings as of 23 May 2025.

68. The defendant, in response, asserts that, in essence, these grounds repeat the allegations that the claimant has made in other grounds and are, therefore an attempt to litigate, on human rights grounds, the decision to suspend her benefit entitlements and, therefore, the appropriate forum to determine the issues relating to the decisions under challenge is the Tribunal and not the Administrative Court. Decision on grounds 11-16

69. My decision on these grounds is that they do, in substance, repeat the largely factual evidence in the other grounds. Cloaking these allegations in alleged human rights violations does not change their fundamental characteristics and these are issues that the Tribunal is well placed to evaluate and determine. I also consider that the claimant has not established in relation to these grounds that they do, in fact, specifically apply in their entirety to the complaints that she makes in respect of them. Conclusion

70. For all of the above reasons, I conclude that in respect of each of the 16 grounds, the claimant has failed to satisfy me that there is an arguable ground for judicial review which has a realistic prospect of success. Therefore. I decline to grant permission on any of the 16 grounds. That being so, it is unnecessary to consider the application for interim relief, as the grant of interim relief is contingent on there being a live claim for judicial review, which now there is not.

71. For completeness, however, if I was required to consider interim relief, I would have refused it, because I do not consider that the claimant has a strong prima facie case on the merits and I do consider that the balance of convenience lies strongly in favour of the defendant’s decision in respect of entitlement to benefits (and therefore allocation of scarce taxpayer resources) remaining in force until final determination of court proceedings.

72. _______

73. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: [email protected]